Contents

Vol. 3, No. 2, December 2014

Paolo Ruspini, John Eade
A Decade of EU Enlargement: A Changing Framework and Patterns of Migration 5

Articles

Marek Okólski, John Salt
Polish Emigration to the UK after 2004: Why Did So Many Come? 11

Heinz Fassmann, Josef Kohlbacher, Ursula Reeger
The Re-Emergence of European East–West Migration: The Austrian Example 39

Julie Knight, John Lever, Andrew Thompson
The Labour Market Mobility of Polish Migrants: A Comparative Study of Three Regions in South Wales, UK 61

Chris Moreh
A Decade of Membership: Hungarian Post-Accession Mobility to the United Kingdom 79

Katharine Jones
‘It Was a Whirlwind. A Lot of People Made a Lot of Money’: The Role of Agencies in Facilitating Migration from Poland into the UK between 2004 and 2008 105

Maura Farrell, Emilija Kairytė, Birte Nienaber, John McDonagh, Marie Mahon
Rural Return Migration: Comparative Analysis between Ireland and Lithuania 127

Heinz Fassmann, Elisabeth Musil, Ramon Bauer, Attila Melegh, Kathrin Gruber
Longer-Term Demographic Dynamics in South–East Europe: Convergent, Divergent and Delayed Development 150

Research Reports

Vesela Kovacheva
EU Accession and Migration: Evidence for Bulgarian Migration to Germany 173

Book Reviews

Teresa Piacentini
Raj S. Bhopal (2014), Migration, Ethnicity, Race, and Health in Multicultural Societies: Foundations for Better Epidemiology, Public Health, and Health Care 189

Andrew Wilbur
David Goodhart (2013), The British Dream 192
A Decade of EU Enlargement: A Changing Framework and Patterns of Migration

Introduction

Migration from Eastern to Western Europe gained greater political prominence and scholarly attention both before and after the 2004 EU enlargement. The EU enlargement process not only contributed to a re-integration of European countries from the former Soviet bloc into the rest of Europe, but also set up a new framework for European mobility. A variety of forecasts and analyses concerning mobility across Europe have since been conducted, sometimes providing contradictory outcomes. This process of eastward enlargement was completed in 2007 by a second round, which brought Romania and Bulgaria into the European polity, and led to unjustified fears of massive flows from the two countries to some Western states in particular, such as the United Kingdom.

Academic discussion concerning the different types of mobility in Europe is, however, far from being exhausted. New issues have been raised by the economic crisis which is still sweeping the continent, by the demographic deficit affecting both Eastern and Western Europe, and by the next steps in the EU enlargement wave which will again involve South-Eastern Europe – especially the Western Balkan countries (other than Croatia which finally acceded in 2013). The aim of this special issue is to explore the variety of unprecedented processes in the field of migration which have emerged across Europe over the last decade. The papers in it seek to make sense of these processes, while trying to capture their evolving nature in the framework of a European migration system which has only been in existence for a relatively short time and which still lacks consolidated and harmonised rules.

In preparing this special issue we have attempted to summarise this array of migratory processes: the substantial migration of Eastern Europeans to Western EU countries; the emergence of new forms of intra-European mobility and transnational migratory patterns; the growth of particular migrant communities and a redefinition of inter-ethnic relations, especially in the main destination countries; and last, but not least, the reconfigurations of the European labour market.

The recent economic crisis has posed additional challenges to economic and social relations between migrants and natives and has resulted in considerable return migration, which has generated positive and negative outcomes for both sending and receiving countries. Empirical research has shown that return migration has not happened to the extent which many predicted in the media. A ‘wait-and-see approach’ has often prevailed in response to difficulties which the countries of origin have experienced during EU integration (Iglicka 2010). Migration flows across the continent have also changed as young, highly skilled migrants from Southern Europe have migrated to Northern European countries. East–West migration has, therefore, been coupled with other types of mobility which only superficially resemble previous migratory patterns such as the ‘guestworker’ influx. Furthermore, they are initiated by more than mere ‘push-and-pull’ factors.
Complexity should be the keyword to any approach to European migration in this regard. Current migratory configurations in Europe require new, more subtle, instruments of analysis which move beyond the mere application of such mutated conceptual features as migration ‘liquidity’ or simple explanations concerning the temporary character of migrant strategies. To explain the supposed temporality and situatedness of current migration features, migration theory needs to draw on an analysis of the social and economic factors operating in both source and destination countries. At the policy level, the present multi-directionality of migration patterns in Europe attests to the many implementation gaps in migration management and the overall incompleteness of the European integration process, with its interlocking and still unsolved East–West and North–South dimensions. At the economic level, the current forms of mobility highlight the need to find solutions to the persistent social inequalities between the different regions of the European continent, as well as between the global North and South. In this regard, the dominant neoliberal model contributes substantially to the increase of economic differentials between neighbouring regions by permitting and facilitating various forms of abuse and exploitation connected to migration, and which constitute some of the distinctive challenges lying ahead.

The papers

This issue is a collection of high-quality syntheses concerning the impact of EU enlargement on the field of European migration over the last ten years. It brings together perspectives from both the sending and the receiving countries, as well as contributions covering the changing European migration system as a whole. The articles have been selected on the basis of their interdisciplinary and comparative approach, include both theoretical and empirical work and draw on quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods. They have been grouped according to macro and meso levels of analysis and geographical context. Themes at the macro level include East–West post-accession migration, the determinants of migration, and transnational labour migration, while the meso level includes mainly case studies pertaining to labour mobility in the post-EU accession period and the role and function of social networks and employment agencies in initiating and facilitating migration and rural return migration. Finally, the geographical context covers Central and Eastern Europe and the South-Eastern European region in terms of both migrant source and migrant destination countries. Demographic dynamics and regional development are also investigated in this context. The changing and multidirectional character of migration in Europe is a consistent theme amongst all the articles and suggests the direction which future research might take.

The first article, *Polish Emigration to the UK after 2004: Why Did So Many Come?*, by Marek Okólski and John Salt, is a well-constructed and authoritative dialogue between two migration experts and focuses on the structural factors of Polish post-accession migration to the UK. The article builds upon and compares the different datasets either in the UK or Poland and also draws from several periods of fieldwork in suggesting the causes and circumstances of this major intra-European ‘perfect migration storm’ of our times. From a theoretical point of view, the article moves beyond any possible ‘fluid-migration’ perspective to emphasise the full migration determinants of this population movement over an unprecedented short time. Okólski and Salt’s paper may encourage further research which analyses the impact and consequences of Polish/CEE out-migration on the UK social fabric and on migrants themselves.

The second article, *The Re-Emergence of European East–West Migration: The Austrian Example*, by Heinz Fassmann, Josef Kohlbacher and Ursula Reeger, is an attentive analysis of the current unified migration space in Europe, and argues that an explanation of East–West mobility should be sought in terms of a resurgence in ‘push-and-pull’ migration patterns. The article describes different features, including migrant socio-demographic profiles, of these flows in order to propose a typology of the various causal factors which encourage migration from different CEE countries to both Western Europe and Austria. The cost and benefits
of migration are the decisive factors in the decision to migrate or not. Although the authors rely on Lee’s theoretical conceptualisation (1966) of the push-and-pull process, it is worth noticing that they also emphasise the ways in which his approach takes for granted historical ties, legal barriers and country-specific (and EU) migration policies. These are clearly all factors which figure substantially in East–West post-accession waves of migration.

Based on some good qualitative work, the third article, *The Labour Market Mobility of Polish Migrants: A Comparative Study of Three Regions in South Wales, UK*, by Julie Knight, John Lever and Andrew Thompson, explores the trajectories of some post-2004 accession Polish migrants in three different Welsh regions. Drawing on Parutis (2014), the article moves on from the concept of ‘middling transnationalism’ to remind the reader of the rationale choice of highly skilled migrants to take low-skilled jobs. It shows the ascent (or lack thereof) in the local Welsh labour market of Poles with diverse backgrounds and skills across time and from a variety of geographical locations. Looking at employment agencies and social networks, the contribution seeks to engage critically with the literature and empirical findings regarding people’s expectations of short-term and circular migration.

The fourth article in this collection is *A Decade of Membership: Hungarian Post-Accession Mobility to the United Kingdom*, by Chris Moreh. This is a very important contribution since Hungarian post-accession migration to the UK has recently gained in momentum. The paper allows for interesting comparative assessments with former flows of different CEE nationalities, particularly Poles, and is built on an elaboration of different datasets and a number of semi-structured interviews carried out in London in 2013. These methods support the wider discussion of ‘new mobility’ and its features – i.e. the so-called ‘fluid’ and ‘individualistic’ nature of these patterns of migration. The socio-economic and political factors which triggered these recent flows are also explored in the light of former waves of migration from Hungary.

Based on the quotation *It’s a Free World* by the UK film director Ken Loach, who has been acclaimed for his social realism movies, the fifth article is ‘It Was a Whirlwind. A Lot of People Made a Lot of Money’: *The Role of Agencies in Facilitating Migration from Poland into the UK between 2004 and 2008*, by Katharine Jones. She provides an interesting snapshot of the still-understudied role of ‘private subcontractors’ in migration as well as that played by exploitation within the overall neoliberal model. Her focus is on the development, after the 2004 EU enlargement, of recruitment agencies as migration intermediaries in the UK and Poland in matching labour demand and supply and in creating a demand for Polish migrant workers in the UK. Her conclusions remind the reader of the possible global institutionalisation of the cross-border recruitment of migrant workers and the so-called flexibility of labour, from the ‘whirlwind’ phenomenon of those pre-crisis years.

The sixth article, *Rural Return Migration: Comparative Analysis between Ireland and Lithuania*, by Maura Farrell, Emilija Kairytė, Birte Nienaber, John McDonagh and Marie Mahon, covers an important topic for migration research – return migration. They emphasise the ‘rural return’ dimension through a comparison of migrants returning to two counties in Ireland and to Lithuania at different periods of time. From a theoretical point of view, the article relies quite extensively on the work of Cassarino (2004, 2008) and the transnational and social-network theories applied to return migration. Methodologically, a number of semi-structured interviews were carried out, the responses to which help to explain the complexities of present return-migration experiences and the context dependency of return-migrant behaviour, including the shift in value-priority scale from economic to social values.

The last section of the special issue explores convergences and divergences in development and demographic dynamics across South-Eastern Europe by encompassing countries at different stage of their migration experience. It also includes a research report on the development of Bulgarian migration to Germany at different periods of time and the impact of the EU citizenship regime. This section opens up new ground for comparative research in a region where countries are following different paths in their EU accession process and where migration, transnationalism and regional development are key features for investigation.
The seventh article, *Longer-Term Demographic Dynamics in South–East Europe: Convergent, Divergent and Delayed Development*, by Heinz Fassmann, Elisabeth Musil, Ramon Bauer, Attila Melegh and Kathrin Gruber, provides a synthesis of the main findings of the eight countries analysed in the SEEMIG project – Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Slovakia. Their analysis relies on longer-term national statistics on migration and other macro-statistical time series. The article considers different theoretical models but, in the migration context, it is mainly based on the policy learning process developed in the ‘model of the migration cycle’ by Fassmann and Reeger (2012) and the resulting changes – for example, from an emigration to an immigration country – when new demographic and economic conditions arise and demographic reproduction is not guaranteed. The conclusions stress the diversity in the long-term distribution of growth and decline in the region and thus the authors highlight the need for differentiation and specific explanations. The need for a better quality of data at the different levels of governance is stressed not only as an important pre-requisite for future research but also for evidence-based policy-making.

A research report by Vesela Kovacheva entitled *EU Accession and Migration: Evidence for Bulgarian Migration to Germany* closes this collection of studies for the special issue by keeping the focus on emigration from a South-Eastern European country which joined the EU in 2007. Based on administrative data and some quantitative analysis in the region of Hamburg, the report addresses the extent, direction and composition of Bulgarian migration flows to Germany across different periods of time. It shows the influence of the changing EU citizenship regime in both promoting temporary and diminishing circular migration, thus challenging some well-known assumptions concerning the pre- and post-accession stages in migration. It is interesting in comparative terms, although the German–Bulgarian case study needs to be taken as just one example of contemporary migration across European regions.

**Conclusion**

While far from being exhaustive, this special issue has presented a wide range of contemporary research on migration across Europe, with particular reference to EU enlargement processes since 2004. It demonstrates the pressing need to better link sending and receiving countries and to explore more deeply the impact of migration in both geographical contexts, and provides fertile ground for future research. The same applies to the link between the much-investigated determinants of migration, transnational migrant patterns and the resulting incorporation of different migrant cohorts and generations in national and local contexts. Notwithstanding the current difficulties that the EU has been experiencing at the institutional level, its future enlargement agenda provides additional opportunities for investigating the transformation of the European migration system across the South-Eastern European region. This policy agenda might also allow a more comprehensive migration strategy towards the flows taking place across the EU’s eastern and southern borders. It could also seek to solve, or at least to alleviate, the current social inequalities between regions which are pursuing different paths in their migration experience and economic development.

References


Polish Emigration to the UK after 2004, Why Did So Many Come?
Marek Okólski*, John Salt**

Despite the abundance of studies of Polish migration to the UK immediately before and in the aftermath of accession to the EU in 2004, one fundamental question has never been clearly answered: why did so many Poles move to the UK? We have sought to provide general explanations, rather than inquiring into the range of observed diversity. We begin by putting together statistical and other data from both ends of the flow in order to assess the scale of movement to and from the UK and to determine the reasons for what may well have been the largest voluntary migration between two countries. We used data from both countries and especially the recently published statistics from the 2011 UK census to present a detailed picture of the characteristics of those involved. Polish statistics suggest a more 'elite' flow to the UK than to other countries. The UK census pictures a maturing settled population, still tending to occupy relatively lower skilled jobs but showing evidence of upward social mobility. The movements are particularly a response to demographic and economic factors in Poland and to a widespread but to some extent hidden shortage of labour in some sectors in the UK. These factors combine with a set of political circumstances in both countries to produce an explanatory framework that may be summarised as 'right people, right place, and right circumstances.'

Keywords: post-accession migration; statistics of migration from Poland to the UK; determinants of migration from Poland to the UK

Introduction
The EU accession treaty stipulated a transition period of up to seven years before free movement of people was allowed. Throughout the period of accession negotiations the government of Poland had stressed the importance it attached to free movement of people (and labour) as a basic principle of European unity and a major benefit of membership. Moreover, the government insisted that the principle should be fully respected in order to protect Polish citizens against discriminatory practices in other EU countries (Kulakowski 2001; UKIE 2003). Such a position was widely popularised and largely supported by the mass media. Although this position was initially upheld by some member states there was no consensus. Contrary to early expectations, only three countries of the EU15 agreed to free their labour market instantly; among them the UK was by far the largest. France and Germany, considered in the pre-accession period as main targets for Polish migrants, quickly expressed their reluctance and decided to introduce a transition period; Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands, which at the time of negotiations were favourable to immediate and unlimited
access to their labour markets, eventually adopted a partial solution (UKIE 2005). Ultimately only the UK, Ireland and Sweden opened up their labour markets immediately so that the whole potential flow of emigrants from Poland, which otherwise could have dispersed across 15 countries, was now directed to only three of them. As easily the largest labour market, the UK became the main target.

There was a Polish population in the UK before 2004, and this helped to create networks and contacts between the diaspora and those back home. The 1951 UK census recorded 152,000 people born in Poland, as a relic from the Second World War when many preferred to relocate to or stay in the UK rather than return home. By 1981 the number had shrunk to 88,000 and although unrest and martial law in Poland continued to encourage a trickle of new migrants to the UK, the inevitable ageing of the post-war group took its toll so that by 2001 the number had fallen to 58,000. The next decade, however, saw a rapid increase in the number of Polish-born in the UK to 676,000 in 2011.

The flow between the two countries has certainly been one of the most studied in the period of post-accession population movements: one website devoted to the subject records almost 500 scholarly pieces, mainly on Polish migration, largely to the UK, most of it after 2004. In both countries the economic costs and benefits of the flows have been closely scrutinised. The focus in the UK has been on the labour market impact for the domestic population and on the fiscal benefits or otherwise of immigrant workers. The burgeoning literature suggests that the flows have been broadly neutral or even positive for the labour market, with an overall fiscal benefit (for a review of findings, see Salt 2011).

Several edited collections have brought together a range of empirical studies, mainly concerned with social issues (see, for example, Burrell 2009). A review of the literature finds that almost all aspects of the movement over the last decade have been examined in detail. For the most part, research has been supply side based, focusing on the migrants themselves. Particular attention has been paid to their characteristics, economic and social situations, the networks in which they engage, their health and wellbeing and their integration into the host population. The varied geography of the movement, affecting regions and communities not normally associated with immigration as well as the common honeypots like London, has made for a rich tapestry of analysis.

What persuaded us to write this paper was that, despite the abundance of studies, one fundamental question has never been clearly answered: why did so many Poles come to the UK after 2004? By putting together statistical and other data from both ends of the flow we hope to assess the scale of flows to and from the UK and in turn to tease out the reasons for what may well have been the largest voluntary migration between two countries over a short period. Meeting this goal did not seem manageable without a comprehensive review of statistics collected by various sources (agencies) in Britain and Poland and without reflecting on their consistency and accuracy.

The paper falls into two main sections: statistical and explanatory. After a brief review of available statistical sources, we attempt to assess the scale of movement as far as data allow. Then, using UK and Polish census data we summarise the main characteristics of the Polish population in the UK and identify the degree of selectivity of those moving to the UK compared with those going to other countries. We then review the main causal factors in Poland which had the effect of creating a push towards the UK. This is followed by a discussion of how demand for immigrant labour was articulated in the UK. Finally we suggest that the principal motivation of the migration was employment and that a particular combination of circumstances in both countries orchestrated the flow.
What statistics are available?

Inevitably, there are more data available on the numbers and characteristics of migrants in the destination country (UK) than the origin country (Poland). Some of the analyses in the UK have been based on quantitative datasets, notably the Labour Force Survey (LFS), International Passenger Survey (IPS), Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) and National Insurance Number issues (NINos). The recent publication of the first results of the 2011 census provides a level of detail of the Polish population hitherto unavailable and only now beginning to enter the literature. Because the census provides us with the first clear snapshot of the Polish stock in the UK, below we report some of its principal findings on Poles living in the UK in the spring of 2011, paying particular attention to those entering since 2001. However, the availability of statistics from the Polish LFS and census allows us to supplement the UK data as well as enabling a comparison of the characteristics of those who came to the UK with those going elsewhere.

In addition to official statistical sources, a multitude of qualitative surveys exists which form the basis of much of the research on Poland–UK movement, and we use the findings of the main ones here. By definition many of them are relatively small scale, often contingent on what is feasible in PhD research, bearing in mind its typical human and financial resource endowment. Others are more ambitious but rarely involve more than a few hundred respondents. Some focus only on Poles, some on those from other accession states as well. Some are geographically focused in particular localities; others sample the range of conditions across selected areas and settlement types.

How many Poles came to the UK after 2004?

Estimating the number of Poles who came to the UK is not easy. Neither UK nor Polish data can provide a definitive figure. Stock data may measure the number at any one time (LFS, census). Flow data are provided by the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) and the issue of National Insurance Numbers (NINos). It is possible, as seen below, to link different sources to make better estimates but they can never be accurate.

Polish emigration data confirm that the UK was not a major destination at the turn of the nineties. Official emigration from Poland was low, around 200 per annum in 1998–2002 (approximately 1 per cent of Poland’s total emigration). In 2004, however, it started to rise sharply – from 500 (2.6 per cent) to the maximum 24 000 in 2006 (30.3 per cent) but in the following years it stabilised at a much lower level – between 3 500 and 5 000 (approximately 20 per cent). Altogether, between 2004 and 2012 only 55 000 Poles officially emigrated to Britain and ceased to be counted as official residents of Poland. Strikingly, this figure was a small fraction of the cumulative number of new Polish immigrants recorded in the UK in that period (see e.g. Table 2 and Figure 2). The difference between migration flows measured in the two countries is because a large proportion of people actually emigrating from Poland were officially designated as temporary migrants and therefore excluded from the public migration statistics.

Indeed, the outflow of temporary migrants to other countries, including the UK, was much higher than official emigration. According to the 2002 census, 786 100 Polish people (2.1 per cent of the total population) were temporary migrants, of whom only 23 700 were in the UK (3.0 per cent of the total). The number of long-term temporary migrants, i.e. those staying in a foreign country for at least one year, was 626 000, of whom 15 000 were believed to be in the UK, meaning that Britain ranked sixth among the most attractive countries for Polish migrants. The 2011 census revealed 2 015 500 temporary migrants, of whom 611 000 were living in the UK (30.3 per cent of the total); of these, 466 500 had stayed in Britain for at least one year. Thus, in the post-accession period the UK came to occupy a dominant role as a destination (Table 1). Over-
all, the net increase in the stock of Britain-based temporary Polish migrants between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2012 was between 573 000 and 588 000.

Table 1. Estimated stock of temporary migrants from Poland in 2002–2012 by major country of destination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All destinations</th>
<th>Country of destination of all temporary migrants (thousand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>All European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1 450</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1 950</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2 270</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2 210</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2 100</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2 060</td>
<td>1 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2 130</td>
<td>1 650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>(.)</sup> No estimate.

<sup>a</sup> On 31st December.

<sup>b</sup> Poland’s official residents staying abroad more than two months in 2002–2006 and more than three months in 2007–2012.

<sup>c</sup> On 20th May.

<sup>d</sup> Estimates available only for population census years.

Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland.

UK data provide a fuller picture but in general have been fairly consistent with Polish sources. Those recorded in the census and the LFS represent only those living in the UK at the time: many others have come and returned home, some of them on more than one occasion. During the 1990s Poles were already coming into the UK to work, for example, 3 200 in 2000 under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme. Others were in skilled occupations, some 400–600 a year in the late 1990s under the work permit system, rising to 1 761 in 2003, with the rate of increase among Poles in the intervening period being almost five times greater than the rate for all work permit issues. The increase was accompanied by a shift in the occupations for which permits were granted. In 2000, almost three-quarters (72.8 per cent) were for professional, managerial or associate professional and culture and media occupations. By 2003, although the number in almost all categories had risen, the proportion of elementary occupations had reached 40.9 per cent while that for professional, managerial or associate professional and culture and media occupations had fallen to 44.4 per cent. It appears that in anticipation of 2004, entry policy through the work permit system was already shifting towards lower skilled occupations, implying that job vacancies at that level were already manifest.

The two most used statistical sources for measuring the inflow of Poles by researchers, politicians and the media are the Worker Registration Scheme and the issue of National Insurance Numbers. Nationals of the
eight newly accessed EU countries who wished to take up work with an employer in the UK for at least
a month were required to register in the WRS. They were also required to re-register if they changed em-
ployer (but without needing to pay another fee) but it appears that substantial numbers did not do so. To
avoid counting applicants more than once, each applicant is represented only once in the data. They give no
clue as to the duration of employment, nor if and when a return home occurs. The data thus record those
arriving but nothing on departure and so cannot be regarded as migrant stock statistics.

Every foreign worker who is legally employed requires a NINo, so the allocation of new numbers should
give an indication of the annual (year running April–March) increment to the workforce. Foreign workers re-
entering the UK after a period away and who already have a NINo are not required to re-register. Hence,
NINos are in effect flow figures. NINos also allow migrants to access the benefits system. Inflow and out-
flow data are available only from the International Passenger Survey which is based on stated intention at the
time of entry and exit and defines an immigrant/emigrant as someone who intends to stay/leave for more
than a year, having been out of/in the country for a similar period. It is a sample survey, consisting of about
4 400 contacts. Adjustments are made to the survey data to take into account those whose intentions change,
asylum seekers whose cases are still under consideration and flows between the UK and Ireland. These ad-
justments produce Long Term International Migration statistics.\(^3\) Compared with WRS and NINo data,
where there is no stipulation of length of stay, IPS records show a lower level of inflow.

Over the period 2004–2012 the IPS records a total of 396 000 (+/– 44 000) long-term (over one year)
Polish immigrants and 165 000 (+/– 27 000) emigrants, with a net balance of 231 000 (+/– 51 000) (Table 2).
On average, 44 000 came each year, the highest figure being 88 000 in 2007; since 2009, the number has
been just over 30 000 per annum. It is likely that these data underestimate the overall number of long-term
migrants because of an inadequate sampling frame before 2008 (ONS 2014), although compared with other
sources the number would still be low. Taken together, UK data indicate large annual temporary flows by
migrants with at best uncertain stay intentions – a pattern clearly indicated by the series of special surveys
carried out in the UK.

Table 2. Long-term international migration flows of Polish citizens into and out of the UK in 2004–2012,
estimates from the International Passenger Survey (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflow Estimate</th>
<th>+/- CI</th>
<th>Outflow Estimate</th>
<th>+/- CI</th>
<th>Balance Estimate</th>
<th>+/- CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+231</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+45</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+51</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+68</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table uses 95 per cent confidence intervals (CI) to indicate the robustness of each estimate. For any given estimate,
there is a 95 per cent probability that the true figure lies in the range: estimate +/- confidence interval. Users are advised to be
cautious when making inferences from estimates with large confidence intervals.

Source: Office for National Statistics.
By the end of 2005, 185,490 Poles had registered in the WRS and over the next three years a further 401,268 did so. By the time of its demise in April 2011, the WRS had registered 1,134 million A8 citizens, of whom 705,890 (62.2 per cent) were Poles. However, WRS registrations undercount actual numbers coming to work. Those who were self-employed were not required to register. Others chose not to register, although they should have done, with surveys variously suggesting that the proportion choosing not to register was as high as 36 per cent (CRONEM, n.d.) and 42 per cent (Pollard, Latorre, Sriskandarajah 2008). The likelihood of registering varied by geographical location and sector. More likely to register were people living in smaller towns, older workers and those intending to stay for longer periods (CRONEM, n.d.); construction sector workers were also less likely to register since the majority of them were self-employed (Drinkwater, Eade, Garapich 2009). On a conservative estimate that a third of those who should have registered did not, it may be that about 920,000 employees came in. To these must be added an unknown number of self-employed whose numbers vary by sector, perhaps 55 per cent of construction workers and 10 per cent in hospitality (Drinkwater, Eade, Garapich 2009). LFS data suggest that, overall, 14 per cent of Poles living and working in the UK were self-employed. If we relate this proportion to NINo data (2004–2011) it suggests another 140,000 workers on top of those derived from the WRS, giving a total of about 1.14 million by 2011. This is slightly more than the one million NINo issues between 2004 and 2011 (Table 3).

Table 3. National Insurance Numbers (NINos) and Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) data for Poles in 2002–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NINos</th>
<th>WRSa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4,735</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9,461</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>38,425</td>
<td>66,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>144,807</td>
<td>118,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>192,105</td>
<td>153,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>242,584</td>
<td>144,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>152,275</td>
<td>102,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>85,859</td>
<td>55,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>74,826</td>
<td>53,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>84,149</td>
<td>10,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>80,475</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>111,449</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a 2004 data are for May–December; 2011 data are for January–April.

Source: Department of Work and Pensions.

The number of NINo issues was already beginning to rise before accession but it then escalated rapidly, reaching almost a quarter of a million in 2007 (Table 3). By 2011 one million NINos had been issued to Poles and by 2013 the figure had risen to 1.164 million. As the recession took hold, the number fell but from 2009 it was relatively stable at around 80,000 until 2013 when it rose to 111,000. It is too early to say whether this reflects economic recovery in the UK – unlikely given the scale of the increase (and perhaps the anti-immigration rhetoric from the government and others) – or a slow-down of economic growth in Poland. Although after adjustments there is a broad consensus between them in the number of Poles coming to work,
Harris, Moran and Bryson (2010) show that discrepancies between WRS and NINo statistics vary geographically, being particularly great in London (55 per cent difference) where self-employment is more likely.

The differences between the aggregated ‘flow’ data from the WRS and NINos and the ‘stock’ data from the census and LFS give some indication of the scale of temporary migration and the reasons for them. NINos record a shift in the ages of those registering. The proportion of those aged 25–34 declined after 2002 while that of the younger 18–24 population increased. This concurs with the Polish data and is consistent with a pattern of young people moving temporarily, probably single and willing to accept shared accommodation, coming to work at the end of their secondary or tertiary education or to pursue further or higher education in the UK.

### Table 4. Worker Registration Scheme applications approved for Poles in 2005 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number of applications</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number of applications</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81 Process, plant and machine operatives</td>
<td>38 371</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>811 Process operatives</td>
<td>37 767</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 Elementary administration and service occupations</td>
<td>23 918</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>922 Elementary personal services occupations</td>
<td>15 759</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 Elementary trades, plant and storage</td>
<td>20 933</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>911 Elementary agricultural occupations</td>
<td>9 369</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relate occupations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 Sales occupations</td>
<td>13 221</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>712 Sales related occupations</td>
<td>8 895</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82 Transport and mobile machine drivers</td>
<td>5 177</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>913 Elementary process plant occupations</td>
<td>7 752</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and operatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 Caring personal service occupations</td>
<td>5 165</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>923 Elementary cleaning occupations</td>
<td>7 599</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 Total</td>
<td>127 325</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>00 Total</td>
<td>127 325</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number of applications</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number of applications</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81 Process, plant and machine operatives</td>
<td>19 602</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>811 Process operatives</td>
<td>19 505</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 Elementary administration and service occupations</td>
<td>9 530</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>712 Sales related occupations</td>
<td>5 413</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 Sales occupations</td>
<td>7 380</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>922 Elementary personal services occupations</td>
<td>5 260</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 Elementary trades, plant and storage</td>
<td>7 182</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>923 Elementary cleaning occupations</td>
<td>4 161</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relate occupations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62 Leisure and other personal service</td>
<td>2 053</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>911 Elementary agricultural occupations</td>
<td>3 595</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 Textiles, printing and other skilled</td>
<td>1 586</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>913 Elementary process plant occupations</td>
<td>2 728</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 Total</td>
<td>53 536</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>00 Total</td>
<td>53 536</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Home Office, Worker Registration Scheme.

Although the WRS is an incomplete record of the total Polish labour migration, it does give us a dynamic account of which occupations they entered. Table 4 shows the proportions in 2005 and 2010 by sector (two digit level). It is clear that Poles were highly concentrated in certain, mainly less skilled, occupations. In 2005 the top six groups accounted for 83.9 per cent of the total, with process, plant and machinery the largest, followed by elementary administrative and service jobs, then elementary trades and sales occupations. It is possible to break down these groups in more detail (three digit level). The top six accounted for 68.6 per
cent of all occupations, among whom process operatives were the most important, then a series of elementary jobs in personal services, agriculture, process and cleaning, along with sales related jobs.

The data for 2010 show similar concentrations, indicating that over the intervening period little had changed. Four groups stand out, accounting for 81.6 per cent of registrations. The process, plant and machinery group was still the most important, having increased its representation from 30.1 to 36.6 per cent of the total. The more detailed breakdown shows a growing concentration in a smaller number of occupations. The top six groups accounted for 75.9 per cent of the total, up from 68.6 per cent in 2005. Process operatives were again the most important, increasing from 29.7 to 36.4 per cent of the total. As in 2005, a series of elementary and sales related jobs occupied the bulk of the Polish workforce. Particularly significant in this comparison is the role of the process sector: although there is no comprehensive statistical evidence, some survey evidence suggests that substantial numbers work in food processing (the so-called three ‘P’ jobs – picking, packing and plucking), which explains the presence of Poles and citizens of other newly accessed EU countries in more rural parts of the country. What we may glean from these data is that the stream of new Polish entrants continued into similar low-skilled occupations. They do not indicate that earlier entrants remained in those occupations.

The characteristics of the Polish population in the UK

The view from Poland

Polish LFS data on ‘temporary migrants’ allow comparisons of the characteristics of those coming to the UK with those going to other countries and also how they evolved in the years after 2004. The analysis below shows that the nature of the flows varied as circumstances changed over three distinct periods: 1999–2004 (immediate pre-accession), 2004–2007 (early post-accession) and 2008–2011 (economic recession).

Age and sex. A long-lasting trait of Polish migrants departing to the UK is male preponderance. The early accession period saw a strong increase in the proportion of men in the flow (from 52.7 to 65.2 per cent) which then gave way to an almost equally strong decline (to 55.5 per cent). A majority of post-accession migrants were of young working age (81–83 per cent at age 20–34) but in the course of time new migrants included more children and middle-aged adults. Of particular note is that the age profile of the UK-bound Polish migrants shows a large, albeit decreasing over time, predominance in the 20–24 bracket (42 pre-accession, 37.8 early post-accession and 36.2 per cent recession period). This is in contrast to the older cohorts (25–29 and 30–34) who tended to go to Italy, Germany and the Netherlands.

Education level. Emigrants with secondary education dominated; their share in all three periods was around 50 per cent. Degree holders were relatively highly represented but their proportion declined with time from 25.2 per cent pre-accession to 17.5 per cent in the later period. The proportion of migrants with basic vocational education was relatively low but rising (from 19.8, to 23.6 and 24.9 per cent). Hence, it appears that the early flow attracted more highly educated people while latterly the flow was less qualified. This is consistent with evidence (below) from UK studies which suggest that an initial attraction of Polish workers for UK employers was their ability, even in relatively mundane occupations. As they settled in the UK, the more able managed to move into jobs higher up the socio-economic ladder, for example from bar staff into hospitality management. This process in turn created low-skilled vacancies that could be filled by a less qualified workforce.
Urban/rural residence prior to migration. A majority of migrants originated from cities but the data indicate a declining trend – from 67.2 to 61.1 and to 56 per cent in the three successive periods. This is consistent with the trend for earlier flows to include a higher proportion of the better educated.

Are they different from the ‘average’ Polish emigrant? Comparisons of these characteristics with those of emigrants to other countries reveal major differences which may be analysed by the Migrants Selectivity Index (MSI – see Anacka, Okólski 2008). The MSI measures over- (positive values) or under-representation (negative values) of a given category of migrants relative to the share of that category in a general population.

Table 5 presents the selectivity pattern in the three sub-periods for Polish migrants irrespective of the destination of their movement and for those heading only to the UK. MSI values are based on four variables: sex, age, education and type of residence prior to migration.

### Table 5. Migrants Selectivity Index for selected characteristics by period of migrant departure and country of destination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All destinations</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>All destinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (males)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (mobile, 20–39)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (20–24)</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (40–44)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (tertiary)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (basic vocational)</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of residence (urban areas)</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Persons aged 15+ who left Poland before 1 May 2004.

b Persons aged 15+ who left Poland between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2007.

c Persons aged 15+ who left Poland between 1 January 2008 and 30 June 2011.

Source: BAEL (Polish Labour Force Survey).

A low to moderate over-representation of male migrants was observed in all three sub-periods for those heading for the UK, although in the third sub-periods it was considerably lower. A plausible reason for this might be stabilisation of Polish migrants’ residence in Britain compared with those going elsewhere, resulting in an intensified family reunification as more women arrived.

One important feature of the migration of Poles to the UK is a large over-representation of people aged 20–39 which continued over the three sub-period and was distinctly higher than in case of moves elsewhere. This surfeit of 20–24 year olds in particular reflects the attractiveness of the UK to Polish labour market entrants, as discussed below. By contrast, Polish migrants aged 40–44 (and more so the older ones) were under-represented in the UK-bound flow.

The ‘otherness’ of persons migrating to the UK is particularly noticeable with respect to education level. The British flow was characterised by a very strong over-representation of migrants with a university degree in the first two sub-periods and still (but much lower) over-representation in the last period. This was in sharp contrast to the general pattern where such migrants were under-represented or over-represented to a small degree. For those with a basic vocational education the UK showed an ‘indifferent’ pattern, whereas the pattern for those going elsewhere was a continuous moderate over-representation. The UK was also more successful than other destinations in attracting migrants from urban areas, although to a lesser extent in the crisis sub-period.
Figure 1. Migrants Selectivity Index by selected Polish migrants’ characteristics in the UK and Germany in pre-accession, early post-accession and recession period

Source: BAEL (Polish Labour Force Survey).
The selectivity of Polish migration flows is particularly noticeable when the UK and Germany – traditionally (until 2004) the main destination for Polish emigrants – are compared as destinations (Figure 1). The most striking contrasts were with respect to the level of migrants’ education: unlike the UK, Germany strongly attracted persons with basic vocational education (high positive values of MSI) while those with a university degree were much less likely to go there (high negative values of MSI). In addition, the attraction of the UK for Polish migrants at the most mobile age (20–39) proved to be much stronger than in the case of Germany. Conversely, the UK was less attractive than Germany for residents of rural areas. Another significant characteristic of that selectivity is its stability over time in both the host countries, with apparent resistance to external shocks such as the EU accession or post-2007 economic recession.

In sum, especially in the post-accession period, a stylised portrait of a Polish migrant heading for the UK is that of a young male, highly educated, and originating from an urban area. However, in the last of three periods under consideration, these characteristics became a little blurred as the nature of migrants evolved.

**The view from the UK**

Data on the stock of the Polish population by nationality after 2004 are available annually from the UK Labour Force Survey. They show a steady rise in number to 658,000 in 2011, similar to the census figure for that year, and 679,000 in 2013 (Figure 2). The results of the 2011 census provide an opportunity to profile the new Polish population in the UK. Two new questions in the 2011 census, on year of arrival and nationality, allow analyses not hitherto possible. The statistics below refer to nationality, not country of birth. However, at the time of writing a detailed breakdown for those in Scotland is not available so that the data below refer to England and Wales only.

**Figure 2. The stock of the Polish population in the UK in 2004–2013**

![Graph showing the stock of the Polish population in the UK from 2004 to 2013](image)

*Source: Labour Force Survey (annual) and 2011 census.*

**Age and sex.** The Polish population in the UK in 2011 is a youthful one: 57.3 per cent were aged 20–34 and only 4.6 per cent were aged 60 and over, the latter reflecting earlier inflows. Children (under 15) comprised 11.4 per cent of the total. Given the even split by sex and the number in the fertile age range (two-thirds being aged between 20 and 39), further family formation is likely.
Year of arrival. Only 8.2 per cent arrived before 2001, although many who had come during this time would have become naturalised. In the run-up to 2004 the number almost doubled. Over a quarter of a million (45.4 per cent of those present in 2011) arrived during 2004–2006. In total, almost half a million (85.8 per cent) arrived from 2004 onwards (Figure 3).

**Figure 3. The stock of Poles in the UK in 2011 by year of arrival**

Language. Over two-thirds of those arriving between 2001 and 2011 (‘new arrivals’) said they could speak English well or very well, with only 3 per cent unable to speak the language. Five per cent said their main language was English.

Education level. The new arrivals were well educated, although it is not possible to establish how many were degree holders. Those with UK degrees and some of those with Polish degrees placed themselves in the census Level 4 qualifications category for degree holders (22.6 per cent), while others, with Polish degrees, could opt to tick the ‘other qualifications’ category (41.5 per cent) which includes non-degree qualifications. Only 14.3 per cent, particularly those aged 16–24 and 50 and over, had no qualifications.

Housing tenure. The majority of new arrivals (75.6 per cent) were living in private rented or rent free housing. It is possible that many of the latter were in tied accommodation, especially in rural areas, where some form of accommodation formed part of fringe benefits. Only 9.7 per cent were in the social rented sector and the rest (14.7 per cent) were in self-owned or shared ownership housing.

Economic activity. The bulk of the new arrivals were economically active in employment (379 287, 81.4 per cent), 12.1 per cent were inactive and only 3.5 per cent were unemployed. Of the inactive, three per cent were full-time students. Of those in employment 56 931, or 17.7 per cent, were self-employed.

Industry and occupation. By 2011, the new arrivals had spread widely across the main economic sectors (Table 6). The largest group (27 per cent) was in distribution and hospitality, followed by manufacturing (19.2 per cent), business services (16.5 per cent) and public administration, education and health (11.6 per cent). The transport and communication industry hosted almost 10 per cent, but only small numbers were in agriculture (1.3 per cent) and public utilities (1.4 per cent).

They were also spread throughout the occupational range, giving credence to the view that as they became established some Poles engaged in upward occupational mobility. However, jobs were still mainly at the lower end of the skill spectrum. About a third were in elementary occupations, almost 19 per cent worked
in manufacturing as process, plant and machine operatives, 15 per cent in managerial, professional and technical occupations, 16 per cent in skilled trades and 18 per cent in other services (leisure, caring, sales and administrative and secretarial).

Table 6. Poles arrived in 2001–2011 by occupation and industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All categories: Occupation</th>
<th>390 815</th>
<th>100.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Managers, directors and senior officials</td>
<td>15 512</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Professional occupations</td>
<td>22 778</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Associate professional and technical occupations</td>
<td>19 859</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Administrative and secretarial occupations</td>
<td>21 294</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Skilled trades occupations</td>
<td>62 084</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Caring, leisure and other service occupations</td>
<td>30 362</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sales and customer service occupations</td>
<td>18 632</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Process, plant and machine operatives</td>
<td>72 724</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Elementary occupations</td>
<td>127 570</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All categories: Industry</th>
<th>390 815</th>
<th>100.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Agriculture, forestry and fishing</td>
<td>5 179</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Manufacturing</td>
<td>74 923</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B, D, E Energy and water</td>
<td>5 332</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Construction</td>
<td>36 347</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G, I Distribution, hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>105 512</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H, J Transport and communication</td>
<td>38 390</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K, L, M, N Financial, real estate, professional and administrative activities</td>
<td>64 658</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O, P, Q Public administration, education and health</td>
<td>45 237</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R, S, T, U Other</td>
<td>15 237</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
B, D, E ‘Energy and water’ includes the SIC 07 groups ‘B Mining and quarrying,’ ‘D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply’ and ‘E Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities.’
G, I ‘Distribution, hotels and restaurants’ includes the SIC 07 groups ‘G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles’ and ‘I Accommodation and food service activities.’
H, J ‘Transport and communication’ includes the SIC 07 groups ‘H Transport and storage’ and ‘J Information and communication.’
K, L, M, N ‘Financial, real estate, professional and administrative activities’ includes the SIC 07 groups ‘K Financial and insurance activities,’ ‘L Real estate activities,’ ‘M Professional, scientific and technical activities’ and ‘N Administrative and support service activities.’
O, P, Q ‘Public administration, education and health’ includes the SIC 07 groups ‘O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security,’ ‘P Education’ and ‘Q Human health and social work activities.’
Source: 2011 census.

These data complement those from Poland, discussed above. What they reveal is a relatively newly arrived Polish population now showing evidence of settled maturity. It is a young, sex-balanced cohort, engaging in family formation. It is well educated, with good English language capabilities. It mainly makes use of the private rented housing sector, but with one in seven already in some form of ownership. Over 80 per cent are in employment, with a substantial number in self-employment. Industry and occupation distributions show a wide penetration of the UK economy, although still with a tendency to occupy relatively lower skilled jobs.

Why did the Poles come?

On the surface it seems clear that simple economic motors – disadvantage in the homeland, opportunity in the new land – drove Polish migration to the UK. In fact, this is only part of the story. The post-2004 migrations – and their cultural and political consequences – may also be seen as managed and negotiated by
a range of agencies, each of which having a vested interest in maximising its returns from population movement. Above all, the flow resulted from a concurrence of political circumstances, socio-demographic forces in Poland and a pent-up demand in the UK for low-skilled labour.

The role of government policy

Impact of the terms of the accession treaty. The position of the Polish government during the period of accession negotiations and mentioned at the start of this paper was based on several premises, including ‘numerous analyses’ predicting only moderate out-migration after accession (Kulakowski 2001; Rada Ministrów 2002). First, it was thought that after 2004 most of the increase in the working age population would consist of ‘immobile people’ aged 45 or more. Second, in view of a supposedly decreasing demand for low-skilled workers in the EU, a relatively low propensity to migrate was expected on the part of Polish workers, who were described as in general poorly educated and unable to communicate in foreign languages (ibidem). Third, the evidence of earlier EU enlargements indicated that the economic integration of Poland with the EU would promote growth in the Polish economy and thus weaken emigration pressure. Fourth, the analysis predicted a steady increase of immigration into Poland from other EU countries, so flows would be two-way. Fifth, studies suggested that, for social rather than purely economic reasons, dwindling numbers of Polish citizens were interested in working abroad (ibidem). This last claim was based on the growing costs of supporting two homes by migrant workers (one in Poland and another in a foreign country), which could not be offset by the existing (in fact, narrowing) wage differences between Poland and EU15 countries. Generally, the Polish government estimated an extra migration potential of only 100 000 persons in addition to what might have happened in the absence of an EU accession outflow. It thus argued that there was little danger of destabilising the EU labour market as a result of granting the citizens of Poland instant access to that market.

After the accession treaty was agreed, the mass media and analysts, while presenting it as a success for the government, emphasised the importance of unrestricted access to the EU market, including its labour market, and funds for combating unemployment as the most significant achievement from the point of view of society (Gór ska 2006: 184). As a result, during the early post-accession period the climate of enthusiasm for the westward movement of people and the exploration of employment opportunities in the old EU countries became a normality (Romejko 2009). Even before, but especially after May 2004, many Poles ventured a journey to EU15 countries to ‘test’ the freedom of movement and work. Apparently the test came off well. A public opinion poll in March 2006 revealed that the possibility of working freely in other member countries was perceived as the most positive effect of Poland’s EU membership (CBOS 2006b). However, this perception stemmed mainly from a two-year long experience of unlimited access to the UK.7 Hence, a positive association of the benefits of movement became synonymous with the UK labour market.

Policy in the UK. In the UK, the migrations from 2004 onward followed several years of relatively permissive labour immigration policies by the Labour government which came into power in 1997. From the late 1990s, with backing from several ministries, notably including the Treasury, a more liberal approach to labour migration, particularly for the skilled and highly skilled, was pursued. A series of schemes was either expanded (Seasonal Agricultural Workers, Working Holiday Makers) or instituted (Sectors Based Scheme, Highly Skilled Manpower). Opening up to the accession states was perceived as being sound from the perspective of foreign policy as well as offering a solution to increasingly publicised shortages of both skilled (especially in construction) and lower skilled labour (especially in agriculture and hospitality). When the UK initially made its decision, it was not known that most other EU15 states would refuse to open their borders in similar fashion. Furthermore, an econometric study carried out for the Home Office and written before the policies of the other EU15 countries were known forecast a net annual immigration from the accession states...
of some 13,000 during the first decade (Dustmann, Casanova, Fertig, Preston, Schmidt 2003). Although it was assumed that substantial numbers might come, it was also assumed that most would return home in due course. Hence, in both countries forecasts of the scale of migration were wide of the mark.

**Major factors in emigration from Poland to the UK**

Most explanations for the subsequent migration are based on labour market and other economic differences between the two countries. Various regression analyses have shown migration flows to be positively related to variations in wage rates, unemployment and economic growth (see, for example, Drinkwater, Eade, Garapich 2009 Pollard et al. 2008; Szwabe, n.d.). Most emphasis is put on conditions in Poland, emphasising the push effects of low wage rates, youth unemployment and lack of opportunities, especially for women, resulting from the post-communist restructuring of the Polish economy. However, it is not just aggregate wage rates which affect decisions to move. Average monthly net wages in Poland and the UK vary by sector: in construction and hospitality, for example, the differential was threefold in one study (Cizkowicz, Holda, Sowa 2007). The series of surveys of Polish immigrants carried out in the UK consistently found that financial reasons, lack of opportunities in Poland and the desire for personal and professional development were key factors in decisions to migrate. Surveys of return migrants in Poland (IIBR 2006, quoted in Cizkowicz et al. 2007; CBOS 2006a) uncover a similar situation, with discrepancies in earnings level as the primary determinant of the decision to move to the UK, even at the minimum UK wage, even among well-educated Poles. Cizkowicz et al. (2007) argue that job compatibility with the migrant’s education was not a prerequisite for the decision to migrate, better pay being more important. What was perceived as good pay was strongly positively correlated with job satisfaction even if the job did not require the use of the skills and qualifications held. Furthermore, a body of primarily qualitative research has emerged which suggests a complexity of non-economic motivations for movement (Burrell 2010; Luthra, Platt, Salamońska 2014).

A great wave of Polish citizens migrating to the UK after Poland’s accession to the EU might be perceived as a paradox, at least when it comes to looking at its root causes in the home country. It took place at a time of very fast economic growth, job creation, wage rise and declining unemployment in Poland (Fihel, Kaczmarczyk, Okólski 2007). This may suggest that the causes on the part of the receiving country, the ‘pull factors’ might have been more powerful than the ‘stick factors’ in Poland that might discourage emigration. Alternatively, ‘push factors’ influencing decisions whether or not to emigrate might have been at play. Below we analyse the determinants of recent Poland to the UK migration in their complexity and interdependency.

**Structural demographic and economic factors.** On the eve of Poland’s accession to the EU several structural factors favoured out-migration, some of them specifically to the UK.

The period around the date of accession to the EU coincided with increasing numbers of new labour market entrants. Assuming that the average age of entry was around 23 years, between 2002 and 2007 the Polish labour market had to face the arrival of people born in 1979–1984. In that period the number of births (4.3 million) was 322,000 higher than in the preceding six years and 573,000 higher than in the following six years. Moreover, those baby-boomers were as a rule better educated and their occupational aspirations were higher than the general economically active population. At that time, entry of young people into the labour market in Poland was difficult owing to very high unemployment (41 per cent of those aged under 25 were unemployed in 2004). Given that the only accessible and absorptive labour market was the UK (and to lesser extent Ireland) it is not surprising that many of the baby-boomers of 1979 to 1984 were Britain bound.

The structure of the labour force was changing too. Firstly, in the years preceding and following 2000 the working age population was growing fast, with the number of people entering retirement age declining and
those entering working age increasing. Between 2000 and 2005 the share of population aged 25–59 rose from 47.1 to 50.1 per cent, exerting a significant supply pressure on the national labour market, which in some of its segments struggled with over-employment inherited from the communist past.

Secondly, the legacy of a large economically redundant population in relatively backward and predominantly rural areas led to a sizeable potential for current and future emigration. For these people the transition to a market economy after 1989 offered few viable employment opportunities outside the major urban areas in Poland (Okólski 2012). Until accession, the realisation of this potential flow was slow because of its high dependence on relatively few social contacts in receiving countries and on the ability to find jobs in the shadow economies of EU15 countries. Therefore, the accession-related freedom of population movement and unlimited access to some EU labour markets removed a major obstacle to a massive outflow of that superfluous labour force.

Thirdly, the opening up of the huge labour market of the UK (approximately twice as large as the Polish market) on 1 May 2004 expanded the space in which Polish citizens could freely seek employment opportunities, without having to depend on their social capital and ensuing migration networks. It is therefore plausible to argue that structurally Poland was a country with a great migration potential; what was less certain how big was the UK’s capacity to absorb new migrant workers.

Viewed by a typical economically active person in 2004, Poland’s economic situation seemed much less favourable than that of the UK, which was generally richer and its institutions, including employment, public health care, social security and welfare more highly developed. Life in the UK was perceived to be easier and of higher quality. In particular, the prospects of having a job differed substantially. In 2004 the unemployment rate in the UK stood at 4.8 per cent, in Poland it was 19.5 per cent. The number of vacancies in 2004 was around 600 000 in the UK and only 220 000 in Poland, which translated into 2.5 unemployed persons per vacancy in Britain and 13.5 in Poland. The difference with respect to job availability did not change much in the next two to three years.

Additionally, pay in the UK was much higher than in Poland. The minimum monthly wage in the UK (expressed in US$ using purchasing power parity, or PPP) was 1 507, whereas in Poland it was 628 (ILO 2010). A McDonald’s cashier or crew member earned an hourly wage rate 5.5 times higher in the UK than in Poland. Even accounting for differences in price levels, the gap was still significant: British employees of McDonald’s could buy 2.11 Big Macs for their hourly wage while Polish employees had to make do with less than one (Ashenfelter, Jurajda 2001).

Although the wage differentials diminished after Poland’s accession to the EU, Polish wages still lagged behind British ones. The difference in an annual wage per full-time equivalent dependent employee (expressed in US$ using PPP) was 25 776 (57.5 per cent) in 2004 in favour of the UK and 24 674 (55.2 per cent) in 2011 (OECD 2014). Also, compensation costs of labour in manufacturing in the UK differed substantially from the respective costs in Poland. In nominal terms (expressed in US$), in 2011 it was 30.77 in the former country and 8.83 in the latter, or 22.00 and 5.34 if social insurance contributions, labour-related taxes and directly-paid benefits were excluded (BLS 2012).

Educational boom in Poland and improved human capital endowment of migrants. Contrary to the views of the Polish government during pre-accession negotiations with the EU, the level of education and ability to communicate in foreign languages was not low and in the immediate pre- and post-accession period, the situation greatly improved. In 2002 only 9.9 per cent of Poland’s population aged 13+ consisted of university graduates, but 41.4 per cent had completed at least secondary education. Among those aged 25–29 and 30–34, 20.5 and 16.2 per cent respectively had obtained a university degree. In both these age groups, the share of people whose education was at least secondary exceeded 50 per cent. Moreover, the transition period witnessed a great educational boom, especially among the population of rural areas. Overall, the propor-
tion of 19–24 year olds in higher education rose from 12.9 per cent in 1990/1991 to 40.7 per cent in 2000/2001 and 48.7 per cent in 2013/2014. By 2011, 36.1 per cent of 25–29-year olds and 32.9 per cent of 30–34-year olds held a university degree. In these two groups as a whole, two-thirds of people had completed at least secondary education. All this means that at the time of accession, a high quality labour force was available and one which continued to improve.10

Parallel to this boom, a significant improvement occurred with regard to the incidence of learning and knowledge of foreign languages, especially English and German. Whereas 34.2 per cent of pupils in primary and secondary schools were learning these two languages in 1992/1993, of which 18.2 per cent were learning English, in 2004/2005 99.5 per cent were learning the two languages, 77.1 per cent of them learning English (MEN 2005). The knowledge of English increased from 9 per cent of the adult population in 1997 to 17 per cent in 2004 and 30 per cent in 2012, by which time 77 per cent of those aged 18–24 could communicate in English (CBOS 2012). In a 2012 study of proficiency in English in more than 50 countries, Poland was given a ‘high knowledge’ mark (together with Austria, Belgium, Germany and Hungary), just behind a ‘very high knowledge’ which was attributed to four Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands (Gazeta.pl 2012). These changes transformed and upgraded the human capital of Polish youth and often stimulated professional aspirations and life strategies that could not be fulfilled in Poland but required further studies or work in other countries.

The emergence and rapid growth of a middle class after 1989 was accompanied by a growing demand for an international education. Growing familiarity with the English language increased the attractiveness of UK universities and colleges (Andrejuk 2013; Szewczyk 2012). Why was Britain so attractive for Polish students? First, British universities were highly regarded and had well developed admission programmes for foreign students. In addition, accession to the EU meant that Polish students enjoyed the same conditions as the British with regard to tuition fees and access to stipends. Furthermore, large international communities of students and teachers and the relatively high degree of tolerance of British society to foreigners were also important. Second, there was a high incidence of secondary school graduates in Poland proficient in the English language. Many of them attended Polish schools offering an International Baccalaureate programme, recognised in the UK. Finally, the openness of the UK labour market to Polish citizens enabled a large number of young but less well-off Poles to initiate, continue or resume education there along with being employed. Between 2004/2005 and 2012/2013, approximately 30 000 Poles were admitted to universities in the UK (HESA 2014). This figure may seem low when compared to the total number of Polish residents, but thanks to the internationally highly-valued university degrees and relatively easy access to jobs in the primary labour markets all over Europe, in transnational corporations and European institutions, those persons were likely to be members of the elite among the Polish post-accession migrants. Hence, studying in the UK constitutes one of stages on the path of further professional mobility (Andrejuk 2013: 272). The author of the above quotation argues that those students’ experiences and aspirations point to their significant role in the creation and development of a new occupational class of pan-European mobile professionals (ibidem: 274).

Other factors. There was not only an aspiration to emigrate. Practical improvements in travel eased the friction of distance for those moving. The increased availability of transport means and routes, with the wide availability of regular coach lines and cheap airlines, made it easier to come and go. Other improvements that made the post-accession migration of Poles easier, more effective and executed at lesser costs included the widespread use of plastic money cards, mobile phones and the internet.

Perceptions also shifted. Over several months after 1 May 2004, journeys from various parts of Poland to London and other cities of the UK became iconic in the Polish media. They reported, for instance, that in June coaches from Poland arrived at Victoria Station every 10 minutes. Although many migrants failed and returned (or ended up in the streets), the prevalent message sent to relatives and friends in Poland was one of
success. The narratives about the migration of Poles to the UK in those early post-accession months recalled tales of the Klondike Gold Rush in the late 1890s.

Such mystification culminated in ‘The Londoners’ (Londyńczycy), a TV drama series which had its debut on the main public television channel in Poland in October 2008. It was watched on average by more than three million people. Although particular episodes focused on hardships, inter-personal conflicts and even criminality, the series painted life in London as colourful and manageable for all, irrespective of their social background and past experience.

Within a relatively short time Britain, and especially London, became well known to Polish public opinion, better than any other place outside Poland, and it became clear that in practically every corner of Poland some persons were missing because of migration to the UK. The practical side of this knowledge included information about employment opportunities and living conditions and access to quickly expanding Polish-British social networks that paved the way for a well-thought, steady and regular movement of people between the two countries.

Labour demand in the UK

What has received less attention in the literature is where the jobs taken by migrants came from and how the demand for labour by UK employers was activated. For most commercial employers, recruitment and mobility decisions and processes are determined by the need to maximise profitability, often involving highly flexible work arrangements such as the need to bring in additional workers to meet peaks of service, product and process demand. Circumstances vary between sectors and by type of employer because of the nature of each organisation’s main activities. Each industry has its own distinguishing characteristics in size, skill mix and training requirements, geographical spread of operations, ownership, nature of service or product and trends in product/service demand, all of which affect the recruitment of migrant labour. Hence, the nature of business operations underlies the ability of the UK labour market to attract and offer employment to Poles and other incomers.

Figure 4. Vacancies (thousands, left hand scale) and unemployment rate (right hand scale) in the UK in 2002–2006

Source: Labour Force Survey.
It is clear that in the years both before and after 2004, large numbers of Poles and other citizens of new EU countries found jobs. A survey in Britain among the UK citizens and members of the 25 most numerous immigrant nations revealed enormously high employment (rank 3–4) and low inactivity (rank 24–25) among Polish migrants, accompanied by very high workloads per week (rank 2) (IPPR 2007). In the circumstances, a shift in the number of job vacancies might have been expected. In fact, as Figure 4 shows, there was little change in recorded vacancies between 2001 and 2006. Only after 2008 did the number of vacancies start to fall. There is no evidence of a rise in vacancies before 2004 or a fall afterwards, both of which might have been expected if there was an unfilled demand which the new migrants were able to satisfy. Furthermore, the industry sectors with the most vacancies were not necessarily those into which migrants from newly accessed EU countries moved. However, it is likely that many (most?) vacancies were not registered. Unemployment data show a similar pattern. There was little change in overall numbers of unemployed before and after 2004. It thus appears that immigrants from those new EU countries were absorbed into the labour market with little effect on the two major indicators.

**Self-employment.** One reason for the lack of effect on vacancies and unemployment was self-employment. Many immigrants entered into self-employment on arrival in the UK, a process already occurring before 2004. The 1993 EU Associate Members Agreement gave the accession countries the right to establish businesses in EU15 states. By the turn of the century Polish businesses were already being set up in the UK, in low-income businesses such as window cleaning as well as more skilled trades (Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly, Spencer 2006) although how many were employed in this way is uncertain. Self-employment was especially common among immigrants from the newly accessed EU countries working in construction before 2004, accounting for 48 per cent of the total in the sector. Two-thirds of the self-employed were in skilled trades (the stereotypical ‘Polish plumber’). They were able to find work because of a chronic shortage of skilled building trade workers, possibly a consequence of government changes to the industrial training system in the 1980s and 1990s which resulted in fewer young people entering apprenticeships (Holmes 2010).

For many self-employed, some mastery of the English language, enabling them to cope with the necessary legal and bureaucratic complexities, was key to business establishment (Helinska-Hughes, Hughes, Las-salle, Skowron n.d.). However, these complexities may not themselves have been barriers, given migrants’ experiences of the regulatory barriers and bureaucracy in Poland. Not surprisingly, entrepreneurs initially occupied the enclave economy. In their study of Polish entrepreneurs in Scotland, Helinska-Hughes et al. (n.d.) found that initially businesses tended to be in the enclave economy, relying on personal resources owing to lack of access to formal sources of finance and advice. They rapidly branched out from a Polish clientele, especially into construction, transport and small food and personal service outlets and IT, often becoming more localised over time and serving the whole community (Harris 2012). Similarly, many highly skilled Poles in London, working in jobs that maximised their skills and qualifications, were initially providing services for the Polish community (Iglicka 2008). Pollard et al. (2008) quote a British-Polish Chamber of Commerce estimate that, as of 2008, 40 000 Polish entrepreneurs had set up business in UK. Self-employment seems to have been a vehicle for longer term stay.

**Sectoral demand.** In the years leading to 2004, shortages of low-skilled labour were already manifest although, as it transpired, many were not registered with the government vacancy service. In one study of the recruitment of citizens of the eight new EU countries, carried out on the eve of accession, all employers surveyed reported recruitment difficulties (Anderson et al. 2006). This was especially the case for low skilled and some higher skilled positions in agriculture, hospitality and construction. A large majority of employers had tried to recruit domestic workers and raised pay and non-wage benefits but still had shortages. However, no one factor underlay recruitment difficulties, depending on the kinds of jobs available in each sector: factors included geographical location, prevalence of self-employment and degree of informality. One key find-
ing, to be repeated in several other studies over the following years, was that two-thirds of employers in agriculture and food processing and 40 per cent in hospitality suggested that UK workers were difficult to recruit because the work was physically demanding and ‘not glamorous’ (Anderson et al. 2006; Rogaly 2006; McCollum, Findlay 2011; MAC 2014).

A key sector for the employment of Poles and other Eastern Europeans was agriculture and related food processing (‘agribusiness’), as WRS data show. The government Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) and several other reports into seasonal work in agriculture pointed to the growing trend towards greater capital investment and intensification in the sector. However, it appears that the availability of migrants from the new accession states in 2004 may have halted the decline in employment in an industry where workers were being substituted by labour-saving capital investment, so that the effect of the new workers was to slow investment as cheaper labour became available.11 In their submissions to the MAC, most employers complained of the continuing impossibility of recruiting British workers so that foreign workers in the industry were not displacing domestic ones. There was a trend in the industry towards vertical integration in which producers increasingly engage in PPP (picking, plucking and packing) activities, while developing closer associations with the supermarkets. The latter seek to derive ever greater value from producers while insisting on a highly flexible ‘just in time’ system of product delivery (Rogaly 2006). Accompanying these trends has been a declining core, full-time labour force and a burgeoning need for temporary workers deployed in a highly flexible fashion, necessitating the recruitment of workers who are reliable, flexible and compliant. McCollum and Findlay (2011) surveyed 61 employers and labour providers in hospitality and food production and processing in urban and rural areas of England and Scotland. They found that in some rural areas migrants formed the core as well as temporary workforce in food production and processing. It has also been suggested that the provision of tied accommodation in some rural areas, usually in the form of caravans and huts, helps recruit and retain migrant workers (Jentsch, de Lima, MacDonald 2007 – quoted in Trevena 2009).

Vacancies also existed in the hospitality industry where employers claimed that prior to 2004 most hotels were understaffed (McCollum, Findlay 2011). Initially employed in both core and temporary ‘back office’ jobs, Poles and others were more likely than domestic workers to see hospitality as a career and increasingly to take on more visible and senior roles. This was particularly the case for those with higher education: with mastery of the English language, talent emerged as natural skills and education came through. For those with developing careers, upward social mobility stabilised the population leading to longer stays and even settlement.

Role of agencies. An essential link between employers and migrant workers was provided by labour contracting agencies which recruited and placed employees. The substantial presence of Poles in the administrative and service sector referred to earlier is predominantly a reflection of their registration with employment agencies which were then recorded as their employers and from where they were able to take up temporary posts in a range of occupations across industries.

In agribusiness there was a direct connection between supermarket practices and the use of agency gang workers (Rogaly 2006). Only agencies, through the gangmasters licensing system, could provide the flexibility necessary when fine tuning of the work place regime was needed, perhaps in response to supermarket demands associated with a specific marketing initiative. However, part of that flexibility is the frequent lack of enforcement of the national minimum wage and of workplace regulations (MAC 2014). Agencies operated in other ways. Garapich (2008) points out that many of them were initially low-key, back-door, one-person businesses within the migrant community, for example helping others fill out forms and follow procedures, often easing the passage from the grey economy into a formal one. Pooling of resources was common, including the sharing of accommodation and finding jobs (Schneider, Holman 2009). Informal
networks were important in the hospitality sector, being an inexpensive, quick and stress-free way for employers to recruit good quality workers (McCollum, Findlay 2011). Latterly networks have developed into a multitude of websites and internet radio stations geared to helping migrants as well as organising events such as one-day job fairs.

Conclusions

Statistical summary

Using the available statistical evidence, we have compiled as comprehensive a picture as possible of the scale and nature of the new Polish migration to the UK. Its major traits may be summarised as follows.

Sources from the two countries are in broad agreement on the stocks of Poles in the UK at various times. The UK census recorded 676,000 Polish born in 2011. LFS data show a steady rise in the annual stock to 658,000 in 2011, not far short of the census figure for that year, to 679,000 in 2013 before a steep rise to 826,000 in 2014. Meanwhile, Polish LFS and census statistics indicate that by December 2012 an estimated 637,000 had stayed in the UK for more than 3 months.

Estimates of the flow vary because the definitions and counting systems used present differing pictures. By the time of its demise in April 2011, the WRS had registered 705,890 Poles. Allowing for those who should have registered but did not, it may be estimated that about 920,000 employees came in. To these must be added the self-employed, giving a total of about 1.14 million by 2011. This compares with one million NINos issued to Poles by 2011 and 1.164 million by 2013. What we do not know is how many, having registered, came to the UK and returned on more than one occasion. Survey evidence suggests the number may have been substantial. Furthermore, these two sources omit children aged under 15 who comprised more than one in ten Polish born in England and Wales in the 2011 UK census.

Data from both countries on the characteristics of Poles coming to the UK suggest an evolving stream. Polish statistics suggest a more ‘elite’ flow to the UK than to other countries. The UK census pictures a maturing settled population, still tending to occupy relatively lower skilled jobs but showing evidence of upward social mobility.

Towards an explanation

In many respects the movement between Poland and the UK followed a common pattern in Western Europe in the second half of the 20th century. Examples include Italians to Switzerland in the 1950s and 1960s, Turks and Yugoslavs to Germany and Portuguese to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s. Initial flows of labour were transformed into settled communities which continue to this day. What was to some extent different from the moves discussed here is the more direct role of employers in the initial recruitment in these older flows and the stronger role then played by economic growth in a Europe still recovering from the Second World War.

In addressing the question put forward in this paper, we deliberately focused on underlying structural factors, and followed an approach that was in contrast to much of the existing research dealing mainly with the individual strategies of migrants. We sought general explanations rather than inquiring into the range of observed diversity. Unlike several other authors who investigated the causes of the post-accession migration from the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe, including migration of Poles to the UK (e.g. Burrell 2006, 2010; Cook, Dwyer, Waite 2011; Galasińska, Kozłowska 2009; Luthra et al. 2014; Ryan,
Sales, Tilki, Siara 2009), we argue that the principal motive (and at the same time the guiding premise of predominant strategies) of Polish emigrants was gainful employment in the UK. This is why it was so important for the post-accession flow of arriving Poles that the UK labour market was accessible to them instantly and unconditionally.

Our position is supported by evidence from the UK census and elsewhere (IPPR 2007) that, compared with other nationalities, Poles in the UK had high levels of employment and low levels of inactivity. Therefore we argue that personal motives such as education enhancement, female liberation/emancipation, adventure or curiosity were not the main driving force of Polish migrant strategies. In particular, the paradigm of ‘fluid migration’ (Engbersen 2012) whose central part was young and adventurous ‘vagabond’ acting, with no clear strategy and following a philosophy of ‘intentional unpredictability’ (Eade, Drinkwater, Garapich 2007), certainly did not reflect the behaviours of a large majority of Poles moving to the UK.

It has been demonstrated in the foregoing analysis that answering the question included in the title of this paper is not an easy task. Any question that asks ‘why’ inevitably seeks a helping hand in theory. Unfortunately, the recent migration of Poles to Britain revealed so many significant determinants involving the interplay of a wide variety of factors that it hardly fits any theoretical framework applied to analyses of current intra-European population movements. In particular, the migration of Poles has not resulted from any predominant single cause, such as wage differentials, recruitment of labour, collective household strategies (those in line with the New Economics of Labour Migration postulate) or migration networks. Nor could it be satisfactorily explained by such all-embracing but dangerously vague concepts as ‘pull and push’ theory as manifest in the strikingly different pattern of migration to Germany and the most recent movement to the UK. This difference is of particular relevance as a warning signal of the dangers in applying that explanatory framework to current post-accession emigration. Indeed, the complexity and diversity of underlying causes have been supported by a number of empirical studies, which point to a variety of motives and strategies followed by Polish post-accession migrants, both among those heading for a specific country (like the UK) or in a comparative international scope (Eade et al. 2007; Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski 2009; Kaczmarczyk 2008; Krings, Moriarty, Wickham, Bobek, Salamońska 2013; Luthra et al. 2014; White 2011, 2013).

We are in agreement with those who argue that the phenomenon of mass Polish post-accession migration (and, consequently, also the movement to the UK) over an unprecedented short time (compared to other voluntary movements of population) needs a new approach (and explanatory framework) since the movement represents a novelty in an entirely new global environment and historical context (Engbersen, Snel, de Boom 2010; Favell 2008; Luthra et al. 2014). It might be epitomised by means of three complementary and mutually indispensable adjectives: right people in the right place under right circumstances.

The concept of ‘right people’ embraces the surplus (reinforced by the ‘boom’ of young labour market entrants/higher school graduates) and structural mismatches of labour in Poland, post-communist anomy (migration as one viable strategy to overcome that, similar to migration as a response to social disorder accompanying rapid urbanisation, as described by Thomas and Znaniecki), high educational and cultural competence/maturity (including widespread knowledge of the English language) and awareness of freedoms and entitlements stemming from ‘European citizenship’. Furthermore, at least since 1939 Poles had been generally favourably regarded by the British.

The ‘right place’ was the UK labour market, although it was not immediately apparent at the time. The economy was growing rapidly but there was a reluctance among domestic workers to undertake many of the jobs available at the wage rates on offer. Migrant workers willing to work for minimum (or less) wages allowed employers to avoid capital investment that would have increased productivity in, for example, food processing. In service provision, such as hospitality, migrants provided flexibility in working practices that reduced costs. In addition, public attitudes towards the inflow of people from new EU member states were
generally favourable. Coincidental with this was the ‘compression’ of the physical distance between Poland and the UK through a rapid development of non-costly and effective transport, communication and information facilities between the two countries. This made it possible to achieve the high levels of flexibility required by both employers and migrants.

Finally, by the ‘right circumstances’ we mean the juncture of Poland’s accession to the EU with the decision taken by the UK government to grant immediate access to the British labour market. That other countries did not follow suit meant the lack of any strong competition from other receiving countries.

It was the coincidence of these three circumstances – a perfect migration storm – that allowed a wider set of personal reasons to come into play.

Notes

1 In Polish statistical terms, ‘official emigration’ (or emigration recognised as such by the public statistics) is a far cry from the real world. It requires individuals to cancel their Polish domicile prior to departure to be counted (i.e. included in the population register) as an emigrant, which few comply with.

2 Temporary migrants are persons whose duration of stay in a foreign country at the time of measurement was at least three months (two months before 2007) and who retain their official domicile in Poland.

3 The Office for National Statistics suggests that the overall totals derived from the IPS should be adjusted. IPS data are based on intentions and so it is likely that they exclude most people seeking asylum and dependants of asylum seekers. An adjustment is made for these. Further adjustments are made for other people who intend to be migrants but who in reality stay in the UK or abroad for less than a year and for those who state an initial intention to stay for more than a year but actually leave before this. These adjustments are used to produce Long-Term International Migration (LTIM) flows.

4 For instance, register statistics show that in 2006 80.3 per cent and in 2012 56.0 per cent of emigrants were 20–39 years old (86.7 per cent and 70.9 per cent for emigrants aged 15+, respectively), while the proportion of children under 15 increased in that period from 9.1 to 22.2 per cent.

5 On journeys to and life in the UK of Polish citizens in early months after the accession, see for instance articles published in Dziennik Polski (London) by Bugajski (2004), Garapich, Foczpański (2004); Śpiwok (2005); Wiśniowska (2006) and others.

6 All data in this paragraph were derived from the Polish CSO statistics.

7 According to a UN estimate, that proportion was to rise from 46.1 per cent in 1990 to 51.2 per cent in 2015, whereas the total population size was to remain stable (UN 2009).

8 All data in this paragraph were derived from national statistics of the respective countries.

9 Directly-paid benefits are primarily pay for leave time, bonuses and pay in kind.

10 All data in this and preceding paragraphs were derived from the Polish CSO statistics.

11 We are indebted to Professor Alan Manning of the London School of Economics for this insight.

12 Luthra and co-authors (2014) extend that list of ‘non-economic motivation of the new EU migrants’ by including migration for love or adventure (Favell 2011), migration for self-development (Cook et al. 2011), migration to realise family goals (Ryan 2010), migration maximising friendship networks (Conradson, Latham, 2005), migration for lifestyle improvement (Benson, O’Reilly 2009; Crowley-Henry 2010) and even (in case of young people) for ‘seeking a lark’ (Galasińska, Kozłowska 2009).
References


CRONEM (Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism) (n.d.). Polish Migrant Survey Results, commissioned by the BBC Newsnight. Guildford: University of Surrey.


The Re-Emergence of European East–West Migration – the Austrian Example
Heinz Fassmann*, Josef Kohlbacher*, Ursula Reeger*

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain 25 years ago, the asymmetric Central European labour market that was cut off by different legal systems gradually disappeared and has now been replaced by a unified migration space, where the costs for migration or pendular mobility and the wage gain which migrants can achieve are the decisive factors in the decision of whether to migrate or not. Official statistics show that, over the past ten years, migration from the new member-states of 2004 and 2007 to the EU15 in general and to Austria – a country directly bordering many of the new EU member-states – in particular, has significantly gained in importance. This new East–West migration is characterised by high qualification, a concentration on employment-relevant age groups and high spatial flexibility. Migrants are moving if wage differentials are significant and employment opportunities are given and they return or move further away if the labour market loses its attractiveness. The new East–West migration can provide gains for the target regions, for the regions of departure and for the migrants themselves.

Keywords: East–West migration; push–pull theory; transnational labour market; Austria

Introduction
Central and Eastern Europe has undergone enormous political changes which have gone hand-in-hand with the gradual removal of migration-related barriers. Starting with the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 after 40 years of substantial constraints in individual mobility, the region saw Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995 and that of ten mostly Eastern European countries in 2004, followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Both the 2004 and 2007 enlargements went hand-in-hand with the implementation of transitional rules concerning labour-market access on the Austrian side, rules which were finally abolished for the 10 Eastern European member-states in May 2011 and for Romania and Bulgaria by the end of 2013 (cf. Engbersen 2012; Fassmann, Reeger 2012; Okólski 2012a).

With the removal of substantial legal constraints in individual mobility – the main hypothesis of this article – a push-and-pull-driven migration pattern becomes more and more important (cf. Kahanec, Kureková 2014). The decisive parameters of such an international migration are income differentials on the one hand and migration costs on the other. In other words, proximity between the potential regions of departure of
labour or pendular migrants, as well as income differences and employment opportunities, become more important than other factors (see also Parnreiter 2000). The migration space, divided due to international boundaries, and with its several asymmetric labour markets, will gradually be transformed into a unified migration space with symmetric labour markets around the large metropolises. Policy differences between the countries of origin and of destination also appear to be relevant, for example in terms of regulations on businesses and labour markets (Westmore 2014). Cross-country differences in structural economic policies may also explain international migration to some extent (Strzelecki, Wyszynski 2011).

This article focuses on this process and on the emergence of migration driven by push and pull factors. It is divided into four main sections. Firstly we explain the research question, the revisited push and pull model and (problems with) the available data used in the analysis. Secondly, we show the development of inflows, outflows and stocks of migration from the EU8+2 countries to the EU14 in general. In the third section we focus on the case of Austria and look in more detail into the stocks and flows – including some socio-demographic features – from Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). In a short concluding section we end with an emphasis on the growing importance of intra-European migration and mobility and review our three basic research questions.

**Research questions and the theoretical and empirical background**

**Research questions**

We assume that, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the accessions of 2004 and 2007 and the phasing out of the transitional rules, a push-and-pull-driven migration pattern becomes dominant. The decisive parameters in push-and-pull-driven migration are income differentials (in particular skill-specific wage differentials; see Westmore 2014) on the one hand and migration costs on the other (see, e.g., de Haas 2008; Hagen-Zanker 2008). Migration costs are, furthermore, linked to the distance or proximity of the regions of origin to the potential target regions (Kahanec, Pytliková, Zimmermann 2014). With the ongoing process of the emergence of a legally harmonised and unified European migration space, the push and pull factors became more and more important and the legal barriers weaker.

Our first research question examines the increase of international migration across the former Iron Curtain in the last decade. If the hypothesis concerning the importance of the push-and-pull-driven migration pattern is correct and if the large economic differences are still in effect, international migration between the former East and West will increase (see also Borchers, Breustedt 2008; Strzelecki, Wyszynski 2011). It will increase gradually and perhaps contradictory to a converging economic process, as the population starts to identify migration as a project via which to solve their socio-economic problems (Reniers 1999). It is important to note that Strzelecki and Wyszynski (2011) stressed the differences and changes in unemployment rates between countries – important factors for migratory flows, particularly at their later stage. People need time to adapt and to explore, therefore the scale of international migration could increase despite the fact that economic disparities are starting to decrease. The emergence of a legally harmonised and unified European migration space requires time.

Our second research question focuses on the emergence of transnational labour markets. If – once again – the hypothesis is correct that a push-and-pull-driven migration pattern is of considerable relevance (Borchers, Breustedt 2008), and if large economic differences are observable in adjacent regions, those regions will grow together and emerge as functional regions with flows of labour migrants in one direction and capital in the opposite direction. With the emergence of a legally harmonised and unified European migra-
tion space, geographical variables became more and more important. Proximity shapes and supports the emergence of transnational labour markets (see Hagen-Zanker 2008; Müller-Mahn 1999). We assume, therefore, that the over-proportional growth of such transnational labour markets is driven by the maximisation of migration gains (wage differentials) and, at the same time, the minimisation of migration costs by split households.

Our final research question focuses on the assumption that, if the push-and-pull-driven labour-migration pattern of our hypothesis does indeed become dominant and legal barriers disappear, then we should see high spatial flexibility and an increase of in- and out-migration. With the decline of barriers, the costs of migration fall. Minor signals from the labour market in potential target regions in terms of wages and labour opportunities are therefore stimulating the realisation of potential migration. We expect to see the dominance of labour migration and a focus on labour-market relevant attributes concerning age and qualification. The young and the well-qualified in the sending population will be the dominant group amongst the new East–West migrants because they react more quickly and are able to find employment outside their country of origin.

The push and pull model, revised on the basis of macro factors

In 1966, Everett Lee published his classic ‘Push and Pull Model,’ based on the general assumption that everybody is a potential migrant, evaluating the economic attractiveness of the place of residence and work and comparing it to other possible contexts in which to earn a living. After evaluating the complexity of economic attractiveness in one region compared to that of another region, perfectly informed and rational people are deciding whether or not to migrate. Historical ties are taken for granted in this approach, as are legal barriers and country-specific migration policies. The individually perceived and expected costs and benefits of migration are the only variables in the model.

In this context the attractiveness itself is the sum of location factors, which can be separated into positive so-called pull (or plus) factors and negative (minus) push factors (see Figure 1). Push factors are those circumstances which make it unattractive for a person to live in a particular place, region or country. These push factors could be high unemployment, low wages or perspectives that do not promise any change in the future. Pull – or positive – factors, in contrast, might be a high income, a favourable job or business opportunity and promising expectations. In this context, Lee emphasises that the perception of pull and push factors is differently defined for every (prospective) migrant, depending on his or her life style and personal circumstances. Lee also states that the decision to migrate is never completely rational and not all persons who migrate reach that decision themselves (Lee 1966: 51). For this reason, amongst others, he warns that factors which hold, attract or repel people are precisely understood neither by social scientists nor by the persons directly affected (Lee 1966: 50).

Whether or not an individual really decides to migrate depends on the balance of push and pull factors at home compared to the push and pull factors anywhere else. The balance in favour of the move must be enough to overcome the natural inertia which always exists (Lee 1966: 51), as well as any intervening obstacles. Obstacles can include distance and related transportation costs or the legal frameworks governing migration which may hinder migration or make it very costly. Finally, there are also personal factors which affect individual thresholds and facilitate or delay migration. In this connection, Lee emphasises that it is not the actual factors at origin and destination, but rather the perception of these factors, which results in migration.

In the original literature, the push and pull model is a concept which describes individual decision-making processes at a micro level. However, assuming that the principal idea of the push and pull model is valid – the balancing of push and pull factors at home compared to the push and pull factors anywhere else, followed by the
decision to migrate or to stay – then the model can be transferred to the macro level of regions or countries. The migration from one region to the other will be directly proportional to differences in attractiveness (labour-market-related factors like wages and unemployment, for example, and welfare and social benefits) and indirectly proportional to constraints on migration, such as distance, transportation costs and political barriers in particular.

**Figure 1. Push and pull factors and constraints to migration – an illustration**

![Diagram of push and pull factors to migration](Image)


Most models at the macro level refer to two main macro-economic variables that affect the migration decision: wage differences and employment opportunities (Pytliková 2006: 78). In aggregate terms, the differentials in wages and the probability of being unemployed are typically proxied by GDP per capita levels in destination and source countries in combination with (un)employment rates. Migration stocks and, thus, established networks, usually foster migratory movements in reducing migration costs and in steering the direction of migration flows by perpetuating them (Bauer, Zimmermann 1999). Finally the distance from the origin to the destination country shows a statistically significant negative influence on migration flows, supporting the theoretical considerations of the costs and risks of movement on the migration decision (Fields 1991). Recently this was confirmed by Kahanec et al. (2014: 20), who emphasised that, in addition to mere geographical distance, linguistic proximity is also significantly associated with stronger emigration flows. Despite some justified criticism of the model (Müller-Mahn 1999; Parreiter 2000; Zolberg 1989) and debate about whether or not it is flexible enough to enable analysis of the complex interactions between migration factors, it is still relevant from our perspective. This position was confirmed by Borchers and Breustedt (2008: 16) who worked out the relevance of the model for migration projections and potentials. They proposed an extended push and pull model, taking into account a multitude of factors and making the model more meaningful. Braun and Topan (1998), in particular, emphasised that a diversification of the factors in sending and receiving regions would be necessary. Strzelecki and Wyszynski (2011) have strongly argued for a more distinctive analysis of the relevant push and pull factors of Polish migration, but this does not mean that the model as such has become obsolete (see also Westmore 2014) as a basis for empirical analysis.

**Data situation**

For the following analysis on migrant stocks in and flows to Austria we rely on data from the Austrian Population Register (on an annual basis) and from the register-based census. Generally it has to be acknowledged
that official statistics may fail to give a ‘complete picture’ in this respect, as they do not provide information, for example, on duration of stay or migration motives. Furthermore, some migrants either do not register (as they do not intend to stay for a longer period of time or even commute on a daily basis from neighbouring countries) or they deregister upon leaving again, as there are virtually no negative consequences for them and they are thus not depicted in official data. However, the population register is well elaborated and functional. Living in Austria for a longer period of time without being captured in the register is highly unlikely.

We should also point out that statistics are often quite slow to accurately reflect what is happening and it may take a long time for data to be available. This time lag has also proven to be a problem for this article. For some aspects the data are quite up-to-date – e.g. for numbers up until 2013; on the other hand, flow data are only available until 2013, so nothing can be said about the effect of the end of the transitional rules for Romania and Bulgaria at the end of that year.

The time-lag problem also applies to the data which we use for the analysis of migration from EU8 and EU2 countries to the EU15 in general. We sourced data on the population in the EU15 by countries of origin and destination from Eurostat, which relies on member-states sending in their national data. This is a principal issue when using Eurostat data – they are just as valid and reliable as national statistics. Eurostat has neither the potential nor the official mandate to collect data on their own. Migration data pose problems, in particular, of comparability (different concepts and definitions) and availability (cf. Fassmann, Reeger, Sievers 2009).


With the accession to the EU of the most important countries of origin of traditional East–West migration in 2004 and 2007, a common European migration space was created for the first time. However, this new freedom of movement was not accompanied by a freedom to work and so, in most Western EU countries, free access to the labour market did not immediately exist for citizens of these ‘new’ EU countries. Germany and Austria, in particular, both sharing borders with some of the accession states, kept their labour markets closed for citizens of new EU countries until 1 May 2011 (2013 for Romania and Bulgaria). However, in factual terms, the transitional rules did not limit the freedom of settlement as such. As a result, it has become possible for citizens of the new EU states to move to any other member-state as students or retirees or to join family members. They also have the right to establish businesses in any EU member-state and thus to work in a self-employed capacity (cf. Engbersen 2012; Fassmann, Reeger 2012; Okólski 2012b).

CEE migrants by country of origin

Since the EU enlargement of 2004, the size – as well as the structure – of the immigrant population from CEECs has changed noticeably in the EU15. Before 1 May 2004, there were fewer than 1.2 million CEE citizens legally residing there. However, this figure did not include any current data for France, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg. If these countries are included, the estimated number in 2003 rises to approximately 1.5 million CEE citizens. In Western Europe, the share of immigrants from CEECs was thus slightly below 7 per cent of all foreign residents officially living in the EU15.

By 2007, however, the number of CEE citizens in the EU15 had more than doubled to just over 2.6 million (see Table 1). Again, this figure contains no data for France, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg; however, if estimates for these countries are included, the number was around 2.9 million in 2007. The increase was therefore more than 100 per cent within four years. This contradicted the popular expectation that East–West migration within the EU could actually be prevented through restrictive transitional regulations. As most
EU15 countries had been granting CEE citizens access to their labour markets since 2006–2007, this rate of increase has continued.

Table 1. CEE citizens in selected EU15 countries by country of origin in 2003–2011 (absolute numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2003 = 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>103 899</td>
<td>155 779</td>
<td>210 645</td>
<td>304 096</td>
<td>362 360</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>44 114</td>
<td>50 274</td>
<td>60 506</td>
<td>67 146</td>
<td>71 039</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>19 705</td>
<td>22 057</td>
<td>27 446</td>
<td>34 460</td>
<td>43 168</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>12 799</td>
<td>14 561</td>
<td>19 047</td>
<td>22 224</td>
<td>33 399</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>32 861</td>
<td>59 326</td>
<td>93 529</td>
<td>120 090</td>
<td>169 755</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>81 308</td>
<td>76 963</td>
<td>92 247</td>
<td>113 315</td>
<td>135 412</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>471 561</td>
<td>566 047</td>
<td>946 681</td>
<td>1 272 609</td>
<td>1 415 553</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>334 054</td>
<td>673 439</td>
<td>1 057 858</td>
<td>1 851 478</td>
<td>2 161 710</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>33 109</td>
<td>42 683</td>
<td>57 168</td>
<td>68 104</td>
<td>77 307</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>30 199</td>
<td>31 553</td>
<td>34 506</td>
<td>35 225</td>
<td>36 062</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total CEECs</td>
<td>1 165 612</td>
<td>1 694 687</td>
<td>2 601 640</td>
<td>3 890 756</td>
<td>4 507 776</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign residents</td>
<td>17 223 622</td>
<td>19 586 664</td>
<td>22 206 835</td>
<td>24 875 965</td>
<td>26 236 656</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Information on the number of foreign residents from CEECs not (completely for all years) available for France, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg, these countries have been excluded from the present analysis; data for Belgium, Portugal and the UK have partly been extrapolated. UK data only include Lithuania, Poland and Romania.

Source: Eurostat; own calculations.

By the end of the observation period (2011), the number of CEE citizens in the EU15 had again risen sharply, despite the fact that some economic indicators showed a tendency towards convergence. By 2011, 4.5 million East-West migrants resided in Western European countries; their number has grown almost fourfold since 2003. If we once again include estimates for France, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg, the figure stands at about 4.8 million people. In 2003, the share of immigrants from CEECs in the EU15 countries under consideration amounted to 7 per cent, growing steadily to 11.7 per cent in 2007, 15.6 per cent in 2009 and finally 17.2 per cent in 2011.

For the whole period, immigration into the EU15 was primarily from Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. In general, these three countries are characterised by lower income levels than some other new EU-member states, and there had, in fact, already been significant emigration from them over the previous 15 years. In contrast, no significant rise in emigration occurred from the Czech Republic, Hungary (until 2007) and Slovenia following EU accession. On the contrary, immediately after 2004 the number of Hungarian citizens in the EU15 decreased, whereas that of Slovenian citizens remained about the same. At the same time, these three countries increasingly became destination countries for immigration from other EU, as well as third, countries. After 2007 this situation changed: Hungary became a main ‘exporting’ country for migrants due to its disastrous economic performance, rising unemployment and real costs of income.

**CEE migrants by country of destination**

The migrants from CEECs were, however, not evenly distributed throughout the EU15 (without France, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg due to the unavailability of data). In 2007 the largest group resided in Spain (767 700), followed by the UK (386 000 Lithuanians, Poles and Romanians only, unofficially 700 000), Germany (682 800) and Italy (456 300). The vast majority of all CEE migrants were registered in these four...
countries, with Spain and Italy only recently having become significant destination countries for migrants from CEECs. By 2011, the general distribution had not much changed, though the growth was considerable in some countries. Generally speaking, it is important to note that Austria and Germany display the lowest growth rates, demonstrating the effectiveness of the transition rules on the one hand and the high proportion of CEE citizens in the starting year 2003 already living in Germany and Austria on the other. Italy and Spain are amongst the countries with the strongest growth, both with more than one million migrants from CEECs in 2011.

The highest immigrant increase from CEECs can be found in Portugal (though from a low level), Spain, the UK and Italy (see Table 2). In contrast, Germany – up to the 1990s, still the most important destination for European East–West migration – recorded a decline in legal foreign residents from CEECs until 2006. This was partly due to high unemployment and partly to the restrictive transitional regime and a stricter control system. In the Scandinavian countries of Finland, Denmark and Sweden the increase was comparatively lower. This is quite surprising for Sweden, as free access to the labour market was immediately possible there up to 2005. In Austria, applying the restrictive transitional regime, the increase between 2003 and 2011 amounted to 91 per cent.

Table 2. CEE citizens in selected EU15 countries by destination country in 2003–2011 (absolute numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2003 = 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>82 258</td>
<td>95 273</td>
<td>109 007</td>
<td>135 440</td>
<td>157 258</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>21 047</td>
<td>45 377</td>
<td>69 708</td>
<td>80 552</td>
<td>119 077</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>11 394</td>
<td>12 703</td>
<td>18 458</td>
<td>35 310</td>
<td>47 399</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>15 624</td>
<td>17 377</td>
<td>21 890</td>
<td>29 127</td>
<td>37 206</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>597 480</td>
<td>551 360</td>
<td>682 843</td>
<td>761 767</td>
<td>870 123</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>143 794</td>
<td>331 978</td>
<td>456 339</td>
<td>966 170</td>
<td>1 162 427</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15 959</td>
<td>22 827</td>
<td>33 821</td>
<td>64 527</td>
<td>93 817</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1 815</td>
<td>9 392</td>
<td>16 964</td>
<td>36 727</td>
<td>48 256</td>
<td>2 659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>190 355</td>
<td>426 240</td>
<td>767 670</td>
<td>1 101 077</td>
<td>1 157 899</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>24 499</td>
<td>26 427</td>
<td>36 837</td>
<td>59 766</td>
<td>74 954</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>59 384</td>
<td>153 728</td>
<td>386 096</td>
<td>618 284</td>
<td>737 349</td>
<td>1 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total CEECs in EU15</td>
<td>1 165 612</td>
<td>1 694 687</td>
<td>2 601 640</td>
<td>3 890 756</td>
<td>4 507 776</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Information on the number of foreign residents from CEECs not (completely for all years) available for France, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg; data for Belgium, Portugal and the UK have partly been extrapolated. UK data only include Lithuania, Poland and Romania.

Source: Eurostat; own calculations.

For the whole observation period we can assume that the CEE migration to EU15 countries was largely temporary and circular in character, facilitated by the free movement regime within the EU. This is in line with the growing importance of return migration, since the labour markets in the sending countries of East–West migration offer increasing job opportunities (Cassarino 2004; Dustmann, Bentolila, Faini 1996; Ghosh 2001). With recovering economies in the home countries and growing migration costs in the countries of destination, returning home is an option for at least some of the East–West migrants. It is also likely that one of the consequences of the economic crisis was more intense circular migration amongst EU15 and EU8+2 countries. According to Grabowska-Lusińska (2010), even those who choose to return to Poland for good do not rule out further short-term emigration. Indeed, it has been observed that Polish returnees, after spending some time back in Poland, re-emigrate – often to the country of the first emigration (Barcevičius, Iglicka, Repčákaitė, Žvalionytė 2012: 8).
CEE migrants in Austria

Inflow and outflow

Turning to the Austrian situation and focusing on the ten countries that are primarily of interest, the cumulative migration balances with both EU8 and EU2 countries were always positive between 2002 and 2013, with the inflows always being higher than the outflows (see Figure 2). The year 2004 marked a first peak of the inflow overhang; in 2005 a regressive trend started that lasted until 2010. As of 2011, a new take-off phase began, easily explained by the termination of transitional rules for the EU8 countries. From 2011 onwards, Austria guaranteed free access to the labour market for EU8 citizens and, from the beginning of 2014, for citizens from Romania and Bulgaria.

Figure 2. Inflows and outflows from EU8 and EU2 in 2002–2013

The ten countries under consideration show widely varying inflows and outflows in the years from 2002 until 2012. For some of these countries, Austria is an extremely attractive destination, with its existing networks and geographical proximity whilst, for others, it is not an option in terms of migration, mostly due to greater distances, other more attractive destinations or a generally lower level of emigration. Overall, 309 000 persons born in one of the ten CEECs entered Austria between 2002 and 2012, and 192 000 left.3

Though migration relations between Austria and Romania are comparatively new, Austria is the country with the highest cumulative inflow between 2002 and 2012 (92 300 persons) and displaying the highest positive migration balance (38 700). It is followed by Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, countries that share a long migration history with Austria, and the Vienna region in particular (see Table 3). Flow data prove that – at least up to now – Austria has not been an important destination for people from the Baltic countries or Slovenia.

Romania entered the EU in 2007, which is clearly reflected in the flow data. Until 2006, Romanians were, legally, third-country nationals and the number of persons registering in Austria remained at around only
5 000 persons per year. As from 2007 we see a pronounced rise, with 9 000 entries by 2009 and a peak of 13 400 entries in 2012. Outflows remained considerably lower, resulting in a pronounced positive net migration.

### Table 3. Inflows, outflows and net migration of persons born in CEECs from and to Austria, 2002–2012 cumulative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Inflow</th>
<th>In %</th>
<th>Outflow</th>
<th>In %</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
<th>In %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>92 251</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>53 583</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>38 668</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>60 351</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>35 717</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>24 634</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>59 127</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>37 505</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>21 622</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>43 128</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>27 400</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15 728</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>24 469</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>15 100</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9 369</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>16 759</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>13 949</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2 810</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>8 059</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6 110</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1 949</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1 648</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2 302</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1 534</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>308 768</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>192 127</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>116 641</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Austria, Population Register. Sorted descending by net migration.

In the case of Hungary, the balance has seen almost continual growth (with the exception of 2006), and reached an interim peak in 2011 (the year in which the transitional rules were abolished), with 9 638 persons registering in Austria, the highest number for all countries under consideration and for all points in time. The trend is not as clear for Poland. From 2004 until 2009 the balance diminished and was near zero by 2009; however, it then improved and reached 6 907 persons in 2011. The migration balance for Slovakia fluctuated constantly between 2002 and 2011. Inflow grew in 2011, as did outflow, though at a lower level. Finally, official migration from the Czech Republic to Austria was very stable in the previous decade, at a very low level, with about 1 200 people entering and around 1 000 Czechs leaving Austria every year.

### Population stock

Table 4 again focuses on the ten countries that are of interest in this analysis. In total, 295 500 persons who were born in a CEEC are currently officially registered in Austria; their total number has grown by 41 per cent since 2002. A quarter emigrated from Romania, with Poles second in quantitative terms, making up more than a fifth. Hungary (16.3 per cent) and the Czech Republic (14.1 per cent) are third and fourth in this ‘ranking’ of 2013. However, not all groups have been growing in quantitative terms between 2002 and 2013: the number of Czechs and Slovenians fell over the previous decade, a consequence of the mortality of the population born in the Czech Republic and Slovenia and expelled after World War II. Furthermore, Table 4 proves that immigration from the Baltic States is more or less irrelevant in the case of Austria.

Accession of the CEECs to the EU in 2004 as such did not immediately leave a significant trace in the development because regulations still existed which reduced the free admission of labour from Eastern-European EU countries into Austria. The number of gainfully employed CEE citizens has been growing since 2000. Before the EU accession of CEECs (and for citizens of new EU member-states for as long as the transition regulations still applied), one way of gaining access to the labour market was through seasonal work, predominantly in tourism and harvesting.
Table 4. Austrian population born in CEECs in 2002 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>2002 Abs.</th>
<th>2002 In %</th>
<th>2013 Abs.</th>
<th>2013 In %</th>
<th>Change abs.</th>
<th>Change in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>39 149</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>73 904</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>34 755</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>41 337</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>63 242</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>21 905</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>30 722</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>48 137</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>17 415</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>56 739</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>41 618</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>-15 121</td>
<td>-26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>12 796</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>29 963</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>17 167</td>
<td>134.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>20 573</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>18 871</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-1 702</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7 601</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>17 043</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>9 442</td>
<td>124.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1 158</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>228.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1 137</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>241.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>205.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>209 741</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>295 494</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>85 753</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Austria, Population Register; own calculation.

Statistics from the Federation of Austrian Social Insurance Institutions mirror the situation on the Austrian labour market in the two years following abolition of the transitional labour market restrictions. Thus, the number of legally employed Hungarians increased extremely quickly over the two years from March 2011 (28 219) to March 2013 (55 327) and they are now the second largest group of migrants (after Germans) on the Austrian labour market. During the same period the employment of Slovaks almost doubled (from 11 203 to 22 461). The number of Poles grew from 18 060 to 26 694 whilst, in the Czech case, the increase was rather more modest – from 9 033 to 12 200. There is virtually no displacement of the Austrian workforce by this inflow but, instead, the replacement of a poorly qualified foreign labour force by better-qualified CEE citizens.

The emergence of transnational labour markets: Austria and its neighbours

The fast-growing influx after transitional rules ended clearly demonstrates how flexible the workers from the neighbouring countries are. They make their decision to migrate based on the costs and gains of mobility and are able to re-orientate their destination countries within a short period of time. Most striking is the importance of distance and of neighbouring countries for the regional distribution of EU8 and EU2 migrants in Austria. For all CEE migrants, Vienna and its urban region is the most important target, though in differing proportions – a distribution that can be easily explained by the geographical distance and the possibility of commuting from the neighbouring countries of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The capital of Slovakia is adjacent to the Austrian-Slovakian border. The construction of a motorway to connect the two capitals was completed in recent years. From city limit to city limit, in reasonable traffic, the journey takes 45 minutes. Both are Schengen countries and thus the border control was abolished after the accession of Slovakia to the EU. However, commuters and short-term migrants do not exclusively originate from the Bratislava region, which is – compared to other Slovakian regions – a relatively high-wage region. The catchment area of near-border mobility includes the poorer regions in the east of Slovakia (cf. Kahanec, Kureková 2014: 7) as well as the western part of Hungary.

Map 1 illustrates the distribution of EU8+2 citizens in Austria as a percentage of the population in each municipality. There is, in general, a high concentration in the enlarged Viennese urban area and some further spots of high concentration in other municipalities, mainly linked to job opportunities in tourism, agriculture, forestry and specific health resorts. Geographical distance to the regions of origin of these EU8+2 citizens
seems to be an important factor. In addition to the foreign resident population, commuters from the neighbouring countries strengthen these transnational relations. Migration from Austria’s neighbouring countries still has a largely temporary and circular component. The migrants are reacting to unemployment or low pay, and to the lack of job opportunities in their country of origin, by a quick return home, where the costs of living are (still) substantially lower (Okólski 2012b: 35). Furthermore there is empirical evidence, at least for Polish migrants, that the circular pattern has become more diversified since 2007, with an increasing share settling down in their destination country (Kaczmarczyk 2014).

Map 1. Share of EU8+2 citizens in the total population in Austria on the municipal level in 2011

The emergence of a transnational labour market has been evident over the last decade, but it includes more than migrants and commuters. Some of the Austrian villages in the east are now, essentially, suburbs of Bratislava due to cheap land prices and good accessibility. In recent decades the urban area around Vienna has expanded significantly to the south, and it is now realistic to assume that the east–west axis will be the decisive direction for future settlement.

Basic socio-demographic features of CEE migrants in Austria

Sex and age

In the early phase, when immigration from CEECs re-emerged, labour migrants were – typically, for new migration flows – young, male and well-educated (Fassmann, Hintermann 1997; Fassmann, Kollar 1996). Thus, in 1991, when immigration from CEECs began in greater numbers, the demographic selectivity of the labour force coming to Austria was rather pronounced (cf. Fassmann, Hintermann, Kohlbacher, Reeger 1999). The majority of East–West migrants was made up of young, economically active males who were
more often willing to take on migration-related risks, as they were usually ‘footloose and fancy-free.’ In 1991 the proportion of male migrants amongst all CEE migrants was around 70 per cent, with only a limited margin of variation between the individual sending countries. At the same time, they were very young, with around one third and – in the case of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic – even 43 per cent under 30 years old (for Polish migration, cf. Kaczmarczyk 2014: 129).

The gender composition has changed dramatically since the fall of the Iron Curtain, female migrants from the CEECs (over 15 years old) becoming more prevalent and today clearly outnumbering males in almost all age groups. Women from CEECs can very often be found in all sub-segments of the service sector, such as in private households, in child- as well as elderly-care (cf. Kahanec, Kureková 2014: 13). These are fields of occupation where demand is strong in Austria, thus providing a considerable numbers of jobs, but generally subject to modest incomes and often organised on an informal basis.

The current age structure of CEE migrants demonstrates a concentration in the age groups relevant to the labour market. Around 45.2 per cent of the population born in the EU8 and 60.6 per cent born in the EU2 are in the age group 15–44 years. The proportion of the under 15-year-old population is significantly below the Austrian average. The high proportion of elderly people, not typical for labour migration, must be mentioned – the majority of them born in one of the countries of the EU8 were from the Czech Republic. The figures reflect migrations to Austria that date back to the post-war period: displaced persons from the Sudeten region and asylum-seekers during the time of the so-called Prague Spring (see Enengel, Fassmann, Kohlbacher, Reeger 2014).

Table 5. Age of persons born in CEECs and in Austria in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age in years</th>
<th>EU8</th>
<th>EU2</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>In %</td>
<td>Abs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 15</td>
<td>11 736</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6 457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 44</td>
<td>98 547</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>59 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 59</td>
<td>43 569</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>19 987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and more</td>
<td>64 041</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>12 059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>217 893</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>97 745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Austria, Population register; own calculation.

**Education**

An important characteristic of East–West migration affecting guestworker migration from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey of the 1960s and 1970s is the above-average level of education of many more recent immigrants (Fassmann et al. 1999; Fassmann, Kohlbacher, Reeger 2004) which has made brain drain an integral part of this migration stream since 1989 (Iredale 2001). The majority of the guestworkers from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia were often educated only to primary-school level, and some were illiterate. The proportion of secondary academic school graduates was almost negligible.

In contrast to the guestworker migration, the new East–West migration is characterised by a high level of formal and occupational qualifications (Kaczmarczyk 2014: 133). The statistics show that the share of migrants from EU10 and EU2 countries with a tertiary education is higher than that of the Austrian-born population (cf. also Kahanec, Kureková 2014: 15). Slightly over 17 per cent of EU10 immigrants finish tertiary education (see Table 6). On the other hand, however, almost one in three immigrants born in Romania or Bulgaria has only primary-school education compared to the Austrian-born at 25.6 per cent (cf. Enengel et al. 2014).
Table 6. Educational level of persons born in Austria, the EU10 and EU2, aged 15 and older in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>EU10</th>
<th>EU2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>In %</td>
<td>Abs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1 516 260</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>49 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>3 753 835</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>103 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>662 283</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>31 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5 932 378</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>184 467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Austria, Register-based Census 2011; own calculation.

The educational profile of CEEC migrants was, and remains, markedly higher than the Austrian average. This fact continues to contrast with how migrants, in particular women, from CEECs often accept downward mobility in terms of status and qualifications and often become trapped in particular de-skilling jobs and sectors, with low wages and few opportunities for upward mobility in the labour market (Kaczmarczyk 2014: 133; Lendvai 2010: 8). Favell (2008: 711) highlights the danger of the ambitious ‘New Europeans’... becoming a new Victorian servant class for a West European aristocracy of creative-class professionals and university-educated working mums. This may sound too drastic, but female migrants holding a teacher’s diploma or even a PhD and working in Austria in child or geriatric care is not an uncommon occurrence, though it is becoming less relevant in quantitative terms.

Qualifications and training obtained in Austria are key to gaining employment that correlates to the level of educational attainment acquired. The duration of stay and length of employment are other important factors when seeking adequate employment. In the medium-skill segment, over-qualification is fairly rare, particularly in the case of an apprenticeship education (Bock-Schapelwein, Bremberger, Hierländer, Huber, Knittler, Berger, Hofer, Miess, Strohner 2009). University graduates are more likely to work below their skill levels, especially if they have not graduated from an Austrian university. This is particularly true for those persons who migrate to Austria at a more mature age, say over 40 (Biffl 2011).

**Occupational status**

The current activity status of CEE migrants compared to the Austrian population allows an assessment to be made of important social groups, like the economically active, the unemployed, students, retirees and other non-economically active people (cf. Enengel et al. 2014). About 50 per cent of EU10 and 56 per cent of EU2 migrants are economically active, but have a higher share of unemployment than the Austrian-born population (unemployment rates: Austria – 4.9 per cent, EU10 – 8.0 per cent, EU2 – 8.8 per cent). Children, pupils and students as part of the non-economically active population are under-represented amongst CEE migrants. As a consequence of the definition of migrants as a foreign-born population that includes elderly people who migrated decades ago (e.g. from the Czech Republic), the share of retirees is higher among EU10 migrants (28.7 per cent) than among Austrians (23.2 per cent) and quite low for Romanians and Bulgarians (10.5 per cent).

An interesting group is that of ‘other non-working persons,’ which is made up of people aged 15 years and older who are either co-insured with another person, have an income from their own capital, or are not economically active due to other reasons (e.g. housewives). Of Romanians and Bulgarians, 23.3 per cent are part of this group and the share of EU10 migrants is also almost three times higher than in the Austrian population. Many of them probably form part of the informal labour market while being officially registered as part of the resident population.
Table 7. Activity status of persons born in Austria, EU10 and EU2 in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity status</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>EU10</th>
<th>EU2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>In %</td>
<td>Abs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active, employed</td>
<td>3 369 282</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>86 966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>175 168</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7 613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons below the age of 15 years</td>
<td>1 153 778</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>8 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirees</td>
<td>1 644 992</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>55 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils and students aged 15 years and older</td>
<td>311 312</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3 588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-working persons</td>
<td>431 624</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>31 083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7 086 156</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>192 708</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Austria, Register-based Census 2011; own calculation.

The analysis of the occupational status of East–West migrants on the Austrian labour market in the 1990s was clear: although their level of qualification was quite high – not only compared to other migrants but also to Austrian citizens – they only had limited access to the labour market in the lower segments (see Bauer 1996). High proportions of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers and fewer opportunities to find white-collar positions painted an undoubtedly pessimistic picture. At the end of the 1990s we argued that dequalification was the price which East–West migrants had to pay for access to the Austrian labour market (Fassmann et al. 1999). The widespread phenomenon of occupational de-qualification was empirically proven for the Austrian Polonia by Fassmann, Kohlbacher, Reeger (1995, 2004) and for East–West migration in general by Morocvasic (1994) and Morocvasic, de Tinguy (1993).

Table 8. Occupational positions of economically active CEE migrants and Austrians in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational position</th>
<th>EU10</th>
<th>EU2</th>
<th>Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>In %</td>
<td>Abs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainfully employed</td>
<td>81 705</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>39 483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed total</td>
<td>12 038</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7 673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed with staff</td>
<td>2 626</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1 643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed without staff</td>
<td>8 708</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5 581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family members of self-employed</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>94 579</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>47 495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Austria, Register-based Census 2011; own calculation.

Data for 2011 do not allow for a differentiation between white-collar and blue-collar positions, only for self-employed and gainfully employed persons, which nevertheless gives some interesting insights. We can see an enormous growth in self-employment between 2001 and 2011, with 27 per cent of Slovaks belonging to this segment and one in five migrants from Poland. Being self-employed does not play such an important role for Hungarians and migrants from the Czech Republic. This growth is a reaction to the transitional rules, which limited access to the labour market as a gainfully employed person and opened possibilities for the self-employed. However, the growth of self-employment can be seen as part of a convergence and normalisation process between the native and the foreign labour force. The significant de-qualification as the entrance fee to the labour market is increasingly replaced by a general allocation of jobs and job-seekers. The effect of being a CEE migrant for one’s position on the labour market disappears gradually.

However, there are some branches where EU8 or EU2 migrants can be found to a significantly higher or lower degree. The construction sector has to be mentioned as one such branch featuring a higher share of
East–West migrants, as well as accommodation and food services, administration and support services. On the other hand, public services like education or public administration and defence are occupied to a higher degree by the native population. Once again, the high concentration of the East–West migrants in some exclusive niches can still not be observed, even two decades after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Table 9. Employment by ÖNACE of the workplace, persons born in Austria, EU10 and EU2, in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity in</th>
<th>Austria Abs.</th>
<th>Austria In %</th>
<th>EU10 Abs.</th>
<th>EU10 In %</th>
<th>EU2 Abs.</th>
<th>EU2 In %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry</td>
<td>135 133</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1 444</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1 303</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, quarrying</td>
<td>6 760</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>516 770</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>9 148</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>6 751</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, gas, steam supply</td>
<td>26 684</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply, waste management</td>
<td>16 361</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>248 638</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>12 228</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>4 912</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale, retail, PKW repair</td>
<td>562 129</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>13 361</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6 480</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, storage</td>
<td>164 748</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4 213</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2 715</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitality, food service</td>
<td>176 294</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10 823</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>5 496</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information, communication</td>
<td>86 525</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1 788</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, insurance</td>
<td>121 522</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1 705</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate</td>
<td>60 381</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2 025</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, science, technics</td>
<td>224 842</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5 991</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2 268</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration, support service</td>
<td>157 453</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8 127</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5 422</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration, defence</td>
<td>296 253</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2 939</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>275 150</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4 382</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1 528</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, social work</td>
<td>269 297</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8 392</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3 264</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts, entertainment, recreation</td>
<td>49 746</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1 885</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>100 924</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3 785</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1 972</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private households</td>
<td>6 143</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exterritorial organisations</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>38 937</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1 151</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 541 442</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>94 342</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>47 385</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Austria, Register-based Census 2011; own calculation.

The informal dimension

The picture thus far only provides information on persons working in Austria on a legal, official basis. Relatively little is known about the structures and actual amount of illegal employment of CEE nationals in Europe in general (Cyrus 2008) and in Austria specifically (Biffl 2011; Fassmann, Kollar 1996; Fassmann et al. 1995, 2004). Kraler, Reichel, Hollomey (2008: 53) stated that on the basis of the available evidence, no serious quantification of irregular migration in Austria is possible. Sometimes researchers or political officials made estimates about the extent of and numbers in irregular employment, but these have always been very vague (for example, Grzegorzezska-Mischka 1995; Sauberer 1991; Walterskirchen, Dietz 1998). Biffl (2002: 360) spoke of 47 000 foreigners working in the informal sector and based her approximation on the assumption that the share of foreigners in the informal sector is about 10 per cent of overall employment. Jandl (2004), on the basis of data from the Inspectorate of Labour, criticised the unrealistically high estimates based on extrapolations. Enste and Schneider (2006) estimated that about 104 000 illegal foreign full-time workers were employed in 2005. Schneider (2006) estimated that 98 000 full-time-equivalent foreigners were working illegally in Austria. Jandl, Hollomey, Stepien (2007: 37), in their Delphi study, esti-
mated the extent of irregular migrant work in Austria as a percentage of total employment to be highest in construction and in catering/tourism (around 15 per cent) and agriculture (13 per cent). Substantially lower was the average estimate for trade and industry (5.2 per cent). The estimated share of irregular migrant work in total employment in Austria came out at 5 per cent. The estimates on the absolute numbers of irregularly employed foreigners were around 29 000 in the care sector in private households and for cleaning in private households it was around 24 000. For the household sector, estimates at the high end were backed up with evidence from surveys on household expenditure, which allegedly indicated some 60 000 illegally employed household helpers.

Bearing in mind the short distances and thus the possibility of moving back and forth on a daily or weekly basis, as well as the income differentials on the one hand and the demand for cheap help in private households in Austria on the other, we can assume that there are many housekeepers, baby-sitters and (geriatric) nurses who find work. From the perspective of individual migrants, illegality is often seen as a temporary and passing state (even though it may last for several years). Migrants tend to ‘settle within mobility,’ staying mobile ‘as long as they can’ in order to improve or maintain the quality of life at home. This is especially true for care work in the household sector, to a large extent undertaken by persons from the new EU countries without the legally required steps of social-security-backed employment contracts. Reacting to this, parliament changed the legislation in 2007. These workers can now be legally employed under the terms of the ‘Private Household Workers Act’ or as self-employed nurses (see Adam 2007), another sign of a normalisation process. This materialised to a large extent in 2008, raising the employment of foreigners (salaried as well as self-employed) by some 20 000, and thereby contributing to the slow-down in measured productivity growth, which was a result of legalisation (Biffl 2011: 96).

Summary and outlook: the growing importance of intra-EU mobility

We started out with three main research questions. First we assumed that, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the accessions of 2004 and 2007 and the phasing out of the transitional rules, a push-and-pull-driven migration pattern had become dominant. Second, we expected that, with the emergence of a legally harmonised and unified European migration space, geographical variables would become more and more important and lead to the emergence of transnational labour markets. And finally, we assumed a further focus of the new East–West migration. If the push-and-pull-driven migration has become the dominant form, we expect to see a clear focus on the labour-market-relevant attributes.

The first research question was clearly proven. The size of the migration from CEE countries to the EU15 increased from year to year. Throughout the observation period (2002–2011) the number of citizens living in one of the EU15 countries increased by nearly 400 per cent. This increase does not exactly hold true for every EU15 country (different starting positions and different legal frameworks), but a general tendency is clearly detectable. The EU8+2 countries became an important and closely linked periphery to the EU15 and a reservoir for a flexible and spatially mobile labour force. The observation made on the EU15 level is the same as that for Austria.

The second research question was also approved. We have illustrated with the Austrian example how quickly and how clearly a transnational labour market has emerged. The distance between sending regions and economically prosperous receiving regions became much more important. Asymmetric labour markets cut off by different legal systems disappeared gradually and have now been replaced by labour markets where the costs for migration or pendular mobility and the wage gain are the decisive factors.

Finally, we analysed the stock of migrants from the EU8 and EU2 countries in Austria and compared it to stock data from a decade earlier. We observed a growing importance of the peak working age, a convergence
of the employment status and a more uniform distribution of the sectors in which EU8 and EU2 migrants are employed. In the construction, accommodation and food-service sectors, and in administration and support services, the share of new East–West migrants is higher; however, when compared to the distribution one or two decades ago, a ‘normalisation process’ can be observed.

Notes

1 In this article we refer to the 10 sending countries to be analysed (in alphabetical order, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) either as CEECs (Central Eastern European Countries) or as EU8 (accession countries of 2004 without Cyprus and Malta) and EU2 (Romania and Bulgaria).

2 It is apparent that a mass return migration of CEEC nationals did not occur during the economic recession of 2009–2011 (see Holland, Fic, Rincon-Aznar, Stokes, Paluchowshi 2011: 35; Koehler, Laczko, Aghazarm, Schad 2010: 24). However, it is a fact that new migration from Poland to the UK and Ireland, for example, has fallen sharply (Krings, Bobek, Moriarty, Salamonska, Wickham 2009; Ratha, Mohapatra, Silwal 2009: 5). Many migrants chose a wait-and-see strategy before returning. Thus, the financial crisis resulted in a slight freezing of both emigration and return migration, rather than in a pronounced intensification of returns. What, in the case of Poland, was taken as a sign of a large-scale return migration appears to have been an ‘overestimate’ (Iglicka 2010).

3 It is important to keep in mind that an individual can be included more than once, as people can go back and forth a good deal in 11 years. The present statistics do not allow for tracing back individuals who are included more than once.

4 When Austria – as well as Germany – set up their transitional rules, many experts criticised the decision, arguing that the migration linkages are cut down for a long time and that the ‘best and brightest’ migrants would be lost because they went to the UK and Ireland. The dynamic of the re-orientation of the migration pattern shows these predictions to be false. The UK and Ireland lost their attractiveness when Austria and Germany opened their labour markets.

5 It can be shaped by the term ‘liquid migration,’ which means that the transformation of institutions and the enhancement of individualisation processes promote all forms of temporary migration (Engbersen 2012; Engbersen, Snel, de Boom 2010).

6 Data from the register-based census of 2011 are only available for the EU10, including Cyprus and Malta. As the number of persons from these two countries (persons born in Cyprus: 296 and in Malta: 101) in 2014 in Austria is very small, the outcomes are not biased.

References


Since Polish migrants began entering the UK labour market in the post-accession period, there has been a significant amount of case study research focusing on the impact of this large migrant group on the UK economy. However, ten years after enlargement, there is still insufficient information regarding the labour market mobility of Polish migrants residing in the UK for the longer term. The available research on this topic is largely concentrated in urban settings such as London or Birmingham, and does not necessarily capture the same patterns of labour market mobility as in non-urban settings. Using qualitative data collected in three case study locations – urban, semi-urban and rural – in the South Wales region from 2008–2012, this article has two main aims. First, given the proximity of the case study locations, the article highlights the diversity of the Polish migrant characteristics through the samples used. Second, using trajectories created from the data, this article compares the variations among the labour market movements of the Polish migrants in each sample to determine what characteristics influence labour market ascent. Through this comparative trajectory analysis, the findings from this article point to the relative English language competency of migrants as the primary catalyst for progression in the Welsh labour market across all three case study regions. The secondary catalyst, which is intertwined with the first, is the composition of the migrants’ social networks, which enable, or in some cases disable, labour market progression. These findings have significant implications in the national and in the supranational policy sphere regarding the employment of migrants as well as their potential for cultural integration in the future.

Keywords: Polish migration; labour markets; trajectory

Introduction

A significant amount of attention has been paid to the population of Polish migrants that entered the United Kingdom (UK) in the period after Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 (Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly, Spencer 2006; Krings, Bobek, Moriarty, Salamonska, Wickham 2009). This attention is largely due to the number of Poles that entered the UK from 2004–2011, with estimates ranging from 250 000 to 1 million Poles (Booth, Howarth, Scarpetta 2012). With no major connec-
tions to previous Polish migrant groups in the UK (White 2011; Garapich 2008, 2011), this influx of migrants came as a surprise to policymakers who originally expected between 5,000–13,000 Poles to migrate to the UK (Dustmann, Casanova, Fertig, Preston, Schmidt 2003). This estimation was the reason that the UK government allowed CEE migrants to enter the UK labour market immediately after enlargement. In comparison, countries such as Germany and Austria implemented seven-year transitional arrangements to reduce the expected influx of CEE migrants post-enlargement. The large influx of Poles into the UK during this period tends to be attributed to the high unemployment and low wages in Poland around 2004, compared to migrants’ potential earnings in the UK given the strength of the economy at that time (Drinkwater, Eade, Garapich 2006; Eade, Drinkwater, Garapich 2006). To put this into perspective, in 2004 Poland had the third lowest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of all of the EU member states (25) and the highest unemployment rate of the CEE countries, with 18 per cent unemployment (Drinkwater et al. 2006; Eade et al. 2006).

Aside from the size of this new, legal migrant population, academics and policymakers have also focused on the characteristics of this migrant group, describing them as economically motivated, young, well-educated individuals who would enter the UK for a short term, work in low-skilled employment and return to Poland (Anderson, Clark, Parutis 2007; Anderson et al. 2006; Mackenzie, Forde 2007). As these migrants were largely considered well-educated individuals who, despite their education levels, took low-skilled, often 3D – ‘dirty, dull, and dangerous’ – jobs, the term ‘migrant paradox’ has been used extensively to describe their actions in the UK labour market (Favell 2008: 704; Anderson et al. 2006; Parutis 2011). Because of this characterisation as well as previous migration patterns to the UK, it was expected that the majority of these migrants would migrate to cities for a short period of time, earn some money, and return migrate. Ten years after enlargement, through qualitative and quantitative studies, academics have a better understanding of the characteristics and the actions of this migrant group.

Over time, research on this large migrant group has begun to highlight the variations in the post-2004 Polish migrants’ characteristics and motivations, particularly regarding their decision to stay in the UK longer than originally expected. Research on post-2004 Polish migrants has focused on migration to a variety of locations throughout the UK, including cities such as London (Eade et al. 2006), Birmingham (Harris 2012), Belfast (Bell 2012) and Glasgow (Helinska-Hughes, Hughes, Lassalle, Skowron 2009). Other studies note that Polish migrants migrated to locations across both urban and rural areas in the UK (Scott, Brindley 2012), including areas with strong regional economies (such as London) and weaker regional economies (such as North East England) (Stenning, Dawley 2009). Due to this variation, academics are increasingly focusing on the motivations and the impact of this migration flow on non-urban locations such as Llanelli and the South Wales Valleys (Thompson 2010; Lever, Milbourne 2014).

These location-based patterns could have been studied amongst short-term migrants; however, the ability of Polish migrants to stay in the UK beyond their original short-term migration plans has given academics more time to interact with this group. As EU citizens, Polish migrants in the UK in the post-2004 period enjoy the same privileges as British citizens – they can work and live in the UK indefinitely if they wish (Ciupijus 2011). Some studies (Thompson, Chambers, Doleczek 2010) have focused on migrants in this group who stayed in the UK longer than they initially expected but have not necessarily settled in the UK. However, little research has been produced focusing on these longer-term migrants and comparing their labour market mobility across different spatial areas. This article seeks to contribute to this gap in knowledge by comparing the labour market progression of post-2004 Poles across three distinctly different spatial areas in South Wales over time. By combining three independently conducted studies, the aim of this article is to determine if there are any differences regarding the types of migrants that settle in specific locations and their experiences in the Welsh labour market, specifically: what factors contribute to the labour market mobility of migrants throughout the course of their migration period?
The article will explore this question in three ways. First, qualitative data on post-2004 Polish migrants from three samples will be compared to achieve a better understanding of the varied characteristics of post-accession Polish migrants. These ‘characteristics’ can include the basic demographic features of Poles, such as education level, age and English language skills. Second, qualitative data on post-2004 Polish migrants across three different spatial areas – urban, semi-urban and rural – will be compared. By comparing samples across these spatial areas, links can be made between location-based advantages and how these can influence migrant labour market mobility. For example, an urban setting may provide more diverse employment opportunities and more opportunities to transition out of low-skilled jobs than in a rural setting. Third, the acquisition of human capital and migrant social network use will be assessed and compared. This article adds to the existing literature by comparing the characteristics and motivations of Polish migrants to understand their labour market mobility over time.

The evolutionary aspect of this comparison will be presented through trajectories. Trajectories were created instead of typologies because they allow us to understand the transitions migrants make over time and, by doing so, demonstrate the dynamism of this population (Nowicka 2013). There is a noticeable increase in the use of trajectories in post-2004 Polish migration studies (Nowicka 2013; Helinska-Hughes et al. 2009; Bell 2012) due to interest in understanding the evolution of this group over time. Instead of comparing a specific event such as the initial motivation to migrate, a trajectory follows the migrants over time to understand how their motivations evolved.

This article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature on the spatial preferences of migrants and their position and experience in the division of labour. Where possible, the literature will focus on post-2004 Polish migration flows. This will be followed by a review of the case study locations, the methodology used in each study and the samples gathered. Next, the findings and discussion section will compare the experiences of Poles in each case study location and highlight why their experiences vary. The concluding remarks will focus on the policy implications of the spatial spread of migrants as well as the cultural and economic integration of longer-term EU migrants.

**Literature review**

Traditionally, migrants find work and accommodation in the destination country using their social networks. In this context, social networks do not motivate migrants but facilitate their migration to a specific area. Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino and Taylor (1993: 48) state that migrants are more likely to move to another country where there is a social network because it *lowers the costs and risks of movement while increasing the expected net return of migration*. Social networks encourage migration in two distinct ways. First, they lower the risk for new migrants due to the expanding network. Second, they offer on-the-ground support in the destination country through the provision of short-term accommodation and assistance in finding a job (Massey *et al.* 1993). As a result of this facilitation role, scholars of migration have shown how these social networks serve to direct new migrants to particular localities in destination countries. Patterns observed in other contexts, such as in North America, are evident in post-2004 Polish migration to the UK. Thus, in nearly all of the cases of Mexican migration to the United States studied by Garip and Asad (2013), individuals spoke of how network contacts reduced the risk of migration through the assistance provided in-country. Similarly, Ryan, Sales, Tilki and Siara (2008: 679) noted that among new Polish migrants in London many had, at least initially, relied extensively on social support from close contacts on arrival in London, and, to quote one participant whose experience was echoed across their sample: *Poles helped me to stand on my own two feet.*
A notable feature of post-2004 Polish migration has been its geographical spread across all parts of the UK, however. London and the surrounding areas have been the principal magnets for migrants coming to the UK, but research has shown how places with no previous history of international migration, such as South West England and Northern Ireland, have attracted significant numbers of post-2004 migrants from Poland and other CEE countries (Pollard, Latorre, Sriskandarajah 2008). Rural areas, too, saw sizeable immigration, such as in the Highlands of Scotland, the East of England and West Wales.

Trevena (2009) was one of the first scholars to note that rural localities can create unique challenges for migrants, particularly due to the nature of local labour markets, which can be seasonal and limited in scope. For example, the food production industry has been one important source of employment for post-2004 Polish migrants and a determinant for their movement to rural parts of the UK (Scott, Brindley 2012). More recently, Trevena, McGhee and Heath (2013) highlighted how the internal mobility of international migrants is not driven by location per se but rather by the availability of work and accommodation. Trevena et al. (2013) also explained how the migrants interviewed in their study, who were accompanied by dependent children, were more likely to make the move from urban to rural locations for work, particularly if rural locations were perceived to present opportunities for greater long-term stability.

So how are these migrants migrating to non-urban locations? Is their migration solely attributed to social networks, or are other actors involved? By defining the role of social networks for new migrants as a way of reducing the costs and risks associated with migration, recruitment agencies could be considered manufacturers of social networks for new migrants. In this capacity, employment agencies have been important actors in directing migrants to sites beyond major British cities. Chappell, Latorre, Rutter and Shah (2009) found that almost a quarter of the Polish migrants they interviewed in England identified work arranged by a staffing agency as the reason for moving to work in a rural area. Research on migrant workers in Bristol and Hull reported that in the latter city, the primary channel of recruitment was through employment agencies, even noting that some agencies were unofficially only taking Polish workers (Glossop, Shaheen 2009). In rural areas the leverage provided by staffing agencies may be greater still, particularly in localities with little local experience of migration. Jentsch, de Lima, MacDonald (2007), for example, show how recruitment agencies have made the far north of Scotland one of the premier locations for CEE migrants in recent years. Moreover, these agencies demonstrate how direct recruitment can replace local social networks, at least with respect to their role in securing employment in specific localities where previous knowledge of employment opportunities would have spread by word-of-mouth (Sporton 2012).

Social networks and recruitment agencies facilitate Polish migration to even seemingly unlikely locales for migrants within the UK. Once the migrant arrives in the UK, these ‘migration facilitators,’ along with the individual endeavours of migrants, can assist the migrant in gaining employment. However, what kind of employment will the migrant enter? According to Anderson et al. (2006), Anderson et al. (2007) and Mackenzie and Forde (2007), post-2004 Polish migrants entering the UK were originally perceived as well-educated individuals who would enter the UK for a short period, work in low-skilled employment and return to Poland. The characteristics of these migrants have changed over time to include low-skilled migrants and longer-term migrants (Burrell 2010); however, the low-skilled employment taken by these migrants when initially arriving in the UK has remained constant.

Through her work on CEE migrants in the UK post-2004, Currie (2007) – taking into account the complexity of EU migration – focuses on the low-skilled employment of migrants in the destination country. She focuses on the legal framework of CEE migration to the UK (Worker Registration Scheme (WRS)), the lack of education recognition, and the supply of labour to explain why highly educated migrants take low-skilled employment when migrating. These factors explain not only why migrants take low-skilled positions, but by focusing on education devaluation and the supply of labour over time, also why highly educated migrants
may take low-skilled opportunities beyond initial migration. As the WRS ended in 2011, this aspect of Currie’s argument is no longer relevant for post-WRS migrants and there is scepticism as to how many CEE migrants enrolled in the WRS while it was active (Galgoczi, Leschke, Watt 2009). In addition, the focus on the contradiction between high education and low-skilled jobs in Currie’s work does not consider the labour market mobility of migrants without high levels of education.

In her work on migrants’ ascent in the division of labour, Parutis (2011) highlights that the acceptance of low-wage, low-skilled jobs can be attributed to a migrant’s need to earn money when initially migrating. In her study of Polish and Lithuanian migrants in the UK post-accession, Parutis (2011) describes migrants using the term ‘middling transnationalism,’ which alludes to the paradoxical nature of migrants as high-skilled individuals taking low-skilled jobs. In terms of migrant motivations, this ‘middling transnationalism’ will seek any position when reaching the destination country to earn enough to live (Parutis 2011). Once savings are accrued through ‘any job,’ the migrant can then move on to a ‘better job’ that more closely relates to their skill level, and finally accrue more savings and move on to a ‘dream job’ (Parutis 2011). This argument links the migrants’ earnings to the migrants’ ability to move up the division of labour in the destination country; however, Parutis (2011) does not provide a timeline for this movement, making it possible for both short-term and long-term migrants.

Parutis’ theory (2011) is based on Chiswick, Lee and Miller (2005) U-shaped pattern of migrant progression in the division of labour in the destination country. This pattern depicts the high level of occupational attainment achieved by migrants in their home country, the initial low level position they took when migrating, and their subsequent ascent up the division of labour in the destination country (Chiswick et al. 2005). To achieve this occupational attainment in the destination country, migrants will have a high-level occupation prior to migrating; they will have developed their human capital prior to migrating; and they will acquire additional ‘location-specific’ human capital in the destination country (Chiswick et al. 2005). The more non-transferable the skills of the migrant are between the country of origin and the destination country, the more likely the migrant is to immediately have low employment options and, over time, to have significant upward occupational mobility in the destination country because location-specific human capital is acquired (Barrett, Duffy 2008). By contrast, Parutis (2011) discusses the migrant’s ascent up the division of labour from the time the migrant enters the destination country and only mentions their high-skill level prior to migrating through the migrant paradox. The migrant paradox for Poles in the UK focuses on high-skilled migrants taking low-skilled positions; it should be noted, however, that ‘high-skilled’ can refer to their education level while the U-shaped pattern research focuses on ‘high-skilled’ as employment experience.

Both studies by Parutis (2011) and Chiswick et al. (2005) indirectly highlight that migrants hold several jobs during their migration period. Other studies have observed that in order to maximise their earning potential, a common strategy among migrant workers is to change employment regularly, even for relatively minor improvements in pay (Datta, McIlwaine, Evans, Herbert, May, Wills 2006). If the migrant was in the destination country for a longer term, as demonstrated by Chiswick et al.’s (2005) longitudinal sample, they could eventually contribute to their ‘boundaryless career’ (Arthur, Rousseau 1996) by having multiple positions that enhance their skill level over time.

The contrasting views of the migrants’ ascent in the division of labour and their holding numerous jobs in the destination country, demonstrates the motivations of migrants to take low-skilled positions when initially migrating and their human capital needs if interested in ascending the division of labour. However, the timing of this ascent, whether it occurs uniformly, as well as other conditions relating to the migrants’ labour market mobility, are not assessed. As a result, the main question raised through this review of the literature, which will be addressed in this article is: using three different spatial areas, what factors influence a mi-
grants’ progression in the local division of labour? This question will be discussed using the three samples of Polish migrants in Cardiff, Merthyr Tydfil and Llanelli.

Review of the case study locations

Wales has a significant history of both inward and outward migration (Hooper, Punter 2006). There are migrant populations of widely varying origin countries, ranging from the Somali migrant population in Cardiff to the Irish migrant population in Llanelli to the Russian migrant population in Merthyr Tydfil (Hooper, Punter 2006). In relation to post-2004 Polish migration, according to WRS data, almost 21 000 Poles entered Wales between 2004–2011, with 16 000 Poles entering the South Wales area (UKBA 2012). At the local authority level, from 2004–2011 the WRS listed 4 300 Poles entering Carmarthenshire, 1 312 Poles entering Merthyr Tydfil (semi-urban) and 2 510 Poles entering Cardiff (urban) (UKBA 2012). The Merthyr Tydfil and Cardiff numbers reflect two of the fieldwork locations; however, it should be noted that while Carmarthenshire received the highest number of Poles in Wales during this period, Llanelli (rural) is a town in the wider Carmarthenshire local authority (see Map 1). While estimates vary, Llanelli is reported to have received approximately 1 000 Poles during this period (Thompson 2010). These migrant numbers are interesting given the varying spatial aspects of the three fieldwork locations, which is part of the grounds for comparison within this article.

Map 1. Wales case study locations

Beyond the varying numbers of Poles that these locations received, they also have significantly different spatial characteristics. Cardiff, the urban case, is the capital of Wales, with a diverse geography, economy and society. Geographically, with a population of 346 090, Cardiff is located on the southern coast of Wales, spread across 14 038 hectares of land (ONS 2011). Economically, the main employee jobs in Cardiff (in 2008) are in the service sector (87.9 per cent) which accounts for distribution, hotels and restaurants (20.4 per cent); finance, IT, and other business activities (25.5 per cent); and public administration and health (30.9
per cent) (ONS 2013). The recession had a sizeable impact on the Cardiff economy, with unemployment rising from 4 per cent in 2006 to 9.7 per cent in 2012, which was also accompanied by a rise in the cost of living. Despite these economic indicators, Cardiff is the only one of our three localities that is not an EU convergence region (2014–2020). Socially, Cardiff is a diverse city with an established history of migration due to the once prominent docklands area in Tiger Bay bringing inflows of migrants from popular port countries such as Somalia, Ireland, Spain and Portugal (Hooper, Punter 2006). This inflow of migrants to port cities is common in other UK cities such as Liverpool, Bristol and London (Hooper, Punter 2006). Following urban renewal efforts, the Tiger Bay area is now known as Cardiff Bay, but the wider city still retains a diverse population as it is home to 111 different nationalities (Cardiff Council 2008). As a result, Cardiff continues to be the most ethnically diverse local authority in Wales (ONS 2013).

The semi-urban case is the local authority of Merthyr Tydfil, which has a history of migration dating back to the industrial revolution. When the South Wales Coalfield (SWC) expanded during the 19th century, migrants arrived from England, Ireland, Italy, Russia, Poland and France, among other places. At the height of the economic boom in 1913, the region (encompassing 11 138 hectares) employed over 230 000 people and produced almost one third of the world’s coal exports (Nicol, Smith, Dunkley, Morgan 2013). Coalfield employment peaked in 1920 and between the wars around half a million people left the Valleys to look for work in the New World (Morgan 2005). As coal production declined dramatically in the second half of the 20th century, Merthyr Tydfil experienced a period of rapid social and economic decline. The economic issues are on-going with Merthyr Tydfil continually categorised as an EU convergence region (2014–2020).

Using the ONS (2011a) data on location quotients, the Merthyr Tydfil local authority is currently the home of the following industries: public administration, health and social work, manufacturing and ICT. Much like unemployment trends in Cardiff, which are reflective of the rest of Wales, the recession had a significant impact on Merthyr Tydfil, with unemployment more than doubling to a high of 12 per cent in 2012 (ONS 2011). Nonetheless, the population of Merthyr Tydfil is becoming increasingly diverse. According to the UK census (ONS 2011), Merthyr Tydfil has a population of 58 802 of which 1 000 residents are Poles. In addition, Merthyr has 293 Portuguese residents, the highest number in any Welsh local authority, and 194 Filipinos, the third highest number in any Welsh local authority (ONS 2011).

The rural case is the town of Llanelli, located in the local authority of Carmarthenshire. As of 2011, Carmarthenshire has a population of 183 777 spread across 237 035 hectares of land (ONS 2011). Similar to the semi-urban case, Llanelli was once a principal centre of industrial production in Wales, attracting migrant labour to its industrial foundries and factories. However, Llanelli is no longer a natural magnet for large-scale migration. A good deal of the industrial production once undertaken in the town, employing tens of thousands of workers, is now done elsewhere or requires a substantially smaller workforce. Using the ONS (2011a) data on location quotients, the Carmarthenshire local authority is currently the home of the following industries: healthcare, administration, construction and mechanical goods sale. The unemployment trends experienced in the other case study locations have also been experienced in Llanelli.

Similar to the Merthyr case, Llanelli once had a diverse population. Industrial expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries attracted migrants from other parts of the UK and Ireland, while a sizeable Italian population settled in the town after World War 2. Today, the population of Llanelli is predominantly Welsh-born (86 per cent). The percentage of the population that is Welsh-born is markedly higher than the proportion for the wider region of Mid and West Wales (67 per cent) and higher than the Welsh average of 75 per cent (NAfW 2010). Interestingly, however, the proportion of the population born in the EU and classed as ‘migrants’ roughly tracks national data, with 1.1 per cent of the population born in another EU member state compared to 1.3 per cent in Wales, and with 10 per cent of the population classed as ‘migrant’ compared with 11 per cent for the Welsh average.
This brief review of the economic and social dimensions of the three case study locations highlights the variations among these locations, particularly regarding levels of diversity and the lack of significant employers in the non-urban cases. The variations amongst these locations will be further discussed in relation to the case study samples, which are discussed next.

Methodology

The three samples compared in this article were used in independent, qualitative studies of Polish migrants in each of the three aforementioned locations; one study also undertook some statistical analysis. In each case, the labour market mobility of Polish migrants was only one part of the overall study. For example, the Llanelli study also focused on the long-term effects of Polish migrants’ reliance on recruitment agencies, while the Cardiff study focused on the changing motivations of Polish migrants during the recession. The Merthyr Tydfil study also focused on the Polish migrants’ ability to economically develop the region. Despite these variations, the labour market mobility of Polish migrants was a major component of each study.

Across all three locations, participants were recruited through snowball sampling, aided by gatekeepers in the local economy of each area. The gatekeepers provided access to the wider Polish community in each area and, in some cases, set up the actual interviews. In Cardiff, data collection was arranged through gatekeepers in the local Polish community. In Llanelli, while gatekeepers were useful, the participants came largely through contacts the researchers had developed independently. In Merthyr Tydfil, participants were recruited through community gatekeepers with the help of a Polish researcher.

The methods used in each location and the characteristics of the samples are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. The methods and samples of three case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Method used</th>
<th>Sample characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural – Llanelli sample</td>
<td>• 27 semi-structured interviews (2008)</td>
<td>• 60 per cent &lt; 40 years of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 25 semi-structured interviews (2011)</td>
<td>• even gender distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• all fieldwork conducted in Polish</td>
<td>• for majority, high school is highest level of formal education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• most come with very low levels of English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• initially migrated for economic and non-economic reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• planned to stay in the UK for several months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• all stay significantly longer than they initially expected when migrating; all have been resident in the UK for between 4–7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Urban – Merthyr Tydfil sample</td>
<td>• 15 questionnaires (2012–2013)</td>
<td>• &lt; 54 years of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 10 semi-structured interviews (2012)</td>
<td>• even gender distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• fieldwork conducted in English and Polish</td>
<td>• mixed education levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• English language level is poor and often problematic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• initially migrated for economic and non-economic reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• planned to stay in the UK for several months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• all stay significantly longer than they initially expected when migrating; the majority have been resident in the UK for between 3–8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban - Cardiff sample</td>
<td>• 20 semi-structured interviews (2008)</td>
<td>• &lt; 35 years of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 19 semi-structured interviews (2011)</td>
<td>• even gender distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• all fieldwork conducted in English</td>
<td>• high levels of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• higher English language skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• initially migrated for economic reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• planned to stay in the UK for several months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• all stay significantly longer than they initially expected when migrating; all have been resident in the UK for between 4–7 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration.
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data in all the studies. Open-ended questionnaires were also used in the Merthyr Tydfil study. Semi-structured interviews were completed with post-2004 Polish migrants across all three locations to get a better understanding of the migrants’ motivations, mobility in the Welsh labour market, human capital development and long-term plans in the UK. In Cardiff and Llanelli, the interviews were conducted in 2008 and 2011 to take account of the impact of the recession on the motivations and the long-term labour market activities of migrants. In Merthyr Tydfil, all semi-structured interviews and open-ended questionnaires were conducted between late-2012 and early-2013. Due to a small interview sample size, open-ended questionnaires permitting anonymous responses were disseminated using the same questions that were asked in the interview, to reach a larger population of the Polish community in the area. The staggered timeline to the data collection was due to the overarching aims of each of these studies and did not have an impact on the findings reported in this section as the migrants were residing in these locations for comparable amounts of time.

For each study, the interview questions were developed in line with the overarching aims of each independent study. However, specific questions relating to the migrants’ initial migration, education level, work experience, labour market mobility and future plans were asked. The questions that each participant, in all three studies, were asked included, but were not limited to the following:

- When did you migrate to the UK?
- What were your reasons for migrating to the UK?
- What is your highest level of education?
- Where were you educated?
- Are you currently employed?
- If so, what is your current job?
- Is this the first job that you have had since migrating?
- If no, what other jobs did you have?
- How did you get this job?
- What, if any, are barriers for you to get a job in the UK?
- What are your future plans?

In each location, even though the data was collected over a substantial amount of time, the same questions were asked of the participants. In Cardiff, during the 2011 data collection period, some additional questions were asked about the impact of the recession on the migrants’ future plans.

Beyond the different methods used in these studies, the sample sizes vary; the rural sample has the most participants and the semi-urban sample had the least. The variation in the sample sizes could be attributed to the following four points: 1) the size of the Polish community in each location, 2) the migration patterns of the Poles in each location, 3) the language the interview was conducted in, or 4) other research conducted in the area. First, the size of the Polish community and therefore the pool of potential participants varied in each case study location. In addition, the geographical size of the location as well as the diversity of the population can make recruitment difficult. Second, the migration patterns of the Poles in urban and non-urban areas also vary (Trevena 2009). This is particularly the case when recruitment agencies facilitate migration to a specific location such as Llanelli, creating a densely populated migrant area in an otherwise homogenous population. By contrast, the migration patterns of urban migrants in places such as Cardiff could be greatly influenced by employment opportunities, transportation links, and accommodation. Third, the language an interview is conducted in can favourably influence the number of participants. In the case of Cardiff, where an interpreter was offered, the participants were concerned about the interpreter divulging interview information to the wider community. In comparison, in Llanelli, the researcher was fluent in Polish, thus removing the need for an interpreter and potentially increasing the sample size. In Merthyr, participants found
anonymity in the open-ended questionnaires used. Fourth, due to the widespread interest in the topic, the participants may have been invited for interviews multiple times, leading to fatigue and a lack of interest in participation. This could particularly be the case in Merthyr, with several migrants recently intra-UK migrating to Merthyr. More generally, this could be the case for ethnic entrepreneurs due to the visibility of the business presence in the community.

All of the migrants in the three samples migrated to the UK from Poland post-2004 and initially planned to stay in the UK for 3 to 12 months. The motivation to migrate varied across the samples. The Cardiff sample initially migrated for economic reasons and their migration was greatly facilitated by their social networks. In comparison, migrants in Llanelli and Merthyr Tydfil were motivated to migrate by economic factors and also by non-economic factors such as a sense of adventure or to try something new. The migration of the Llanelli and Merthyr samples were facilitated mainly by recruitment agencies, with the Merthyr Tydfil also being influenced by social networks. Regardless of the conditions that migrants experienced when entering the UK, across all three sample migrants had stayed in the destination country significantly longer than they initially expected.

In terms of demographics, each sample had a relatively even gender distribution. Focusing on the age of migrants, their English language skills and education level, each sample had its own unique attributes. As a brief comparison, the migrants in the Cardiff sample were the youngest and had the highest human capital levels (education and language skills). The Merthyr Tydfil sample contained the oldest migrants with the second highest levels of human capital. Migrants in the Llanelli sample were somewhere in the middle and had the lowest human capital. These varying characteristics will be a major theme throughout the rest of this article.

Using Grounded Theory as the basis for analysis, in all three studies the qualitative data was thematically coded based on categories derived from the text. The interview text was coded using NVIVO 2.0. The nodes used to code the interview transcripts were generated from the data. This analysis was completed in three stages, yielding precise data focused on the migrants’ labour market mobility during their migration period. Through this extensive review of the data, the context of the original quotes was retained while focusing solely on the specific issues discussed by the migrants. Patterns were identified by reviewing the participants’ responses. These patterns contradict the traditional varied results expected from a small sample. Similar to the findings of Bell (2012) and Nowicka (2013), the patterns in the participants’ responses are the basis for the trajectories created in this article.

Comparison of the case study findings & discussion

Rural case

The majority of the Poles in the Llanelli sample had their migration facilitated by recruitment agencies or were migrating because network contacts had told them of agencies who would be able to secure work for them on arrival in the town. Among those interviewed in Llanelli in 2008, just over half stated they had arranged work through a recruitment agency before coming to Wales. Recruitment agencies offered migrants accommodation and employment when initially migrating to the UK. In this way, recruitment agencies could be considered a surrogate social network, as a social network often facilitates migration to a specific location using the same means, namely offers of accommodation and employment. Also, similar to a social network, since a significant proportion of the Poles in the Llanelli sample were directed to the region through the recruitment agency, the agency fulfilled some of the functions of a social network for them, e.g. by connecting
them to other migrants in the same situation, creating friendships and offering an opportunity to continue speaking Polish.

The Poles in the sample who used the recruitment agency worked at a meat packing plant on the edge of Llanelli. The limited exposure to the local economy through the location of the plant, the hours of work and the use of the Polish language in work and at home, reinforced the workers’ position in the meat packing plant at the bottom of the division of labour. There are few instances where individuals successfully made the transition beyond this 3D employment. Where the migrants worked alongside locals, they often did so as agency workers recruited along with other migrant workers. New arrivals quickly learned that agency work is uncertain and that their entitlements, whether in pay or contracted hours, may be less than colleagues employed directly by firms.

Still, relatively few of the workers changed their jobs despite their longer stay in the area. The majority of migrants in this sample did not change jobs more than once, and nearly two thirds of these migrants had not left the job for which they were initially recruited. At best, these migrants would continue to be employed by the organisations that initially recruited them through recruitment agencies. Most migrants, nevertheless, spoke openly of wanting to improve their employment status and earnings, as well as, in some instances, of matching their job more appropriately to their skills and level of education.

Working almost exclusively with co-ethnics not only limits the possibility of interaction with individuals beyond the ethnic world, but also acts as a barrier to flows of information beyond the realms of this relatively enclosed population. Thus, it is possible that individuals may not come to acquire information about job openings or knowledge about how to access such opportunities. Due to limited personal networks, information about scarce resources does not tend to travel far. Social networks, then, appear to have a bearing on the low level of occupational mobility among the Polish migrant population in Llanelli.

**Semi-urban case**

Unlike the migrants from the other cases who selected their migration destination based on employment opportunities, the migration of the semi-urban migrants was to some extent motivated by proximity to family and friends. Approximately 65 per cent of the Merthyr sample migrated to Wales to be near family and/or friends and a quarter of participants had extended family members living with them or nearby at the time of contact. Around a third migrated for pre-arranged jobs, with the rest migrating with the knowledge that jobs were available. Regardless of their education level, the majority of these migrants looked for and took low-skilled employment when they first arrived, primarily in the food and meat-processing sector. In the early 2000s, the majority of migrants working in Merthyr’s meat-processing factories were Portuguese, but after 2004, factories and recruitment agencies servicing the area turned their attention to Poles to keep down costs and maintain control of the workforce (Tannock 2013). Employment opportunities for migrant workers in Merthyr are generally limited to this sector. A small number of factory workers moved up the occupational hierarchy into language-related support services in youth work, for example, but language remained an impediment to upward occupational mobility for most. Despite the difficulties of maintaining their position in the hierarchy of migrant labour, many Poles appeared happy with their situation and with employment that offers them a better quality of life and financial security than in Poland. Opportunities to move up the division of labour appeared to be a secondary concern and many Poles seemed to accept their position with a sense of resignation (Lever forthcoming).

For those Poles who were unhappy with their financial situation – or increasingly, for those who could not find employment – entrepreneurship and going into business became an alternative form of employment. In recent years, competition between Polish and Portuguese entrepreneurs has had a significant impact on the
town of Merthyr, both physically and culturally. Merthyr now has a range of ethnic shops, cafes and bars that were unimaginable a few years ago (Lever, Milbourne 2014). This dramatic increase in ethnic businesses is changing the image and wider perception of the town, which was traditionally considered an area that was suffering the consequences of economic decline. Asked to explain these developments in Merthyr, one interviewee answered: *It’s more multicultural if you like, which for somewhere like Merthyr Tydfil is quite unusual because the Valleys’ mind-set is the norm.* This situation has also contributed to the sense of well-being and satisfaction experienced by many Polish migrants, who appear happy in the area despite their lack of occupational mobility.

**Urban case**

Looking at the entirety of the sample for the Cardiff study, Poles seek low-skilled employment when initially migrating regardless of their (language and education) skill level. At this stage, the Poles in this sample sought low-skilled employment because they just wanted ‘any job’ to earn money when initially migrating (Parutis 2011). Approximately half of the migrants in the sample acquired their first job in the lower end of the local labour market through their social network. After having several low-skilled positions they began to move up the division of labour, advancing their language skills and in some cases their education level as well. This ascent traditionally begins after living in the UK for 18 months and continues until the migrant reaches a position that is commensurate with their skill level. For example, several migrants originally had low-skilled jobs despite being well-educated and having high English language skills. Over time, and by gaining confidence in their language abilities, some started working in an industry that they were educated in, including university research, diversity officer and translator. Due to the migrants’ well-educated nature (in Poland and in Britain) and the language ability of the migrants in this sample, at the last point of contact they had positions in the division of labour that would be difficult for recent graduates in Britain to acquire. While the pre-migration professions of the migrants in this sample is unknown, it could be argued that their ascent is largely based on their ability to acquire language skills in the UK and, in the case of several migrants in the sample, to acquire British educational qualifications.

The Cardiff findings support the labour market progression literature in a number of ways. The migrants are actively trying to get their ‘dream job’ by moving up from ‘any job’ when initially migrating, which supports the findings of Parutis (2011). It could be argued that the socioeconomic features of Cardiff, with its diverse range of industries, acts as a pull factor for the migrants when deciding where to live in the UK in the longer term. The city, in comparison to the other South Wales locations reviewed in this article, can provide ample employment opportunities for well-educated migrants.

**Comparative review**

In a trajectory format, Figure 1 brings together the experiences of the migrants from each sample collected in South Wales to illustrate the mobility of these Polish migrants in the Welsh labour market over time. The rural migrants enter the Welsh labour market in low-skilled positions upon arrival in the UK and stay in those positions throughout their time in Wales, ranging from 4–7 years, with no plans to return. These positions are largely at the meat packing plant that the recruitment agency placed them in when they arrived or in another agency-placed, temporary position in the local labour market. Given the rural migrants’ constrained social network, which reinforces the shared use of the Polish language and their relatively closed relationship with the local community, these Poles are the least likely to have labour market mobility.
By comparison, the semi-urban Poles in the sample from Merthyr have a markedly different experience in the Welsh labour market. All of the migrants in this sample start in similar low-skilled positions when initially migrating to Wales; however, after working in low-skilled positions for almost two years, the migrants’ paths vary. For those migrants in the ‘semi-urban 2’ group, their labour market mobility is based on their ability to acquire the knowledge and confidence to use their English language skills in daily conversation. Once these migrants have the confidence to use their English language skills, they move beyond their basic social network and, in several cases, seek entrepreneurship in the local economy that would not otherwise be possible. The education level of these migrants is higher than the education level of the migrants in the other semi-urban group. By contrast, the Poles in the sample that form the ‘semi-urban 1’ group have a similar trajectory as the rural migrants due to their lack of English language skills. They may have several different jobs during their time in the destination country in the service sector or the food-processing sector, but they do not move up in the labour market.

The Poles that form the Cardiff sample have several low-skilled jobs when initially migrating to the UK that are often provided through their social networks. Regardless of the migrants’ education level, all of the migrants in this sample sought to increase their English language skills while working in these low-skilled jobs. On average, this advanced language acquisition took 18 months to complete, which coincides with the migrants’ ascent up the division of labour mentioned above. At this stage, the migrants were able to continue to rise in the Welsh labour market through entrepreneurship, management and other, more high-skilled positions. Their mobility in the labour market is primarily based on their language development with secondary influences from social networks as well as the availability of opportunities in the urban setting. The social networks of the migrants in this sample remain but evolve to include a diverse range of fellow Polish migrants, non-Polish migrants and British nationals.
Conclusion

In our research in South Wales, we wanted to better understand migrant mobility within the local labour markets we studied. Specifically, we were interested in learning how migrants’ commitments to remaining abroad were influenced by their ability to move between jobs in order to maximise the return on the investment they made when moving from Poland. As part of this, we also wanted to know what factors – networks, education or skills – influenced their potential for labour market mobility.

Our studies across the sites we investigated lead us to a three-part conclusion. First, as each of our studies in the South Wales region found, migrants typically underestimate the amount of time they will spend abroad. They are not alone in this. When the early wave of labour migrants from Poland arrived in the UK in 2004/2005, it was widely expected that these young migrants, who were plugging immediate gaps in the labour market, would be staying in the UK for the short-term. It is only in recent years that social scientists have begun to show that significant numbers of migrants stay far beyond the point at which they had envisaged they would leave the UK (Burrell 2010). More pointedly, a decade after Poland joined the EU, studies are revealing that for a significant proportion of migrants – perhaps up to half of those who migrated (Duvell, Garapich 2011) – there are no clear plans to return to Poland in the foreseeable future or, alternatively, to settle down and make the UK their home. They are, instead, prepared to ‘see what happens’ while continuing to shape the labour market of the UK.

As EU citizens, the ability of migrants to stay in the UK indefinitely is a factor that contributes to their labour market mobility as, without visa restrictions on their time in-country, they can acquire new skills, try new career options and fully integrate into the British economy. Against the backdrop of continued EU enlargement and the free movement of migrants from Bulgaria and Romania into the UK from January 2014, the capacity for these EU citizens to stay in the destination country indefinitely should lead to broader questions of cultural integration. As demonstrated in this article, under certain conditions migrants are able to economically integrate into the local economies of the area they migrated to; however, cultural integration is of equal importance in the long-term.

Second, there are markedly different approaches to labour market mobility among migrants. These ‘approaches’ can range from overachievers, who actively invest in their human capital development in order to climb the division of labour, to those individuals who are content to get by with no specific aims. Those with higher levels of education and training actively pursue a career of upward mobility, as we found among those we interviewed in Cardiff. They were prepared to tolerate work not commensurate with their level of education and training, if it was temporary. The low-skilled nature of this work was initially attractive to the migrants as they wanted to ensure a flow of wages from the time of arrival in the UK. However, while in this low-skilled employment, these migrants were searching for other, better positions in the labour market. Once migrants obtain these positions, it reinforces motivations, that are no longer solely economic, to stay in the UK for longer periods. By contrast, the migrants who moved to Merthyr Tydfil and Llanelli are, broadly speaking, individuals who were struggling the most to make ends meet in Poland. In many cases, they will have been coping with more than one job to raise sufficient income to cover their bills. In Llanelli, our research showed that their chief aim is usually to remain with the employer they joined on arrival, usually through an employment agency. Like their fellow nationals living in Cardiff, they are keen to pursue better prospects, but they are aware that they lack the skills to progress in the labour market, which would give them better financial returns. These individuals are nevertheless generally content with what their employment in Wales delivers, both in terms of financial returns and lifestyle improvements. While there are many factors involved in the decision to return migrate, it should be highlighted that continued employment in the
destination country is a significant motivation to stay, despite the migrants’ approach towards labour market mobility.

Third, where migrants live and work has a bearing on their employment opportunities and on their ability to remain abroad. Each of the localities offered different employment prospects. The comparatively higher skilled migrants living in Cardiff would not have enjoyed the same employment prospects in the smaller, less diverse local economies in Llanelli and Merthyr Tydfil. As noted above, several of the migrants in the Cardiff sample made the necessary improvements in their English skills and were then able to access employment opportunities that British graduates would also be competing for in the local economy. For those who had been recruited to work in food-processing plants in Merthyr Tydfil and Llanelli, their ability to continue to live away from Poland is contingent on the on-going demand for their labour, either in the plant or in other low-skilled employment. While this demand continues, they can choose to keep their options open. If this work dries up, or labour is sourced from elsewhere, then their inability to be mobile may well signal the end of their sojourn in Wales. Generally, these migrants do not possess the social and cultural capital to make themselves less vulnerable to the vicissitudes of local labour markets in the long term.

Similar to other studies (White, Ryan 2008; Burrell 2010), our findings show why expectations about short-term or circular migration must be revised. A key characteristic of CEE migration has been the movement of migrants to all parts of the UK, with employment agencies – local, national and multinational – playing a key role in securing work for migrants in localities which might otherwise not have expected to see significant immigration. In this respect, Merthyr Tydfil and Llanelli are typical of other similar small town, semi-urban and rural localities in other parts of the UK. The local labour markets do not necessarily offer opportunities for upward mobility. Those without the skills to trade-up occupationally may be susceptible to changes over which they have little or no leverage, but so long as their prospects are better in the UK than they are in Poland, there is every likelihood that substantial numbers will continue to stay longer than they original envisaged.

Notes

1 The countries that joined the EU in 2004 were: Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia. Of these accession countries, those that are considered ‘CEE’ include: Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Czech Republic and Estonia.
2 The low estimate was attributed to the historic East–West migration figures and the limited impact that changing institutional arrangements historically had on migration to the UK (Dustmann et al. 2003).
3 Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 and Croatia joined the EU in 2013, taking the total number of EU member states to 28; however, this article will focus mainly on the 2004 EU enlargement.
4 The authors acknowledge that there are limitations to the use of the WRS data (Gillingham 2010) but it was one of the few migrant data sets available at the local authority level in Wales.

References


White A. (2011). Polish Migration in the UK: Local Experiences and Effects, paper delivered at the AHRC Connected Communities Symposium titled ‘Understanding Local Experiences and Effects of New Migration,’ Sheffield, 26 September 2011.


A Decade of Membership: Hungarian Post-Accession Mobility to the United Kingdom

Chris Moreh*

This paper examines Hungarian migration to the United Kingdom following EU accession. Migration from Hungary has generally been low both before and after accession, but trends have recently started to change. Based on the available statistical data, the paper explores the volume, key demographics and geographical distribution of this migration, and shows how a combination of economic, political and social factors is accountable for the migration of Hungarians to the United Kingdom. To give a human face to the phenomenon, the paper also builds on narrative interviews collected during recent ethnographic fieldwork in London, highlighting the role of economic decline, policy miscalculations, language competence and the online migration industry in shaping the motivations, aims and accommodation of migrants. The paper suggests that migration from Hungary may become more dominant in the second decade of the country’s EU membership than it has been during the first ten years.

Keywords: migration; mobility; EU accession; Hungary; United Kingdom

Introduction

The 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) is often seen as having opened a new chapter in the history of intra-European migration, in terms of both the volume and the forms of movements on the continent (Black 2010; Favell 2008). The ‘novelty’ of this mobility lies, from this perspective, in the special condition of EU membership set against the broader framework of complex interconnections and the articulation of different processes of production and consumption in the globalising world economy (Sassen 1988). Nevertheless, membership conditions are experienced differently throughout the EU, and it is necessary to regularly examine these differences and their evolution. Currently, East–West mobility experiences speak of a phenomenon stranded between ideals of free movement and mutated forms of economic and racial discrimination (Favell, Nebe 2009; Fox, Morosanu, Szilassy 2012; McDowell 2008).

The ‘free movement’ policy is generally seen by EU citizens as best encapsulating the ‘meaning’ of the European Union, as well as being its ‘most positive result’ (cf. European Commission 2013a: 63; European Commission 2013b: 18). In the old member-states, however, this general assessment is coupled with fears regarding the immigration effects of the policy and, in 2004, only Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom decided not to impose any serious limitations on the flow of workers from accession countries. This decision
had created a *situation comparable to an experiment that is unprecedented in the history of European migration* (Bahna 2008: 845), and which came to a close in 2011, when the optional seven-year moratorium on labour-market access for the 2004 accession countries expired in all member-states.

The present paper looks at the outcomes of this ‘experiment’ by exploring the case of post-accession mobility from Hungary to the United Kingdom. As Hungary has had a relatively low emigration rate compared to other countries in the region – a trend which has recently begun to change, as the data in this paper will demonstrate – it presents a useful case-study for discussing the complexity of migratory processes in the ‘new European migration system’ (Favell 2008), particularly the role of specific national policies in shaping mobility practices. First, I will place the phenomenon within the wider regional context of Central Eastern European mobility, highlighting the similarities and differences in patterns, and presenting the dominant economic push factors in the wake of the financial crisis. Second, relying on available statistical sources, the paper explores the main geographical and demographic dimensions of Hungarian migration to the UK. This analysis aims to outline some of the possible characteristics of this ‘new’ mobility. The third section of the paper complements the statistical data with qualitative descriptions emerging from recent ethnographic fieldwork in London. For the purposes of the present paper, these descriptions will give a human face to the previously identified trends, and illustrate certain major themes rather than permitting an in-depth analysis.

**Post-accession migration in Central Eastern Europe**

A decade after enlargement we can form an impression of the outcome of the selective opening of labour markets to new accession countries by looking at the distribution of A12 migrants in EU member-states (see Map 1). As we can see on Map 1, almost 80 per cent of all A12 migrants reside in only four EU15 countries, 23 per cent of them in the United Kingdom.¹ This image is radically different from that of 2003, when Germany accommodated 43 per cent of all migrants, and the UK only 8 per cent. Today, in half of the A12 countries (and also in half of the A8), the United Kingdom is the preferred destination for more than a third of all emigrants to the EU15. Germany is still the first, at least in terms of migrant stocks, only in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In the case of Hungary, the importance of previous migration networks is obvious, as there were already 54 714 Hungarian nationals living in Germany in January 2004, and only 6 021 in the UK (Eurostat).

The persisting German orientation in Hungarian, Czech and Slovenian emigration also signals that the ‘social experiment’ created by the unequal distribution of the main pull factor – an open labour market – has had a somewhat different outcome in these three countries, explained by their relatively low emigration rates between 2003 and 2013 (based on the total population in sending countries in 2003): 0.48 per cent for Slovakia, 0.57 for the Czech Republic, and 1.63 for Hungary. Slovakia registered 2.39 per cent, Estonia 3.37 and Poland 3.59, while Latvia (5.33 per cent), Lithuania (6.77 per cent) and Romania (9.07 per cent) reached much higher levels.² As Bahna (2008) noted when comparing predictions with the actual emigration from accession countries between 2004 and 2006, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is highly correlated with migration behaviour, proving the explanatory power of neoclassical theories for intra-European migration. However, if we extend our inquiry up until the present day, these national divergences raise some questions, partly explained by the differential effect of the 2008 economic crisis, which has had a disproportionate influence on emigration from the Baltics.³
The financial crisis and economic push factors in the CEE and Hungary

In contrast to the Baltic States, economic decline in Hungary appears to be a longer-term and steadier trend. As Figure 1 shows, Hungary’s per capita GDP in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) was still the third highest in the region in 2003, behind Slovenia and the Czech Republic. By 2012, however, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia had all outweighed the Hungarian economy. If we consider the absolute value of earnings in euros, in 2003 Hungary was second to Slovenia alone, while now wages are higher in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia. This is an important factor in relation to international migration, as the value of remittances depends more on wage differentials in absolute terms and, from a rational-choice perspective, it is this comparison that could influence migration decision-making.
Figure 1. Change in GDP and net annual earnings in 2003–2012

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat data.

Figure 2. Post-accession CEE emigration rates and GDP

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
Taking the above into consideration and examining the relationship between migration rates and 2004–2012 GDP averages, we find a slightly weaker correlation than for the period examined by Bahna (2008), and emigration from Hungary appears somewhat exceptional, with a comparatively lower rate than its post-accession economic development might have suggested (Figure 2). This ‘relative immobility’ has represented Hungarian society since the early days of capitalist transition when, amidst rapidly growing unemployment and radical economic restructuring paralleling the opening of borders to free movement, Hungarians exhibited an inclination to bide their time, to postpone their decisions on migration (Szoke 1992: 318). We can observe a similar attitude during the financial crisis of 2008–2009, and an increasing impatience and loss of faith four years after the downturn.

As we can see in Figure 3, employment in some segments of the economy – primarily in the public sector – has been in decline since 2005, while the private sector suffered the most between the third quarter of 2007 and 2011. The largest growth in employment between 2008 and 2011, and again since 2012, was registered in so-called ‘public employment’ – an artificial employment and training programme for those out of work – and in the number of those working abroad, who are unlikely to benefit from and fully contribute to the national economy. Paralleling the negative changes in employment, the population’s subjectively perceived level of poverty has also reached a new constant peak (Figure 4). More than a quarter of households feel that they are making ends meet ‘with great difficulty,’ and one third of the total population is deemed to be ‘at risk of poverty and social exclusion,’ a return to pre-accession levels. At the same time, following a crisis-induced rise between 2008 and 2010, the unemployment rate remains above 10 per cent, even after the inclusion of emigrant workers in labour-market statistics.

**Figure 3. Decomposition of the cumulative change of employment in Hungary in 2005–2013**

*Annual change (thousand persons)*

Source: Dóra Bak, MNB (2014b).
Figure 4. Unemployment and subjective poverty in Hungary in 2005–2013

Source: Eurostat (SILC) [ilc_mdes09], [une_rt_a], [ilc_peps01].

Figure 5. Volume of household debt in Hungary by late payment and status in 2009–2014

Source: own elaboration based on data from MNB (2014a).

Unemployment and low incomes, however, are only partially responsible for subjective poverty, another factor having to do with the specific and long-term impact the crisis has had on financial institutions and
foreign-exchange rates (Åslund 2010). The proliferation of credit options – especially the advantageous contracts based on foreign currencies – has led to a high level of household debt vulnerable to currency fluctuations, subsequently driving many debtors into insolvency (cf. Rona-Tas, Guseva 2013). In Figure 5 we can observe the increase in the amount of household debt incurring payment difficulties during the first half of 2010, and the growing share of debt with payment delays of over a year, thereafter. This trend shows that a substantial amount of debt is ‘fossilising,’ with increasing amounts becoming classified as ‘problematic’ or outright ‘bad.’

Far from constituting a Hungarian specificity, foreign currency mortgages were widespread throughout Central Eastern Europe, and especially in the Baltic states, and governments have intervened in different ways to ‘save’ the debtors, however belated these measures may have proved for many (Rona-Tas, Guseva 2013). While household debt may have contributed to migration decisions everywhere in the region, it certainly represents an important economic factor in Hungarian migration, as the migrants’ narratives presented in the third section of the paper will corroborate. If Hungary’s low migration rate in the early post-accession years was, indeed, due to an ‘inclination to bide time,’ the slow and steady pace of economic decline – as somewhat different from the sudden shifts characterising economic development in the Baltics – would have favoured such strategies and could also explain the recent rise in emigration.

As we saw in Figure 3, the share of emigrants in the economy was already visible during the crisis years, but has increased significantly since the second half of 2011 and, today, migration has become a very topical issue in Hungarian media and political discourse (Kapitány, Rohr 2013). With migration potential surveys registering alarmingly high rates, especially among students and youth, it is also bound to be an enduring phenomenon (Gödri, Feleky 2013). Reliable data on emigration are scarce, with the number of those living abroad estimated at anywhere between 195,000 (Blaskó, Jamalia 2014) and 335,000 in the 18–49 age group alone (Kapitány, Rohr 2013). According to Eurostat data, a total of 257,299 Hungarian citizens were living in the EU15 at the beginning of 2013 and, according to national statistics in the two main destination countries – Germany and the United Kingdom – the increase in the number of Hungarian nationals during 2013 was higher than in any single previous year after EU accession (based on data from the Department for Work and Pensions and Destatis). In the following section I will explore the available statistical data on migration to the United Kingdom more closely.

Hungarians in the UK: demographics, geography and economic activity

Leaving aside the actual extent of flows, we can identify different patterns in the migration from CEE countries that joined the EU in 2004, shaped by the distinct push factors in each country of origin. As shown in Figure 6, there are two dominant types – the ‘double-hump’ trajectory of migration from the Baltics, and the ‘single-hump’ pattern characteristic of Central Europe, from which Hungary started diverging in 2008. That year, while migration rates from other countries in the region declined, migration from Hungary saw a modest increase, and flows stabilised at around 14,000 per year (about 20 times higher than before accession) until 2011, when they began increasing again. As we can see, before 2006, migration from Hungary to the United Kingdom was moderate, lower even than migration from the Czech Republic, and only in 2010 did it exceed the falling immigration rate from Slovakia (a country with a population just over half that of Hungary) in both relative and absolute terms. In the previous section I discussed some socio-economic factors that may have contributed to this change in migration patterns, and in the next section we will also examine migrants’ reasoning. Another socio-political factor that I will not be dealing with extensively in this paper but which, nevertheless, requires mentioning, is the possible mobility consequence of the 2010 change in Hungary’s citizenship law (Law no. XLIV of 2010). The new legislation allowing for the preferential naturalisation of ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary has yielded over 500,000 new citizens since January 2011, and
a proportion of those registered as Hungarian migrants in other countries may be such ‘dual citizens.’ Although Kapitány and Rohr (2013: 1), for instance, assume that a significant part of those appearing in the mirror-statistics since 2011 are Hungarian citizens who have never lived on the territory of Hungary, there are no data on the precise numbers.\(^5\)

**Figure 6. Patterns of CEE migration to the UK**

Based on a combination of population-census and national-insurance data, I estimate the number of ‘usually resident’ first-generation Hungarian migrants in the United Kingdom to have been around 76,000 in April 2014 (see Figure 7). This estimation is based on census 2011 data complemented with the weighted number of post-census National Insurance Number (NINo) registrants believed to have stayed along.\(^6\) We can infer this latter ratio by comparing year-of-arrival data from the census with the number of NINo registrations during the same period, and I have used a 46 per cent rate for my estimation of migrant stock increase be-
tween March 2011 and March 2014 (see Table 1). With all their deficiencies, I consider these sources and method to be currently more precise than Annual Population Survey data.7

Figure 7. Stock and flow of Hungarian migrants to the UK

Source: own calculations based on UK census 2011 (Office for National Statistics; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency; National Records of Scotland) data and NINo data (Department for Work and Pensions).

Table 10. Hungarians in England and Wales in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian-born by year of arrival</th>
<th>Passport held</th>
<th>NINo registrations</th>
<th>‘Usual residents’ as % of NINo registrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>non-British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before 2004</td>
<td>11 503</td>
<td>6 374</td>
<td>5 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td>11 249</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>11 065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>17 310</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>17 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011 (March)</td>
<td>8 246</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>8 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 (April) – 2014 (March)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 2004-2011 (March)</td>
<td>36 805</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>36 350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All data are for England and Wales only.

Source: UK Census 2011 (Office for National Statistics) and Department for Work and Pensions.

The re-migration rate is, in itself, interesting to examine. As shown in Table 1, the 2011 census recorded 5 129 Hungarian-born residents in England and Wales who did not hold a UK passport and who had arrived before 2004. Only 11 065 had arrived in the three years following Hungary’s EU accession, while the majority (17 154) went between 2007 and the end of 2009, and a proportionate number (8 131) during 2010 and the months before the census. If we look at the inflow of Hungarian nationals during these same periods, as
represented by NINo allocations, we find that 63 per cent of those registering between 2004 and 2007 were still residing in England and Wales in 2011. This rate is only 45 per cent for those who requested a national-insurance number between 2007 and 2010, and slightly higher (47 per cent) for the more-recently arrived. This is somewhat counterintuitive, as we would expect the more recent arrivals to still be present in greater proportions than those who had arrived earlier. There are several possible explanations for this. One is that there has been a shift in mobility types, from a longer-term and more stable migration to a more ‘fluid,’ ‘liquid,’ ‘circulatory’ type of mobility, seen as increasingly representative of intra-EU movements (Engbersen, Snel, de Boom 2010; Kupiszewski 2002). Another possibility is that, among those applying in the early period, many had already been living in Britain for a while, with clearer intentions of settlement but without access to national insurance. This thesis is in line with empirical evidence concerning the ‘status regularization’ effect of EU accession, especially in relation to Polish migration (Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly, Spencer 2006; Portes, French 2005). In fact, in the case of Poles – who represent the historically most established and single largest group of CEE nationals in the UK – we find an even more striking contrast: 80 per cent of those who arrived between 2004 and 2007 were still present in 2011, compared to 45 per cent and 58 per cent for the following two groups respectively (based on data from the Office for National Statistics and the Department for Work and Pensions). It is therefore not a Hungarian specificity, but probably a more general consequence of the financial crisis affecting newcomers to a greater extent (cf. McCollum, Findlay 2011).

Overall, the mobility of Hungarians seems more ‘fluid’ than that of Poles, only half of the total post-accession NINo registrants showing up in the census, compared to 60 per cent for Polish nationals. However, considering the issue discussed above, for the purpose of estimating the proportion of stayers among those registering since the census date, I used a 46 per cent rate, the average for the previous two cohorts in England and Wales. As we saw in Table 1, more new arrivals were registered in the three years since the census than during the six years immediately following Hungary’s EU accession, with the highest rise during 2013.

A third factor relating to re-migration rates is that they also cover some internal migration, as a proportion of those registering for national insurance in England and Wales may have subsequently moved to Scotland or Northern Ireland, which appear separately in census statistics. However, considering the number of Hungarian nationals living in these regions, this factor should not have played too great a role. In terms of geographical distribution, at the time of the census more than one third of all Hungarian-born usual residents lived in London, a somewhat higher rate than for other A10 migrants (see Map 2) (cf. Bauere, Densham, Millar, Salt 2007). Within London, Hungarian speakers were more concentrated in the northern boroughs, with 28 per cent living in Brent, Haringey and in the lower wards of Barnet, home to only one tenth of all Londoners (see Map 3). Since then, first-time national-insurance application data show an increase towards the eastern boroughs, especially Newham and Waltham Forest (based on data from Department for Work and Pensions).

There is a dearth of useful data sources for the internal migration of resident foreign nationals but, when analysing the location of first-time NINo registrations over time, we can observe a general trend of dispersal. The share of Hungarians registering in London decreased every year between 2004 (44.3 per cent) and 2007 (33.5 per cent), and then increased steadily each year from 35.6 per cent during 2008 to 43.1 per cent in 2012, followed by another decrease in 2013 (40.9 per cent). Considering what we know about the role of social networks in migratory movements, it is safe to assume that many of those registering in regions outside London between 2005 and 2008 were following in the wake of acquaintances who had moved internally (cf. Trevena, McGhee, Heath 2013). If this is so, then the rising trend in new registrations in London may indicate a change in mobility types, as I have already speculated on above. Apart from being more ‘fluid,’ then, this second type of post-accession mobility may also be more ‘individualistic’ and reliant on ‘weak ties’ (cf. Granovetter 1973). Further, the percentage of Hungarians living in the capital must have increased over the last three years.
Map 2. Geographic distribution of Hungarians in the UK in 2011

Source: own elaboration based on UK census 2011 (Office for National Statistics; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency; National Records of Scotland).

Map 3. Hungarian speakers in London wards in 2011

Source: own elaboration based on UK census 2011 (ONS) [QS204EW]. © Crown copyright. All rights reserved GD272183.2014.
Another demographic characteristic of intra-EU mobility in general is the greater equality in gender balance than that which is representative of classical forms of labour migration; especially in their initial phase, these are dominated by young males (cf. Castles, Miller 2009; Recchi, Favell 2009). The age and gender of Hungarian migrants to the UK seem to replicate intra-EU trends. Considering all national-insurance applicants since 2002, Hungarians in the UK are generally young (80 per cent are aged 18 to 35), 53 per cent are male and 47 female (Figure 8). However, as the gender composition of Hungary’s over-15 population is the exact reverse, we can see an overrepresentation of men among labour migrants in the 27–44 age group. This trend is representative of CEE migration more broadly, placing it between classical forms of labour migration and the mobility from old EU member-states. Overall, it is characterised by greater diversity in motivations, aims and opportunities for both young men and young women (cf. Recchi, Favell 2009).

Differences between the mobility of old and new EU citizens are greater in terms of their economic activity. Unfortunately data broken down to individual nationalities are limited in this respect, but allow for a general assessment of the A12 countries comprising Hungary (cf. Table 2 and 3). As we can see in Table 2, important differences exist not only between UK, EU15 and A12 nationals, but also among accession-country migrants. Overall, A12 migrants are economically more active than those from the old member-states who, in turn, are more active than UK nationals and the average working population. Of those who arrived after 2001 and were in employment at the time of the 2011 census, A12 nationals are underrepresented in professional and managerial positions, and are more likely to be employed in skilled trades and industry (including construction) – and more so for Poles than other A12 nationals, with one third working in elementary occupations (Table 3).
Table 2. Economic activity of working age A12 migrants in England and Wales in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All passports</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>EU15</th>
<th>A12</th>
<th>Major A12</th>
<th>Other A12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>56 075 912</td>
<td>42 456 526</td>
<td>889 716</td>
<td>988 123</td>
<td>104 676</td>
<td>558 082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 16s</td>
<td>45 496 780</td>
<td>35 353 412</td>
<td>729 347</td>
<td>810 202</td>
<td>85 221</td>
<td>444 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active (%)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In employment (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees (%)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (%)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time students (%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed (%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically inactive (%)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired (%)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students (%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking after home or family (%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term sick or disabled (%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All percentages refer to usual residents aged 16 and over.

Source: UK Census 2011 (Office for National Statistics): [DC6209EWR],[DC2110EWR].

Table 3. Occupation of working age new A12 migrants in England and Wales in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation of workers arrived between 2001–2011 by passports held</th>
<th>All passports</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>EU15</th>
<th>A12</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Other A12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All occupations:</td>
<td>2 100 451</td>
<td>346 823</td>
<td>284 739</td>
<td>617 689</td>
<td>357 335</td>
<td>260 354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Managers, directors and senior officials (%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Professional occupations (%)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Associate professional and technical (%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Administrative and secretarial (%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Skilled trades occupations (%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Caring, leisure and other service (%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sales and customer service (%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Process, plant and machine operatives (%)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Elementary occupations (%)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All data refer to usual residents aged 16 and over who arrived between 2001 and 2011 and were in employment the week before the census (27 March 2011).

Source: UK census 2011 (Office for National Statistics): [CT0078].

The main differences in economic activity between British, EU15 and A12 nationals are in the size of the retired and student population (Table 2). Interestingly, we can see differences along similar lines between Poles – the major migrant group – and other A12 migrants, especially in the ratio of students, with 13 per cent of working-age migrants from accession states other than the three major origin countries counting as students (either in employment or inactive), compared to 7 per cent of Polish migrants. The second major difference among A12 migrants lies in the number of self-employed, primarily due to the high percentage of
Romanian and Bulgarian nationals choosing this route, although Lithuanians are also more inclined towards self-employment.\textsuperscript{11}

**Figure 9.** Change in Hungarian and CEE applications to UK universities in 2004–2013

We can find more specific data on student numbers from the UK Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS). As Figure 9 shows, there was a sharp increase in 2012 and 2013 in the number of applications to UK higher-education institutions by Hungarians, both in absolute terms and relative to other CEE nationals (cf. Makó, Tóth 2014). The number of applicants was 3.5 times (354 per cent) higher in 2012 than in 2004 and almost 5 times higher in 2013, more than twice that of the previous years’ average. These ratios are equally valid for applicants domiciled in Hungary, and for the total number of applicants (including those Hungarians applying from within the UK).

These comparative trends in student mobility parallel those we have seen in Figure 6 in respect to labour migration, and raise further questions regarding causal mechanisms that are specific to Hungary. In the following section I will draw on qualitative narrative interviews, collected during personal ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in the summer of 2013 in London,\textsuperscript{12} to gain a better contextual understanding of the processes highlighted above. While the fieldwork had a wider scope, for the purposes of this paper I will focus more closely on those migration stories which are the most representative of wider social phenomena, and examine further the contextual factors affecting migration decisions.

**Hungarians in London: reasons, aims and adaptation**

In the previous section I outlined some demographic and geographic characteristics of Hungarian migration to the United Kingdom, and formulated several assumptions regarding the character of this mobility. As we saw, it is a rather ‘fluid’ and ‘individualistic’ type of mobility, involving predominantly young men and women, with a greater preference for London than in the case of other A10 migrants. It is also relatively recent, with a major upsurge over the past two years in both labour and student mobility. In the following
section I will further explore some of these characteristics by highlighting certain major themes related to migrants’ motivations, aims and settlement as they emerged from narrative interviews.

Preliminary results from a recent online survey (associated with the Leave/Stay project)\textsuperscript{13} may also be helpful in guiding our discussion. On a large (\(N = 5200\)) but non-significant sample – in which those with higher education seem over-represented – the survey found that 77.8 per cent of Hungarians in the UK migrated for work (about half of whom had a job offer before they moved), one in ten people had followed a partner, 7.2 per cent moved for studies, and just over 5 per cent went there without any specific aim, to ‘try their luck’ (MTA 2014). Before moving, 70 per cent had been in employment, 16 per cent had been studying, and the remaining 14 per cent used to be unemployed, economically inactive, or sporadically employed on a short-term basis. One in five respondents considered ‘better study prospects’ and ‘curiosity, adventure’ as important factors in their migration decision, whereas two-thirds mentioned ‘higher living standards,’ and more than half, ‘better job opportunities.’\textsuperscript{14} For almost 20 per cent of the respondents, ‘loan repayment’ was an important factor, and for 10 per cent ‘financing a business’ topped the reasons for leaving Hungary behind (MTA 2014). We should bear in mind that the two latter reasons are more specific than the general dissatisfaction with the economic situation in Hungary or the higher living standards and job opportunities in Britain, and they seem to reflect the experience of a more substantial number of people than the multitude of individual reasons that may exist. With his one-year experience as a migrant, Bence was unequivocal that:

\begin{quote}
There are three types of Hungarians in London: those like me, who came here to work because they had lost their jobs or businesses and have families to support; those with no obligations back home, without families and free to do what they wish; and those who had a mortgage and could no longer pay, losing their houses (Bence, 44 years old, 29 May 2013).\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

This ‘emic’ evaluation has proved quite accurate, and many of my interviewees mentioned difficulties in supporting their businesses, or being unable to pay their mortgage, as their main reasons for migrating.

\textit{Bankruptcy and the spectre of debt}

I proposed earlier that the slow and steady pace of economic decline and the ‘fossilisation’ of household debt may have had an influence on both delaying migration projects and the recent increase in emigration. Migrant narratives can help us to understand the mechanisms behind such processes, and here I will briefly present two telling cases of former entrepreneurs and foreign-currency mortgage debtors.

According to Bence, who has been a painting contractor for almost fifteen years, the business environment in Hungary has been deteriorating slowly but steadily ever since he launched his enterprise in 2000, and plans to migrate have been on his mind ever since:

\begin{quote}
My main reason for leaving is that I used to be a contractor and my business went bankrupt. There was this debt running in circles, and [subcontractors] were ’forgetting’ to pay me... and I haven’t been paid up to this day. (...) This situation has been constant, but kept worsening year after year. Around 2000 – this is just a rough estimation – in 7–8 jobs you ran into a situation [where you were not paid] maybe once. You can survive that. Then by 2011–2012 I was virtually merely covering my costs. Of 7–8 contracts, around half were not settled (Bence, 44).
\end{quote}

In the experience of Balázs, who had worked in television for over twenty years, and at the time of the fieldwork had been in London for almost a year, the situation in the media production business in Hungary was
nothing better. He had also run his own company, producing media contents for television stations and advertising agencies:

My last contract ended in December 2011, and I could feel that I wouldn’t be able to secure other jobs. Before that I hardly had finished a job and another one was already lined up, and often I had to give up contracts for lack of capacity. My last job was a two-year contract, with fewer and fewer parallel commissions, and by the second year it was the only one I held. That contract ended on 31st December, and around February I began realising that there may be no other choice for me than to leave (...), and finally in July I decided to leave. I had by then used up my savings (Balázs, 47 years old, 27 May 2013).

In the cases of both Bence and Balázs we can discern the previously hypothesised tendency to ‘bide time’ and postpone migration projects until all other options are exhausted, as with those who became caught up in the trap of foreign currency mortgage debt. Accounts of mortgage default-induced migration are all very similar:

We had taken out not one loan, but four loans (...) and as long as we could pay them from our salaries, it wasn’t an issue. It became an issue when we took out a loan denominated in Swiss francs, and that hadn’t been an issue either for three years (...), but things changed in 2009 when the economic crisis hit and the rates started increasing. Then we took out another mortgage to buy off this one. (...) Finally I decided to leave because I could not afford the instalments (Luca, 46 years old, 6 June 2013).

Apart from influencing migration decisions, debt may also affect the migration life-course in other subtle ways. Adam (50), for instance, sees the freedom opened up by EU accession as ‘salvation,’ while at the same time experiencing his migration as an ‘entrapment’:

For me there is no return. I took out the foreign-currency mortgage, I defaulted, and now I can’t do anything back home because the taxing authority would immediately come and take my entire income (Adam, 50 years old, 30 May 2013).

Political corruption and policy miscalculations

While the economic crisis is acknowledged in the narratives above as a major cause of their economic hardships, many migrants perceive ‘politics’ – or political corruption – as the main culprit. In the Leave/Stay survey, almost half of the respondents answered that ‘bad political situation’ was a main reason behind their migration (MTA 2014). In my interviewees’ accounts, this overly general diagnosis concretised around very specific practices and policy decisions. For Bence, the ‘debt running in circles’ he mentioned was spiralling downwards within large state-funded infrastructural projects run by businesses related to political actors and involving a great number of subcontractors, with payments ‘vanishing’ somewhere along the way. According to him, the main problem lay in the very practice of commissioning government projects:

Bids were settled at governmental level; it was in vain for a contractor to bid with a normal price, his application was not even considered... the contract always went to the lowest bidder, and everyone knew what this entailed (Bence, 44).

This practice, if indeed widespread, was ingrained in the economic and political culture of post-socialist marketisation and less connected to any particular political party. Others cite transformations taking place more specifically after the 2010 elections and the formation of a two-thirds supermajority government. Hav-
ing worked primarily for national television channels. Balázs has also voiced his suspicions regarding the reasons why he no longer received new media production contracts, his accusations reflecting the wider social anxiety about growing government influence on the state media. These concerns led, in 2012, to Hungary’s ‘Freedom of the Press’ rating devaluation by Freedom House, which deemed that, *By creating a central property management and production fund, the government deprived three previously independent institutions – Hungarian Television (MTV), Hungarian Radio (Magyar Rádió), and Danube Television (Duna Televízió) – of their financial and organisational autonomy* (Freedom House 2012).

Policy miscalculations in the area of education have also been referred to by some migrants. For Laura (41), who had been a teacher for fifteen years, the final push came as a consequence of a change in the law on public education, which now made it easier for local authorities with financial difficulties to hand over schools to religious institutions and escape the burden of having to maintain them (see Law LI of 2010):

*There has been a change of administration at the school where I used to work, and its management was taken over by the Reformed Church. (...) We had got used to working in a state school, many of us had been teaching there for 30–35 years, and now they brought in a totally new perspective, a new system... everything changed. (...) They told us they would like to work with us, that it is not an issue if we are not Protestant – I’m Catholic – we don’t have to become that... but when the time came, we experienced otherwise. Many things happened that no longer worked for me* (Laura, 41 years old, 28 May 2013).

As Laura stressed, she and her husband had long cherished the dream of ‘experiencing living abroad,’ and what happened with her school only ‘came as a sign.’ It is, however, due to such policy miscalculations that a general dissatisfaction with the ‘political situation’ is becoming dominant, leading many to take advantage of the liberties offered by EU freedom-of-movement provisions.

**Higher education policies and youth mobility**

Education policies – especially those affecting the higher education sector – have had a much wider influence on migration potential, shaping the mobility aspirations of an entire generation of young adults. While higher education has generally been state-subsidised, the introduction of fees has often topped the political agenda in the past twenty years and, to gain approval, proposals have invariably taken the shape of rather complex arrangements. Since 2011 the riest debates have been around the introduction of a ‘student contract’ requiring state-funded students to work in Hungary for a certain period after graduation in order to recompense society for what it had invested in their education. The finally adopted and currently enforced law sets rather loose terms for this requirement; however, the enduring uncertainties regarding its content and a gloomy media discourse have made university education in Hungary seem less attainable and more risky. The popular reference to the ‘contract’ – or, rather, ‘declaration’ – by means of a historically charged expression denoting the boundedness of medieval serfs exacerbates the contrast with EU ideals of free movement, highlighting the latter as a viable alternative.

It is thus no surprise that Hungarian applications to UK universities have multiplied over the past two years, even amidst rising tuition fees (as seen in Figure 9 above), and that, in a recent survey, secondary-school students in their final years came out as the subgroup the most inclined (52.8 per cent) to nurture migration ‘plans,’ with many of them (23.5 per cent) aiming to continue their studies abroad (Gödri, Feleky 2013: 3). Another fresh survey of secondary-school students’ aspirations shows that 5.9 per cent of those planning to continue their studies have applied to foreign universities and, of those terminating their studies, 25.6 per cent wish to find employment abroad (Makó, Tóth 2014: 16–18). One of the migration stories which
best captures young people’s attitude towards mobility is that of Viktória (22). Following secondary school, Viktória, originally from a southern county of Hungary, studied applied graphic design at a further education college in Budapest. In the meantime she was accepted by a top provincial university, but chose to leave the country instead:

I thought it through, that I have two–three options; the first – and most important – is that I begin my university course. But I know myself, and I know I have high expectations, and that my mother is raising me on her own, and I cannot expect her to support me at the age of 21–22, to ask for money whenever I want to go out or buy a new dress. (...) And, well, I wanted to leave, to live, I’m young, and I thought I could study here too. (...) I wanted to continue my studies as a graphic designer, and this is how I set off a year ago, that I won’t be a waitress for the rest of my life, but that I want to study... to earn an English certificate in graphic design (Viktória, 22 years old, 21 June 2013).

While the expected negative effects of youth emigration are an increasing cause for concern in Hungary, and there have been several recent governmental initiatives aimed at the ‘re-migration’ of qualified young professionals (Lados, Hegedűs 2012), the consequences of the latest wave of student migration are yet impossible to ascertain. The experience of Emma (28), however, leads us to believe that the reverse transfer of skills and qualifications acquired in Britain may be more problematic than many would expect. Emma first arrived in the UK on an internship while a student in Budapest, where she had been enrolled on her ‘dream’ course at an expensive private university. Here, the medium of instruction was English, for which she paid with revenues from a family property sale:

I didn’t want to do [the internship] back home, because my classes were in English anyway, and [in Hungary] I wouldn’t have learnt anything new (...). In the end London caught my fancy so much that I began inquiring about courses, and I found one (...) that was similar to the one back home. I got in touch with the course director, and I was able to arrange for a transfer and finish the last year of my degree here (Emma, 28 years old, 2 July 2013).

She took out a UK student loan to cover the fees, which – she says – were lower than what I had to pay in Hungary, and the conditions of the loan are also better than back home, while also working as a nanny alongside her internship and studies. After her graduation in 2011 she returned to Budapest enthusiastic about the career prospects her British qualification, international experience and language skills would open up, but she encountered difficulties:

So I went home, and (laughs) could not find any work, because when I told them that I graduated in London, everyone was like: ‘Oh, oh, London! Oh, okay, so you must be a millionaire. Then what do you need a job for?’ So, the general attitude was something like this, and I was truly flabbergasted... (Emma, 28).

She remained in Hungary for a year, doing temporary jobs only remotely connected to her qualification and, in October 2012, she decided to return to London: I tried [to manage] back home with best of heart, but if this is their attitude...

The stories of Viktória and Emma also confirm that, within the EU migration system, educational, economic and leisure motivations become conflated, disturbing supposed dichotomies between ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled,’ ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ mobilities (Parutis 2014). As has become obvious from many interviews, the level of English-language competence is the skill which plays the greatest role in migrants’ opportunities.
Language is a factor shaping migration motivation and hindering adaptation at the same time, while impacting on employment and earning potential (Dustmann, Fabbri 2003; Johnston, Khattab, Manley 2014). In what follows, I examine these two aspects of language competence before closing with a discussion of the ‘migration industry,’ yet another important element influencing migration decisions and adaptation.

Language competence and labour-market incorporation

For the younger generation, English represents their first foreign language. Over and above its better salary prospects, moving to Britain is also seen as an opportunity to improve these language skills (cf. Parutis 2014). Viktória, whom I introduced earlier, arrived to London with limited practical language abilities although she had studied English at school; this made it more difficult for her to continue her education in Britain as planned:

I could not see myself not finding a job, and I found a job [as a waitress] within a week (…) I believe that there are certain steps: cleaner, waitress, receptionist... I’m young and I would work as a cleaner only as a last resort, because as a cleaner I could not practice the language; (…) as a waitress I have to communicate with the customers, they sometimes talk about the weather, where they work, so I can progress (…) My final, final, final aim would be to… I would very much like to work for the BBC as a graphic design editor. Yes, I know it sounds crazy, but… (…) The key is to learn English well, (…) to be able to express myself more eloquently (Viktória, 22).

Viktória shows a clear expectation of professional advancement from ‘any job,’ through a ‘better job,’ to her ‘dream job,’ a transition observed more widely among new migrants in Britain (Parutis 2014). Although dissatisfied with her current employment – the second since she arrived in London a year earlier – and seeking to make her next step as a receptionist, she does not see her job as a trade-off between student life in Hungary and higher incomes in Britain, but as a necessary stage in her career development. Her knowledge of English was good enough to allow her not to begin her migrant career from what she perceives to be the lowest ‘rung’ on the ladder of success, but it may still be insufficient for advancement. She enrolled on a free language course at a local college, but her current job is less flexible, making it harder for her to complete her course, a common concern among those planning to combine work with studies.

It is worth placing these issues in a wider social context. There is a general dissatisfaction in Hungary with the population’s overall foreign-language skills, a frustration increasingly voiced in the wake of recent data on foreign-language competence across the EU, and national statistics regarding the falling number of language exams (European Commission 2012; KSH 2014). Among EU27 nationals, Hungarians feel the least able to understand English well enough to follow radio or TV news (12 per cent), to read press articles (12 per cent), or communicate online (16 per cent) (European Commission 2012). What ultimately makes the younger generation more susceptible to assuming the risks of migration while lacking confidence in their English-language ability is, on the one hand, a conviction that being abroad is the best method of language learning and, on the other, the requirement that a university degree may only be granted to those possessing a language-test certificate. This latter stipulation is the reason for one quarter of all university graduates in Hungary not receiving their diplomas (KSH 2014: 39). The situation has worsened in the past couple of years as a consequence of changes in the higher education admissions system, whereby extra points can be earned from a greater variety of different sources than for language tests alone. According to language-teaching professionals, this situation is partly to blame for the continuous decrease in the number of language exam attempts since 2010 (KSH 2014), and also explains why interrupting one’s studies for a period working
abroad – as was indeed the case for several of my interviewees – or preferring post-graduation employment abroad below one’s qualification level, makes sense not only economically but also academically.

For many older-generation migrants, English is their second foreign language, as they studied German at school instead. In many cases family or friends were the main reason for going to Britain, and they often emphasise the openness of English society and the British labour market, which makes it easier to integrate even with limited language skills. Máte is representative of the 10 per cent who had followed a partner to Britain – as shown in the Leave/Stay survey cited at the beginning of this section – but their relationship ended soon after moving, leaving him on his own without any knowledge of English:

*My greatest surprise was that I arrived here without speaking any English at all, and they still hired me; (...) I was still able to obtain the documents I needed in order to find employment, starting with the NI number... and I did it all alone* (Máté, 37 years old, 29 June 2013).

Had it not been for his partner, Máté says, he would probably have gone to Germany, as he spoke German. For Jázmin it was precisely a brief and unpleasant previous experience in Germany which made her follow her friends to London in 2006, even though she did not speak English. She was also astounded by how easily she got her first job at a pub:

*On the phone I didn’t even understand if I got [the interview] (...) I had prepared a monologue anticipating what they might ask me, confident that once there I could prove myself (...) [The manager] asked if I would like to work there and made [a wide gesture with his hands]. I didn’t understand a word, and thought he was asking if I had worked in a place like that before. I said no (...) He asked me two more times, probably thinking that I’m demented, and in the end I said ‘Yes’ (...) The manager just laughed and laughed (...) and he must have pitied me, because I got the job (...) To succeed in the hospitality industry you need to work hard, and smile. The English (...) take it much easier than a Hungarian would if, in a restaurant, they couldn’t understand the waiter* (Jázmin, 34 years old, 3 June 2013).

Others have chosen Britain without having any acquaintances there. Balázs – whose difficulties in maintaining his media production business in Hungary we have already heard about – found employment as a hotel porter and later as a cleaner. Although he had never studied English, and Britain was not among his first choices as a destination, language nevertheless played a central role in his decision:

*My first choice was Sweden, because my brother-in-law is there and I thought it is better to have at least someone who could help; but I don’t speak any Swedish, very little English, and if I must learn a new language, I would rather it not be Swedish, which I would make no use of later in life. My second choice was Australia, then New Zealand but, at 47, without knowing the language, it is impossible. (...) There was nothing left but England, where there are many (...) organisations on the internet, and they take care of everything* (Balázs, 47).

The logical trajectory exhibited in Balázs’s testimony was very common among those who migrated without any language proficiency and with only weak social ties in Britain. From a behavioural economics perspective, such decisions could be explained as ‘expected utility maximisation’: with the risks roughly equal in Sweden and England – given the existence of the online ‘migration industry’ – the value of English as the global language is increasingly taken into consideration as an expected additional benefit, secured even if the main aims of the migration project ultimately fail. A final factor in the mobility of Hungarians to London
that I outline here is the emerging online migration industry, which aided the migration and accommodation of many of my interviewees.

Accommodation and the online migration industry

As mentioned before, 2013 saw the highest influx of Hungarians in Britain and, at the time of my fieldwork, the ‘migration industry’ was booming. Describing it in relation to the Polish case, Garapich (2008) defines this special sector of the service industry as a set of specialised social actors and commercial institutions that profit directly not only from human mobility but also from effective adaptation into the new environment (2008: 736). As the first function is increasingly taken over by large multinational low-cost flight operators, services relating to migrant ‘adaptation’ are gaining ever greater importance. There are currently several companies offering different services to Hungarians wishing to move to London, and they play a crucial role in facilitating and perpetuating migration, making possible the more ‘individualistic’ type of mobility I alluded to earlier.

For the purposes of my fieldwork I appealed to the services of probably the largest – but certainly the best known and with the widest online presence – company providing temporary and long-term accommodation in London, with offices in both Budapest and the British capital. The firm, established in February 2004, acts mainly as a letting agency (primarily sub-letting, but with an increasing portfolio of company-owned properties), but also provides complementary free services to clients, such as job-search advice, CV editing, or booking interviews for national-insurance-number requests and bank-account applications. For a fee, it is even possible to arrange a pick-up from the point of arrival in the country, delivered by an associated Hungarian taxi service. The company also publishes a periodical informative booklet and maintains a website where affiliated businesses can post their offerings and opportunities. According to information on their webpage, they currently have more than 120 properties with over 600 available rooms and studio flats. The majority of the rooms are singles or shared by two people, equipped with the basic amenities – including broadband internet – and are located in the north, north-west and north-east of London (cf. the distribution of Hungarian speakers in London on Map 3 above). The company offers ‘short-term’ (four nights to two weeks) and a ‘long-term’ (over two weeks) rental options, with shared-room prices of 15 GBP per person per night for short-term stays, or between 60 to 100 GBP per week (around 75–130 euros), bills inclusive, for longer contracts.

Of course, not all newcomers live in accommodation provided by such agencies and most of their customers eventually move out to houses with lower occupancy and better conditions. Almost all of my interlocutors who had arrived during the previous twelve months were searching for a new abode – adhering to the general trend of ‘residential hypermobility,’ especially among those in the early stages of their migration, as observed by Trevena et al. (2013: 684). Nevertheless, under the conditions described above, the difficulty and risks of moving for someone without any ‘strong’ social ties or knowledge of English, but enough confidence in securing employment rapidly, are reduced to a minimum.

Recruitment agencies and individual recruiters are also actively present on web forums and in social-media groups, raising the confidence of transnational jobseekers and providing the missing link in the success of the resettlement, with all the well-documented risks and insecurities involved in such mediation (Garapich 2008; Trevena et al. 2013). As became apparent from my interviews, several agencies offering accommodation and employment mediation have gained a rather negative reputation, and many migrants consult and share their experiences of different intermediaries on specialised online blogs. The existence of such channels for the timely circulation of information and the possibilities they create for direct interaction between different actors – what we may collectively call the ‘online migration industry’ – is one of the dis-
distinct features of international migration in the age of the internet, and it is no less representative of Hungarian migration to the UK.

**Concluding remarks**

My aim in this paper was to describe and explain some of the migratory processes of Hungarian nationals. Compared to other countries in the region, Hungary has shown lower levels of emigration both before and following EU accession, but this trend has recently begun to change. Looking at the case of migration to the United Kingdom, immigration from Hungary intensified as rates from other Central Eastern European countries were declining. Based on my own calculations, the paper estimates that there are around 76,000 Hungarian nationals presently living in the UK, and that more than half of those entering the country with the purpose of taking up employment stay for a fairly short period. Like other CEE migrants, ‘fluidity,’ ‘individuality,’ a relative gender balance and a great variety of reasons, aims and opportunities are the main features of Hungarian post-accession mobility.

It is hard to appraise the future development of the phenomenon described above, as the lives of migrants are riddled with uncertainty. Some of those whose migration stories I have highlighted in this paper could easily be identified as ‘hamsters’ – according to the typology designed by Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich (2007) for Polish migrants in the UK – wishing to stay only for as long as necessary in order to achieve a certain goal. The majority of my interviewees, however, were ‘searchers,’ leaving open the question of return, expressing the wish to advance professionally and socially in Britain, and taking steps towards achieving those aims. Predominantly ‘young, individualistic and ambitious,’ as Eade et al. (2007) describe this group, their refusal to confine themselves to one nation-state setting underlines their adaptation to a flexible, deregulated and increasingly transnational, post-modern capitalist labour market (2007: 11). For them ‘in-betweenness’ is not something to be resolved, but to be lived as a lifestyle.

Others seem driven by an implacable frustration with circumstances in Hungary and, although – in contrast to the ‘stayers’ identified by Eade et al. – many have moved to Britain fairly recently, they are determined never to return ‘home.’ It is noteworthy that 38 per cent of the respondents to the Leave/Stay survey ‘are not planning to return at all,’ while another 35 per cent are ‘certainly not returning in the coming five years’ (MTA 2014). Two-thirds of the people in that sample arrived in the UK since 2010.

As I attempted to show in this paper, the latest rise in the mobility of Hungarians was engendered by a long economic decline and policy miscalculations. While the cases discussed here are far from representing all the migrants, they are well able to capture the many forces driving this ‘new’ mobility, which may become more dominant in Hungary’s second decade of EU membership than it was during the first.

**Notes**

1 In this paper I use the following taxonomic terms to group countries: EU15 as the ‘old’ EU member-states; A12 as the countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007; A10 as the countries which took part in the 2004 enlargement; A8 as the Central European and Baltic members of the A10; A2 as the two Eastern European countries which took part in the 2007 enlargement; and the CEE as the A8 plus A2.

2 Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data (cf. Figure 2).

3 Among all A12 countries, only Estonia and Latvia registered GDP decreases in 2008 while, in 2009, when the recession had truly reached Central Eastern Europe, the fall in total GDP compared to the previous year was a further 14.1 per cent in Estonia, 17.7 in Latvia and 14.8 in Lithuania, more than three
times the EU28 average of 4.5 per cent, and twice the 7.8 per cent of Slovenia, the next highest in the region (Eurostat data). For a detailed analysis of the financial crisis in the CEE, consult Aslund (2010).

4 Indeed, based on 2004 GDP rates, the coefficient of determination is 0.718.

5 My own Freedom of Information request with the UK Department for Work and Pensions, which might hold relevant information, has not yet received a reply.

6 These statistics need some specification. My analysis relies on the CT0161 census dataset on ‘passports held by year of arrival in the UK by country of birth,’ containing only data for England and Wales. For national representativeness I added data from the Northern Ireland [QS206NI] and Scotland [QS203SC] census detailing only ‘country of birth.’ In the final count, however, I excluded those Hungarian-born in England and Wales who possessed British passports, the majority having arrived prior to 2004 and, in fact, two-thirds before 1970 (see Table 1 above). This option was not available for the Irish and Scottish data but, as the number of Hungarian-born registered there is very low (999 and 2 943 respectively), this should not distort the estimation significantly. The non-Hungarian-born are also excluded, i.e. Hungarian citizens (or ethnic Hungarians) born in any other country or Hungarian children born in the UK. These data therefore represent mainly the ‘first generation.’ Also, they only count the ‘usually resident population’ defined by the ONS as people ‘who had been resident or intended to be resident in the UK for a period of 12 months or more’ (Office for National Statistics). Therefore, numbers may include some of those who arrived during the 12-month period before 27 March 2011 (census day), while excluding others. ‘National Insurance Number Allocations to Adult Overseas Nationals Entering the UK’ after the census reflects country of citizenship, and thus includes those born outside Hungary, but not the children. Its major drawbacks are that it only registers ‘labour migrants’ and does not record out-flows. I have tried to deal with the challenge posed by this latter shortcoming as outlined below (see Table 1), and I believe the present estimate to reflect ‘usually resident’ Hungarians in keeping with the above definition.

7 The latest available APS dataset for December 2012 estimates the number of Hungarians at 49 000 (+/– 10 000). My calculation for the same date results in 61 618 estimated ‘usually resident’ Hungarian migrants. For an assessment of the different available migration data sources, see e.g. Drinkwater and Garapich (2011), Boden and Rees (2010).

8 While the two statistics do not necessarily cover the same population, it is not unreasonable to assume a high level of agreement, and I shall treat them as coterminous.

9 Jivraj, Simpson and Marquis (2012) have discovered a similar trend for A8 migrants based on school census data; also cf. Bauere et al. (2007); Simpson, Finney (2009); Trevena, McGhee, Heath (2013).


11 Romanian and Bulgarian nationals who joined the EU in 2007 did not have free access to the British labour market until January 2014, self-employment being for them the primary form of economic activity they could undertake.

12 During the fieldwork a total of 27 interviews were conducted with Hungarian speakers, of which 17 were Hungarian citizens with a previous Hungarian address. Data in this paper are from these 17 interviews. Initial research participants in the overall project were selected based on a purposeful random sampling procedure, mainly from social media communities (6 participants), followed by chain-referral sampling (21 participants).

13 The Leave/Stay survey was administered by researchers at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) during May 2014, complementing a documentary film series on migrants’ experiences (http://www.men
jekmaradjak.hu/english/, accessed: 16 December 2014). Preliminary results have been disseminated in press releases.

14 Factors given the two highest values on a scale of one to ten.

15 Interviews were conducted in Hungarian and translated by the author. I use pseudonyms throughout the paper to safeguard the anonymity of the participants.

16 Law No. CCIV. of 2011 on national higher education, Ch.12, Section 28/A, §48/A stipulates that (partially) state-funded students will have to hold employment in Hungary for a period commensurate to the length of their funded studies during the twenty years following their graduation, otherwise – including if they fail to graduate in timely fashion – they must reimburse the amount of their scholarships.

References


'It Was a Whirlwind. A Lot of People Made a Lot of Money': The Role of Agencies in Facilitating Migration from Poland into the UK between 2004 and 2008

Katharine Jones*

The period after May 2004 – when Poland acceded to the European Union – until the onset of the recession in the UK in late 2007 saw a multitude of British employment agencies bringing migrant workers from Poland and placing them in temporary employment in the food industry, in construction, in social care, and in jobs in logistics and transport. Up to one half of the migrants who arrived in the UK after 2004 found work through an agency. As they arrived, a growing number of media and NGO reports highlighted both the exploitative living and working conditions in which many Polish workers found themselves and the role of agencies in this. Yet, the specific role of agencies as intermediaries between employers and workers has been comparatively neglected within the wealth of scholarly literature that analyses post-2004 East–West migration. This article documents how and why agencies recruited Polish workers into the UK labour market after May 2004. It argues that recruiting from Poland was a ‘market-making’ strategy for agencies, specifically linked to resolving a temporary crisis in finding a sufficient supply of workers willing to work in temporary agency jobs for low wages and in poor working conditions. The success of this new competitive strategy for agencies rested on: 1) marketing Polish nationals to employers as ideal-type ‘flexible’ workers, and 2) how quickly and easily they could move recruits from Poland into the workplace in the UK. This research contributes to an emerging body of work that analyses the competitive behaviour of agencies and the low-wage markets in which they are embedded, and to an also emerging body of literature exploring the role of migration intermediaries within Europe and internationally.

Keywords: agencies; recruitment; Polish migration; labour-market intermediaries

* Address for correspondence: Katharine.v.jones@gmail.com.
Introduction

Have you heard of our recruitment agency: Angie and Rose Recruitment? We’re the next big thing! We’ve got Polish, Lithuanian; basically all Eastern European workers. Set up ready to go right now. Hardworking. Work overtime. Work shifts. Work. Evenings. All the time. I mean, we’ve got everything there (It’s a Free World, Ken Loach 2007).

In It’s a Free World, the social-realist film director, Ken Loach, powerfully depicts the ease with which those searching for a quick profit could establish employment agencies in mid-2000s Britain. *We’ll be set up for life*, argues lead character, Angie, in persuading flatmate Rose to join her in setting up a business in their kitchen with nothing more than a laptop and a mobile phone. This was not just fiction. In the 2000s, an army of SME (small and medium-size) employment and recruitment agencies proliferated in the UK and in Poland. In 2007, agencies in the UK generated 23.2bn GBP (28bn euros) in annual revenues from the recruitment and placement of temporary workers, including migrants, in the UK (Key Note 2008: 2). Globally, in the same year, the industry turned over 256bn euros (CIETT 2010), representing the peak of a trebling of business over the past three decades (Coe, Johns, Ward 2010).

Although most employment agencies’ business takes place within national labour markets (Coe, Johns, Ward 2008), nevertheless the period after May 2004 when Poland acceded to the European Union until the onset of the recession in the UK in late 2007, saw a multitude of British agencies bringing migrant workers from Poland and placing them into temporary employment in the food industry, in construction, in social care, and in jobs in logistics and transport (Findlay, McCollum 2013; Green, Owen, Jones, Owen, Francis, Proud 2008). Eastern European nationals were over-represented in the agency workforce, with up to one half of migrants to the UK after 2004 finding work through an agency (Stenning, Dawson 2009). By 2007, one in seven agency workers had arrived in the UK in the previous three years (Forde, Slater 2008), and only one in four agency workers working on food production lines had been born in the UK (Balch 2009). The agencies and agents which brought Polish nationals to the UK were identified by journalists and by human rights organisations as being responsible for, a not insignificant, amount of exploitation in their working and living conditions (cf. Anti-Slavery International 2006; Lawrence 2013; Lawrence, Pai, Dodd, Carter, Ward, Watts 2004; Pai 2010). Yet, the specific role of agencies as intermediaries between employers and workers has been comparatively neglected within the wealth of scholarly literature that analyses post-2004 East–West migration (McDowell, Batitzky, Dyer. 2009).

In response to a gap in the scholarly literature which analyses the specific role of agencies as intermediaries in facilitating post-2004 East–West migrations, this article documents how and why agencies recruited Polish workers into the UK labour market between May 2004 and 2008. The article argues that recruiting from Poland was a ‘market-making’ strategy for agencies (Peck, Theodore, Ward 2005). In order to secure job contracts with employers, British agencies marketed Polish nationals as ideal-type ‘flexible’ workers, and competed with each other on how quickly and easily they could move recruits from Poland into the workplace in the UK. As mediators between UK employers on the one hand and Polish workers on the other, agencies were entrepreneurs that sought out profitable markets for their ‘products’ (Gray 2002; Ofstead 1999; Tseng 1997). This research seeks to contribute to two bodies of literature. Firstly, it contributes to an emerging scholarship that analyses the competitive behaviour of agencies in low-wage markets (cf. Coe, Johns, Ward 2008; Peck, Theodore 2001). Secondly, the paper contributes to an also emerging body of literature exploring the role of migration intermediaries, both within Europe (Elrick, Lewandowska 2008;

The article proceeds with a brief review of the conceptual framework underpinning this research, followed by a contextualisation of the political and economic context in which this phenomenon occurred and an account of the research methods. The sections that follow analyse how and why recruiting directly from Poland became a competitive strategy for British agencies, as well as why the geographical focus had shifted back to the UK by early 2008. The article concludes with some observations on how, through reaching into the most eastern side of the European Union to hire workers, agencies made new forms of flexible migrant labour possible for British employers (Gottfried, Fasenfest 2001; Ofstead 1999).

**Conceptualising agencies’ competitive strategies**

This research explicitly draws on the work of scholars who have analysed agency growth strategies in local and national labour markets (see Coe et al. 2010 for a full review of this literature), and on literature which theorises the role of migrant labour within national labour markets (cf. Piore 1979). The former body of work theorises how agencies continually seek to develop growth strategies through expanding into new sectors (Peck et al. 2005) and developing new services to sell to clients (Ward 2004). To generate profits, agencies must continually compete for clients (employers) to whom they can supply workers (Gray 2002). Agencies must also seek out new sources of labour to recruit in order to continually replenish the supply of workers to their clients (Ofstead 1999). This is central to their market-making strategies (Peck et al. 2005). In so doing, agencies may target particular groups of workers who they perceive to be ‘suitable’ for this type of work, or who they believe may be more likely to accept it (Ofstead 1999). If the targeted workers are not reachable in the immediate vicinity, agencies may open or relocate their offices in order to entice workers into agency jobs (Ofstead 1999). In a study of low-wage urban neighbourhoods in Chicago, Peck and Theodore (2001) analysed how agencies specifically located their offices and hiring halls close to welfare offices or homeless shelters, because they had identified a low-paid, flexible workforce which they wished, at that time, to recruit for day-labour construction work.

Scholars have theorised how agencies actively ‘sell’ temporary labour to potential clients by intensively cold-calling or otherwise marketing their business and the types of worker that they supply (Parker 1994; Vosko 2000). Employers may already be open to employing these workers and need only gentle persuasion. For employers, the attraction of hiring agency workers is that they avoid having to comply with the employment protections, such as pension payments, sick leave, annual and maternity leave, that are due to workers on standard employment contracts (Allen, Henry 1997; Gonos 1997; Parker 1994). Employers can also hire agency labour in order to bypass any collective bargaining agreements in place in their firms or to avoid hiring unionised workers, thus reducing labour costs while also reducing the influence of potentially troublesome employees (Gonos 1997; Peck, Theodore 2002). Most importantly, employers can hire and fire agency workers almost ‘at will’ without the costly need to make redundancy payments (Autor 2001). In short, agencies make it possible for employers to have flexible workforces and be able to add or dismiss employees as production requires. Consequently, Kalleberg refers to agency workers as a modern day ‘reserve army of labour’ (Kalleberg 2000: 348).

The economic geography literature focuses attention on agency activities within national labour markets, leaving them – in relation to hiring labour overseas – largely un-theorised. However, a body of useful research has sought to explore how agencies, when supplying migrant workers, may go beyond marketing the attributes of agency labour as a form of workforce organisation, to pitch the specific and racialised ‘attributes’ of workers. In a study of agencies in the Philippines which recruited nannies and domestic workers for
overseas destinations, Guevarra (2010) found that these businesses worked to promote and transform Filipino labour into an ‘idealised’ workforce in order to obtain business. In contrast, Geraldine Pratt (1999), in a study of nanny agencies in Toronto, found that these firms deliberately juxtaposed the ‘characteristics’ of nannies from the Philippines, presenting a racialised duality between the (white) European nannies – represented as superior in training and in decorum – and the (non-white) Asian nannies – shown as uncivilised and poorly motivated. The explanation lies, argues Pratt, in attempts by agencies to construct a two-tier wage structure between the nannies and to displace demands for higher wages, in order to more effectively compete with other recruiters. Those who attempted to subvert expectations were accordingly constructed by agencies as greedy; agencies promoted the idea that nannies from the Philippines should be grateful for the wages they received in Canada, which were substantially higher than those received at home (Pratt 1999; see also England, Stiell 1997).

The literature also reveals many similarities between the theorisation of why employers want to hire agency workers, and of how they seek to employ migrant labour. As with agency workers, employers may also seek to hire migrant labour in order to avoid or to undermine trade unions (Kelly 2002; Preibisch 2010). Similarly, hiring migrant labour may be a way to resolve temporary ‘shortages of labour’ which would otherwise have to be resolved by raising salaries in order to attract more candidates (Piore 1979). Hiring migrant workers, therefore, may be an especially attractive solution to employers who are looking to resolve profitability crises in labour-intensive, low-wage sectors of advanced industrial economies, including horticulture (Castles, Kosack 1973; Piore 1979; Rogaly 2008). Of additional benefit to employers is their belief that migrant workers will work harder and for longer hours, thus enhancing profitability in the long term (McDowell, Batitzky, Dyer 2007; Preibisch 2010). As Kalleberg (2000: 348) refers to the temporary workforce as a ‘reserve army’ so also do scholars conceptualise migrant workforces as a ‘reserve army’ of labour (Castles, Kosack 1973; Miles 1982).

The following section documents the political and economic context in which recruiting from Poland occurred.

The context in which agencies’ competitive strategies developed

Agencies comprise a small, but expanding, subsection of a much larger and immensely profitable global professional and business-services industry, which includes ITC and telecommunications, legal services, distribution and logistics, and financial services (Coe, Johns, Ward 2007). Agencies which are specifically engaged in cross-border recruitment also sit within a wider ‘migration industry,’ which includes travel agents, immigration consultants, insurance brokers and others (Gammeltoft-Hansen, Nyberg Sørensen 2013; Goss, Lindquist 1995). No data exist on the number of businesses, people within the ‘migration industry,’ or migrants who are facilitated across national borders, nor to the migration industry’s profitability, although reference has been made to the ‘multi-billion dollar’ revenues generated (Kyle 2000: 66). There is, nevertheless, a consensus that this industry has evolved and grown with new forms of businesses and subcontracting business relationships evident within global production networks (Barrientos 2011). The rise of subcontracted labour should be understood in the context of neoliberalism, flexibilisation and the deregulation of global labour markets (Harvey 2007). In other words, agency work has thrived within labour-market environments in which state regulation has sought to encourage labour markets to behave more like ‘real’ markets, to strengthen the play of competitive pressures, to erode social protections and to de-collectivise employment relationships (Peck et al. 2005: 6; see also Allen, Henry 1997).

In addition to the benefits gained from neoliberalism in terms of their market-share, the temporary-agency industry has travelled some distance in the legitimising of its activities. Most critically, and overturning
a previous policy advocating a ban on fee-charging agencies, the International Labour Conference adopted the Private Employment Agencies Convention No. 181 in 1997, which declared agencies to be contributing factors in well-functioning capitalist labour markets (International Labour Organisation 1997). As a result, the political clout of its collective voices has continued to accelerate (cf. Conos 1997; Peck et al. 2005). At the same time, the approach taken within the EU towards the industry, in particular by the European Commission (EC), has been generally favourable (cf. European Commission 2003). Support for the industry has been in alignment with the EC’s objective of removing barriers to the movement of labour which lay at the heart of the Lisbon and Stockholm Agreements, the European Employment Strategy and the Job Mobility Action Plans of 2002 and 2007 (cf. European Commission 2002, 2007). Worker mobility within the EU, including that facilitated by temporary-work agencies, has been explicitly linked to better-functioning labour markets and more competitive and dynamic economies (European Policy Centre 2010; Eurociett 2009; Eurofound 2006; European Commission 2007; Janiak, Wasmer 2008).

In the UK, the industry has been considered to be barely regulated (Geddes, Scott, Nielsen 2007). The Employment Agencies Act 1973 introduced a requirement for agencies to be licensed, formalising the pre-existing, localised and ad hoc requirements introduced by some local authorities (Forde 2008). Licensing, as it turned out, was relatively short-lived as, 21 years later, Prime Minister Thatcher removed it with a clause inserted into the 1994 Deregulating and Contracting Out Act (s35, Schedule 10), consistent with the broadening of the national labour market from structural regulation into more individualistic post-hoc regulation aimed at penalising anti-competitive or fraudulent behaviour (cf. Cerny 2000).

During the course of the 2000s, licensing requirements were re-introduced in five sectors. Agencies active in the supply of temporary workers to domiciliary social-care establishments were required under the terms of the Care Standards Act 2000 and the Domiciliary Care Regulations 2002 to apply for a licence to operate. Quite tellingly, though, the intent was to improve standards in social-care delivery rather than the employment protection of domiciliary-care agency workers (2003). Subsequently, the 2004 Gangmasters (Licensing) Act (implemented in 2006) re-introduced licensing requirements for agencies – or ‘gangmasters’ in the legal terminology of the Act – active in supplying labour to agriculture, horticulture, shellfishery and forestry. The Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) was established in order to tackle business fraud and reduce worker exploitation in these sectors, which had low rates of trade-union penetration, and long traditions of informal employment practices (Scott, Geddes, Nielsen, Brindley 2007: 4). The four sectors, however, only accounted for around 10 per cent of the estimated temporary-staffing industry, described as one of the toughest and most intensely competitive in Europe (Geddes et al. 2007; Scott et al. 2007). Critically, the GLA’s licensing standards have required any agencies operating from outside, but supplying labour into, the UK, whether directly to an employer or via a third-party agency, to be licensed (GLA 2006). This requirement entailed agencies to comply with their own domestic national regulations in the country of origin, as well as with the licensing standards set by the GLA. However, by 2007, only seven Polish agencies had registered with the GLA (Geddes et al. 2007: 94).

It was in this context that, after 1997, the New Labour government in the UK embarked on a bold, but often bumpy, road to link immigration to the demands of the labour market (Anderson, Ruhs 2010; Flynn 2003). In support of his government’s decision to not impose any restrictions on Central and Eastern European (CEE) nationals after May 2004, Prime Minister Blair argued that migrant workers could make up essential shortages in the UK labour market – they could do the jobs that British workers did not want to do (Blair 2004). There was an unambiguous policy to replace the often irregular workforce servicing the bottom end of the labour market with newly ‘Europeanised’ workers from CEE states (Anderson, Ruhs 2010; Home Office 2002: 77–78). In 2000, the then Home Office Minister for Immigration, Barbara Roche, signalled a new approach to immigration in a speech made to the British Bankers’ Association at an event organised by the
Institute of Public Policy Research. In this speech, the Minister declared that Britain needed more, not less, immigration (BBC 2000), and signalled the elevation of the ‘market’: You need to listen to what the business community is saying to you as to what it wants... We noticed [that] there were reports during the summer of strawberry fields where fruit was rotting because there was nobody to pick it. Well then, you have to respond accordingly (cited in Ashley 2000). This was in tune with a neo-monetarist approach presiding at the British Treasury; Immigrants keep inflation down, emphasised Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, in no uncertain terms (Trefgarne 2005). Securing access to sufficient external sources of labour, such as Polish workers, was presented as critical to the UK’s global economic competitiveness (Home Office 2005; House of Lords 2008).

As a result of the British government’s decision to not impose transitional controls, as they were entitled to do under the Treaties of Accession, the number of Polish workers applying for a National Insurance Number in order to legally work in the UK rose from 50,000 in 2004 to over 200,000 in 2006 and 2007, before dropping significantly after 2008 (Department of Work and Pensions 2012). A flood of empirical research identified that the Polish workers who came to the UK in the early years following free movement were predominantly young, well-educated, spoke some English and came alone rather than with families (Burrell 2009; Green, Jones, Owen 2007, Green et al. 2008; Hardy 2009). Although Poles were evident in all sectors of the labour market, studies identified that they were over-represented in some sectors, including in agency work (McDowell et al. 2009; Trade Union Congress 2007; Wills, Datta, Evans, Herbert, May, McIllwaine 2010). The following section briefly outlines the research methods employed in this study.

**Research methods**

The research in this article is focused on the period between Poland’s accession to the EU in May 2004 and that of the onset of the recession in late 2007, early 2008. Agency and employer activities during this period exerted considerable influence on the nature and channels of labour-migration flows (McCollum, Shubin, Apsite, Krisjane 2013). Senior representatives from a total of eighteen agencies – ten in the UK and eight in Poland – participated in in-depth interviews and engaged in follow-up email discussions and telephone calls between 2008 and 2012.1 Interviewees were either the owners or senior managers of the agencies who had been in post prior to 2008 and were thus able to share knowledge based on their own experience. All had recruited Polish workers into the UK during the period under study. Three months of preparatory work for the research indicated that agencies predominantly recruited Polish workers for jobs in food production, driving and logistics, engineering and light industrial manufacturing (Fitzgerald 2007; Green et al. 2007). Agencies were consequently purposively sampled according to these sectors (Bryman 2012).

Agencies’ competitive strategies were analysed at the national scale – that is to say, the fieldwork was not restricted to one particular region of the UK or of Poland. This was in part due to the lack of any pre-existing empirical knowledge about the phenomenon at the national scale and in part a wish to analyse how agency activities, including their organisational geographies, were shaped by national frameworks of regulation (Coe et al. 2008; Peck 2001). An additional 35 key informants in Poland and the UK (including government officials, regulators, and trade-unionist and civil-society representatives) were also interviewed, and agency promotional materials, websites and media reports were analysed (Yeung 1995).

Before proceeding, some definitions of terms utilised in the research are required. Agencies mediate or broker employment relations between employers and workers for a monetary fee (Peck, Theodore 1998). This definition incorporates the recruiting agencies and agents who are one or more steps removed from the physical act of mediation in the country of origin of the worker (see, for example, Barrientos 2011). Although, globally, the industry is heterogeneous (Coe et al. 2007), almost 90 per cent of agency profits in the
UK arise out of the placement of temporary agency workers in largely low-wage labour markets (Key Note 2008). Temporary agency work is clearly defined by the triangular nature of the employment relationship – between the agency, the employer and the worker (Coe et al. 2010) and is therefore differentiated from fixed-term employment in that the agency worker, unlike fixed-term or permanent employees, holds a contract with the agency and not with the employer who expropriates the labour. Whereas temporary staffing agencies profit from a ‘per-head’ fee for the placement of fixed-term employees, agencies profit from an extraction of a portion of these workers’ wages (Parker 1994; Vosko 2000). In effect, agencies ‘rent’ the labour power of temporary agency workers to employers.

Agencies engaged in international (cross-border) recruitment also commonly deliver ancillary services associated with migration, such as transportation, accommodation, loans, equipment and insurance, for all of which a fee is charged to the workers, to the employers or to both (Hernández-León 2008). The following section analyses why agencies in highly competitive markets went to Poland to recruit agency workers.

‘Making markets’

Agency interviewees enthused about the period between 2004 and 2007 and the onset of recession, referring to it fondly as a bonanza – a time when business was good. As one exclaimed: It was a whirlwind: a lot of people made a lot of money (A08, Bristol, April 2009). For the British agencies, the eastwards expansion of the EU and the British government’s decision not to impose transitional controls on new EU nationals opened up new competitive opportunities. A senior manager in a British agency specialising in engineering and construction recruitment explained how his boss had conducted extensive market research before proposing that the firm start recruiting engineers from Poland: My group director took it upon himself to look at a source of supply within Eastern Europe. We looked at a few countries, but Poland was, primarily, for a number of reasons, the choice (A14, Warsaw, March 2009). For this firm, Poland was just the first stop in an expansionary drive, which later saw them open an office in Dubai, UAE. But, in the mid-2000s, We saw Poland really as a gateway to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe (A14, Warsaw, March 2009).

Such directness was not evident among the other British agency representatives interviewed for this research – for most, the strategy was a more gradual process. This group reflected on how they made the decision to recruit from Poland either after they saw their competitors doing so successfully or because they had become familiar with Polish nationals who had arrived independently in the UK, as this quote from a company director in Somerset illustrates.

We stumbled on the Eastern European route. We had tried everything else. Nothing had worked and we thought we might as well give this a go as well. So, in the summer of 2005, we had a need for about 80 migrant workers, and 32 of them turned out to be Polish. Pure fluke. No design behind it at all. At the time we didn’t even know the make-up of the European Union or anything like that (A30, Somerset, April 2009).

Following what he regarded as a successful recruitment campaign ‘for migrant workers’ – and at this point, he recounted, his agency was happy to recruit ‘any nationality,’ this director decided that he preferred hiring Polish workers over and above any other nationalities, including British workers. He had subsequently sought out a business-partner agency in Poland which could help him to recruit Poles directly into the UK.

For all, the date of 1 May 2004, when Polish nationals could freely move to, and take up employment in, the UK, was critical. None of the interviewees had previously recruited from Poland prior to this date. For agencies this meant that, for the first time, they could (legally) hire Polish nationals as temporary agency workers.
workers (Ruhs 2006). Although many Poles were already working in the UK before this date (Fihel, Kaczmarczyk, Okólski. 2006), agencies were (and are) precluded from acting as ‘employers’ for immigration sponsorship purposes according to British immigration law. In effect, this prevents agencies from (legally) hiring anyone who is subject to immigration control as an agency worker, although they can recruit foreign nationals on behalf of employers.

Underpinning agencies’ innovations was the fact that, in 2004, agencies were operating in highly competitive localised temporary agency market in the UK. The number of agency businesses registered for VAT almost trebled from 6 500 in 1994 to 16 800 in 2005 (BERR 2008), the highest number in the EU at that time (CIETT 2010). By 2004, agency work was familiar across all sectors and industries of the UK (cf. Audit Commission 2011; Forde, Slater 2008; Hoque, Kirkpatrick 2008), although it was employers in agriculture, horticulture and food manufacturing who were especially dependent on this form of labour (Rogaly 2008; Scott 2013). Consequently, a 2004 government-commissioned survey of the ‘gangmasters’ active in these sections of the labour market estimated that there was a ‘top tier’ of 500 to 600 agencies supported by a base of 1 000 to 2 000 small and micro labour providers (Precision Prospecting 2004). In the same year, Brass (2004) estimated that, in total, there were between 3 000 and 4 000 agencies actively supplying agency workers to rural jobs, indicating a high degree of saturation in these markets.

In addition, agencies were struggling to recruit sufficient workers to meet employer demand for agency labour, which they need to be able to do in order to win contracts and stay competitive (Ofstead 1999). A 2007 survey conducted among agencies confirmed that, during this period, these businesses were finding recruitment challenging – what the industry refers to as a ‘candidate-short’ market during the 2000s (TB01, London, January 2009; Key Note 2008). High vacancy levels were reported in social care, engineering – especially in the energy sector – and food production across the UK labour market (Cangiano, Shutes, Spencer, Leeson 2009; House of Commons 2007; REC 2008; SEMTA 2007).

A recruitment consultant reflected on why his agency had invested in recruiting engineers directly from Poland in 2005:

_We started to find new enquiries from nowhere. Companies were coming to us with recommendations and other recommended companies, etc., etc... It was so obvious for us. It was just emails upon emails, phone calls upon phone calls, faxes upon faxes from the clients_ (A08, Bristol, April 2009).

A deluge of what he referred to as ‘job orders’ for the West Country-based aerospace industry had, according to him, created a correspondingly high level of demand for CNC operators, welders and other more highly skilled engineers for which he had no ready supply of workers who could operate on a temporary contractual basis: _We just could not find enough people locally_. For this recruiter, the response was, quite simply, ‘obvious’: go to Poland to recruit.

Agencies echoed the familiar refrain heard in the UK at the time – i.e. that migrant workers from Eastern Europe were desperately needed to fill vacancies in the UK labour market which employers were unable to fill (cf. Dench, Hurstfield, Hill, Ackroyd 2006; Green et al. 2007, 2008; House of Commons 2007; SEMTA 2007). Recruiters, reminiscing about the period from 2004 to 2008 when business was so good for them, juxtaposed the imagery of British employers knocking on their doors for workers, with images of Polish workers queuing up at airports and bus stations in Poland seeking the agencies’ assistance in finding jobs in the UK, as one recruiter depicted:

_[t]here was a large abundance of people [in Poland] who were quite young, well educated, English was the sort of language that people would speak when they came out of education. The unemployment levels..._
were 18 to 20 per cent in some pocket areas, up to 30 per cent. After 2004 [in Poland], agencies were so overflowed with CVs, with candidates. People knocking at doors every day with 10s and 100s of ‘Do you have a job?’ (A08, Bristol, UK, March 2009).

According to the agencies, they were providing a service in matching the erstwhile under- or unemployed Polish workers with job opportunities in the UK. Recruiting agency workers from Poland enabled these agencies to compete. Scholars remind us, though, that the act of matching ‘supply’ (workers) with ‘demand’ (employers) is not a neutral function (Hanson, Pratt 1995). Interviewees acknowledged that the reason why they could not meet employer demand was not because there were simply no people locally, but because locals did not want the particular jobs that agencies were offering. A small agency owner explained that, for him, the problem was that the local population did not want to work at ‘his’ food-processing factory:

'[t]he low skill level, the low pay, the messiness of the job, the premium there is to being on the dole – the less likely you are to get people (A30, Somerset, UK, April 2009).

Agencies whose business lay in the social-care sector echoed this refrain: local (British) workers did not want to work the unsocial hours for low pay in what, agency interviewees acknowledged, were often poor working conditions – these often included being hired as an agency worker (Hussein, Manthorpe, Stevens. 2010). In other words, British workers who were still in a position to be able to refuse to do this type of work were doing so (Low Pay Commission 2008; Moriarty, Manthorpe, Hussein, Cornes 2008; Piore 1979; Scott 2013). Although not able to persuade British workers, agencies could, on the other hand, persuade Polish workers to come to the UK to take up these jobs. Agencies were guaranteeing that they, and the employers, had an adequate supply of labour to hand (Findlay, McCollum 2013), recognising that, at that time, young Polish nationals had few opportunities at home, which the agencies could capitalise on. The owner of one Polish agency (A02, Krakow, February 2009) argued that Polish workers did not mind taking low-status and low-paid jobs due to a different frame of reference (Waldinger, Lichter 2003). The migrants knew that they were going to return one day to Poland because, generally, the plan after their studies in Poland is to make some money, buy an apartment and then start their professional life. Thus many people, when they finish their studies, just move for one or two years to gain international experience.

Eastern European nationals were, in other words, more exploitable than British workers (House of Lords 2008). Another interviewee was even more explicit about why he preferred to hire workers direct from Poland and why this worked for him as a competitive strategy: In 2006, if I was doing [recruiting] a British welder, if I asked him to work for 7.50 GBP an hour he would laugh at me. The going rate for a welder was 10 GBP an hour, minimum (A08, Bristol, April 2009). In contrast, Polish engineers, he argued, were grateful to find a position in the UK; 7.50 GBP an hour was acceptable to them in a way which it was not to British engineers. In short, British agencies’ competitive strategies rested on Polish workers’ willingness to work for less pay; they were selling and providing ‘cheaper’ labour to employers. This, however, was not the only factor which was attractive to British agencies in deciding to recruit from Poland.

‘They take instructions well’

Once they had made the decision to recruit directly from Poland, the British agencies promoted their new service on their company websites, in printed material such as flyers, and in their conversations with potential clients. The owner of a family business in the South West, which recruited Polish nationals into local
food-production factories, happily recounted making handshake deals for Polish workers over lunch with local employers, and even at his local cricket club (A30, Somerset, UK, April 2009). Everyone wanted his Poles, he remarked. As another respondent observed: *The branding to us as a recruiter of Polish labour is very important to us* (A08, Bristol, April 2009). One Polish agency director, when asked how he found clients for his Polish workers, shrugged his shoulders and said *I have simply the same action: you have to call one hundred cold calls, and then to meet three and maybe [there is] one client from it* (A01, Opole, April 2009). This, he explained, was the same wherever and whenever agencies operated, regardless of whether or not it was migrant workers they were attempting to place; it was ‘obvious.’ Agencies cold-called potential clients offering them workers direct from Poland.

Sam Scott (2013) has detailed how British employers deliberately sought Eastern European workers for particular types of employment, constructing nationals of these countries as ‘good workers.’ A British agent who specialised in recruiting Polish engineers for the energy sector explained how employer demand for Polish workers influenced his business:

> We were finding from the feedback from the clients that quite often they were typing into Google ‘Polish welder,’ ‘Polish CNC.’ *The news proliferates very fast so, in the engineering environment, Polish welders are huge. And we were going to them first offering this* (A08, Bristol, April 2009).

Several interviewees described how they thought carefully about how to position their website branding as recruiters of Polish workers, or even paid for Search Engine Optimisation so that employers would find them on the first page of search engines. The branding became part of the competitive strategy, helping agencies to be noticed by employers amongst the market of other agencies, many of which, by 2005, were also recruiting Polish workers. Advertising being able to recruit *directly* from Poland was, one interviewee argued, a plus factor in competing for contracts, as her strapline advertised:

> As a European recruitment specialist, [we] provide access to an increasingly mobile and flexible workforce. With an office in Poland [we have] an ideal link with Eastern Europe and the availability of skilled workers there (A09, Rzeszow, April 2009).

Agencies did not, however, stop at simply advertising to employers that they recruited directly from Poland. Much as Canadian research documented how agencies marketed the migrant nannies and domestic workers they recruited in racialised terms with the objective of creating a two-tier workforce (Pratt 1999), so British agencies marketed Polish workers as ‘hard-working’ and ‘having a superior work ethic.’ The owner of one agency explained that, in the early years after 2004, he had no problem in finding clients because: *They [Polish workers] were the cream of the cream. Most were under 25... And they were so well educated* (A30, Somerset, April 2009). On this, he said, he was in agreement with employers. Another agent who recruited workers from Poland for jobs in food production and driving added: *They also had a very good working attitude. They were very good workers* (A30, Somerset, April 2009).

When asked what was meant by ‘a Polish work ethic’ it was clear that, for the British agencies, this was less to do with ability or motivation, but more associated with a belief that Polish workers would be less inclined to complain about their work environment and less likely to be unionised. An interviewee who recruited for food manufacturing factories shared this approvingly: *They [Polish workers] take instructions well. And they have an almost 1970s’ or 1980s’ attitude towards hierarchical structures* (A04, Somerset, April 2009). These were also the particular ‘skills’ required by this type of agency work, which might involve shift work, being notified of work at short notice, short-term, possible daily contracts and extended and
required overtime (Rogaly 2008). The skills required for these jobs were, the agent continued, a capacity both to do what they were told by their foreman, and to work long hours without complaining. In other words, ‘work ethic’ was related to employers’ ability to generate higher productivity from migrant workers (Burawoy 1976).

In order to obtain clients, it was not enough for agencies to simply ‘talk up’ the Polish workers. Agencies also engaged in discourse highlighting to employers the ‘positive’ qualities of Polish workers versus the so-called negative qualities of British and other migrant workers. One agency owner spoke of why Polish workers were ‘better’ than the local British population: *With every employee, you get a brain. But with the Poles it actually functions okay! So that’s a bonus* (A30, Somerset, April 2009). He was negatively contrasting the ‘good workers’ from Poland whilst shaking his head about the local unemployed workers that he said did not want ‘his’ jobs: the ‘benefit scoungers’ as he called them. When talking about the later accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007, he also negatively compared the ‘hard-working’ Polish nationals with the so-called ‘gypsies’ from these countries: *I tell my clients not to bother with people from Romania and Bulgaria. Poles are much better* (A30, Somerset, April 2009). This was, he explained, useful for him as it was Polish workers that he recruited.

Much has already been written about how employers construct ‘migrant hiring queues’ (cf. Scott 2013; Wills et al. 2010). In an earlier study, Linda McDowell (2003) found evidence of this discourse in employers’ decisions in hiring migrants over white working-class labour, deliberately positioning the latter as lazy and unwilling to work. Engaging in these discriminatory practices and discourse made logical business sense for agencies, which had a financial incentive for complying with employers’ prejudices, as ignoring them would mean losing contracts with potential client employers to their competitors who were hiring Polish workers (Peck, Theodore 2001; Tyner 1996). On the other hand, agencies made it possible for employers to hire Polish workers. The following section analyses how volume, speed and simplicity were essential components of the flexibilised labour they offered to employers.

‘Fast and easy Polish workers’

Although many Polish workers arrived independently in the UK, and agencies could have attempted to hire them once there, a critical component of agencies’ strategy between 2004 and 2007 was to recruit directly from Poland. Technically this bypasses the Race Equality Act (1976) which makes discriminatory advertising within the UK for a particular nationality of worker illegal. In addition, one interviewee reflected ruefully, Polish workers already in the UK tended to make their own choices about which jobs they wanted to do, whereas those who arrived straight from Poland were more likely to accept the jobs that agencies offered to them.

Recruiting directly from Poland also enabled agencies to mobilise the high volumes of workers which employers might require. This was especially the case in food production, in which up to a third of jobs are filled by agencies (Scott 2013). One interviewee explained that, in some parts of the food-production system, up to 95 per cent of staff on any one day might be agency workers (TB02, London, March 2009). As one recruiter, now relocated in Warsaw, reminisced, *In the early days, we had so many coming over we used to just book whole planes. Well, almost* (A14, Warsaw, March 2009).

However, it was during 2004 to 2005 that any of the British agencies first ventured into recruiting outside the UK. None had prior experience on which to draw to devise their new strategies. One firm, quoted above, had embarked on their overseas strategy after conducting market research, including how to go about recruiting from Poland. This had involved working in partnership with the British Polish Chamber of Commerce (BPCC), which had advised them how to set up an office in Poland, from where to recruit, and even which
transportation companies to utilise. Others, unfamiliar with Poland, its regulations or its language, took a shorter, quicker route, subcontracting recruitment to Polish agencies which were ready and willing to do so. As one UK respondent explained: *I know the British market fully and completely. I don’t speak Polish; I don’t know where to find the right workers – the ones that are right for us. They do* (A30, Somerset, April 2009).

In 2004, agency work was still a relatively unfamiliar concept in Poland (Coe et al. 2008). For agencies operating in this market, recruiting Poles for overseas employment offered infinitely more business opportunities than at home. As a consequence, Polish recruiters earned their income through sending Poles to temporary jobs all over Western, Northern and Southern Europe (Elrick, Lewandowska 2008; Pijpers 2010; Sula 2008). According to one recent study, the number of agencies in Poland providing ‘foreign services’ quadrupled over the 2000s (Fiałkowska, Napierała 2013). The owner of a Polish agency based in Silesia gesticulated as he explained: *I have an expression: for the bread I am working in Poland at home. And for the ham on the bread I am working abroad* (A01, Opole, April 2009).

Subcontracting relationships between British and Polish agencies were instigated by recruiters from either side, with online internet searches common to how Polish and UK firms ‘found’ each other. A Krakow agency owner recounted: *[I]t was just recommendation. Even today, the companies call and say ‘I heard that you supply staff, we heard that you do it well, so we would like to work with you’* (A06, Krakow, April 2009). Another Polish agency owner explained how the relationship worked: *We are the recruitment agency. The insurances and taxes are lower in the UK. So it’s cheaper to employ them in the UK as temporary workers.* He contrasted this with the situation in France:

*Not like in France. We employ the people in Poland – we pay the taxes and insurances over here. And we send them over to the clients over there because the taxes and insurances are cheaper over here. In the UK it’s [the] opposite. So it’s cheaper if we employ them over there. So then the end client likes it* (A02, Krakow, February 2009).

In other words, according to this agency, although Polish workers were cheap to recruit and hire, the difference in agency and employment regulations between Poland and the UK meant it was cheaper to send Poles to the UK for the British agency to supply to the employer. Polish recruiters mobilised workers for jobs in the UK through job fairs and internet job boards and even with the assistance of giant advertising billboards, strategically placed along Poland’s main highways. According to one Krakow-based agent, fairs for temporary jobs in the UK were held in Shergine, in Rzeszow. Krakow. Katowice, Poznan. We had them all round Poland (A09, Rzeszow, April 2009). Other Polish recruiters, specialised in recruiting for the UK, opened offices around Poland. ‘Word-of-mouth’ recruitment was also especially important to Polish agencies because it was cheaper: *We spend an enormous amount on advertising and on PR, but this only gives us 20 per cent of our employees. The other 80 per cent, he explained, came from far cheaper ‘word-of-mouth’ recruitment* (A03, Opole, March 2009). Agencies also advertised for workers on job portals and through social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn and the Polish social network *Nasza Klasa* (‘Our Class’).

Meanwhile, British agencies competed for contracts with clients on the basis of how many Polish workers they could supply, and how quickly the migrants could start work. Agencies pitched ‘fast-and-easy’ migrant labour to employers, as Figure 1, a screenshot of a 2007 Polish agency website targeted at the UK market, demonstrates.

One interviewee, representing a British recruiter, boasted how, in less than a week after having the first conversation with the client employer, he could ensure the delivery of 100 Polish temporary workers at the required workplace: *In some cases, we’d get an order for 100 workers on a Tuesday afternoon, then have*
flights booked and them all there ready to start on a Monday morning (A14, Warsaw, March 2009). As the British agencies competed with each other for contracts with employers based on the speed with which they could turn round high-volume recruitment, the Polish agencies, in turn, competed to obtain business from the British agencies based on how quickly they could mobilise recruits to the UK. A Polish interviewee made an analogy between the Polish recruits whom he sent to the UK and fresh food; if the time between selection and placing in temporary employment was too great – which he defined as approximately three days – then the worker would ‘go off’: Many times I’m making the comparison: our branch is like a selling point with goods (A01, Opole, April 2009).

To facilitate speedy recruitment, agencies conducted only basic screening checks so that recruits could be put on a plane or bus as soon as possible. A Polish agency manager explained that, while he undertook some checks on the welders and care assistants he recruited, he made very few on workers to be supplied for food-processing jobs:

_We were checking the references. We organised everything by telephone, by email. They didn’t have to come [to see us]. If we had a good person we just checked the references._ (A06, Krakow, April 2009).

In other words, his agency did not even meet with the candidates face-to-face. Job selection was a simple exercise to be undertaken by telephone or by computer. What he meant by a ‘good person’ was simply that their CV matched expectations and their references were appropriate, he explained. A British interviewee went even further: Really, we checked that they are who they say they are. That they can speak English – well a bit! That they have two feet, two hands, etc. (A30, Somerset, April 2009). More than one agency respondent who recruited from Poland explained that it was not necessary for all employees to speak fluent English in order to work in the UK:

_It is important. It’s not like, you know, picking up British papers. You need to be able to communicate with the clients at the basic level to be able to understand what the job is and to be able to communicate with them._ (A08, Rzeszow, April 2009).

While the Polish agencies mobilised workers, the British agencies focused on managing the insertion of the Polish workers into employment as quickly as possible after they set foot on British soil. One interviewee described the endeavours his agency made when organising the recruitment of Polish nationals during the period 2004 to 2008:

_We were helping them with national insurance, with bank accounts, with the Home Office. Yes with WRS [Workers Registration Scheme] forms. We were finding accommodation. We were arranging plane tickets. Train tickets. They had full support from us. They had all of the maps and all the information. And which bus they had to take. And which stop they needed to get off at – just the full package._ (A09, Rzeszow, April 2009).

This constituted what another interviewee labelled an _all-inclusive package, just like the holidays_ (A06, Krakow, April 2009), although working on a food-production line as an agency worker was far from being a holiday (cf. Lawrence 2013). These workers were ‘ready to go’ – ‘just-in-time workers’ (cf. Herod 2000; Moody 1997).
‘And then it downsised’

And then it all changed. Just as quickly as it had flourished, agency-led direct recruitment from Poland into the UK slowed to a trickle. The whirlwind was over. At the time that this research was conducted, the UK recruiters in this sample had largely stopped recruiting directly from Poland: *And then it downsised... There’s no massive structure any more*, related one interviewee sorrowfully (A10, Warsaw, March 2009). Nevertheless, Polish workers who were already in the UK still comprised a significant component of their temporary agency workforce in the UK.

There were two connected factors which contributed to why direct recruitment from Poland into the UK had mostly ceased by 2008. The first was that, in 2008, after a continuous period of economic growth during the 2000s, the UK and the rest of Europe (with the exception of Poland) had moved into an economic recession with its associated knock-on effects on employment. In the UK, 2.4 million people were recorded as unemployed (HM Treasury 2009) and, as one interviewee argued, *At crisis time, employers don’t need any more low-skilled people; there’s a shortage of high-skilled people* (A07, Lancashire, August 2009). As another put it:

*In the last nine to 12 months, there’s been a massive shift because of the UK crisis. Naturally there have been a lot of UK people in the market looking for work so there hasn’t been a need for us to supply anyone from Poland, or from any other EU state to work in the UK* (A08, Bristol, April 2009).

Secondly, by 2008, almost one million Polish workers were already in the UK, having arrived either *via* an agency or independently. This meant that UK recruiters could simply advertise in the UK for Polish workers, most often through advertising in Polish language albeit illegal according to anti-discrimination law (Craven 2010; EHRC 2010). Some sought to recruit through Polish social networks, as one Polish employee of a UK-based agency explained:

*I was Polish so it was quite easy for me to access those niches. And Polish shops, Polish newspapers – it was much easier for us to find skilled Polish CNC operators than in England. We targeted a niche. Like I said, Polish shops, Polish newspapers, websites, friends, etc., etc. We could get really good people that way* (A09, Rzeszow, April 2009).

Another spoke of the queues of Polish workers who continued to weave their way around the streets near his office, despite the recessionary labour-market conditions (A08, Bristol, April 2009).

Overall, Polish nationals no longer had as much need of an agency to organise migration if they wished to go to the UK. By 2008, Poles who wished to work in the UK were more likely to know a friend or a family member who had been to the UK, and who could assist or advise them. Many, by this point, also spoke English (Garapich 2008; White, Ryan 2008). As one respondent argued: *Poles have become more settled since 2003. They create some links, it’s easier now, they know how the system works. They don’t rely on the formal agencies and they try to find work by themselves* (A10, Warsaw, March 2009). Even without this, Poles were still able to travel independently to the UK and approach an agency once there, as one UK respondent explained: *Often they arrive having heard about us* (A04, Somerset, April 2009). In addition, many chose to stay at home, able to find employment in a much improved Polish labour market (Fiałkowska, Napierala 2013).

In introducing the business of international recruitment, an industry representative emphatically asserted that *Agencies would always prefer to go to a candidate down the road; this is the easiest for them and for the*
employer (TB01, London, January 2009). The changing labour-market conditions and the increase in Polish workers already in the UK, or savvy enough to know how to get there independently, meant that British agencies could return to doing exactly that (Findlay, McCollum 2013).

Conclusion

This article has placed employment agencies – an often-ignored labour-market intermediary within academic accounts (Coe et al. 2010) – centre stage in order to analyse why and how, from 1 May 2004 until the onset of the recession in late 2007, early 2008, British employment agencies embarked on recruiting low-wage workers from Poland. It has argued that agencies, as capitalist profit-making businesses (Ofstead 1999) identified asignificant new business opportunity after 1 May as, from that date, agencies were, for the first time, (legally) allowed to hire Polish nationals as ‘agency workers’ (Ruhs 2006). Operating in highly competitive labour markets at the low-wage end of the UK labour market enabled agencies to resolve what had become a temporary crisis through being able to source sufficient numbers of local workers at a price that employers were willing to pay (REC 2008). This was a particular problem for employers in industries such as food production, which had an overwhelming reliance on agency labour. In turn, agencies rely on having access to sufficient sources of labour if they wish to remain competitive (Ofstead 1999).

Despite the distance, the differences in language, in labour markets and in regulatory frameworks, British agencies were able, through outsourcing recruitment to Polish agencies, to facilitate high-speed recruitment, and place ‘plane-loads’ of Polish workers in employment within a matter of days from receiving a ‘job order’ from a client. Most critically, agencies were able to recruit high volumes of migrant workers willing to work long hours for low wages who they had identified as being unlikely to complain about working conditions (Burawoy 1976). The strategies’ success relied on British agencies being to deliver workers from Poland ‘fast and easy,’ with agencies competing on how quickly and how easily they could manage this. Thus British agencies, with few exceptions, subcontracted recruitment to Polish agencies, embarking on new spatial geographies in the process (cf. Peck, Theodore 2001). Engaging in transnational subcontracting consequently made it possible for even the smallest agencies to recruit internationally (cf. McDowell et al. 2009).

Ultimately, agencies made it possible for their clients (employers) to hire migrant labour which, in these industries, was a way of increasing flexibility and productivity and reducing the costs of labour (cf. Preibisch 2010; Purcell, Purcell, Tailby 2004). In this way, agencies themselves actively engaged in increasing the flexibility of low-wage labour markets in the UK and throughout the EU (Theodore, Peck 2002). In addition, British and Polish agencies branded themselves as recruiters of ‘Polish workers,’ marketing them as ‘flexible’ vis-à-vis other workers, using well-understood terms such as ‘superior work ethic’ to signal the migrants’ flexibility to UK employers. This made logical business sense for agencies (Tyner 1996), as employers had also identified Polish nationals as an ideal flexible workforce (Currie 2007; Scott 2013). The ramifications of agency strategies, however, go beyond simply meeting employer demand for particular workers. Agencies influence demand for particular types of worker – including migrants – by making their recruitment possible for employers. Through selectively mobilising particular populations, agencies enable employers to bypass anti-discrimination legislation – what Peck and Theodore refer to as a ‘crude sorting function’ (2001: 488). Agencies also facilitate the avoidance of regulations associated with standard employment relationships (Theodore, Peck 2002), and evade responsibility for reported exploitation (cf. Anti-Slavery International 2006; Lawrence 2013). According to Ofstead (1999: 274) Part of its [agency industry] growth and success in new areas must be credited to its own efforts in creating demand where it might not otherwise be present. In short, the industry normalises flexibility not only for employers, but also for workers, labour unions and governments (Gottfried, Fasenfest 2001).
Notes

1 This research was funded by an ESRC CASE PhD Studentship, part-funded by the Recruitment and Employment Confederation in the UK. With the aim of exploring the importance of different regulatory frameworks to agencies’ competitive strategies, the thesis compared how – and why – agencies recruited migrant workers from Australia, the Philippines and Poland and placed them in temporary employment in the UK.

2 Codes are used to identify interviewees. The ‘A’ identifies an agency representative. The ‘B’ identifies a trade union representative.

References


European Commission (2007). *Communication from the Commission to the Council to the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions – Mobility, an


Rural Return Migration: Comparative Analysis between Ireland and Lithuania

Maura Farrell*, Emilija Kairytė**, Birte Nienaber***, John McDonagh*, Marie Mahon*

Globalisation is a ubiquitous influence in rural Europe, offering both opportunities and challenges. The liberalisation of travel restrictions, in addition to the growth and development of transport and global communication networks, have contributed to an international mobility that promotes patterns of migration, return migration and repeat emigration from and to rural regions. Return migration in particular represents a stimulating field of research, as thought-provoking as it is diverse. In some regions, migrants return to their native country to play a pivotal role in the economic, social, and cultural vibrancy of a local rural community, while in others, migrants find themselves excluded and isolated. Investigating this diversity of experience, this paper presents analysis of findings from research carried out as part of the FP7 DERREG\(^1\) project. Thirty-six biographies of return migrants (from the west of Ireland and Alytus County, Lithuania) were generated, allowing an understanding of how various life trajectories develop, reasons behind decisions, feelings regarding relocation and re-integration, and the experience of returning to a rural location. Drawing on transnationalism and social network theory, this paper reveals the complexity of contemporary return migration experiences and the similarities and diversities that exist between Western and Eastern Europe. Key issues to emerge include the context dependency of return migrant behaviour and their further life choices, integration, and the shift in migrants’ value priority scale from economic to social values.

Keywords: rural; return migration; globalisation

Introduction

‘Globalisation’ surfaced as the buzzword of the ‘Roaring Nineties’ as it best captured the increasingly inter-dependent nature of social life on our planet (Steger 2009: 1). Incorporating a variety of discourses, the concept of globalisation not only challenged the 1990s, but continues to create significant social, economic, cultural and ecological challenges, for both urban and rural regions, in the 21st century. In defining globalisation, Steger (2009) suggested that the concept, also could be understood as the inter-connection and inter-

---

* National University of Ireland, Galway. Addresses for correspondence: Maura.Farrell@nuigalway.ie, John.McDonagh@nuigalway.ie, Marie.Mahon@nuigalway.ie.
** Institute NeVork. Address for correspondence: Emilija.Kairyte@gmail.com.
*** Université du Luxembourg. Address for correspondence: Birte.Nienaber@uni.lu.
dependence between localities around the world. Furthermore, Steger (ibidem) identified globalisation as a set of processes, which includes the creation and multiplication of networks, the expansion and stretching of social relations, activities and interdependencies, and the intensification and acceleration of social exchanges and activities. These processes also manifest themselves in rural locations, e.g. in the presence of transnational corporations, immigrants, imported technologies and trade, travel and consumption networks (Woods 2011). In recent years, such processes have become a permeating influence in rural Europe, offering both opportunities and challenges. This in turn has led to what Woods (2007) describes as a ‘globalised countryside,’ in which new globalised flows stretch beyond urban areas to encompass rural regions. It is a dynamic that sees flows in rural regions that are not uni-directional, but are composed of movements into, out of, within and through rural places (Milbourne 2007: 385), thereby creating a ‘global village’ which in some ways can lose control over its relationships, or conversely can gain more power through globalisation processes (Cid Aguayo 2008: 542).

A key feature of this ‘globalised countryside’ is migration. Pries (2009, 2010) and Faist (2010) differentiate migration and its impacts as being international, re-national, transnational, or globalised. Karakayali (2011) argues that discussions involving globalisation cannot obscure migration, while Castles and Miller (2009) refer to the ‘Age of Migration’ and how the general trends of migration are globalisation, acceleration, differentiation, feminisation, growing politicisation, and the proliferation of migration. Indeed, evidence of extreme increases in cross-border migration patterns led Castles and Miller (2009: 54) to suggest that, Globalization remains a crucial context for understanding twenty-first-century migration. On the one hand, globalization drives migration and changes its directions and forms, while on the other hand, migration is an intrinsic part of globalization and is itself a major force reshaping communities and societies. The liberalisation of travel restrictions, along with the growth and development of transport and global communication networks, have also contributed to an international mobility that promotes patterns of migration, return migration and repeat emigration from and into rural regions (e.g. Hillmann 2007; Urry 2007).

Increasingly viewed as a significant area of research, return migration in particular can be contextualised within the wider processes of societal change (Farrell, Mahon, McDonagh 2012). Dustmann and Weiss (2007) suggest that return migration is often characterised by its temporary status. They further suggest that it describes a situation where migrants return to their country of origin as a personal choice and often after an extended period abroad (ibidem). A large proportion of the migration within Europe over the last decade falls into this category (ibidem). Focusing on the occurrence and increasing frequency of return migration within Europe, this paper explores the diversity of experiences that exist for returnees to rural regions. Unpacking the multiplicity of experiences that exist for return migrants in the context of the western Ireland and Alytus County, Lithuania, this paper identifies the key role played by some returnees in the economic, social and cultural vitality of local rural communities, while also identifying the exclusion and isolation experienced by others. Drawing on research carried out for the DERREG (7th EU Framework Project), this paper utilises results from 36 biographies of return migrants, providing a clear understanding of the diverse life trajectories that develop once individuals return to their native region. Drawing on transnationalism and social network theory, the paper explores the decisions, experiences, and reintegration processes of individuals from two different backgrounds and locations (Eastern and Western Europe), but who chose a similar direction in life, and the potential impacts these decisions can have on the chosen rural areas.
Theoretical approach

Defining the return migration process

To understand return migration, a variety of economic, sociological, political and/or geographical approaches are often transferred from traditional migration research (Currie 2006; Smoliner, Fürschner, Hochgerner, Nová 2013). Black, Kosier and Munk (2004), for example, identify structural (the situation in the country of origin and in the host country), individual (age, sex and social relations) and political (incentives and disincentives) reasons for migrants to return to their country of origin. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) estimate that the majority of migrants always harbour a desire to return to their native country. Gmelch (1980: 136) defines return migration as *The movement of emigrants back to their homelands to resettle. Migrants returning from vacation or an extended visit without intention of remaining at home are generally not defined as return migrants.* However, Fihel and Górny (2013) suggest that this ‘traditional’ definition often implies permanency of a return move, which is not realistic in the current era of globalisation and mobility. Drawing on the OECD definition, Fihel and Górny (*ibidem*) suggest that return migrants be defined as *persons returning to their country of citizenship after having been international migrants (whether short-term or long-term) and who are intending to stay in their own country for at least a year.* Halfacree (2011), on the other hand, suggests that non-permanent or return migration is increasingly considered routine behaviour, although still a moderately novel area of migration in that a standard definition in national or international policy or law is absent. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the DERREG project research (and this paper); a ‘return migrant’ is defined as one who has returned to his/her place of birth following a period in another country (Farrell et al. 2012).

Theorising return migration

Return migration is often viewed as a multifaceted process, academically debated since the 1960s, but with more extensive theoretical underpinnings from the 1980s onwards (Kubat 1984; Farrell et al. 2012). Theoretical explorations of return migration have, over time, assisted in how the concept has been characterised and how return migrants are represented. Conceptualisations of return migration very often start with an exploration of the neoclassical approach based on the response of the individual to economic opportunities in other countries (Cassarino 2004, 2008). While relevant in relation to financial needs as an incentive (Hunter 2010), the neoclassical approach is criticised as migrants often miscalculate the financial burden of migrating against the higher incomes expected within the source country (Cassarino 2004). This approach therefore lends itself to the notion of migrants returning with a sense of failure, as their human capital was not rewarded in monetary terms.

The new economics of labour migration (NELM) theory, by contrast, evaluates return migration as returning to the home country after successfully completing a period in a foreign country. However, the success is measured in financial gain with little attention for the social aspects of the migrant’s decision to return. Cassarino (2004) criticises both NELM theory and neoclassical theory for placing considerable emphasis on the financial aspects of the migrant’s decision to return, often to the detriment of social and cultural decisions. Addressing this shortfall, Cassarino (*ibidem*) presents the structural approach to return migration, suggesting that the subject needs to be examined as a social and contextual issue, as well as a personal or financial one. The structural approach can however be criticised for its failure to take both the host and home country into consideration simultaneously (Hunter 2010). This approach fails to consider the difficulties faced by returnees, often related to the length of time spent abroad, in addition to the level of contact maintained with family and friends while away. By contrast, transnationalism presents a theoretical framework...
based on solid connections between the host and home country (Cassarino 2004). The ‘cycle of contact’ investigated in transnationalism explores the return migrant’s ability to maintain strong links with the home country, which in turn acts as preparation for the return process. Chacko (2007) argues that transnational linkages due to reverse brain drain have a strong impact on the economic development and globalisation of the receiving home countries.

The networking process evident in transnationalism bears some similarities to social network theory. Social network theory has contributed significantly to a better understanding of return migration, as it views return migrants as actors who draw on tangible and intangible resources to ensure a successful return to their home country (Cassarino 2004). In contrast to transnationalists, social network theorists believe that return migrants need not be dependent on diasporas, but that the process of migration has equipped the returnee with various forms of capital which can be utilised for a successful return to the home country. According to Cassarino (ibidem), the reintegration process is made simpler as the returnee has maintained the social structures required to ensure that sufficient information and resources are at hand once the return process commences. Additional to financial capital, social network theorists suggest that returnees return with human capital in the form of skills acquired in a foreign country, in addition to experiences, social networks and knowledge; all of which contribute to a positive reintegration process for the return migrant (ibidem). In considering all five theoretical approaches, it is appropriate to draw on de Haas, Fokkema and Fassi Fihri (2014) as they suggest that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all theory,’ and that different aspects of relevant theories should be taken into account to ensure that the heterogeneity of migrants is considered. When analysing data collected for the DERREG project, however, transnationalism and social network theory are most relevant. In considering return migrants in Ireland and Lithuania, these theoretical approaches allow the significance of social networking, human capital, transnational mobility and identities to be investigated with interesting insights emerging. Drawing on transnationalism, for example, allows an exploration of the manner in which Irish and Lithuanian migrants create social groups across borders, which in turn helps them in their return to the home country. Levitt (2001: 213) explores this notion within the context of a transnational village that emerges when large numbers of people from a small, bounded sending community enact their lives across borders. Levitt (ibidem) also suggests that migrants and non-migrants create other kinds of transnational social groups through their enduring ties. Drawing on social network theory, this study aims to ascertain whether the migration process has equipped both Irish and Lithuanian return migrants with various forms of capital, which can be utilised for a successful return.

Rural return migration

Return typologies, according to Glorius (2014: 219), often focus on the impact of return migration on the individual and on, at the country level, integrating return motives, voluntariness of return and return preparations, as well as the institutional context prior to and after return. This corresponds with considerations arising in the context of post-accession migration in the EU, namely, the question of brain return and the return-development nexus (ibidem). At the micro level, Glorius (ibidem) suggests that the definition of ‘re-migration’ is inadequate, in that it provides little information on the length of time spent abroad or on the definitive nature of the return. In considering spatial factors, Glorius (ibidem) suggests that even though re-migrants may have crossed international borders back to their country of origin, they might not have returned to their place of origin, so the return is not complete (ibidem). This scenario applies to rural emigrants, who may choose to return to an urban area rather than to a rural region. Regarding the decision to return, and in particular the decision to return to a rural rather than to an urban area, the work of Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß (2010) and Klein-Hitpaß (2013) offers relevant insights. Their research work analyses the
transformation of the former socialist Poland before and after Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004, showing that many highly skilled migrants returned to rural areas or smaller cities and not to the larger urban Polish agglomerations (ibidem). Unfortunately, a research gap appears to exist in relation to other Central Eastern European countries and a similar deduction cannot be made. What is evident however, according to Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß (2010: 1646), is that rural return migrants contribute to knowledge-based development, but the idea of a bridging function of social relations has to be scrutinized more carefully.

Conceptualisations of the rural currently lead to an exploration of the diversity that exists in rural areas; in rural identities, interests and priorities (Cloke 2006; Panelli 2006; Woods 2003, 2011). This contemporary rural diversity, or diversity of place, is often not what many migrants expect to discover on returning to their native rural areas, however. Although many migrants return for family and economic reasons, many also return seeking the mystical ‘rural idyll,’ which appeals to migrants who are often situated between two places and are seeking to decide on a future trajectory for themselves and their family (Halfacree 1995; Ni Laoire 2007). Discourses of ‘belonging’ and ‘not belonging’ also suggest that such conceptualisations need contemplation, particularly when considering migrants who view their foreign location as temporary and their eventual location to be their original rural home (Ni Laoire 2007). Overall, many reasons, such as age, class, and lifestyle choice are presented for rural return migration. However, what becomes imperative for a greater understanding of the return process is to consider the complexity of rural populations and to avoid narrow conceptualisations, in favour of broader considerations (Milbourne 2007).

Methodology

Selection of the sample

Qualitative, semi-structured face-to-face interviews were carried out with 36 return migrants (individually or as couples) between January and November 2010, in both Ireland and Lithuania. The key objective of the study was to achieve ‘theoretical saturation,’ and as such, all pertinent features of the research were included in the sample and addressed in the interviews (Farrell et al. 2012). Once all interviews were completed, and all significant data relating to return migrants’ experiences and motivations were obtained, the research methodology used a selection of cases by selective sampling. In the case of return migrants, for example, those selected for interviews returned to Ireland and Lithuania willingly, without any coercion and at their own financial cost (ibidem). Respondents were chosen for interviews on the basis of a conscious selection process rather than a random selection. This method of selective sampling was used to ensure that all significant facets of information were included in the sample.

When choosing the required sample of interviewees, the following criteria were considered: candidates of Irish and Lithuanian origin; both male and female candidates; interviewees were professional or non-professional; both individuals and couples were selected; and both long-term and short-term durations of stay were considered. The study included interviews with return migrants from all types of employment backgrounds, including highly skilled migrants, skilled workers (e.g. artisans), as well as non-skilled workers (Farrell et al. 2012). Current employment was a key consideration and although the level of education was considered, it was not paramount. An additional key consideration was the information regarding a change in work practices once return migrants were employed in either the west of Ireland or Alytus County, Lithuania. Family dynamic was also considered, and couples with children were interviewed to determine whether their motivation to return was different from their single counterparts. Other family issues were also explored, such as the connections maintained by the migrants while abroad and on their return, and how this motivated migrants to return and how it assisted them once they returned.
The period of stay abroad was also taken into consideration. Depending on the time spent abroad, the study made a distinction between a short-term stay (a period of at least 1 month but less than a year) and long-term stay (a period of at least 12 months). Initially, a pre-test to check the accuracy and feasibility of the guidelines was carried out. Audio recordings of all interviews were made and transcribed in full and used to inform the analysis (Farrell et al. 2012). Thematic analyses were carried out on all transcriptions to identify the key themes emerging from the interviews.

**Characterisation of the sample**

The interviewees chosen for this research were located in Eastern and Western Europe; namely the west of Ireland and Alytus County, located in the south-eastern part of Lithuania. In relation to both study locations, the following table characterises the research sample:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Characterisation of the sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Return migrants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Irish return migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 males, 6 females, 4 couples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Lithuanian return migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First interviews: spring 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 males, 4 females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second interviews: autumn 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 males and 1 female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration.

In both the west of Ireland and Alytus County, the interviews sought to establish why the return migrant left the home country, their length of stay abroad, their motivation to return (retirement, problems with integrating abroad, language problems, quality of life, economic stature, personal reasons) and their experiences as return migrants.

**Case study regions**

**Case study selection**

Ireland and Lithuania were chosen as the case study countries for this research due to the scale of economic emigration that exists within both countries, from a historical and contemporary perspective. A comparative analysis of the two countries is also relevant in light of Ireland as a significant destination country for many Lithuanian emigrants (Thaut 2009). The case study region of Alytus County, Lithuania, was selected due to its peripheral character as an economically deprived border region. Comparably, the West Region of Ireland is peripherally situated on the Western Seaboard, with the Atlantic Ocean forming the western boundary and the river Shannon forming the eastern boundary. Additionally, and comparably, the Irish case study region
was selected for its NUTS2 status of economic disadvantage. The added value of an international comparison lies not only in the similarities discovered between the return migrants (the differences between the case study regions notwithstanding), but also in the lessons that can be learned from the experiences of both return migrant groups.

**County Roscommon, West of Ireland**

The first study location was the West of Ireland, a NUTS2 designated region and part of the Border Midlands and West Region of Ireland (BMW) (Figure 1). This study focused particularly on County Roscommon (Figure 2), as representative of a rural Ireland and embodying a history of emigration and return migration (Farrell et al. 2012). The 2006 census recorded a population of 414 277 for County Roscommon, which represents nearly 10 per cent of the national population, although population growth, recorded at over 13 per cent, is well below the regional and national average (20.7 per cent and 20.3 per cent respectively). County Roscommon has levels of prosperity around the national average, with greater deprivation in the north of the county. Communities around Athlone and rural areas neighbouring Roscommon town have above-average affluence, but a number of rural divisions in northern Roscommon have relatively high levels of deprivation compared to the national average.

**Figure 1. Map of Ireland showing Border Midlands and West Region of Ireland**

Return migration is not a recent phenomenon to Ireland. However, return migration trends are increasingly recorded from the 1990s onwards and in particular during the ‘Celtic Tiger’ period. According to Ní Laoire (2008), in a 10-year period from 1996 to 2006, net inward migration to the Republic of Ireland increased by up to 50 per cent. Between 1991 and 1996 nearly 20 per cent of return migrants arrived in County Roscommon per 1000 population (CSO 2006). Of these returnees, two distinct groups can be identified; the first are individuals who return to Ireland to retire, and the second are descendants of emigrants returning to their native land (ibidem). Those who returned came mostly from the United Kingdom and the United States, with many returning to their native rural regions.

**Figure 2. Map of Ireland showing County Roscommon**


**Alytus County, Lithuania**

The second research area was Alytus County, a NUTS3 region located in the south-eastern part of Lithuania, bordered by Poland and Belarus (Figure 3 and Figure 4). As with the West of Ireland, Lithuania and Alytus County in particular have a long history of emigration. Since its independence in 1990, approximately one-fifth of the Lithuanian population emigrated, making it one of the largest net negative migrations per 1000 population in the European Union (Population Census data 2011). A national population decline is evident in Alytus County, with the region recording the second largest decline in population of the ten counties in 2010. In 2012, Alytus County’s population was recorded as 155,203, with 90,726 living in the urban municipality of Alytus County and the remaining inhabitants dispersed across four rural municipalities (Statistics Lithuania 2012). The urban majority is the result of recent urbanisation, but the region is currently still
categorised by the OECD as ‘predominantly rural’ (Eurostat 2010) with the third lowest population density of Lithuanian regions at 28.6 persons per km² (Statistics Lithuania 2012). Alytus County is a region with comparatively low incomes, high unemployment, a dwindling population, and net out-migration. The region currently faces considerable social and economic challenges, which are compounded by a global recession applied to a context of a post-Soviet recovery (Kairytė 2014).

Contributing strongly to this trend is international net out-migration, which, in 2010, saw out-migrants outnumbering in-migrants by nearly 5 000 in 2010 (Statistics Lithuania 2012). This process of out-migration is fuelled by limited economic opportunities in Alytus County, with large numbers leaving to live and work abroad, especially in Western Europe. Due to conventional social networks, countries such as the UK, Ireland, Spain and the USA were often the destination countries for Lithuanians, with Scandinavian countries becoming more popular in recent years. While some migrant workers returned, difficulties in finding appropriate work in the home country often led to repeat emigrations. Although there has been a decline in the immigration figures of foreign nationals into Alytus County, an important new trend is the return migration of Lithuanians who were migrant workers in other parts of Europe or elsewhere. In 2012, over 20 000 people were recorded as immigrating to Lithuania, with return Lithuanian residents accounting for 87 per cent of all immigrants. Changes in health insurance regulations, as an important issue for Lithuanians, are seen as a key factor for this growth. Compulsory Lithuanian health insurance payments for those who did not declare departure encouraged many to do so (as well as to declare arrival on return). It is argued by government, however, that the increase of returning citizens is also influenced by a better economic situation in Lithuania and the continued revival of the economy, which will result in further increases in returning emigrants (Migration in Numbers 2013). This view is supported by Garbenčiūtė (2013), who suggests that the home country is rapidly changing with more possibilities for a better quality of life and the ability to work at a higher professional capacity, with access to social services and an improved cultural life.

Figure 3. Location of Alytus County in Lithuania

Results

This remaining section of the paper focuses on the results of interviews held with return migrants in County Roscommon and Alytus County, Lithuania. The purpose, in the context of the theories already discussed, was to gain insight into the movement patterns and the motivations behind a returnee’s decision to return to rural Ireland or rural Lithuania. Additionally, results were analysed to determine the significance of the relational aspect of return migration and the role of concepts such as the rural idyll, networking and building social capital in influencing movement patterns.

Original motivation

Economic reasons

A background exploration of both study groups showed that 13 of the 19 Irish return migrants left their home country in the 1980s because of a national recession and high unemployment. All 17 Lithuanian migrants reported leaving their country at a later stage, between 1997 and 2007, although the majority also suggested that an economic depression and high levels of unemployment were the most significant factors in their decision to leave. Previous Irish migration research established that 30 per cent of the Irish population was unemployed during the 1980s and that emigration was a basic reality, rather than an exception (Jones 2003; Ni Laoire 2007; Noble 2013). This study found similar results, with one respondent suggesting that: *There was no work and no money in Ireland in the 1980s, we were musicians and we went to England because our family and friends told us there was work there* (I.11). Another interviewee stated that: *The first time I left was to go to London in 1987. When I left college there was no work here in Ireland* (I.5). Historically, Irish emigrants emigrated with little more than traditional farm, domestic or building skills as cultural capital. By the
1990s, however, almost 30 per cent of Irish college graduates were emigrating to seek employment and gain experience abroad (Farrell et al. 2012). This was reflected in the Irish study, as all but 1 respondent had completed secondary level education prior to leaving Ireland and 9 of the 17 migrants had completed tertiary qualifications, to Diploma or Degree level.

In Alytus County, similar scenarios were evident with unemployment and wage differences between Lithuania and destination countries being the central push and pull factors. Figures suggest that 85 per cent of Lithuanians leaving their county in 2010 or previously indicated that they had been unemployed for a year or longer prior to their departure (IOM in Lithuania 2011). This push factor was reinforced by pull factors such as the potential wage increases for emigrants in the main destination countries. Many emigrants experienced wage increases of approximately two to three times higher in terms of purchasing power parity or up to six times in current prices if compared to wages in Lithuania (ibidem). The main reason to leave was stated clearly by one of the respondents: I left because there was no job and money (L.12). The survey respondents collectively identified a series of ‘goals,’ which many of them aimed to achieve while living and working abroad. These goals included: earning enough money to start a new business on their return; accumulating money for accommodation or further education; and obtaining additional finances to support their families in Lithuania. One respondent in particular noted that: There are better payments for the same or other jobs abroad (L.11), while another reported that: I wished to gain more experience and knowledge while abroad, to try and better myself and my family in a new environment (L.6). Such responses are comparable with a Lithuanian survey, which found that 86.7 per cent of Alytus County residents viewed their employment prospects negatively or very negatively, and 81.6 per cent assessed the possibility of starting a business negatively or very negatively (RAIT Market Analysis and Research Group 2010). The same survey found that 29 per cent of respondents had at least one unemployed person in their family, with little opportunities for re-skilling and improving qualifications (ibidem). Although Alytus County is well developed, the available programmes have not been sufficiently adapted to changing market conditions (Alytus Regional Development Council 2010).

Social and cultural motivations to leave

Economic instability played a key factor in motivating both Irish and Lithuanian natives to leave their home county originally. Both sets of respondents also indicated that additional issues, such as social security and justice, better long-term career prospects and opportunities to experience new cultures and traditions also played a role in their decision-making process. In the Irish context, 12 of the 17 interviewees were motivated to emigrate in the 1980s by family or friends. One respondent reported that: I was working in hotel and catering in Ireland and I just wanted something different and to see how things were done somewhere else. In fact, my mum is Scottish so I had a lot of friends over there. That’s really, why I chose to go to Scotland. My mother was living in Ireland but her sister my aunt was living there. The security of having family there really helped (I.4). Although most Irish interviewees agreed that they had a good quality of life prior to emigrating, they were influenced by family and friends who had emigrated previously, and had high expectations of the quality of life abroad. They expected better ‘employment prospects,’ ‘increased income,’ ‘better working conditions,’ ‘opportunities for leisure activities’ and career advancement through enhanced educational prospects. As one individual said: I left Ireland as there was loads of work in London with better pay and working conditions (I.5).

Similar responses emerged from interviewees in Alytus County where some suggested that curiosity and a desire for new experiences and/or challenges motivated them to travel abroad. Motivation to see the world was alluded to by many interviewees once they had discussed their economic motivations to emigrate. As
with Irish interviewees, an improved quality of life was an incentive, particularly with younger respondents. These decisions are similar to those identified by Conlon (2009), when he pointed to factors including a prevailing depressed economic climate in addition to gaining experience overseas and forming new personal relationships. A common feature among both east and west return migrants was their long-term intention to return to their home county, which was often entwined with a social attachment to their respective countries rather than with economic factors.

**Motivation to return**

Globalisation increasingly enhances ease of mobility, which weakens the traditional tendency to consider migration as permanent. As such, migration has become more of a circular or return process, with a variety of factors affecting each individual’s decision to return. Sipavičienė, Cock and Dobryninas (2009) suggest that such factors can often be grouped into four different headings: 1) failure to integrate into the destination country; 2) priority given to home country; 3) achievement of set goals (to reach an earning target, to get education, to gain experience) and finally, 4) emergence of employment opportunities in the home country due to obtained experience in the destination country. This classification was found useful following the analysis of the interviews for both Alytus County and the West of Ireland, as it became apparent that these groupings bore varying degrees of relevance to both sets of results.

**Failure to integrate into the destination country**

According to the research, a failure to integrate into the destination country is more typical for emigrants with lower education or emigrants living in the destination country during an economic recession. Although this was not paramount in the decision-making process of many immigrants, particularly in the Irish context, it was significant for four Lithuanians who returned from France because of difficult employment and economic circumstances. One interviewee suggested that: *The main reason to return was due to the end of the job contract. The contract was not extended, but I think this was influenced by the increasing unemployment in France* (L.14), while a second respondent suggested that: *The main reason I returned was due to the bankruptcy of the French enterprise, where I was working. They didn’t need us anymore* (L.16). Two further Lithuanian respondents indicated that their return was instigated by a poor working environment and living conditions, in addition to, *missing family and the homeland* (L.10). In theorising this aspect of the respondent’s decision to return, neoclassical stance can be utilised: migrants returned to their home country because of a failed experience, particularly in relation to their work environment, and the fact that their human capital was not acknowledged in monetary terms.

**Priority given to the home country**

This aspect of return was significant to most if not all respondents from both Ireland and Lithuania. In relation to the Irish study, the majority of individuals and couples (9 of the 11 individuals and 1 of the couples) required little or no incentive to return, and many indeed suggested that it had always been their long-term intention to return home to their native country. Although patriotism was important to the Irish interviewees, the key motivation for returning was to be close to other family members, particularly once immigrants had children of their own. One interviewee remarked that: *I knew once I had children whenever it would happen I would come home. I suppose it was always at the back of my mind. I knew I would not stay there forever* (I.12). Jones (2003) previously noted how the attraction of having an extended family in their home country
often motivated immigrants to return. Ní Laoire (2008) likewise identifies the family as a key factor in motivating immigrants to return to their native country. At a more theoretical level, Cassarino (2004) suggests that such motivation is strongly connected to transnationalism, which aligns return migration with a strong attachment to home and the family.

In comparison to the Irish response, Lithuanian return migrants outlined more patriotic reasons for returning to their native country. One respondent who returned from the United States expressed his motivation to return this way: Being Lithuanian, I never felt myself a citizen of any other country except Lithuania, and in my opinion, citizens have to live in their country (L.6). Another respondent reported: I felt like an immigrant in the USA with another language, culture and habits – I felt foreign there. However these feelings were strengthened by the hard job, leaving no time for social integration – life was closed, just work and home (L.17). Another respondent, a second generation emigrant living in the United States, returned to the homeland of his parents, suggesting that he always felt himself to be Lithuanian: I was born into a Lithuanian family (in the USA), to which it was very important to preserve Lithuanian culture, language, and traditions, particularly since Lithuania was under occupation. My parents were communicating mainly with Lithuanian society, were dreaming of Lithuania as homeland. As such, the interviewee felt that he was practically programmed to return and be Lithuanian (L.1). As he went on to explain, it is easier To be Lithuanian in the natural environment as it does not require an extra effort. I was hoping to create a family with a Lithuanian partner and have the Lithuanian language spoken in my family (L.1). Such patriotism was strengthened by the occupation of Lithuania during the Soviet era and increased the immigrants’ desire to return to their native land, now that their country is independent and free. Many respondents suggested that they had a longing for their homeland, with one return migrant in particular suggesting that despite his satisfaction with the destination country, he wanted to return home, stating that: I missed the homeland, I couldn’t imagine myself working in construction all my life and living somewhere else rather than Lithuania (L.10). However, in most cases the homeland was understood as the place where family and close people reside, as suggested by the following two respondents: I had nostalgia for Lithuania, family and friends. It was hard to be alone in a foreign country without support and friends (L.11); My main reason to return, however, was my wish to live in the homeland, where all my own people live (L.15). Similarly, Garbenčiūtė (2013) suggests that the environment of the family and other relatives living in Lithuania is particularly important to the migrant community. The decision to return, for many migrants, is often based on the importance of social contacts, with these relationships having a greater effect on return than economic reasons. Additionally, work carried out in 2011 (Barcevičius, Žvalionytė 2012) confirms that the most important factor for Lithuanian return migrants is to return to family, home and friends and to live in their own cultural environment. Over 50 per cent of respondents within this survey expressed this desire. These results are similar to that obtained by Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß. (2010) in their work on return migrants in Poland.

Achievement of goals

Sipavičienė et al. (2009) suggest that the achievement of set goals, such as obtaining ample finances to start a business, purchase accommodation, finance further education or to gain satisfactory experience abroad, are often sufficient motivation for immigrants to consider returning to their native country. Similarly, Barcevičius and Žvalionytė (2012) produced research results showing that 40 per cent of return migrants named the achievement of set goals abroad as a significant factor in their decision to return. Interviewees from Alytus County, for example, suggested that returning depended largely on the amount of financial capital they had accumulated. One respondent pointedly said: Since the reason for my departure was to earn money to start my own business, the reason to return was to establish the business (L.10). Another return
migrant alluded to the fact that: *The job was very hard, but I earned enough money to return* (L.11). Additionally, three migrants suggested that they returned because they had to *finish studying at home* (L.5, L.10, L.11), and once they earned sufficient funds, they felt compelled to return. Such responses can be aligned with the theoretical framework of new economics of labour migration, in that return was the natural conclusion to a successful experience in a foreign country (Cassarino 2004). This theory emphasises the financial aspects of a returnee’s decision to return, placing less emphasis on the social and cultural aspects of the decision. By contrast, Irish respondents placed very little emphasis on the accumulation of finances as a key reason to return. Quality of life milestones such as, having children and support systems at home were key responses, with no interviewees alluding to the accumulation of money as a motivating factor in their return. Irish returnees did suggest that savings were important; however, the social networks that assisted them in their reintegration process were given greater prominence. For example, one interviewee suggested that: *Financially moving home was a terrible move, but the quality of life is better in Ireland, than living in a big town in England and we wanted our children to experience the freedom of rural life* (I.7). In understanding such motivations for return, we can draw on social network theory, as it aids our understanding of that process by viewing returnees as actors who draw together tangible and intangible resources to return home (Cassarino 2004).

**Emergence of employment opportunities in the home country**

Returnees to both Alytus County and the West of Ireland alluded to employment opportunities, as motivating their return. Additionally, some returnees from both groups suggested that their experience abroad increased their employability at home. For example, one returnee stated that: *The main reason I returned was due to a job offer in Lithuania* (L.12). Four other returnees reported that they found jobs without difficulties. Some Lithuanian returnees suggested, however, that their experience in the destination country did not influence their employment situation at home; in fact, two returnees indicated that they felt a certain level of negativity towards them on their return. One of the return migrants commented that: *In general, the fact that I returned from abroad was not really perceived as advantage by other people. In Lithuania, everybody says we all were somewhere, though in reality very few people return who emigrate for the longer term. There is a big difference between those who lived abroad only a short time and those who stayed longer* (L.4). Similarly to Irish return migrants, three Lithuanian respondents showed keen entrepreneurial skills by establishing new businesses on their return, including an office for cadastral measurements and house design, a rental company of construction tools and equipment, and an internet (on-line) clothes store. These findings are along similar lines to Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß (2010), who argue that return migrants are often investors and innovators and are equipped with various forms of capital, which aid a successful return. This again, is strongly linked to social network theory and the building of various forms of capital to aid a successful return.

Irish returnees also alluded to increased employment opportunities at home, which influenced their decision to return. One individual stated that: *My husband got a job in Ireland with an English company and that was the deciding factor for us* (I.2), while another stated that: *My husband was a builder and work was very plentiful in Ireland because of the building boom* (I.9). A third interviewee declared that: *The Celtic Tiger was roaring at home, so there was plenty of work. This helped me make my decision to return* (I.4). In the Irish context, interviewees returned to Ireland during the renowned ‘Celtic Tiger’ era, which all but assured them of local, regional or national employment. In fact, in that period Irish unemployment dropped to an historic low of 4 per cent, while economic growth registered twice that of US and four times the rate recorded in Europe. In light of such economic stability, return migrants were highly motivated to consider returning to their native country.
The return experience

Employability: home and abroad

All Lithuanian interviewees worked in a variety of employment sectors while abroad. Jobs in academia, construction, agriculture, trade, the service sector and retail were recorded, with four respondents suggesting the work was physically difficult and working conditions were poor. On their return, most interviewees again worked in a variety of jobs, such as firm managers, a real estate agent, construction workers, a sales agent, website administrator, city artist, mechanic and welder. Nearly all respondents indicated their displeasure at the low wages they were paid on their return. Many reported that low wages prevailed despite the fact that they had obtained a number of extra skills while working abroad. One individual completed tertiary education in the United States; nevertheless, this individual and others felt that their professional experiences abroad were dismissed once they returned and sought employment in Alytus County. In exploring this issue further, some interviewees suggested they had qualifications and professions upon travelling abroad, but to meet their short-term economic goals they took on work in unrelated fields. As such, on their return, this was unrelated to their current employment. Nonetheless, most returnees felt that, overall, the experience had been beneficial to their career advancement with one individual suggesting that: The main valuable experience was not professional, but communication with different people, discovering a different system, different feeling (L.4). Those who gained employment in their chosen profession (a firm manager and two individuals in construction) did feel that their employment experience abroad benefited and advanced their career opportunities once they returned. This also applied to individuals who advanced their education while abroad, particularly returnees who took additional courses in computers, bar tending, auctioneering, and lorry driving.

These results are similar to a Lithuanian survey, which included two polls with return migrants carried out in 2008 and 2011 (Barcevičius, Žvalionytė 2012) which discovered that the majority of return migrants felt that their emigration experience contributed very little to their search for employment, and 11 per cent suggested it could even be considered an obstacle. Similarly, the study concluded that migrants who obtained work in their ‘own field’ advanced their careers on their return, but unfortunately the majority of immigrants worked in employment below their qualification grade (ibidem). These findings reflect the work of Favell (2008) when he suggests that many migrants from Eastern Europe working in the west accept employment that is beneath their status and qualifications in order to fill a niche in the labour market. Many Eastern European migrants justify this strategy by viewing it as temporary, opportunistic and financially rewarding for their families at home (ibidem).

Irish return migrants had a varied experience, in that only 2 of the 19 return migrants failed to gain employment on their return, with one individual suggesting it was a Lifestyle decision to stay at home and look after my children once I returned to Ireland (I.5). Similar to Lithuanian migrants, but in greater numbers, 8 of the 17 currently employed return migrants started their own business in areas such as photography, audio recording, mechanical engineering, turf cutting, restaurant, farmer/plumber and painter. All interviewees were of the opinion that the experience, skills and abilities they obtained abroad were invaluable once they returned (Farrell et al. 2012). One interviewee, currently self-employed, suggested that: You learned to toughen up because in another country you learn to do things for yourself; there is no one there to do it for you. You do learn to toughen up and be a bit more thick skinned and not let things get to you (I.6). Most interviewees (14) were satisfied with their current employment situation except one female who was recently given redundancy notice. All self-employed individuals were anxious about their businesses due to the economic recession and some (5) felt they might have a better chance at ‘growing’ their business if they resided in an urban area, but none were willing to trade the benefits of rural life for their businesses. All interviewees
felt they had gained skills and abilities abroad that assisted them in their current occupation. Eight of the seventeen interviewees had obtained further education while abroad such as obtaining a haulage licence, a degree in Human Resource Management, a photography course, a plumbing qualification, and ITC and Hotel and Catering qualifications. Others suggested they had gained substantial experience, strength of character and the ability to deal with diverse people and situations. As one interviewee explained: *I feel stronger as a result of being abroad and I’ve gained a broader understanding of people and how to deal with them while running a business* (I.6). Under the rubric of social network theory, such entrepreneurial activity and enhancement of education and skills while abroad can be analysed as an accumulation of human capital, which can contribute to the successful return of migrants (Cassarino 2004). Additionally, Black *et al.* (2004) alluded to the fact that individuals returning to their native country with enhanced entrepreneurial skills can only be advantageous to a country and even more so to a rural region in need of additional commercial enterprises.

**Domestic situation on return**

All Irish return migrants were either very satisfied or satisfied with their current living situation in rural Ireland. Some (5) were concerned with the economic crisis in the country and would consider remigration for employment if the situation arose. Nonetheless, no returnee related any feelings of dissatisfaction with their current situation, although some (3) females suggested that they were initially very unhappy after returning to Ireland. As one female interviewee said: *I feel happy now that I am back home, we have a better quality of life here, particularly once we got work, we felt less isolated and more connected to the community* (I.1). There were some similarities in the Lithuanian study, in that the majority of respondents (10) were satisfied with their current living situation. However, in contrast to the Irish findings, 1 return migrant was very dissatisfied with his current arrangements and 4 were not satisfied with their current job arrangements. According to one respondent: *Incomes are lower, but life is better here* (L.11). The positive factors of living in Alytus County were recorded as Proximity to my family and friends, nice nature and landscape, good leisure, Lithuanian language, accommodation possibilities are quite good, it is less expensive to live here and run a business compared to the cities or abroad (L.2, L.5, L.6, L.8). The negative aspects of living in the regions were alluded to as: Lower wages, high prices compared to wages, bureaucracy, improper behaviour among state officials, negative competition, poor salesmen behaviour in the stores (not polite and angry), inefficiency of public and bank officers, selfishness of politicians, lower quality of life, unemployment and peripherality of the region (L.3, L.5, L.8, L.10, L.11, L.14). A higher level of satisfaction among Irish returnees reflects findings presented by Ni Laoire (2008), which suggest that Irish return migrants often reject living permanently in any particular country other than Ireland. Aspirations of Irish migrants revolve around notions of citizenship, homeownership, suburbia and family (*ibidem*: 205). Ni Laoire (*ibidem*) also suggests that such aspirations reflect a normative association of place and life stage and a desire to become permanently rooted in the home country.

**Return migrant and reintegration**

All Lithuanian respondents were in regular contact with family and friends while abroad, via the internet or regular visits. As such, the return experience was considered neither complicated nor difficult, by most returnees. Comments such as: *There was no need for adaptation, after a few weeks we returned to the usual life we had before we left* (L.10) were commonplace. The majority of Lithuanians returned to live with or close to family members in rural regions where they were born and raised. This, for many, was a very im-
portant aspect of their return experience, and many indicated that returning to their native region and being close to family constituted the success of their return. For many returnees, their circle of friends remained the same and many were happy and indeed enthusiastic to join clubs and organisations such as: The Local Invalid Association, Joint Democratic Movement, New Party, Return Lithuanians’ Association, Rotary (Businessmen’s) club and a Women’s club (L.11). However, some returnees returned to their home to experience certain levels of isolation as other family members had emigrated and not returned. One individual in particular stated that: My family lives in the USA now, I am the only one in Lithuania (L.10), while another reported that: Part of my family lives in Germany and part in Lithuania. I am glad that part of my family is in the same region (L.11). Apart from this negative aspect, the majority of Lithuanian returnees reinserted themselves into their native Alytus County region without too much difficulty or distress. Considering the duration of their immigration, however, the fact that Lithuanian returnees spent on average between one and three years abroad may help explain the ease with which they reintegrated into their home society. Cassarino (2008) argues this point and suggests that the duration and type of the migration experience abroad can have a positive or negative impact on the reintegration of the migrant. Short stays abroad can result in a positive reinsertion experience, although Cassarino (ibidem) also suggests that irrespective of the duration abroad, migrants need to return of their own free will, or their return experience may not be positive. In other words, the individuals’ personal decision to return can greatly influence the success of their reintegration process.

Although narratives from Lithuanian return migrants described a relatively easy reinsertion process, in fact they alluded to a mixture of positive and negative experiences as they attempted to readjust to their rural and local surroundings. The majority of returnees claimed they did not require assistance from family or friends on their return. One interviewee in particular suggested that: There was no discrimination from the local people, I did not feel myself as a return migrant. If I did not like returning or if I felt I would need to readapt, I would not have returned or I would leave again (L.11). Another individual suggested that: There was no discrimination, everybody was glad I returned (L.15). There was also a suggestion that: Lithuania gets closer to western countries, it’s becoming better, there is an effort towards better labour relations, the mindset is changing (L.11). Readjusting to their native rural area did not come as easily to others. Two individuals suggested negatively that: People looked differently at me, they thought that I am a proud foreigner, you know how rural people are... (L.12); I felt that some people were jealous, they thought that I had a good job, good wages and a good life abroad (L.16). Narratives relating additional negative experiences pertained to bureaucracy, public official behaviour, business taxation systems and peripherality of the region. Two further returnees alluded to experiencing a certain level of ‘coldness’ on their return. One suggested that while living in the United States he learned to pay greater attention to people, but on his return this familiarity was unwelcome, and often appeared strange or unexpected to local people (L.4). The other returnee suggested that: After the lively, crowded, cosmopolitan London things looked stiff at the beginning (L.8). Drawing on transnationalism and social network theory (Cassarino 2008), the ease with which most migrants reinserted into their own societies can be attributed to their maintaining regular contact with friends and family at home in addition to drawing together both tangible and intangible resources for their return. Maintaining family contact is described by Jones (2003) as ‘social gravity’ or the ‘pull’ of the family at home, a factor that appeared to be evident in the case of most if not all Lithuanian migrants. Additionally, Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pelligrino and Taylor (1998) suggest that the ‘branch family’ also plays a key role in the reinsertion process as they often facilitate the successful social and economic adjustment at the rural destination.

Notions of ‘social gravity’ (Jones 2003) and the ‘branch family’ (Massey et al. 1998) were also evident in the narratives of Irish rural return migrants. Similarly to Lithuanians, Irish returnees also maintained strong connections with family and friends while abroad and more particularly during the process of their return.
For example, all but three interviewees sought assistance from family members in finding accommodation, with one individual suggesting that: *My mother set up the rented accommodation before I returned – I found it difficult when I returned with family – family were not as welcoming as I expected* (I.7). Two others found accommodation via the internet, prior to returning to Ireland, while one male returned home and applied for a planning permit to build a house. One female reported that: *Family was very important in finding our accommodation – we really needed family for that. They helped us find it* (I.8). Eleven of the seventeen interviewees currently live in close proximity to family members. Although the remaining six live at various distances from their families, they are still in regular contact. One female and one couple did however experience considerable problems living in close proximity to family. They both spoke of feelings of ‘claustrophobia’ and equated their return experience to living in a ‘gold fish bowl.’ By contrast, one couple moved back to Ireland expecting support through the *family support network*, but instead discovered that the extended family were too occupied with their own lives to become involved in the returnees’ situation, especially in relation to regular or infrequent childcare. As they said: *We expected a lot more contact and help from our families and I’m very disappointed that this didn’t happen – I thought they’d help out more with the children, but they don’t* (I.13).

In addition to family connections, Irish return migrants suggested that their current circle of friends consisted largely of workmates, neighbours and fellow club members. However, many returnees stated that they now maintain strong and close friendships with fellow return migrants. Such friendships appear to be built on ‘shared experiences’ and similar circumstance abroad and on return: *A lot of our generation funni enough emigrated and returned around the same time so we all had similar experiences* (I.8). There was a very mixed reaction to club or organisational involvement. Three males were not involved in local clubs or organisations and did not see the need to become involved for reintegration purposes. Three females did not become involved in clubs/organisations largely due to family commitments and a lack of time. Only one migrant couple got involved in local activities (GAA\(^2\)), while the other three either did not see the need for participation, or they had too many family commitments. Participation in local GAA clubs rated the highest as individuals felt that this organisation not only represented rural Ireland but it also allowed them to reconnect with old friends and team-mates. Four females became involved in organisations connected to their children’s school (preschool, national or secondary) which appeared to be an area where parents bond and develop friendships. One male, who rejoined his local GAA club, spoke passionately about the need to become involved in local organisations regardless of what they are. He was not alone in his opinion that living in rural Ireland can be isolating even without the added complication of being considered the ‘returnee’ or the ‘outsider.’ He suggested that local organisations such as the GAA not only allow you to reconnect with local individuals, but they also provide you with a sense of ‘place’ and a feeling of ‘belonging.’ He stated that: *Joining clubs is essential to becoming involved in local communities. They integrate you into a community that can appear initially hostile* (I.3).

**Conclusion and discussion**

This paper presents an analysis of two case studies: one in West of Ireland with a concentration in County Roscommon, the other in Alytus County, Lithuania. In all, 36 semi-structured interviews were conducted with return migrants between January and November 2010. It was not the intention of the research to perceive these interviews as representative, but rather as individual case studies or biographies of return migrants. The interviews allowed us to understand how various life trajectories develop when emigrants decide to return; the reasons behind their decision; feelings regarding their relocation and reintegration into their home country; and experiences of returning to a rural location. In the West of Ireland, all but three interviews
were carried out in County Roscommon and mostly in the interviewees’ home, while in Alytus County, ten interviews were conducted in the small towns and villages of the region and seven in Alytus city, as it was convenient for respondents.

In both study regions, interviewees left their place of origin predominantly for economic reasons and largely by choice. In Ireland, returnees left because of the 1980s recession and a lack of employment, but many also sought new life and employment experiences abroad. This is similar to Alytus County where Lithuanians also left due to economic conditions, in addition to a desire for new experiences and employment. In exploring reasons for returning to their place of origin there were differences and similarities between both case study regions. Like Irish returnees, Lithuanians have a strong ‘bond’ and ‘affinity’ with their native country and nearly always intend to return after a period abroad. Furthermore, both nationalities seek out the familiar surrounding of ‘home’ and the support network of family and friends. In both situations, interviewees felt they had achieved their goals and in keeping with a transnational theoretical approach to return migration, they were ‘prepared’ to return (Cassarino 2008).

In relation to employment and professional experiences, there were considerable differences between the two regions. In the Irish situation, all but two returnees gained full employment on their return and in most cases their income was similar if not better than abroad. In Alytus County, 3 interviewees failed to gain employment on their return and where they did, their wages were considerably lower. Additionally, professional experiences gained abroad were not recognised in Alytus and in some circumstances, experiences gained were ‘frowned’ upon and dismissed. The exception was made by those (3) who established their own businesses on return, and those (4) who worked in jobs related to their professions in the destination country (4), suggesting that the experience gained abroad was useful in furthering their career. By contrast, all Irish returnees felt that their qualifications and experiences abroad were key factors in obtaining employment once they returned. Innovative practices also came to the fore in the Irish case study with eight returnees creating new businesses. However, Irish interviewees returned to a strong economy in the last ten years, whereas Lithuanian interviewees returned to a county that is building its economy in the midst of a global economic recession. Within this developing economy, however, Smoliner et al. (2013) suggest that return migrants are increasingly important for Central and Eastern European countries; particularly those who are still professionally active and are returning to use their newly acquired knowledge, which they term ‘brain circulation.’

Although all Irish returnees were satisfied with their decision to return, some did concede that there was a period of adjustment and insecurity regarding their decision. This high level of satisfaction does not however mean that all returnees were content with their current living circumstances. Some had accommodation issues, employment concerns and recession worries, but in general, most interviewees felt that their concerns were not insurmountable. A higher number of Alytus County interviewees were less pleased with their current living situation, with five unsatisfied and four satisfied. Proximity to family, beautiful nature and landscape, native language, lower business costs, less expensive lifestyle and accommodation were reasons put forward by Lithuanian returnees for their level of satisfaction. Reasons for dissatisfaction included a low quality of life, bureaucracy, unemployment, poor services and negative attitudes. Variations in the level of satisfaction between the regions may be related to the economic situation that the returnees found upon their return. It seems that most Irish interviewees returned during the ‘Celtic Tiger’ period, providing them with a high level of economic stability. By contrast, interviewees in Alytus returned to an economically disadvantaged region with poor employment prospects and few opportunities for innovative thinking.

In contrast to Irish returnees, interviewees in Alytus placed a high value on involvement in various organisations such as (in English translation) the Independent Thinkers Network, Local Invalid Association, Joint Democratic Movement and the Return Lithuanian Association. In Ireland, returnees had little interest in social networking outside of the local GAA organisation and local school committees. Both groups neverthe-
less placed a very high value on family networks and appeared to have strong connections with family, irrespective of the distance they currently live from family and the length of time they spent abroad.

Return migrants in Lithuania and Ireland had similar, yet different personal experiences upon their return. Irish returnees returned to a better quality of life and limited problems with bureaucracy, whereas many interviewees returning to Alytus County experienced (in economic terms) a poorer quality of life, unemployment, bureaucracy and poor public official behaviour. Both groups experienced episodes of isolation and readjustment, yet Lithuanian migrants appeared to experience a level of ‘coldness’ from locals that was not experienced by Irish returnees. Commenting on future plans, more Irish than Lithuanians intended to remain in the region; however, this depends largely on the economic recession in Ireland in the coming months and years. In both cases, returnees will consider emigrating once more if the economic and employment situation deteriorates.

Both groups of interviewees offered suggestions for improvements regarding the situation of return migrants in the region. Lithuanian returnees recommended targeting intellectuals returning to rural areas and supporting their positive initiatives and ideas; increasing support for innovative projects of returnees in the region; raising tolerance and understanding of the need for Lithuanians to emigrate, and displaying a level of acceptance with their decision. Some interviewees also felt that the media created a poor image of Lithuanian migrants, but this can be reversed by focusing on the positive examples and the successful return migrant cases. All interviewees, both Lithuanian and Irish, suggested that job creation in rural areas was imperative for the continued sustainability of these regions and as such, government task forces need to consider returnees as a valuable resource that could assist in this situation. Both Lithuanian and Irish returnees emphasised that there is a serious lack of information for returnees. Suggestions put forward by returnees included: information booklets accessible on the internet or collected at airports or at local rural information centres, dedicated websites for return migrants, and rural information centres that provide extensive information regarding the region. Although most Irish and Lithuanian returnees felt that family and friends are a valuable network, they still needed additional information, for example from websites, booklets and information centres. Irish self-employed returnees were adamant that they were a valuable resource for rural Ireland and as such, they needed help and assistance, both mentoring and financial.

In conclusion, both Irish and Lithuanian return migrants appear to have had some similar and some distinct experiences on their return to their country of origin. There is a clear indication from the interviews that the majority of return migrants return with certain resources, in the form of various kinds of ‘capital’ – human, social, financial, cultural. These resources, according to Cassarino (2008), constitute the tangible and intangible resources that are required to ensure a successful return experience for many migrants. As such, return migrants seemed largely prepared for their return, resulting in a certain level of success in their reinsertion process. What also becomes obvious is that these individuals are a considerable asset to a local rural community, as evident in the Irish context where a number of returnees established local businesses. Nevertheless, many individuals experienced difficulties in finding appropriate help when they needed it, which seems to reflect a restricted interpretation of what counts as a ‘need’ and a ‘resource’ in a rural development context. Certainly, at an institutional level, the focus is very much on the development of economic resources, but even here, the interpretation would seem to be a relatively narrow one. While the social capital debate is one that must be treated cautiously in terms of how it is understood and applied, what emerges in this paper is evidence of individuals who have returned with a range of skills and knowledge, which needs to be harnessed and developed as a wider set of resources for rural areas.
Notes

1 ‘Developing Europe’s Rural Regions in the Era of Globalization’ (DERREG) was funded by the European Union Framework Programme 7 under Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities theme 8. Grant no. 225204, 1 January 2009 – 31 December 2011.

2 The Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) is an amateur Irish and international cultural and sporting organisation focused primarily on promoting Gaelic games, which include the traditional Irish sports of hurling, camogie, Gaelic football, handball, and rounders.

References


Longer-Term Demographic Dynamics in South–East Europe: Convergent, Divergent and Delayed Development Paths

Heinz Fassmann*, Elisabeth Musil*, Ramon Bauer**, Attila Melegh***, Kathrin Gruber*

This article offers an overview of the longer-term migratory and demographic developments in eight South–East European countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Slovakia). The main research question aims to analyse the different demographic historical developments and to examine whether convergent or divergent processes are dominant. Over the whole reference period, the population size in these eight South–East European countries (the SEEMIG region) grew from around 100 million people in 1950 to 122 million in 2011. This is surprising, as the public image of the region is linked to decline and backwardness and to being peripheral. However, major differences in the demographic developments of the countries can be observed. Some countries, including Austria, Italy and, with some fluctuations, Slovakia and Slovenia, experienced constant population growth during the entire reference period. All other countries were affected by a decrease in population, as was the case for Hungary in the early 1980s, Bulgaria at the beginning of the 1990s and Serbia and Romania since the start of the new millennium. The fertility trend shows a convergence while the mortality trends (including average life expectancy at birth) prove to be divergent. The net migration pattern seems to follow a migration cycle concept which postulates a general shift from emigration to immigration as a consequence of a declining natural increase on the one hand and a growing demand for new labour on the other. Some countries show trends that do not yet follow this pattern, which might indicate that additional factors and interpretative models should also be taken into account. The long-term distribution of growth and decline in the region is quite diverse and underlines the need for differentiation and specific explanations.

Keywords: demographic change; migration cycle; transitions; South–East Europe
Introduction

This paper offers an overview of the longer-term migratory and demographic developments in eight countries mainly from the Northern and North-Western parts of the South–East European region, in this study named as ‘SEEMIG region (or area).’ In the early 1950s, countries in this region of analysis had quite similar economic and socio-demographic patterns, especially, for example, in their GDP development or migratory trends. Over the reference period of the last 60 years, the Western and Eastern parts of the region developed quite differently, and the area developed into an inter-dependent and heterogeneous region. The main research question looks at these different demographic and migratory developments and investigates how legacies affect current demographic, economic and political trends and whether convergent or divergent processes are dominant in the region.

The article brings together the main findings of the country-level historical analyses of the eight countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Slovakia) of the SEEMIG project partnership – henceforth the SEEMIG countries. The analysis is based on longer-term national statistics on migration and other macro-statistical time series provided by the project partners as well as by the international databases of Eurostat, the United Nations, the World Bank and the Maddison project. An essential source of information was also provided by two recent publications carried out within the project partnership (Böröcz 2009; Meleg 2012), from which this paper draws conceptually as well as empirically. The results – which build on a synthesis analysis elaborated by Fassmann, Musil and Gruber (2014) – were additionally subject to thorough discussions within the SEEMIG partnership.

The conceptual framework1 of this historical analysis is based on several general and more theoretical observations. As such, the empirical work cannot be related to only one or two specific concepts. The concept of the so-called first ‘Demographic Transition’ (Landry 1934; Notestein 1945; Thompson 1929; and see Meleg 2006: 60–64, 71–76 for the history of the idea) is an important theoretical approach for the analysis as is the idea of ‘longue durée’ presented by Braudel (1969). In migration studies, the ‘Migration System Theory’ (Zlotnik 1992) and the historical-structural approach represented by Böröcz and Portes (1989) also influenced our analysis. For an overview on migration theories, see Massey (1999).

Apart from these general observations, two main conceptual approaches are employed. For the long-term analysis of migratory trends, we apply the concept of ‘migration transitions’ (de Haas 2010; Skeldon 2012; Zelinsky 1971) to analyse the relation between migration and broader development processes through space and time. As suggested by Skeldon (2012: 154), transition theory – while it has been disregarded in recent work on migration theory (Brettell, Hollifield 2000; Portes, DeWind 2007) – can be employed as a transitional framework, which allows migration systems to be linked to wider socio-economic change.

The transition model employed within our analysis is the ‘Model of the Migration Cycle’ (Fassmann, Reeger 2012). Based on evidence from several European countries, the concept is based on the idea that a society and the legal system of a country adapt to a new situation and develop a mechanism to handle new or evolving migratory circumstances (Fassmann, Reeger 2012: 67). This policy learning process, which becomes necessary when new demographic and economic conditions arise, is referred to as a migration cycle. According to labour migration theories, such as the push-and-pull model or migration systems theory, the main drivers stem from demographic, economic and sectorial development and the structuring of the labour market. The model thus describes the empirical observation that countries change, for example, from an emigration to an immigration country, if demographic reproduction is not guaranteed.

The article is organised as follows. In the first section, the main socio-economic, demographic and migratory dynamics are examined in a longer-term perspective reaching back to the 1950s. To differentiate, special focus is put on three major time periods that have been identified as particularly important for developments
in the region. In the following section, the long-term development of fertility, mortality, net migration and population change is highlighted. The final section draws conclusions from the historical analysis and provides a brief reflection on the conceptual considerations.

**Historical turning points and demographic periods – a literature review**

Since 1950, the South–East European region has been characterised by several historical turning-points that affected countries within the region to different extents. As mentioned in the introduction, it is necessary to emphasise the historically given heterogeneity of the region of analysis. Whereas all other parts of Europe had more or less stable borders and political and economic systems, the Eastern and South-Eastern parts of Europe were affected by wars, post-war transformations and recovery, the construction and the breakdown of socialist regimes and its multinational socio-economic spaces, the dissolution of federal countries and changes in political regimes from state socialism to democratic capitalism. Recently, the countries also experienced accession or pre-accession arrangements to the greater economic and political space of the European Union. Most of the societal changes in South–East Europe are rooted in key long-term developments that exhibit time lags, intensifications and phases of slow-down as well as convergences with development in Western Europe. Nevertheless, although there are arguments which posit that most historical analyses emphasise political changes and patterns too strongly (Melegh 2012), especially when countries such as the SEEMIG countries, that represent varying political systems, are included in an analysis of long-term change, the importance of combined political and economic changes is indisputable. Three main historic turning points are highlighted in this regard:

- The **installation of state socialism** in several South–East European countries and the closing of the Iron Curtain in the late 1940s. This political reorientation had severe consequences, as it led to a new political, social and economic order in the countries concerned, including the centralised coordination of the economy and relatively closed borders vis-à-vis migration. In this regard it is important to stress, however, that there were different forms of socialism and therefore diverse impacts on the respective economies and societies.

- The breakdown of socialism and the **fall of the Iron Curtain** in 1989/1990 due to restructuring and the new cycle of the world economy and related internal development. The change in the political regime from socialism to democracy and the market transition in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia not only led to the shaping of market-like economies and dramatic changes in the labour market, but also strongly influenced the overall socio-demographic development of these countries by increasing unemployment and, simultaneously, creating possibilities for the free movement of the population, which altered the number and direction of migration flows. For example, in Bulgaria and Romania a rapid increase in the number of emigrants was noted during this period. As a further consequence of the breakdown of state socialism, new independent countries emerged, and international borders changed in Slovenia, Serbia and Slovakia which, again, led to increased migration.

- The step by step **accession to the European Union** (‘EU enlargement’) was a further turning-point that shaped socio-economic dynamics in the region. Integration into the second-largest economic area of the world brought an overall change of regimes in the countries, making it necessary to modernise their economies and implement imposed stability measures. With Italy being a founding member and Austria joining in 1995, the accession process in the other countries, evolved in the current millennium. In several SEEMIG countries – Austria, Italy, Slovenia and Slovakia – accession also meant the abandonment of independent national monetary policies. Accession further entailed the free movement of persons
within the EU, step-by-step inclusion into the free movement area of Schengen, and harmonisation in various policy areas, including migration and asylum.

Politically divided South–East Europe, 1950–1989

In the countries of the so-called former ‘Eastern Bloc’ (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) and the Former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Slovenia), the installation of state socialism at the end of the 1940s induced major shifts in political, social and economic orders and paved the way for huge transformations. However, the developments in this region were much more differentiated than the term ‘Eastern Bloc’ would imply. While Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, as members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), were oriented toward the Soviet Union politically and militarily, the Former Yugoslavia (and with it Slovenia and Serbia) started the ‘Non-Alignment Movement’ and held a special position within the Eastern European communist bloc. Austria and Italy moved towards Western Europe and experienced an economic boom labelled as an ‘economic miracle.’

The first decades after the Second World War were characterised by high fertility rates and population growth. This making up for ‘lost war years’ took place both in socialist countries of the Eastern Bloc (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) and in Austria and Italy. The high fertility rates in some countries were also partially supported by open and sometimes coercive pro-natalist policies. This included restrictions on or the prohibition of abortion as well as the installation of pro-natalist financial and social incentives in specific countries (e.g. family allowance, child-care benefits, a ‘tax on childlessness’ and an anti-abortion campaign in 1952–1953 in Hungary and strict anti-abortion measures in Romania after 1967). Nevertheless, these measures did not succeed unrestrictedly.

Where mortality and health patterns were concerned, after the high degree of convergence experienced with the generalised decline in infectious mortality across the industrialised world, the mid-1960s marked the start of a new divergence in life-expectancy changes (Meslé 2004a: 22). While, on the one hand, Western countries made rapid progress in the late 1960s after the more-or-less significant slowdown, the ground rapidly made up by Eastern European countries, on the other hand, was followed by a long period of stagnation or even deterioration. As such, Austria and Italy have moved in the longer term to a West-European model, with the exception of a few causes of death, which can mainly be explained by similar social developments and underlying social mechanisms (Mackenbach 2006; Meslé 2004a). In the other SEEMIG countries, a mortality and health crisis lasted until the end of the 1980s.

As regards migration trends during this period, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia became relatively closed countries, though to different extents; Yugoslavia, meanwhile, officially promoted the temporary emigration of ‘guestworkers’ to Western countries. Restrictive border-control regimes came into force, meaning that cross-border migration was controlled in both directions and mostly repressed. Entering or leaving the country (even for tourism) was subject to special permits; possessing a passport and travelling abroad were limited rights and a privilege administered by and at the discretion of the authorities, for example in cases of family reunification. Those who left illegally or did not return home from abroad were sanctioned by being deprived of their citizenship, by the confiscation of their property or by imprisonment for illegal border-crossing in certain occasions and certain periods.

In the context of these migration restrictions, unauthorised emigration became increasingly common during the last decade of socialism. These restrictions certainly played a major role in migratory changes, but it is important to note that other economic and historical factors of international migration were also influential. Major outflows occurred in the context of revolutions, such as that of 1956 and 1957 when some 176 000 people left Hungary, or in 1968, when 162 000 people left Czechoslovakia after the Prague Spring.
These ‘refugees’ – although in many cases also economic migrants – were granted asylum by Western European countries, including Austria, which was the first safe country during the Cold War and thus a country of both destination and transit for refugees from Eastern Europe.

A further characteristic policy pursued in socialist countries was that of selective organised emigration. While the emigration of their own nationals was obstructed, it was common practice to organise and implement the emigration of ‘certain groups,’ such as certain ethnic minorities and political critics of the regime. As such, the mass migration of Jewish and German communities (e.g. Transylvanian Saxons and Banat Swabians) was promoted in Romania and organised and financially supported by Israeli and West German authorities. Likewise, in Bulgaria, migration processes were arranged by bilateral agreements between the Bulgarian and Turkish governments and expressed mainly through the emigration of persons of Turkish origin. As in the Eastern Bloc countries, controlled and ethnically selective emigration, based on the Balkan Pact, was also an essential feature in socialist Yugoslavia. As such, the controlled emigration of the majority of ethnic Germans in the early 1950s, followed by that of ethnic Turks and other Islamic ethnic groups, was organised from Serbia.

Temporary labour migration schemes were a further feature of migration processes of this time which involved SEEMIG countries both as sending and as destination countries and which have formed migration processes ever since. Within the COMECON, a circular form of labour migration of professionals (e.g. engineers) and skilled workers (e.g. miners, pipeline constructors) existed in some member-states (especially Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia). These flows were regulated by the states involved, and were intended to encourage temporary migration, not dissimilar from the labour schemes promoted by West Germany towards Hungary, Poland or Yugoslavia. At the same time, following intensive economic development in Western European countries that resulted in increased demand for an industrial labour force, so-called ‘guestworker’ schemes – the temporary employment of foreign workers – were launched, enabling a real expansion of international labour migration. Austria followed the example of Western neighbouring countries and started with the targeted recruitment of foreign workers from Mediterranean countries (especially Turkey and Yugoslavia) in the 1960s. The liberalisation of emigration regimes, the need for migrant workers in the West German economy and the agency of each individual triggered guestworker emigration from Slovenia to Western countries, especially West Germany. In Serbia, after restrictions on leaving the country were abolished in the mid-1960s, temporary labour migration abroad was completely liberalised. Temporary labour migrants were also recruited from Italy as low-skilled workers in the industrial sector in Northern European countries, again particularly West Germany.

Initially, the prevailing idea was that such migration would be temporary, but it soon became clear that many migrants continued to stay in their destination countries. Despite the attempts of both the destination countries – which aimed to reduce the number of foreign workers during the oil crisis of 1973 through the curtailing of recruitment – and the efforts of migrants’ countries of origin such as Serbia, to help returnees to start their own businesses, migrants remained abroad. In contrast to political intentions, these measures also partly led to a consolidation of the settlement of migrant workers. In Austria, fearing that they would lose their jobs and residence status following more restrictive measures, many migrants, who had been circulating between their country of origin and Austria, postponed their return. In parallel, family reunification compensated for the number of people who returned to their countries of origin.

With international migration restricted and industrialisation strongly pursued in many countries, large-scale internal migration flows were a further essential feature of the period, as the process of industrialisation induced intense concentration processes and a spatial redistribution of the population. The urbanisation process and the concentration of migrants were characteristic features during this time in Czechoslovakia, where internal migration between the later Czech and Slovak Republics was shaped by economic and industrial
policies. These migration dynamics were significant not only in terms of their mutual influence on population development, but also in terms of the socio-economic development of both republics.\(^8\)

Internal migration was also a characteristic feature in socialist Yugoslavia. In the 1970s in particular, when Western European countries that had been the primary countries of destination started limiting immigration as a response to the oil crisis, more-pronounced internal migration occurred within the former Yugoslav republics – especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia – particularly towards Slovenia. This migration of mostly young, male migrants was promoted by several developments: an accelerated industrialisation from the mid-1950s, when several hundreds of mostly unskilled workers moved to towns; unemployment in several former Yugoslav republics and almost full employment in Slovenia. Most migrants, although first labelled as temporary, later stayed. In Italy, too, the labour demand generated by economic growth was, for a time, satisfied by internal migration, especially in the 1950s and early 1960s, when major internal migration flows from the south of the country (the Mezzogiorno) ensued to the industrial north. This migration accelerated the urbanisation process in all countries.

Overall the relationship of these changes to longer-term cyclical changes also provides ample evidence that the full reintegration of highly industrialised socialist economies into competitive capitalism led to an increase in emigration, as explained by historical-structural approaches.

**The fall of the Iron Curtain**

Starting in the late 1970s, globalisation began to promote new types of economic policy and establish a new division of international labour, which gradually led to sweeping changes. In the late 1980s, a period of radical political and social transformations arose in the South–East European region. Besides political changes, the breakdown of socialist systems and the subsequent democratic transitions launched various economic and social changes in the SEEMIG countries. While in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania this occurred without changes to the integrity of the state, the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia led to the appearance of Slovenia and Serbia, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia were also separated. The transition towards market-oriented economies, privatisation and the crisis of traditional industrial branches due to the rising new international division of labour meant the end of official full employment and the appearance of unemployment as a new social phenomenon.\(^9\) Employment rates worsened due to a lack of employment opportunities, particularly for certain population groups such as those with little education, young people, those of peri-retirement age and marginalised ethnic groups such as the Roma population. Early retirement was made possible for many workers instead of dismissal, which raised the already high share of pensioners. The transformation was also characterised by a massive decline of industry and a significant setback in economic prosperity, which were reflected by a sharp decline in GDP values between 1989 and 1993 as well as a rise in inflation. These changes also led to the comparatively relative decrease in the economic well-being and weight of these countries (Böröcz 2009).

Another significant consequence of the fall of the socialist systems was an increase in social inequality. While, prior to 1989, the Eastern European countries had been characterised by a very low level of income differences, these inequalities considerably increased after the collapse of the state socialism regimes. In spite of this trend, however, it is possible to distinguish between countries with a relatively low and those with relatively high level of income inequality. Inequality was found to be the highest in Hungary and Slovakia. For example, the increase in Hungarian income inequality during this period was found to exceed the increase experienced by both the United Kingdom over the 1981 to 1986 period and Sweden from 1988 to 1992 (Fürster, Tóth 1997). After two decades of economic transition, Hungary, Slovakia and, above all, Slo-
venia were among the countries where the income inequality was relatively low. At the opposite end, Romania was characterised by quite high income differences.10

A further crucial consequence of the fall of the Iron Curtain was the loss of political control over migration. The national borders became permeable and the way to a free unfolding of migratory processes was opened. The end of the 1980s thus represents a turning point in migration in these countries. Unrestricted travelling from 1988 onwards and the permeability of the borders after the transition opened a new chapter in migration. As Melegh (2012) stresses, the fact that the economies of these countries were included in the space of global capitalism and that they were falling behind economically compared to global development had a significant impact on the migratory links of the countries within the region. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the economic effects (de-industrialisation, unemployment and increasing wage differentials) were strong drivers within the migration system. However, with the exception of forms of temporary employment such as seasonal work programmes, labour migration to European Union member-states (many of which had a history stretching back to the state socialist period) was highly restricted in terms of visas, residency and employment. This had important consequences on the direction and the channelling of migration as ethnic and refugee migration. In Bulgaria, emigration largely affected the population development in a negative manner. In the period from 1985 to 1992, the population of the country decreased by 461 000 people. This decrease was almost entirely a consequence of the negative migration balance to Turkey, which received large numbers of people of Turkish origin from Bulgaria. According to estimates by Horváth and Kiss (2013: 17) based on mirror statistics and earlier studies (Gödri 2004; Szőke 1992), a total of 100 000 Hungarians left the Romanian region of Transylvania between 1988 and 1992, the majority of them going to Hungary. Following their analysis, Hungarians were also highly overrepresented among the emigrants between 1992 and 2002. Emigration from Hungary had a sharp peak immediately after the collapse of socialism, partly due to non-Hungarian citizens who had arrived in the country in previous years. This process was largely connected to transit migration from Romania and other countries to Western Europe. In this process, economic, political and ethnic factors have promoted out-migration in a complex and interdependent way (Melegh 2012).

Major outflows of refugees also arose from Romania in the last years of the repressive Ceauşescu regime and subsequent years. Hungary was the main destination for ethnic Hungarians; however, a part of them also migrated to Western Europe (including Austria, Germany and Sweden). In order to curb the flow of Romanian asylum-seekers, many Western European states amended their asylum laws by qualifying Romania as a ‘safe country of origin.’

In the same period, Hungary transformed from a country of emigration into a destination country of international migration.11 Immigrants came mostly from neighbouring countries, especially Romania, and also from Ukraine and Yugoslavia and its successor states. Between 1988 and 2007, approximately 200 000 foreign citizens received settlement permits (long-term or open-ended residence) (Póczik, Fehér, Dunavölgyi, Jagusztin, Windt 2008). In this way, a new institutional system of migration was established and legal frameworks, mostly of an administrative and law enforcement nature, were accordingly laid down.

Migration processes in the successor states of the Former Yugoslavia and their neighbouring countries were largely formed by the conflicts in the region. The wars at the beginning of the 1990s set off major flows of migration – over 5 million people are estimated to have been forced to leave their place of residence in the 1990s. While many returned later, a major share permanently changed their place of residence. Slovenia, Serbia and, partly, Hungary were among the main destinations for these forcibly displaced persons.

Emigration from the Former Yugoslavia was a further characteristic of the period. While emigration from Slovenia was relatively low, intensified emigration from Serbia during the 1990s could be observed. According to the 2002 census, 415 000 Serbian citizens (5.3 per cent of the total population) were registered as working
or staying abroad – an increase of over 50 per cent in relation to the previous 1991 census – making the emigration of Serbian citizens in the late 1990s and the 2000s the most intense since the second half of the 1960s.

**EU enlargement**

The new millennium opened up the perspective of integration into the European Union for most SEEMIG countries. Austria joined the EU in 1995, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia nine years later in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007. Serbia acquired official candidate status in the year 2012. Economic reforms initiated in the pre-accession and accession periods were directed towards a neo-liberal order: fiscal policies became stricter to conform to the EU accession criteria, privatisation processes were accelerated and the countries became more open to foreign actors. Consequently, the amount of foreign direct investment grew considerably. The SEEMIG countries in Eastern Europe experienced step-by-step integration into the common market and a convergence of the political and economic systems, which can be addressed as ‘Europeanisation.’ Distinctions have, however, to be made between the character of the transformation process of countries joining in 1995, including Austria, and the 2004/2007 EU enlargements. Since, overall, the countries involved provided socio-economic requirements which were even higher than the so-called EU standards, the accession evolved in a smoother manner (Böröcz 2000; Melegh 2006).

During the first years of the new millennium, the economies in the eastern SEEMIG countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) developed dynamically, with annual growth rates in GDP *per capita* that were, in certain years, five to six times higher than the EU27 average. The reasons given for these developments in the country reports included large-scale privatisation, foreign direct investment and reforms of public spending (e.g. austerity packages in Hungary). Although it is still being debated, the period from 2001 to 2011 is also perceived to be the decade which brought about the end of societal, institutional and economic transition. Nonetheless and despite these dynamics, the countries concerned could not reach their economic levels of the 1970s. As regards GDP *per capita* values compared to the world average, the relative position, for instance, of Romania in 2011 was still that of the 1950s. Finally, at the end of the decade in 2009, the global economic crisis caused a decrease of the GDP *per capita*, bringing about serious consequences in the whole region. The SEEMIG countries experienced a period of outright recession: GDP *per capita* declined by between 3.1 per cent (Serbia) and 8.8 per cent (Slovenia). In the last three years, after a period of stagnation, annual economic growth rates have increased again, but stayed at a lower level. One of the consequences of the economic crisis is the increasing unemployment and very low labour-force participation rates – a serious problem in nearly all SEEMIG countries.

The increased European integration also brought the free movement of persons within the area of the European Union: all EU citizens have the right to enter another EU member-state without an entry or exit visa for three months. Upon fulfilment of specific requirements, EU citizens may also remain beyond this period without a residence permit and may acquire the right to permanent residence in the host member-state after a five-year period of uninterrupted legal residence. The right to free movement, however, for countries joining in 2004 and 2007, was not accompanied by an immediate right to enter the labour market without any restrictions. Austria and Germany asked for a transitional phase of up to seven years, when restrictions on the freedom to enter the domestic labour market were abolished. In 2014, the last restrictions for other SEEMIG countries expired.

Furthermore, EU accession brought incremental inclusion into the territory of free movement of the Schengen Area. This possibility of free movement led to the creation of new labour markets, thus reinforcing inner-European mobility. A specific aspect of this includes the increase of cross-border commuters. Finally, former or continuing regions of emigration, especially the Ukraine and Russia, themselves became destina-
tions for migrants outside the EU as well as a place of entry and a transit region for migrants and those from third countries in search of international protection.

Besides the legal changes described above, and in line with the proposed migration-cycle interpretation, the rise in the demand for immigrant labour in some core economies of the EU also played a role in migratory changes related to EU integration. Over and above internal adaptation, these modifications are also related to the changing position of the EU and some member-state economies, due to the intensification of global competition, as migrant labour provides lower wages.

Figure 1. Migration flows in Europe in 2005–2010

Source: Abel and Sander (2014); Visualisation: Sander, Bauer and Frank.
Due to the further integration of the SEEMIG region into the common area of the European migration space, it is not surprising that migration flows from and to the SEEMIG region are concentrated within Europe. The figure above shows SEEMIG flows within Europe between 2005 and 2010 and reveals that they are connected mostly to EU15 countries (i.e. EU member-states before 2004) as well as to other European countries, but not less to EU13 countries (i.e. new EU member-states since 2004).

Net flows in Austria were positive and relatively constant between 1990 and 2010. Only during the late 1990s were net gains lower due to both fewer in-flows and more out-flows. While the level of out-flows from Austria remained relatively stable after 1990, the origins of in-flows shifted from European non-EU countries to countries from the rest of the world. The in-flows from other EU countries were relatively constant but also shifted from EU13 to EU15 countries (mainly Germany). In Italy, net migration gains were moderate during the 1990s, but strongly increased after 2000. These changes in net flows can be attributed to a general drop in out-flows (especially to EU15 countries) and, first and foremost, to a strong influx from non-European countries.

The trend in net migration flows in the two Former Yugoslavian Republics in the SEEMIG region is not comparable by intensity or direction. Slovenia’s net flows were clearly positive between 1990 and 2010, while Serbia’s balance was positive during the early 1990s but became negative thereafter. Among the former COMECON countries in the SEEMIG region, it is necessary to distinguish between Hungary and Slovakia, with positive net migration flows on the one side, and Romania and Bulgaria – both clearly countries of emigration – on the other. Hungary’s net flows were almost constant during the four five-year periods between 1990 and 2010, but are actually a result of decreases in both out- and in-flows. The origin of in-flows also shifted from other EU13 countries to non-European countries. In Slovakia, the focus of both in- and out-flows clearly shifted from other EU13 countries (during the 1990s) to EU15 countries (since 2000), while the volume of out-flows steadily declined. Romania and Bulgaria experienced strong out-flows after 1990. Although the volume of out-migration has decreased since then – mainly due to fewer out-flows towards and more in-flows from non-European countries – the balance has remained clearly negative. In both countries, most out-flows after 1990 were directed to EU15 countries. Since 2000, Romania and Bulgaria have also received some in-flow from non-EU European countries and from the rest of the world, but rarely any from other EU countries.

**Demographic developments in retrospect: convergence or divergence**

After describing the overall demographic and migratory developments differentiated by time-period, we now concentrate on specific issues and variables such as convergence and divergence trends within the region. Measuring convergence presents a number of complexities, because several definitions exist that correspond to different concepts (Monfort 2008). For this analysis we restrict ourselves to assessing the dispersion of demographic developments at the national level. We therefore look at the variance (i.e. the statistical average of the amount of dispersion) as a measure of dispersal across the eight investigated countries, and how the values have changed over time. Convergence is hereby understood as a reduction in the coefficient of variance among regions, while divergence refers to a development with increasing variance. The change of population stock, fertility, mortality and net migration, as well as migration flows, are at the core of the analysis. While the concept of convergence lies at the heart of demographic transition theory (Wilson 2001: 155), this article does not suggest that the SEEMIG countries demographically converge in a nomothetic sense. Instead, it presents an idiographic analysis of demographic processes in the region.
Convergence fertility decline

The decline of the growth rate (see Figure 2) is mainly caused by natural population decrease. At the beginning of the reporting period, the total fertility rate in the region was approximately 2.7 children per woman. It remained at around 2.5 until the mid-1970s and experienced – more than ten years after the birth decline in Western Europe – a moderate decrease to 1.8 children per woman. The fertility rate then sharply declined and has remained below 1.5 since then. Only the Serbian TFR (1.6 in 2010) remained above the SEEMIG average. At the beginning of the reporting period, the variation coefficient of the total fertility rate was around 17 – this means that the standard deviation was about 17 per cent of the mean. The variation coefficient declined to 9 in the first half of the 1970s and then increased to 19 in the second half of the 1980s. Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia and, in particular, Romania were able to successfully slow down their fertility decline, but others were not. However, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the variance declined significantly and the variation coefficient decreased to 8 in 2010.

The so-called ‘Socialist Greenhouse Theory’ offered by Sobotka (2002) explains this time delay in European post-communist countries and describes the general social, political and institutional environment of socialist states aiming to stabilise reproduction rates. The fertility differentials in the region increased due to restrictive birth-control regimes in some countries and wide-scale pro-natalist and social support in other state socialist countries, which pushed fertility higher there than in, for example, Italy and Austria. Whether or not these changes indicate a second demographic transition or demographic crisis is subject to current academic debates (Rychtarikova 2001). However, the high unemployment rate and the relative deprivation of larger households clearly signal that there will be no return to a high fertility level. The convergence tendency of the total fertility rate and the resulting narrowing of the variance of the rate emphasise the generality of the trend.

Figure 2. Total fertility rates in 1950–2010

Source: UN World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, own illustration.
Time-lagging net migration

Another factor that influenced the slow-down of the population growth rate is migration. The country reports and data provided by the United Nations\(^{13}\) allow for a long-term analysis of migration trends in the reporting countries (see Figure 3). Major changes in the migratory trends emerged within the region. At the beginning of the reporting period, most of the SEEMIG countries showed a net migration below zero, meaning that emigration in that time-period exceeded immigration. Beginning in the 1960s, however, the region lost this homogeneity and, in the following decades, the SEEMIG countries were increasingly characterised by a diversification of their net migration rates. While some regions became immigration areas, others became or remained areas of emigration (Melegh 2012). This is also reflected in the variation coefficients – they are much higher and more fluctuating compared to the total fertility or the life expectancy.

Like other Western European countries, Austria and, later, Italy and Slovenia experienced favourable economic development and turned into *de facto* immigration countries. The active recruitment of foreign workers prevailed as labour-market measures in order to satisfy labour-market demands. Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia, in particular, became emigration countries, whereas countries like Hungary and Slovakia – according to the officially registered net migration rates – turned into ‘emerging immigration countries.’ There, a positive migration balance was reached in the 1980s and in countries like Hungary it could probably be easily reversed by recent trends.

**Figure 3. Net migration rates in SEEMIG countries (per 1 000) in 1950–2010\(^{14}\)**

![Net migration rates in SEEMIG countries](image)

Source: UN World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, own illustration.

Based on the findings of the country reports and net migration trends from 1950–2010 and applying the migration-transitions approach to the SEEMIG countries, three types of national migration status can be identi-
fied: Type 1 = relatively ‘old immigration countries,’ Type 2 = ‘emerging immigration countries,’ and Type 3 = ‘emigration countries’ (see Table 1). These types are characterised by specific migration patterns and policy attitudes.

- **Type 1 ‘old immigration countries’** are located at the end of an adaptation cycle regarding immigration. These countries represent the overall European pattern of development: they showed a negative migration rate in the 1950s, but their migration rates became positive parallel to the process observed on the entire continent. As the ‘tipping point’ had already been reached several decades earlier, they have learned to treat immigration politically, instrumentally and in public discourse. In the SEEMIG region, Austria and Slovenia belong to this group, next to other countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.

- **Type 2 ‘emerging immigration countries.’** In these countries a positive migration balance has only recently been reached. The topic of immigration is very contentious in public discourse and the adaptation process is at a very early stage. While Italy joined this group in the 1970s, Hungary and Slovakia have also belonged to this group since the early and late 1990s, alongside countries in Southern Europe such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, as well as Ireland and Finland which, especially before the global economic and financial crisis, were recently confronted with significant immigration.

- The so-called **Type 3 ‘emigration countries’** are still characterised by major emigration flows. However, it is likely that these countries could also become countries of immigration in the future. Countries of Eastern Europe belong to this stage of constant and negative migration balance, amongst which Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. During the times of socialism and mobility constraints, immigration was not a major topic, not the least because the birth decline set in at a later stage.

### Table 1. Typology of SEEMIG countries by migration status, in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Type 1</th>
<th>Type 2</th>
<th>Type 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Designation</td>
<td>‘(Relatively) old’ immigration countries</td>
<td>‘Emerging’ immigration countries</td>
<td>‘Emigration countries’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country typology</td>
<td>Austria, Slovenia</td>
<td>Hungary, Italy, Slovakia</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Structural positive migration balance; starting consensus on immigration; after ‘legislation gap’ a new migration regime is installed</td>
<td>First positive migration balance; immigration as conflictuous topic in the public discourse; starting adaptation</td>
<td>Constant and negative migration balance; immigration (not immigration) are topics of public discourse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*With the exception of major refugee inflows during wars in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.


It is important to note that, even on a regional level, these patterns of change can be related to and reinforce each other in the form of unequal exchange between the various sub-regions.

### Divergent trends in life expectancy

The third main demographic factor that must be presented and analysed is the development of mortality. Two different observations must be underlined: the first is the increasing life expectancy of both males and females in the entire SEEMIG region (see Figures 4, 5 and 6). Over the whole period, the life expectancy at birth grew by around eight additional years or 1.4 years each decade. Nevertheless, while for the past 60 years all Western European countries, including Austria and Italy, have shown increases in life expectancy,
Eastern European countries have had a different and altogether more negative experience. After a period of improvement due to better health care between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, these long-term negative trends in Eastern European countries – for example in Slovakia and Hungary – were reversed for certain male age groups, which led to an overall stagnation of mortality. The gain of additional years of life is higher in the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain than before. In contrast to increasing unemployment or people living below the poverty line, the growth in life expectancy is a positive consequence of the transformation process.

**Figure 4. Life expectancy at birth, males and females (years), in 1950–2010**

![Graph showing life expectancy at birth for various countries]

However, differentiation is again necessary, because a growing divergence in the increase of life expectancy is apparent (Meslé 2004a). The variation coefficients reached their relative minimum in the early 1970s at only 1.6. The standard deviation as a percentage of the mean increased to 4.5 in 2010, which is low compared to those of fertility or migration, but high within the whole reference period. People in countries like Austria and Italy are gaining more years of life than – for example – those in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia. While, in 1950, at the beginning of the reporting period, the difference in life expectancy between Austria and Romania was around five years, by the end of the period, the difference had grown to around seven years. For the whole period, the population in Austria experienced an increase of 14 years, while that of Romania gained only 12 years. Differentiation by gender is also necessary. While men in general show a lower life expectancy than women, the mortality crisis of men in Eastern Europe has been subject to extensive academic research. While female life expectancy increased on average by 13.9 years in the SEEMIG region, the life expectancy of men has grown by only 11.2 years since 1950. The gender gap in life expectancy at birth increased on average from 3.8 years in 1950 to 6.2 years in 2010.
In general, the increase in lifespan is due more to a decrease in infant mortality than to additional years of life in old age. In the 1950s and 1960s, in particular, infant mortality in all countries of the SEEMIG region was reduced significantly through investment in medical services. Convergence and a decline of the infant mortality rate below 10 per 1,000 can be observed for the whole period and without historical breaks, although significant differences are still prevalent at the NUT3 level. Furthermore, favourable trends that occurred in Western Europe as long ago as the early 1970s have spread to Eastern European countries. While it is difficult to assess the main causes of such a reversal, the progress may result from a combination of several factors, including changes in diet, the growth of systematic prevention and screening and the spread of new forms of treatment and cardiac surgery (Meslé 2004b).

Population stock and population change

Over the reference period, the population size in the SEEMIG region grew from around 100 million people in 1950 to 122 million in 2011. This is surprising because the public image of that region is linked to decline, backwardness and a peripheral status. However, major differences in the demographic developments of countries can be observed.

Some countries experienced constant population growth during the entire reference period, including Austria, Italy and, with some fluctuations, Slovakia and Slovenia. All other countries were affected by population decrease. This was the case for Hungary and Bulgaria from the beginning of the 1990s and has also been the case for Serbia and Romania since the beginning of the new millennium. The long-term distribution of growth and decline is quite diverse and underlines the need for differentiation and specific explanations.

Table 2. Population stock on 1 January in SEEMIG countries, 1951–2011 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>6,926</td>
<td>7,065</td>
<td>7,479</td>
<td>7,553</td>
<td>7,711</td>
<td>8,021</td>
<td>8,404</td>
<td>1,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7,273</td>
<td>7,906</td>
<td>8,515</td>
<td>8,877</td>
<td>8,669</td>
<td>8,149</td>
<td>7,505</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>9,383</td>
<td>10,060</td>
<td>10,354</td>
<td>10,713</td>
<td>10,355</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>9,986</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>47,539</td>
<td>50,374</td>
<td>47,793</td>
<td>56,479</td>
<td>56,744</td>
<td>56,961</td>
<td>60,626</td>
<td>13,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>16,505</td>
<td>18,587</td>
<td>20,470</td>
<td>22,353</td>
<td>23,185</td>
<td>22,430</td>
<td>21,414</td>
<td>4,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>6,171</td>
<td>6,678</td>
<td>7,203</td>
<td>7,729</td>
<td>7,823</td>
<td>7,498</td>
<td>7,187</td>
<td>1,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>3,486</td>
<td>4,018</td>
<td>4,540</td>
<td>4,996</td>
<td>5,311</td>
<td>5,379</td>
<td>5,435</td>
<td>1,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>1,896</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEEMIG region</td>
<td>98,787</td>
<td>106,226</td>
<td>108,083</td>
<td>120,596</td>
<td>121,798</td>
<td>120,629</td>
<td>122,607</td>
<td>23,820</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: National Statistical Offices, SEEMIG WP3 Country Reports.

As shown in Table 2, the SEEMIG region as a whole has been one of growth; however, two things are apparent. First, this growth in absolute terms was mainly due to immigration to countries within the region such as Austria and Italy, immigration which stemmed from other countries within the region. Secondly, the speed of growth is declining (see Figure 5). At the beginning of the reporting period, the annual growth rate exceeded 0.5 per cent each year. After a period of slow decline, the growth became negative after the fall of the Iron Curtain. A significant decline in the birth rates and increasing emigration flows were responsible for this
development. Since the turn of the century, the growth rate has recovered and caught up to the zero line. However, once again, the large differences between countries must be mentioned. On the one hand are the steadily growing countries of Austria and Italy, which have been joined again in this trend in the last two decades by Slovenia; on the other hand are Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Serbia, which have experienced population decrease.

**Figure 5. Average annual rate of population change (percentage) in 1950–2010**

As another consequence of birth decline, of the emigration of the mostly younger population and of increasing life expectancy, a process of population ageing can be observed in the whole SEEMIG region (see Figure 6). The convergence tendency is to some extent parallel in all countries, excluding the case of Slovakia. This becomes apparent when looking more closely at the data: in the 1960s, Austria was at the forefront of the ageing process, over and above all other SEEMIG countries. With the return of high net migration in the 1990s and 2000s, the share of elderly people as a percentage of the working-age population decreased, but not because of the emigration of the older population or to increasing mortality. The working-age population itself increased in absolute numbers as a consequence of immigration and, therefore, the old-age–dependency ratio decreased. The opposite development can be observed in countries like Bulgaria. Due to the emigration of the working-age population, the share of the older population saw a relative over-proportional increase. While ageing is still one of the major demographic characteristics in the country (Vaño et al. 2013), Slovakia nevertheless shows a different development – that of a stagnating age–dependency ratio of 17 per cent – and, as such, still holds the lowest share of elderly people within the working-age population of the region.
Conclusions

This dynamic historical analysis, carried out for the SEEMIG region for the period 1950 to 2013, has shown that these years were characterised, to differing degrees, by several historic turning-points in countries within the region and have contributed to a historically given heterogeneity: wars, post-war transformations and recovery, the breakdown of socialist regimes, the dissolution of countries and changes in political regimes from state socialism to capitalist democracy, have all affected the countries. Recently, (pre-)accession to the greater economic and political space of the European Union has marked regional developments. One of the main findings in this regard is that the influence of political systems can be observed and should not be neglected; however, varying trajectories of social and economic development were noted, even among state socialist countries. The different social histories of path dependencies, and global structural positions would appear to contribute to differences between regions, as they may have their roots in the historically accumulated structural differences (Chirot 1991).

General trends of convergence and divergence in the region can be traced as far back as the 1950s. Trends of convergence relate, for instance, to fertility; with some delay in time, a convergence tendency in the total fertility rate and the resultant narrowing of the variance of the rate both emphasise the general trend towards low fertility throughout the region. The total fertility rate declined sharply over time in all countries and has remained at a low level – below 1.5. The high unemployment rate and the relative deprivation of larger households clearly signal that there will be no return to a high fertility level. The SEEMIG region also reflects the overall European trend of population ageing. Throughout all SEEMIG countries, the proportion of the population of working age has been consistently decreasing (or stagnating) and reached a level of 66.5
per cent in 2011, while the share of persons of retirement age climbed to 17.7 per cent (EU27: 15.5 per cent). The changes in the age structure are irreversible and entail a range of challenges for public budgets in securing services of general interest, ensuring individual mobility through public transport, and maintaining pension and health-care systems. This also implies a societal and inter-generational potential for conflict as well as direct and indirect implications for the labour market.

One of the trends of divergence is noted in the area of mortality: while an increasing life expectancy can be observed throughout the region, a growing divergence between the countries is apparent. Divergences are also prevalent regarding economic developments: while the entire SEEMIG region is experiencing economic growth from a long-term perspective and has improved its position against the world average – with some countries producing three times more GDP than the world average and others only producing half – the main differences in the economic performance of countries within the region are predominant.

These differences might also have influenced the fact that net migration also showed different patterns; starting in the 1960s, the SEEMIG countries were progressively characterised by a diversification of net migration rates. While some countries became immigration countries, others became or remained emigration countries. Migration as such is a key driver of population development in the region. In particular, after 1989, the temporary emigration abroad started to be a key differentiating factor among the six former socialist countries. The recent overall population growth of the region can be almost exclusively traced back to immigration to countries in the region such as Austria and Italy, immigration which stemmed from other countries within the region. These connections also show intra-regional links between various developmental patterns.

The trends in international net migration are neither divergent nor convergent. They follow partially overlapping and partially time-lagging migration cycles with the changing dominance from emigration to immigration. Following the empirical analysis, Austria and Slovenia belong to the group characterised as ‘old immigration countries.’ Countries in this type, which is located at the end of an adaptation cycle, show the general European pattern of development: they had a negative migration rate in the 1950s which then became positive, corresponding with the overall observable change in Europe. As the ‘tipping-point’ was reached several decades earlier, they have learned to treat immigration politically, instrumentally and in public discourse (Fassmann 2009). According to the same typology, Italy, and partly also Hungary and Slovakia, were classified as ‘emerging immigration countries,’ representing countries situated in the transitional phase. In these countries a positive net migration was reached in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since immigration is still a very contentious topic in public discourse, the adaptation process seems to be at a very early stage. Countries of the group ‘emigration countries,’ which include Bulgaria and Romania, are still marked by a constant and negative migration balance. Consequently, emigration and not immigration is the focus of public discourse. However, in the context of continued negative natural population development, emigration cannot represent an infinite process in these countries. These population developments rather suggest that these countries will also, in the long run, increasingly become destinations for immigration. Nonetheless, we must stress that, depending on future macro-structural changes, the previously differing historical trajectories and the varying modes of incorporation into the European and the global economy might maintain divergences in the longer run. What our analysis also shows is that, even in the regions with state socialism, various patterns of development existed. Some countries, such as Slovenia, were quite similar to non-socialist countries, such as Austria, while there were substantial difference between socialist countries like Romania and Hungary.

The presentation of the longer-term perspective has proven to be a challenge, as the aim of the analysis was to elaborate a comprehensive picture of long-term processes in a heterogeneous region in a period of somewhat dramatic structural changes. However, we follow Skeldon (2012: 154) in his conclusion that,
While no single pathway through any migration or developmental transition exists, it nevertheless needs to be accepted that a retreat to total relativism is counterproductive. (...) a transitional framework, which allows migration systems to be linked to wider socio-economic change, provides a fertile environment in which to generate future theories of migration. Therefore it seems scientifically interesting to link migration with macro-structural changes to understand the different developmental tracks. As demographic and migratory trends proof to show very different patterns and pictures depending on the scale of observation there is also a need for the study on a sub-national level, particularly in this heterogeneous region. In this context, however, the particular poor situation of data quality, availability but also harmonisation or migration flows (Fassmann, Reeger, Sievers 2009, Lemaitre 2005, Poulain, Perrin, Singleton 2006) has to be highlighted again. To enable founded research in this direction but also evidence-based policy-making, better data not only on the national but also the sub-national and local levels are imperative.

Notes

1 For further information, see Fassmann and Musil (2013).
2 The Slovak Republic was part of Czechoslovakia until 1992; the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Republic of Slovenia were part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
3 Politically favoured groups, such as Greek refugees in 1949 and Chilean refugees in 1973 in Hungary, who received settlement permits, were an exception to these rules.
4 An exception was the emigration registered in 1989 due to the obligatory change of the names of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin.
5 It is estimated that around 40 000 ethnic Germans, mainly from Vojvodina, emigrated to Austria and Germany; 250 000 ethnic Turks went to Turkey.
6 There was a need for foreign labour in the context of a booming economy and an inadequate work force because of the loss of men during the Second World War, post-war emigration and a decreasing female labour participation rate during the baby boom.
7 According to the results of censuses carried out in 1971, 1981 and 1991, the number of Serbian citizens working or staying abroad continually increased (from 204 000 to 269 000 and then to 274 000), which meant that approximately every thirtieth Serbian citizen lived abroad at that time (from 2.8 per cent in 1971 to 3.5 per cent in 1991).
8 During the existence of Czechoslovakia, 679 500 people emigrated from the Slovak to the Czech Republic and 440 000 people emigrated from the Czech to the Slovak Republic.
9 The process of privatisation and economic readjustment to world capitalism ranged from shock therapy in Estonia, at one extreme, to a very smooth and gradual transition in Slovenia, at the other. On this continuum, Hungary stood closer to the ‘shock therapy’ endpoint, contrary to other Visegrad countries that privatised their economy more gradually. In total, 1.5 million jobs were lost in Hungary and never recovered.
10 EU-SILC figures on the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income in 2013 were 35.4 in Bulgaria, 34 in Romania and 32.5 in Italy, above the EU28 average of 30.5. Slovakia (24.2), Slovenia (24.2) and Austria (27) had a comparatively low unequal distribution of income. With an income quintile share ratio of 6.6 in 2013, Bulgaria and Romania were also among the top three European Union member-states with the highest inequality of income distribution. Slovenia and Slovakia, however, both with a ratio of 3.6, were among the five countries with the lowest inequality of income distribution within the European Union.
At the same time, a constant flow of emigrants also existed, not registered by Hungarian statistics but clearly reflected in the relevant mirror statistics.

The conditions include, for example, the engagement in economic activity (on an employed or self-employed basis); the presence of sufficient resources and health insurance; the attendance at vocational training as a student and the presence of sufficient resources and health insurance; or being a family member of an EU citizen who falls into one of the above categories.

These net migration numbers are blurred and do not show trends regarding immigration and emigration separately. Furthermore, emigration data are often unreliable. For further information see Gárdos, Gődri (2014).

References


EU Accession and Migration: Evidence for Bulgarian Migration to Germany

Vesela Kovacheva*

Bulgaria’s European Union accession in 2007 turned the country’s citizens from third-country nationals with restricted mobility rights into EU citizens with rights to free movement within the EU. Economic rights were restricted for seven years by transitional periods in the free movement of workers. This article explores changes in the Bulgarian migration pattern to Germany after 2007 in the specific context of free movement with restricted freedom to work, and analyses the extent to which those changes can be related to that particular regime. Starting from this point, Bulgarian migration patterns to Germany are overviewed and a periodisation of migration since the World War II is suggested. Changes in the dynamics, forms and composition of migration after EU accession in 2007 are analysed, based on administrative data and a small-scale survey among Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg. Both the administrative data and the survey results provide empirical grounding for a plausible relation between EU accession and migration patterns. The scale of migration has increased and more temporary migration has taken place. However, the rise of migration can be attributed not only to new migration from Bulgaria but also, to a large extent, to a redirection of migration flows from other destination countries and the legalisation of irregular migrants. Circular migration has lost to a great extent relevance which could be plausibly explained by changed migration strategies under a regime of free movement. Despite transitional periods in the free movement of workers, labour migration has become a predominant form of mobility. Transitional periods did not prevent migrants from moving to Germany but, given the reduced labour market opportunities, may have hampered their successful labour market integration.

Keywords: EU accession; free movement; migration patterns; Bulgarian migration; migration periods

Introduction

For a number of reasons – mainly geographical and political distance, particularly prior to 1989 – Bulgaria was not in the sphere of particular interest for Germany and was seldom targeted by special migration policies. As a result, Bulgarian migration to Germany did not occur on a large scale, as was the case with other Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). The country’s EU accession in 2007 changed that by triggering migratory movements of an unknown scope and shaping Bulgaria as a main sending country for Ger-

* Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI), Germany. Address for correspondence: kovacheva@hwwi.org.
many. Annual net migration rose from 228 in 2006 to 25 044 in 2012, leading to a sharp increase of the total resident Bulgarian population from 39 000 to almost 118 800 in the same period. Even after the EU enlargement which transformed Bulgaria into a main sending country for Germany, the latter is still not recognised as a main destination country for Bulgarian migration. As a result, the phenomenon of Bulgarian migration to Germany is little known.

Thus this article overviews Bulgarian migration to Germany over time from a historical perspective and analyses its remarkably changing migration pattern since 2007; a periodisation since the World War II is then suggested in the first section. A special focus lies on the EU post-accession migration that took place in the context of the general free movement of persons with restricted access to the labour market from 2007 to 2013. Changes in the dynamics, forms and composition of migration are studied and then analysed to determine the extent to which they could be explained by Bulgaria’s EU citizenship (the second section). Empirical evidence of changes in migration patterns is provided by administrative data and a small-scale survey among 401 Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg. Finally, the issue of the relation between changing migration patterns and integration under the influence of EU citizenship is discussed in the closing section.

**Bulgarian migration to Germany: a historical overview**

Migration relations between Germany and Bulgaria have their roots in the nineteenth century, when many Bulgarians studied in German cities such as Leipzig and Dresden. Their numbers intensified in the late nineteenth century, when German schools opened doors in big Bulgarian cities and a number of German-Bulgarian cultural associations were established (Troebst 2013). Taking into consideration the significant political and legal changes which had an impact on migration dynamics, a periodisation of migration is suggested for the period from 1945 to 2013. Bulgarian migration to Germany can be divided into five periods: the Cold War period, the transition period, the visa requirement period, the EU pre-accession period and the EU post-accession period.

In the Cold War period (1946–1989) the emigration of Bulgarian citizens had been severely restricted by a complicated pass-issuing system and intense border controls. Moreover, the political ideology and the Western–Eastern division in socialist and democratic countries had a major impact on migration dynamics between Bulgaria and the two German states: the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Whereas mobility to other communist and Arab countries, and migration of temporary nature, were desired, mobility to Western democratic countries and permanent settlement abroad were unwelcome. The GDR received mainly temporary migrant workers, political migrants and students who, however, were fewer in number than those from the former Soviet Union (Poutrus 2005). In line with this political stance in both the sending and the receiving country, migration to the GDR took place mainly for tourism and study purposes and permanent settlement was rather the exception.

With regard to Bulgaria’s relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, no bilateral agreement for the recruitment of labour migrants on a temporary basis was signed between the two countries, as was the case with other European countries such as Poland and Hungary. Labour migration thus barely played a role. The political situation in Bulgaria triggered mainly political refugees fleeing from the communist regime. From the perspective of the Bulgarian state, these were irregular emigrants. In Germany, however, they were welcomed as freedom fighters and refugees (Münz 1997).

The first years after the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria and after German reunification can be labelled as a transition period in their migration relations (1989–1993). A law which came into force in September 1989 and which liberalised travel opportunities, meant that Bulgarian citizens could apply for five-year passports, enabling them to travel abroad (UNHCR 1994). This, combined with further legal changes
such as the decriminalisation of non-return after legal departure from the country, may have encouraged the large migration flows after 1989.\textsuperscript{1} The legal and political changes in Bulgaria coincided with historic circumstances in Germany. The reunification of the two German states into one – the Federal Republic of Germany – in October 1990 led to de facto open Eastern borders where control was virtually absent (Kraler, Dzhengozova, Reichel 2009). However, very few legal options for migration were made available to the citizens of the former communist countries and the entry of Bulgarian migrants was mostly considered illegal. The magnitude of migration was not as great as for other Central European countries, due in part to the geographical distance to Germany. Nevertheless, for the first time in the migration relations between Germany and Bulgaria, a quantitatively substantial community of about 30 000 persons emerged which paved the way for future migrations.

In the transition period 1989–1993 the migration dynamics were turbulent and characterised by large numbers of in- and outflows. The unstable economic and political situation in the first years after the fall of the communist regime pushed many people to seek for a better and more secure life in Germany, which became their main destination country (Bobeva, Chalukov, Markov 1996). Although political asylum had been used in the Cold War period, it was not until the early 1990s that it became the main migration channel for Bulgarian citizens to unified Germany.\textsuperscript{2} Of all Bulgarian applications in Europe, 87 per cent were submitted in Germany (UNHCR 1994). Thus 96 000 Bulgarians applied for asylum between 1989 and 1993 and most applications were registered between 1991 and 1993, with a peak of 31 540 applications in 1992 (Dietz 2004). Furthermore, the transition period was marked by the large-scale emigration of Bulgarian ethnic Turks.\textsuperscript{3} Following the adoption of the new laws in May 1989 and their coming into force in September 1989, 300 000 Bulgarian ethnic Turks were allowed to leave the country (UNHCR 1994: 9). The vast majority of them moved to Turkey but some migrated further – to Germany and Austria (Sultanova 2006). Two reasons may explain this more-distant migration. On the one hand, Bulgarian Turks who migrated to Turkey and were disappointed by the situation there moved on to Germany (Vasileva 1992). On the other hand, after the Turkish border was closed on 22 August 1989 by decision of the Turkish authorities, migration to Turkey became difficult and migrants headed to Western European countries (Mancheva 2008). Considering the large community of people of Turkish background in Germany – which constitutes an important social network – the country became an attractive destination for Bulgarian citizens from the Turkish minority.

Two events marked the start of a new phase in Bulgarian migration to Germany: the so-called ‘visa requirement period’ (1993–2001). First, the mobility of Bulgarian citizens was restricted by the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers of the European Community, who put Bulgaria on the ‘black’ visa list of Schengen countries. This was an ‘unusual situation,’ as such a requirement was not imposed on other EU candidate countries (Apap, Tchorbadjiyska 2004; Tchorbadjiyska 2007). Between January 1995 and March 2001, Bulgarian citizens needed a mandatory visa for short-term entries into all Schengen countries, including Germany. Second, as a reaction to the tremendous flow of asylum-seekers to Germany and the suspicion that economic migrants were circumventing restrictive legislation in European countries under the guise of seeking political asylum (Bobeva 1996), the new German asylum law came into force on 1 July 1993. It complicated the recognition of political asylum and excluded persons who came from so-called ‘safe countries’ from the asylum procedure (Dietz 2004). As Bulgaria was declared a safe country in 1993 through a decision of the Federal Council of Germany, the asylum system as a migration channel for Bulgarian migrants was eliminated.

The visa requirement period was characterised by a severe economic and political crisis in Bulgaria in 1996–1997 when the national currency devaluated drastically and the inflation rate was officially at 310.8 per cent (Markova 2010). The unstable political and critical economic situation triggered migration mainly to Southern European countries like Greece, Spain and Italy, whereas official migratory movements to Germa-
ny were at modest levels. The lifting of some restrictions for foreign nationals to study in Germany opened up a further migration channel – the education policy – and correspondingly a new form of migration for educational purposes. The number of Bulgarian students at German universities grew from 991 in 1993 to 7,321 in 2001, turning Bulgaria into a major sending country of students to Germany in the visa requirement period.\(^4\) For the first time in German–Bulgarian migration relations, labour migration was regulated by a bilateral agreement that enabled the temporary migration of three categories of migrant workers: contract workers, guest employees and seasonal workers. Whereas, in the 1990s, posted contract workers prevailed, the relevance of seasonal workers increased in the 2000s.\(^5\) The quota for guest employees of 1,000 per year was rarely exploited. The registered migratory movements increased and temporary labour migration gained predominantly in importance (Haug 2004). Apart from the officially registered cases, there was also a non-negligible number of irregular migrants who were not covered in the official statistics. Irregular migration to Germany and the involvement of criminal organisations in smuggling were highly debated issues in this period (Bobeva et al. 1996).

In 2001, Bulgaria was removed from the black Schengen list that marked the beginning of the so-called EU pre-accession period (2001–2006). Bulgarian citizens were granted visa-free entry and three months visa-free residence in Schengen countries. In the context of a free entry and an enduring requirement for an official work permit, many Bulgarian citizens used their stay as tourists to work in the shadow economy. Undocumented work under the guise of tourism was a main pattern of temporary labour migration for CEECs (Fihel 2007). Yet, for the 1990s, there were indications that seasonal labour migration to Greece and Turkey took place under the guise of tourism (Bobeva 1996). After 2001, tourism emerged as a form of labour migration to Germany although this was not captured in administrative data as these people generally did not register with the local authorities.\(^6\)

Economic growth and decreasing unemployment characterised the Bulgarian economy. Economic instability as a push factor was less relevant in that period than in the previous phases of migration. A main form of mobility in the 2000s remained migration for educational purposes, with 2002 and 2003 being the years with the highest numbers of first-year students. With 11,816 Bulgarian students at German universities in 2006, Bulgaria was the second-biggest sending country of so-called Bildungsausländer, persons who obtained their secondary education outside Germany (Bundesregierung 2007). Besides the EU-level regulation that had a great impact on Bulgarian migration in the 2000s, Bulgarian citizens benefited from the changing political stance towards migration in Germany. Since the 2000s, German migration policies started displaying an increased acceptance of migration (Vogel, Kovacheva 2014). The German government introduced the Green Card programme in 2000 which sought to attract 20,000 IT specialists to Germany. The programme was open to both new migrants and foreign students who had obtained their degree at a German university. Between 2000 and 2004, 469 Bulgarian IT specialists received work and residence permits (Bundesregierung 2005), which corresponds to 2.6 per cent of about 18,000 IT specialists. Applications from some countries exceeded expectations (Liebig 2004) but Bulgaria was not considered a country of special interest and did not attract public or political attention.

A new period in migration relations started with Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union on 1 January 2007. Bulgarian citizens obtained EU citizenship status, which provided them with the right to free movement. The possibility of introducing transitional provisions was stipulated in the Accession Treaty from April 2005. As one of the main initiators of the first transitional rules introduced for Greece in 1981, Germany restricted access to its labour market for seven years for Bulgarian citizens, applying the so-called 2+3+2 rule. In practice this meant that the employment of a Bulgarian citizen as a dependent worker or as a service provider in construction, building, cleaning or interior decoration was bound to a work permit. Liberalisation
for three groups of workers – skilled workers with a university degree who take up a corresponding qualified job, seasonal workers and persons in vocational training – was announced as of 2012.

The migration of Bulgarian workers to main destination countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece was also restricted. In contrast to the eight countries which joined the EU in 2004 (the EU8), the UK made use of transitional periods for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens. Only Sweden and Finland among the old EU15 member states did not apply restrictions on labour market access. The redirection of migration flows due to a differential application of transitional rules did not take place to the same extent as with the EU8 countries (Holland, Fic, Rincon-Aznar, Stokes, Paluchowski 2011; Kahanec, Zaiceva, Zimmermann 2009). Migration flows were, instead, redirected in the course and in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2008 which severely hit the classic destination countries for Bulgarian migrants – Spain, Italy and Greece.

Economic disparities remain an important push factor in the post-accession period. The positive economic development in Bulgaria before EU accession was ended by the economic crisis in 2008. The unemployment rate reached 13 per cent in 2013 compared to 6 per cent in 2008 (Hangaru, Humpert, Kohls 2014). Income differences between Bulgaria and Germany are still substantial, although the GDP *per capita* has increased over time. Almost half of the Bulgarian population was at risk of poverty in 2013 compared to 25 per cent on average for the EU27 (Hangaru *et al.* 2014).

**Data and method of analysis**

The post-accession period of Bulgarian migration to Germany is characterised by specific patterns in terms of dynamics, forms and composition of migration. As migration patterns are captured in administrative data, these were analysed with the aim of identifying changes after 2007. The main data sources were the Central Register of Foreigners, providing information on the stock of foreign nationals, and data from local registration offices on in- and outflows of foreign nationals. However, administrative data are limited to the main demographic characteristics of age, gender and length of stay and do not contain further relevant aspects such as ethnicity, multiple migrations and reasons for migration.

New data were therefore collected through a migrant survey in Hamburg. The city state of Hamburg was selected for the case study due to an increasing scale of migration there since EU accession. With Duisburg, Munich and Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg ranked as one of the four cities with the highest net migration from Bulgaria and Romania in 2013 (Hangaru *et al.* 2014). Since 2007, the number of registered Bulgarian citizens in Hamburg has more than tripled, with 6 000 residing there in 2013 and 4.1 per cent of the total Bulgarian population in Germany (Statistisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein 2014).

Based on the so-called time–location sampling (Baio, Blangiardo, Blangiardo 2011; Marpsat, Razafindratsimab 2010), a small-scale survey was carried out between December 2012 and March 2013 among Bulgarian migrants at selected migrant-oriented meeting points such as religious, cultural and commercial centres. The data collection at meeting points was complemented by an online version of the questionnaire, sent out via the mailing lists of Bulgarian migrant organisations. In all, 401 persons of Bulgarian background in Hamburg gave information about their migration experience and integration situation in Germany. As the initial sample was biased due to the different probability of inclusion of individuals in the survey, the sample was weighted in a statistical procedure by taking into account self-declared information on the frequency of visits to the places of interview. Weighted results may thus be generalised to the total Bulgarian population in Hamburg – the sample size corresponds to 6.7 per cent of the registered Bulgarian population there in 2013.

Migration patterns before and after 2007 were compared by looking at administrative and survey data. Administrative data were mostly analysed for the time frame 2000–2013 and, for certain issues, for a longer
period of time. Survey data were analysed by dividing the sample into two groups – EU pre-accession migrants who moved to Germany before 2007 and EU post-accession migrants who migrated after 2007 – and comparing the results. Of the respondents in the sample, 71 per cent were post-accession migrants and 29 per cent – pre-accession.

Migration patterns under EU freedom of movement: empirical evidence

Based on available administrative data and survey results from Hamburg, three main changes in migration are explored: migration dynamics related to flows and stocks, forms of migration related to duration of stay and reasons for migration, and the composition of migration according to migrant characteristics such as age, gender, education and ethnicity.

Migration dynamics

Migration data give an impression of the scale of Bulgarian migration to Germany since the 1950s and reveal a tremendous change after EU accession. In accordance with the few legal opportunities for migration in the Cold War period, migration to East and West Germany was at a modest level. A mere 145 Bulgarian citizens came to Germany and 86 left the country in 1962. Since then, both flows and stocks increased but remained at a quite modest level, well below 2 000. No more than 5 000 Bulgarian citizens were registered in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1967 and 1989 (Gächter 2002). Although it was a negligible phenomenon from a quantitative point of view, these migrants were the pioneers of Bulgarian mobility who might have provided crucial support to newcomers in subsequent periods.

Migration dynamics considerably changed after 1990; since then, Germany has evolved into a preferred destination country for Bulgarian migrants. Except for the period 1994–1996, when more Bulgarian citizens left than came to Germany, there has been a positive migration balance (see Figure 1) – altogether 26 200 persons during the transition period (1989–1993), 6 700 persons in 1997–2000, after the economic and political crisis in Bulgaria in 1996–1997 and 14 100 persons in the pre-accession period (2001–2006). In line with these migratory movements, the number of Bulgarian citizens registered in Germany has also increased, rising from 5 000 in the late 1980s to 42 000 before EU accession.

Migration statistics reveal accelerating migratory movements in the post-accession period (2007–2013), comparable to the boom in the early 1990s. The number of Bulgarian citizens coming to Germany doubled within one year and reached 20 900 in 2007. Since then, the inflows have been steadily growing and reached a peak at 58 500 persons in 2012. In spite of the increasing number of people leaving the country, which counteracted the large number of newcomers, the migration balance has stayed positive and even risen: from 8 100 persons in 2008 to 25 000 persons in 2012 (Federal Statistical Office 2009–2014). Overall net migration in the post-accession period (2007–2012) accounted for 92 500 persons. The migratory movements contributed to a large increase in the resident Bulgarian population, with the number of Bulgarian citizens registered on the Central Register of Foreigners rising spectacularly from 39 000 in 2006 to 146 800 in 2013. Bulgaria became a main sending country and the Bulgarian community is one of the fastest-growing migrant groups in Germany. In 2012, Germany became the second-largest immigration OECD country after the US, caused mainly by migration from CEECs (OECD 2014). Survey results for Hamburg mirror these migration dynamics over time – half of the respondents migrated to Germany after 2007 while only 3.3 per cent came before 1990.
EU accession did not change the trend of increasing migration from the early 2000s but resulted in accelerated migration with rising in- and outflows and a correspondingly increasing Bulgarian population. Different reasons can explain this development. On the one hand, increasing migration can be attributed to new migration from Bulgaria to Germany, facilitated by better migration opportunities attached to EU citizenship status. On the other hand, it could also be a one-time statistical effect of the legalisation of irregular migrants after EU accession. Furthermore, the increase can also be attributed to a redirection of migration due to a worsening economic situation in the main destination countries of Spain and Italy in the aftermath of the global economic crisis in 2008 (Bertoli, Brücker, Fernández-Huertas Moraga 2013; Brücker, Hauptmann, Vallizadeh 2013).

Since 2007, 78 per cent of migration to Germany can be attributed to changes in the economic and institutional conditions in other receiving countries (Bertoli et al. 2013). Whether this holds true also for the Bulgarian case was one of the issues explored in the migrant survey in Hamburg. Survey respondents were asked whether they had lived in another country before they moved to Germany. A redirection of migration flows was expected from Greece, Spain and Italy, which constituted the main destinations for Bulgarian migrants and which were severely hit by the economic crisis. Even before the economic crisis, Bulgarian migrants with migration experience in Greece, Spain and Italy moved to Germany; however, after the economic crisis, their share increased – the survey revealed that 38 per cent of the post-accession migrants reported that they had lived in one of these Southern European countries before coming to Germany, as opposed to only 13 per cent of pre-accession migrants. It can thus be argued that the redirection of migration flows in the aftermath of the economic crisis may partly explain post-accession migration and that Germany is probably a stopover until the economic recovery of other main destination countries. Another explanation for this increased migration is an assumed legalisation of irregular migrants. EU accession served as a de facto legalisation for migrants who were previously illegally residing in Germany (Vogel, Kovacheva, Prescott 2011). In the UK, 30 per cent of those who applied for the Worker Registration Scheme in the first six months after the EU accession of 2004 had already been living in the UK (Gilpin, Henty, Lemos, Portes, Bullen 2006).
In line with this finding, the number of Bulgarian citizens registered in Germany after 2007 could thus also be partly attributed to the regularisation of existing migrants already living in the country (Holland et al. 2011).

In spite of the expectation that the freedom of movement granted by EU accession would trigger immense flows of new migrants from Bulgaria, the rise is, to a great extent, due to the redirection of migration from other destination countries and the legalisation of pre-accession migrants who had been living in Germany without a regular residence status. Direct migration can be assumed to apply almost undoubtedly to the 14 per cent of post-accession migrants in the survey sample who declared migration for educational reasons. Although EU citizenship is linked to more favourable legal regulations of migration and thus may facilitate mobility, it is more those with migration experience who contributed to the increase than new migrants from Bulgaria.

**Forms of migration**

Migration can be of a temporary, circular or permanent nature and motivated mainly by labour, family, educational or humanitarian reasons. Changes in both the time frame of migration and the main migration categories are expected to take place under the free movement regime.

Strict border control promotes the permanent migration of irregular migrants, as moving to and leaving the country is risky, a phenomenon known as the ratchet effect (Vogel, Cyrus 2008). Where there are barriers to mobility, regular migrants also tend to stay permanently in the receiving country rather than to move repeatedly, as the costs of migration are higher than in case of unrestricted mobility. The lack of mobility barriers generally reduces the likelihood of permanent migration and facilitates temporary and repeated stays abroad, as the migration opportunity after return is guaranteed (SVR 2013). Thus, from a theoretical perspective, in a situation of free movement granted by EU citizenship, increasing short-term and circular migration is to be expected.

In line with this assumption, Bulgarian migrants seldom practiced multiple migrations between 1990 and 2000, when a visa for entry and a residence permit were required, and border crossing to and from Germany was difficult for both regular and irregular migrants. Migration barriers promoted permanent migration in the 1990s. The abolition of visa requirements for entry and permits to stay for up to three months in 2001 created more incentives to these back-and-forth movements to and from Germany. Circular migration was a response to the legal framework and constituted an indispensable part of migration strategies. Data from the Central Register of Foreigners reveal a trend for increasing temporary migration to Germany in the post-accession period. Based on the legal concepts of temporary and permanent residence in Germany, a stay of up to four years is considered to be temporary migration whereas a residence longer than five years is defined as permanent. The share of Bulgarian migrants who left Germany in the first four years of their stay increased from 64 per cent in 2006 to 86 per cent in 2012 (Federal Statistical Office 2005–2014). Whereas only one in four newcomers in 2006 left the country within the first year, more than half did so in 2012.10

Increasing temporary migration combined with the recent nature of Bulgarian migration which has developed mainly since the early 1990s result in a relatively short duration of stay for emigrants. Data for 2012 show that Bulgarian emigrants spent 3.3 years in Germany before moving to another country, compared to 10.3 years on average for all foreign nationals and that the average length of stay of Bulgarian migrants in Germany declined from 7.6 years in 2006 to 5.1 in 2012 (Federal Statistical Office 2005–2014) – far below the 18.3 years which are the average length of stay of all foreign nationals.

Increasing circular migration can be expected when we deal with freedom of movement and the geographic proximity of countries (EMN 2011). Circular migration is defined as at least two back-and-forth movements between country of origin and country of destination (EMN 2011). Administrative data capture
very little information on multiple migrations. With the aim of shedding light on this issue, participants in the migrant survey in Hamburg were asked how often they had been absent from Germany for more than three months after their first entry into the country – 40 per cent declared that they had left Germany at least once; however, circular migration is assumed for the 27 per cent who left Germany more than twice. A high incidence (44 per cent) of repetitive movements to and from Germany was found for persons who migrated in the visa-free pre-accession period 2001–2006. In contrast, a mere 12 per cent of newcomers in the post-accession period 2007–2012 practiced circular migration.

The lower incidence of circularity among post-accession migrants compared to that among pre-accession migrants contradicts the expectations shown in the literature. One explanation could be that only permanent-residence rights provide migrants with the security they need to leave the destination country and be confident that they can subsequently return (EMN 2011: 29). The vast majority of post-accession migrants do not have the right to permanent residence in Germany and probably do not want to jeopardise it. Another plausible explanation could be that EU accession, which is associated with simplified conditions of residence, changed migration strategies. As permanent residence status could be achieved more easily than in the past, the need to leave Germany after the expiration of a visa or a residence permit was eliminated. This probably led to an adaptation of migration strategies to the new situation. Findings from the migrant survey in Hamburg pointed to changed migration strategies with regard to circularity under the free-movement regime. A high number of migrants had migrated to Germany before 2007 but had settled permanently after EU accession, and a further 82 per cent of those who practiced circular migration settled permanently after 2007. The legal need for circular migration in order to comply with residence law regulations fell away due to EU citizenship, which seemed to transform previous circular movements to much more permanent residence in the destination country.

Whether Bulgarian migrants are going to settle in the long run in Germany is hard to predict. Asked about their intention to remain in Germany, many respondents (41 per cent) in the survey did not know how long they were going to stay. The high level of uncertainty is in line with findings from other studies about the intention to remain. Of the respondents, 40 per cent intended to stay permanently in Germany and 14 per cent a couple of years, while 5 per cent intended to leave within the next year. The intention to stay permanently was higher among pre-accession (50 per cent) than post-accession migrants (36 per cent). This is not unexpected, as the likelihood of emigration declines with an increasing length of residence because ties to the destination country multiply in line with the duration of residence.

Apart from the time frame, the reasons for migration seem to change after 2007 and led to a greater predominance of other migration categories than in the past. Changes in migration channels may lead to a substitution of categories, for instance, when there is a lack of channels for low-skilled labour migration, family, asylum or student migration of people, who migrated to work, takes place (de Haas 2011). Following this assumption about the role of migration channels for migration categories, different categories predominated over time: humanitarian migrants from Bulgaria arrived in Germany mainly in the early 1990s, whereas many educational migrants and temporary workers, in the framework of bilateral agreements, went there in the late 1990s and 2000s. Labour migration gained in importance before 2007 but not until the post-accession period did it become the predominant migration category, as the survey results revealed.

Survey participants were asked about their main reason for migrating to Germany. Self-declared reasons may differ from the actual channel of migration used. For instance, a person might have gone there as an asylum-seeker but might have declared economic reasons as the main migration driver in the questionnaire. Nevertheless, reasons for migration can be considered, with a high level of confidence, as indicators for migration categories. Looking at the responses of pre-accession and post-accession migrants, a clear shift in migration categories is observed. The share of educational migration dropped considerably from 48 per cent
to 14 per cent. Family migration also declined from 21 per cent to 12 per cent. Migration for economic reasons rose substantially from 25 per cent to 69.5 per cent and economic reasons were thus the most important motivation declared by migrants in the sample. The main migration categories in the Bulgarian migration pattern were labour migration (56.9 per cent of the sample), educational migration (23.4 per cent), family migration (14.2 per cent) and political migration (0.7 per cent). Compared to EU27 countries in 2008 (SVR 2013), Bulgarian migrants went to Germany more often for economic (57 per cent of Bulgarian migrants versus 43 per cent of EU27 migrants) and educational reasons (23 per cent versus 8 per cent) and more rarely to join family members (14 per cent versus 32 per cent). The change in migration reasons can be explained by EU citizenship, which granted Bulgarian citizens improved opportunities for labour market participation. In spite of the restricted access to the labour market for dependent workers, self-employment was an accessible way to work in Germany. This is reflected in the main activity of migrants in the receiving country. The survey results showed that the share of workers increased from one- to two-thirds, with a high number of self-employed migrants in the post-accession period. Whereas half of the migrants before 2007 were pupils or students, half after 2007 were dependent workers. The main migration category for a decade – students – was replaced by workers.

**Composition of migration**

Administrative data on the registered Bulgarian population in Germany reveal changes in migrants’ characteristics such as gender, age and education after EU accession. Since the early 2000s, the Bulgarian migrant population has been dominated by women. After EU accession, the gender structure changed and the proportion of male migrants rose from 43 per cent in 2006 to 54 per cent in 2013 (Federal Statistical Office 2005–2014). This change in gender composition is due to the rapidly rising immigration of men. Two-thirds of the newcomers in 2011 and 2012, and respectively of the net migration, were men (Federal Statistical Office 2009–2014). A clear shift in the age structure of the Bulgarian migrant population occurred. The relevance of two age groups increased: children aged under 15 and persons of working-age, i.e. 25 to 65 years. The share of children grew from 5 per cent in 2006 to 13 per cent in 2013, whereas that of persons of working age increased from 63 per cent to 72 per cent. The group of young people aged 15 to 25 who accounted for almost 30 per cent in 2006 dropped to 14 per cent in 2013 (Federal Statistical Office 2005–2014). Two developments contributed to these shifts. On the one hand, more children were born in Germany than in the past (Federal Statistical Office 2005–2014). On the other hand, student migration lost its leading position as a main migration channel for Bulgarian citizens. Whereas in the past it was easier to obtain a residence status for educational than for economic purposes, which triggered the migration mainly of young people, the free movement of persons attached to EU citizenship opened up further opportunities, particularly for labour and family migration, practised by those of working age.

Changes took place in the qualification structure of the Bulgarian migrant population. In 2005 the proportion of university graduates among Bulgarian and Romanian newcomers to Germany accounted for two-thirds and that of persons without vocational training for one eighth. Data for 2010 showed that those with a university degree made up 25 per cent of the newcomers from Bulgaria and Romania, 40 per cent had vocational training and 35 per cent had none (Brücker et al. 2013). Both institutional and economic conditions influence employment opportunities and thus the qualification structure of migration. The transitional periods for the free movement of workers led to a concentration of migrants in certain types of employment such as seasonal work and self-employment. Illegal work and legal and semi-legal activities such as posted work and (bogus) self-employment became coping strategies for
overcoming the restricted right to work by transitional arrangements (Cyrus 2006). The number of Bulgarian migrants involved in seasonal work (only the hotel and catering industry) rose rapidly from 1,290 in 2006 to 7,750 in 2012 (Bundesregierung 2014). The increasing relevance of seasonal work and the redirection of low-skilled migrants from important destination countries such as Spain and Italy to Germany led to an increase in low-skilled migration (Brücker et al. 2013). At more than 25 per cent, the self-employment rate of Bulgarian migrants was extremely high (Schaland 2012).

As a rule, high-skilled migrants migrate first and are later followed by low-skilled migrants (Stark, Wang 2002). Considering the recent nature of Bulgarian migration to Germany, which has been evolving since the early 1990s, the increasing relevance of low-skilled persons is consistent with theoretical expectations about migration. In spite of this growth in the migration of persons with low education, the qualification structure of the overall Bulgarian migrant population was more favourable; 23 per cent of Bulgarian citizens in Germany in 2010 had a low educational level whereas the vast majority had medium (43 per cent) or high (34 per cent) educational levels (Holland et al. 2011). In comparison to other EU member states, Bulgarian migrants in Germany were highly skilled and worked in occupations which, to a large extent, corresponded to their qualification (Holland et al. 2011).

Results from the migrant survey in Hamburg are consistent with the transforming structure of the Bulgarian migrant population. As administrative data indicate, after 2007 this population in Germany became more diverse in its main socio-demographic characteristics of age, gender and education. Post-accession migration, characterised by a dominance of male migrants, is mirrored in the gender structure of the sample: 57 per cent male and 43 per cent female respondents. The vast majority of the respondents (88 per cent) were of working age, 25–64 years, but no children under 15 were included in the sample. The proportion of university graduates was higher among pre-accession (61.5 per cent) than among post-accession migrants (27.8 per cent). Correspondingly, the sample comprises 37.4 per cent high-skilled migrants with tertiary education, 37.8 per cent medium-skilled with secondary education and 27.4 per cent low-skilled with primary education.

As the administrative data do not provide information on ethnic groups, no official data on the ethnic composition of Bulgarian migration were available. Apart from the majority of the Bulgarian population of so-called ethnic Bulgarians, there are two big ethnic groups: Turks, accounting for 10 per cent of the population and Roma, who make up 5 per cent. With the aim of finding empirical evidence of this issue, participants in the migrant survey in Hamburg were asked about their religion and language skills. Persons with Turkish language skills or who were Muslims were considered to belong to the Turkish ethnic group, whereas those with Romance language skills were deemed to belong to the Roma ethnic group. Those who only had Bulgarian language skills and were of Orthodox religion were considered to belong to the majority group of ethnic Bulgarians. As Table 1 shows, whereas pre-accession migration was clearly dominated by Bulgarian-speaking persons at 84 per cent, the group made up only 53 per cent of post-accession migrants. Turkish-speaking migrants gained in importance in the post-accession period, when their proportion increased from 14 to 38 per cent. Similarly, more people in the Romance-speaking group migrated in the post- rather than pre-accession period (3 and 8 per cent respectively). The second variable of ethnic belonging – religion – points to a similar trend. Whereas the pre-accession period was clearly dominated by Christian-Orthodoxy – the main religion of ethnic Bulgarians – the relevance of Muslims increased in the post-accession period. Both indicators of belonging to an ethnic group reveal an increasing relevance of ethnic minorities in the post-accession period.

Despite this, the vast majority of migrants were still ethnic Bulgarians. The share of the Turkish ethnic group in the Bulgarian migrant population in Hamburg was deemed to be between 26.2 and 31.4 per cent and that of the Roma ethnic group about 6.5 per cent. As expected, given the large Turkish community in Germany which may attract migrants from the same background, an over-representation of the Turkish ethnic
group in relation to their share in the total Bulgarian population is found. In line with the expectation derived from socio-economic data on qualification structure and labour market participation – that there is no over-representation of Roma among the Bulgarian and Romanian migrants in Germany (Brücker et al. 2013), the share of the Roma ethnic group is comparable to that in the total Bulgarian population.

Table 1. Ethnic composition of respondents by language skills and religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Pre-accession migrants (in per cent of subsample)</th>
<th>Post-accession migrants (in per cent of subsample)</th>
<th>Impact of EU accession</th>
<th>Total sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language skills</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>only Bulgarian-singing</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>↘</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-speaking</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>↗</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanes-speaking</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>↗</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian-Orthodox</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>↘</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>↗</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religion</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>↗</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>↘</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Migrant survey in Hamburg, weighted results, sample size = 401 respondents.

Both administrative and survey data showed that the composition of migration changed after 2007. The increase in male and low-skilled migration could, to a great extent, be attributed to labour market opportunities which became available following the acquisition of EU citizenship. During the transitional periods, it was mainly men and those with low educational levels who were attracted by the free movement of workers from 2007 to 2013, and self-employment in the construction sector and seasonal work. Thus restricted EU citizenship during the transitional periods seems to have impacted on the profile of new migrants.

**Concluding remarks**

Bulgarian migration to Germany is a relatively new phenomenon that emerged during the Cold War but developed mainly in more recent times after 1990. It can be divided into five periods: the Cold War period, the transition period, the visa-requirement period, and the EU pre- and post-accession periods. Over time Bulgarian migrants have used a mixture of migration channels to move to and settle in Germany. The predominant channels were asylum policy in the 1990s, education policy in the 1990s and 2000s, visa policy which prevented legal migration and encouraged irregular migration in the 1990s, visa policy which facilitated regular migration in the 2000s and the free-movement policy with its restricted freedom to work after 2007.

Migration patterns, i.e. the dynamics, forms and structure of migration, have also changed over time and particularly under the regime of free movement. The scale of migration rose rapidly, thus supposing an accelerating effect of EU accession on migration dynamics. However, other factors such as the redirection of migration after the economic crisis of 2008 and the legalisation of irregular migrants appear to have greatly contributed to the rapidly increasing scale of migration from 2007 to 2013. The expectation of immense new emigration flows from Bulgaria seems not to be sustainable and to have opposed the accelerating effect of EU accession in the initial phase after status acquisition.

With regard to the duration of migration, the expectation that there would be increased temporary migration under a regime of free movement was confirmed. Remarkably, contrary to assumptions, circular migration declined. This can be explained by changed migration strategies as a result of EU accession. EU
citizenship abolished the requirement for a residence permit, so that the legal need for circular migration fell away and paved the way for more permanent residence and settlement in the long run. For the first time, labour migration became a predominant form of mobility which can, to a great extent, be related to EU citizenship, which opened up more labour market opportunities for Bulgarian migrants in spite of the transitional periods. Labour migration replaced educational migration as the most relevant category for more than a decade. Nevertheless, the high relevance of educational migration remains a distinctive feature of Bulgarian migration patterns to Germany. After 2007, migrants’ characteristics became more diverse in terms of age, gender, education and ethnicity, thus demonstrating transformations in the composition of migration. Male and low-skilled migration can be related to the transitional periods which restricted access to the labour market for dependent workers for seven years.

Changed migration patterns may, in turn, impact on labour market integration. Changes in the socio-demographic characteristics of the migrants, in particular, may reshape their overall integration situation. The high presence of groups who perform better on the labour market – such as men, migrants of working age and university graduates – facilitates successful economic integration. At the same time, limited economic opportunities through transitional arrangements for the free movement of workers hamper labour market participation. Even though EU citizenship is an inclusive institution at the EU level, its contextualisation in the nation-state in terms of national policies may reduce its potential effects on integration, as is presupposed for the area of labour market integration. With the expiry, as of 2014, of transitional periods in the free movement of workers, a new era of unmanaged migration began which should unfold new migration dynamics, forms and structures of migration from Bulgaria to Germany. This new phase should show more sustainable trends with regard to the relation between freedom of movement and migration patterns.

Notes

1 A person is subject not to criminal penalties but to administrative measures and fines.
2 Legal regulations aimed at managing migration, e.g. visa policy, are considered as migration channels (EMN 2012).
3 There are two main minorities in Bulgaria: Turkish (8.8 per cent of the population) and Roma (4.9 per cent) according to the Census conducted in 2011 (National Statistical Institute 2011).
4 Educational migration is not a new phenomenon in the migration relations between Germany and Bulgaria. It is even probably the oldest migration pattern which can be traced back to the nineteenth century, although the scale of migration was at a modest level. In the past there had been well-established relations between Germany and Bulgaria and Bulgarian citizens went to Germany to study.
5 Initially, a fix contingent of 2 000 work permits per year for posted workers was set up, which was enhanced and accounted for 2 500 in 2010. For Bulgarian citizens, the agreement on seasonal work contained only two sectors – hotel and restaurants – in which workers might be employed for up to six months. There was no annual quota.
6 In Germany, all individuals – irrespective of citizenship – are obliged to register their residence with the local registration office.
7 Data on foreign nationals stem from the Central Register of Foreigners. Probably inflows of individuals with a short period of stay are less covered, leading to lower numbers compared to data from the population projections of the Federal Statistical Office (Brenke, Neubecker 2013).
8 Applying the concept of people with a migration background, those with a Bulgarian background refers to Bulgarian citizens, former Bulgarian citizens who acquired German citizenship and persons with at least one parent born in Bulgaria or with Bulgarian citizenship. Apart from those registered with the local
registration offices, which is compulsory for everyone in Germany irrespective of citizenship, unregistered migrants were also captured.

9 Two questions were asked related to residence: year of first entry to Germany and year of uninterrupted stay.

10 Levels of temporary migration may be much higher, due to an assumed undercoverage of outflows in the statistics (Brenke, Neubecker 2013).

11 Data for Bulgaria stem from the TLS survey in Hamburg; those for the EU27 from SVR (2013).

12 According to the German definition, the working-age population comprises those aged between 15 and 64. However, as people aged 15 to 24 are often engaged in education, they are considered as a separate group of young people. The working-age population in this article is defined as those aged 25 to 64.

References


Raj Bhopal’s *Migration, Ethnicity, Race and Health in Multicultural Societies* (2014) (hereafter ‘Migration’) is an important and timely contribution to the literature on ethnicity and health. Not only does it present its content in a sensitive and pragmatic way, it is highly accessible, engaging and up-to-date. ‘Migration’ is effectively a second edition of *Ethnicity, Race and Health in a Multicultural Environment: Foundations for Better Epidemiology, Public Health and Health Care* (published in 2007). In this latest edition, Public Health expert Raj Bhopal focuses mainly on the fluidity of defining a person’s identity and how this has developed over time into concepts based on ethnicity, national borders, religion, immigration status, a sense of belonging and identity. The new engagement in this edition with the changing nature of migration and how this affects health-seeking behaviours, the delivery of services and health outcomes is its most significant and novel contribution to current debates.

In what has been described as an era of super-diversity (Vertovec 2007), we can no longer afford to ignore the impact of migratory trajectories on health delivery and outcomes. Bhopal demonstrates the many different ways in which health continues to intersect with ‘race’ and ethnicity but also with migration status (in contrast with Bhopal, I have chosen to place ‘race’ in inverted commas to emphasise the widely contested nature of this concept in sociological theory, of which more later). The significance of the social and political effects of intersecting variables of difference is particularly relevant in the United Kingdom (UK); with the new Immigration Act 2014 enforced in May 2014, we are witnessing an increasing border control creep into health centre waiting rooms. This Act introduces even more restrictive policy to create a ‘hostile environment’ for migrants: it legislates for health care access to be dependent upon immigration status; it further limits rights to citizenship; it increases landlord powers for immigration checks and it reduces the number of appealable immigration decisions. Locating the intersecting nature of migration, ethnicity, ‘race’ and health in this particular political context is essential because of the very immediate implications for better understanding how growing population diversity shapes how we do research, and how increasingly regressive political agendas dictate health policy and practice in the UK and indeed internationally.

Across the book, Bhopal covers a wide range of topics, questions, practical concerns, ethical considerations and political controversies around categorisation and classification processes, data collection and analysis, priority setting agendas, ‘rationing’ of resources and mainstreaming of services. This is provided within a useful comparative framework for analysing the historical development of health and health care services and national responses to health aspects of migration (covering the UK, US, Australia, apartheid-era South Africa, the Netherlands and Hungary), and the various socio-cultural, historical and political imperatives driving policy agendas. Throughout the book, Bhopal effectively demonstrates how categories of analysis come to be categories of practice, the intertwining nature of these concepts and variables, and the ways in which ‘race’ and ethnicity are real in their consequences, regardless of their contestable scientific or indeed biological grounding. The author strongly advocates for data to be collected, measured and analysed within an ethical and legal framework which safeguards minority rights, and forcefully argues that the principle of equity can provide the ‘core ethical princi-
ple’ needed to help progress beyond the denial of difference and the continuation of ethnocentric approaches to health care delivery (p. 182). The book makes an important contribution in introducing readers from primarily health-related audiences to a range of concepts such as ‘race’, ethnicity, population heterogeneity, ethnocentricity and migration status, as well as providing classifications of different migrant categories (for example asylum seekers and refugees, illegal, irregular and undocumented migrants, although the author’s point on ‘authenticity’ – Asylum seekers and refugees [when genuine] are involuntary migrants (p. 11), seems rather ill-judged). This book clearly has a public health focus, yet from a sociological perspective there are three areas of theoretical and empirical inquiry I would now like to address.

Firstly, I find the way in which ‘race’ is used problematic. The author goes to great lengths, and successfully so, to challenge the myth of ‘race’ on the basis of biological difference. Bhopal unpacks the widely-accepted position that ‘race’ as a biological concept has no scientific grounds, and effectively argues that it is in fact a social and political construct. He makes direct reference to the way in which the biological concept of ‘race’ has been used and abused to justify atrocities; he states on page 16, race should be used with caution for its history is one of misuse and injustice. And he is right. This is particularly important given the current socio-political context of the book, the connections made between migration, ‘race’, ethnicity and health, and the historical racialisation of immigration in Western societies. Nonetheless, the continued use of ‘race’ suggests there are biological differences between different groups of human beings – ultimately different ‘races’ – which only perpetuates ‘race’ as a viable biological concept.

This reveals the very real problem and challenge of how to write about social and political constructs without reifying those very same constructs. In ‘Migration,’ Bhopal sets out in a very systematic way the problem with certain concepts and classifications, but then continues to use them because they are the dominant concepts which everyone understands. One way forward (following Miles and Brown 2003) for critically engaging with this challenge is to use scare quotes (‘race’) to emphasise that ‘race’ is not a real attribute of human biology, is socially constructed and discursively perceived. As late as Chapter 10, Bhopal comes tantalisingly close to presenting the strongest sociological argument for challenging the continued use of ‘race’ in an unproblematic way, but then resigns himself to the position that because such concepts are part of the ‘core dialogue in the field of minority health,’ they continue to have analytical value. As a result, ‘race’ as difference in biology comes to be continuously held up as some sort of scientific truth.

Bhopal’s response to the question that social construction needs to be based on something ‘real’ is also problematic; it ignores the social construction of difference and the power asymmetries underpinning social construction – how we identify skin colour, language, and dress is of course political. Bhopal is aware of this – he peppers his book with illuminating reflective stores of his own experience of being constructed as different and ‘other’. He engages with racialisation and reification (again following Miles and Brown 2003), making it clear that these are the processes at work when racialised and ethnic divisions are conceived of as real. What is not clear to me is how his continued use of ‘race’ might follow a non-reifying approach. A worrying corollary of this is that migration comes to be racialised along colour lines, and so the emerging scholarship around migration and whiteness is missing from Bhopal’s analysis of the complex interplay of migration, ‘race,’ ethnicity and health. Whiteness often goes unexamined in the literature on health disparities (Daniels, Schulz, 2006), but given its strong association with privilege and social mobility, it has been argued that next waves of research on immigrants must interrogate this construct and examine its relationship with health disparities (Viruell-Fuentes, Miranda, Abdulrahim 2012: 2101).

Following from this point on the racialisation of migrants is the issue of the book’s focus on South–East (SE) Asian migrants. SE Asian migrants rep-
resent a historically and politically important migrant population in the UK and continue to be so today. However other migrant populations are represented in the UK, particularly in the wake of European Union (EU) accession and migration from Central and Eastern Europe. Bhopal only makes passing reference to these migrant populations and so how immigration status, migration trajectory and experiences of health care intersect with the ‘whiteness’ of these migrants is largely obscured by the book’s dominant construction of migrants along colour lines. The SE focus also detracts from the insights to be drawn from different types of migrants. This reflects a wider related issue with ‘Migration’: with only passing reference to gypsy travellers, Roma, asylum seekers and refugees, the very heterogeneity that exists within the ‘migrant category’ is unfortunately obscured, with ‘migrants’ sometimes coming across as a homogenous mass. Absent from this analysis is any sustained engagement with the ways in which differences in immigration status and migration trajectory intersect with ‘race’ and ethnicity and increasingly impact upon health behaviours, access, delivery and experiences. This is a missed opportunity: it would have been both instructive and timely to read more about the health inequalities of increasingly diverse migrant populations and how whiteness as a racialised identity intersects with immigration status to produce further hidden inequalities.

This leads to the third area of contention which, I would argue, relates to a central omission: Bhopal writes about the intersecting nature of variables of difference without theoretical engagement with intersectionality (Anthias 2008) as a potentially powerful theoretical framework for studying, exposing and addressing the intersecting nature of migration, ‘race,’ ethnicity and health inequalities. This theoretical framework very effectively highlights the negative politics of hidden multiple inequalities (Werbner 2013: 403) and – as Bhopal indeed suggests – adds importance to examining the multiple ways in which social inequalities are intensified by simultaneous membership in a range of stigmatised or devalued categories with gender, ‘race,’ age, ability, sexuality, and ethnicity (Crenshaw 1989). An intersectional framework also demonstrates the cumulative effects of these variables in health-seeking behaviours and experiences of health care.

This would be in line with the currently growing diversity turn in health research where intersectional perspectives are used to move beyond ‘language’ or ‘culture’ to explore how multiple dimensions of inequality intersect to impact health outcomes (for example Hankivsky, Cormier 2009; Ingleby 2012 and Krause, Gabriele, Parkin 2012). Foregrounding this theoretical framework would have provided insights into how to integrate an intersectional approach into health research and health policy making, as well as how an intersectional perspective may be applied to research, education and day-to-day practice. Part of the problem may be the issue of ‘disciplinary blinkers,’ and so arguably an interdisciplinary approach to theory building could inform Bhopal’s question as to how to move forward the theorising of ‘race,’ ethnicity and migration with health, and how public health research might move away from ‘race’ as biological to ‘race’ as one of many intersecting variables producing and perpetuating social inequalities which affect health care delivery and access.

In conclusion, ‘Migration’ achieves that rare thing of being applicable to the widest range of audiences and provides a necessary bridge across health and social sciences. It is an important and useful addition to reading lists for teachers, lecturers and students across a range of disciplines from health care research generally to a wider audience of social scientists, medical scientists, human geographers, public policy makers, educators, and clinical practitioners. Undergraduates would find this a useful text book for entry level study into the concepts of migration, ‘race’ and ethnicity and multiculturalism, as would postgraduates, particularly in interdisciplinary areas of study. However, there needs to be a critical engagement with theoretical perspectives that go beyond the public health discipline, as with ongoing debates into how lay terms come to be adopted and used by academics and practitioners, and how such terms intersect to produce further inequalities.
References


Teresa Piacentini  
University of Glasgow


In his preface to the paperback edition of *The British Dream*, David Goodhart claims that many readers will approach the book with an opinion of it already formed by their preexisting position on immigration. Indeed, this controversial book has become something of a lightning rod for both opponents and supporters of stricter immigration controls for the United Kingdom. Progressives can argue that Goodhart has betrayed the notion of transnational solidarity in favour of exclusivism. Conservatives, meanwhile, are armed with data to suggest that the multicultural project has been a failure. Although it may be something of a pre-emptive deflection of criticism, Goodhart claims that he has been *widely attacked in print and routinely accused of racism* (p. x) since publishing the first edition of *The British Dream*. He fails to cite published examples of this accusation, but Goodhart at least deserves to have this charge dismissed from the outset. *The British Dream* could, in the hands of someone already predisposed to an idea of racial hierarchy, potentially be used to further a racist agenda. That would require, however, a determined distortion of its key arguments. In the most politically neutral terms available, these basically contend that post-war immigration to Great Britain has produced a mixed record of success and failure, with some immigrant groups becoming quickly and demonstrably prosperous, while others remain ‘stuck’ in a socio-economic underclass. To be clear, ‘race’ is not the key determining factor in these outcomes. Rather, the forces that do exert such influence are considerably more complex and highly specific to the context in which large-scale immigration occurs.

This should be a fairly self-evident point, but *The British Dream* stands as a testament to the inability of opinion-makers to communicate it clearly, either through genuine ignorance or wilful distortion. Thankfully, Goodhardt takes the necessary time and explores the requisite detail to describe this complexity without flinching at uncomfortable statistics and disheartening conclusions. He begins by taking...
a kind of sociological snapshot of Merton, an area of high ethnic diversity in southwest London. His portrait is meant to reflect a microcosm of contemporary Britain following successive waves of post-war immigration: many national, ethnic and religious groups co-exist in close proximity, but at best the area presents a mixed picture of cooperation and rivalry among the various minorities and white Britons. The remainder of Goodhart’s book seeks to explain how this situation developed and what it means for the country’s political future, particularly concerning the question of how to balance diversity with a sense of solidarity. After supplying a general overview of how Britain’s minorities are faring in the crowded and competitive economy of the early 20th century, Goodhart recounts the historical forces that brought these communities to British shores in the first place, starting with the ‘First Great Arrival’ between 1948 and 1992. He draws a sharp distinction between that period and the next, initiated under New Labour in 1997. These two eras contain certain overlapping elements – sustained immigration from South Asia, for example – while being significantly different in terms of speed and scale.

The British immigration experience is sufficiently diverse to leave scholars and policymakers with a range of data that is simultaneously voluminous, incomplete, contradictory and expository. Goodhart’s major accomplishment with this book is to disaggregate some of that data and examine particular communities in specific contexts of historical immigration, a project that should (and largely does) deflate the idea of immigration as a monolithic (good or bad) phenomenon. Ironically, Goodhart periodically undermines his own achievements by lapsing into language that presents immigration in precisely that way, as an imminent and definable threat on the national scale, if only a mixed bag of favourable and troubling results in individual towns and cities:

In many places immigration is working as the textbooks say it should: minorities are upwardly mobile and creating interesting new hybrid identities... And we have come a long way in a short time. A country that less than 100 years ago believed it was right to control the destiny of many ‘lesser breeds’ has now invited them across its threshold and learnt to treat them more or less as equals... There are places in Britain, however, where the immigration story has been far from successful, notably in the northern ‘mill towns’ and other declining industrial regions... (p. xxvii).

Goodhart relies primarily on secondary sources, such as government and NGO reports, to reflect this ambiguous picture, and couples this analysis with some anecdotal field research. The emerging picture reveals the costs and benefits of immigration to be highly uneven depending on the immigrant group concerned. Some populations, such as East African Asians expelled from Uganda in 1972, have demonstrated a penchant for entrepreneurialism and a noted willingness to engage in the civic institutions of modern Britain. Others, such as Pakistanis from rural Kashmir, remain socially and economically hindered by factors such as gender inequality, poor literacy rates, detachment from the host culture and a ‘clannishness’ that thwarts social advancement. Eastern Europeans generally fall somewhere in between, with Poles described as hard-working pragmatists, but who ‘mainly have a guest worker mentality and many have no particular interest in joining British society’ (p. 213).

While laudatory of more successful minority groups, Goodhart does not shy away from singling out Kashmiri Pakistanis, Somalis and young Caribbean men for intensive criticism. These three groups exemplify Britain’s ‘stuck’ minorities, whose socio-economic progress has lost any traction. Reasons for this circumstance vary between the groups but, he argues, are largely attributable to specific cultural factors. The insularity of Kashmiris and the persistence of conservative cultural practices, such as forced marriage, is seen to be at the root of that group’s endemic poverty and poor educational attainment. Somalis are also characterized as under-educated as well as heavily welfare dependent, the chaos of their home country resulting in an undisciplined approach to work and a lack of stable family structures. Using data on black minority populations in Britain, Goodhart points out that young males of Car-
ibbean heritage show a statistical propensity for antisocial behaviour, exclusion from school and for crime. (He is careful to note an historical bias against blacks in law enforcement and criminal justice; still, among incarcerated blacks, Caribbeans are overrepresented.)

There is, of course, a multitude of factors that contribute to the situations Goodhart describes, and he makes a serious effort to address them, noting that racism and discrimination have historically played a significant role. His typecasting of these ‘stuck’ groups has been the source of much of the criticism that The British Dream has attracted, but some of the critiques overlook an important point: namely, that by specifying and contextualising specific problems within individual communities, Goodhart has helped to decouple these problems from immigration itself, providing a much better toolkit for analysing and working toward resolutions for problems within particular social and ethnic groups. Immigration provides a backdrop to these issues, but often only as a prelude. If anything, the data surrounding Britain’s least successful minorities should demonstrate that a heavily restrictive, one-size-fits-all approach to immigration could only ever be a partially effective method for addressing these problems. In any case, the three ‘stuck’ groups, as well as the Eastern Europeans that Goodhart worries are arriving in unsustainable numbers, all reflect different periods and policies of immigration law. The Caribbeans he discusses are often two or three generations removed from their immigrant ancestors. Pakistanis have migrated in fairly consistent numbers since the 1970s, arriving initially as guest workers and later via the family visa route. Somali immigrants have primarily been asylum seekers and refugees, a condition that explicitly limits their opportunities to work. Eastern Europeans, meanwhile, have arrived via an expansion of the European Union and its labour market protocols.

Goodhart is not wrong to worry about the social and economic consequences of fast-paced, large-scale migration, but his case for imposing onerous new restrictions on migrants is insufficiently supported by his discussions of the less successful minority groups. He has become a vociferous and outspoken campaigner for immigration restrictions as a buffer against declining social trust and the collapse of the welfare state. The British Dream articulates these concerns effectively and with justifiable urgency but relies too heavily on extensive and intrusive state intervention for resolution. This is just one of many factors that make Goodhart’s book both compelling and deeply frustrating. Compared to many others writing for a popular audience, he has made a better effort to understand the full complexity of the British immigration experience. In the name of progressive nationalism, however, he displays a discomforting willingness to collude with right-wing populists, tabloid provocateurs and self-serving political operators by conflating immigration with too broad a range of social and economic problems. Furthermore, he has adopted the rather paranoid and diversionary tactic of accusing those who disagree with him of ‘shutting down debate’ or treating the subject of immigration as taboo. This is a well-worn meme that one frequently finds in the right-wing press, wherein a failure to regard immigration as an immediate and overwhelming threat is equivalent to censorship, or at least a capitulation to the fluctuating whims of political correctness.

The British Dream’s flaws and contradictions do not mean that it is not worth reading. Goodhart may be correct in suggesting that readers’ reactions to the book will be influenced by their foregoing opinions on immigration. Yet there is enough interesting data in this book to enhance the knowledge of both pro- and anti-immigration campaigners, something that should help to promote compromise and policy decisions based on robust evidence. The social and economic ills attributed (rightly or wrongly) to immigration will take far more than new restrictions to overcome, and the discussions they provoke need to stop referring to immigration as a homogenous phenomenon with predictable results. The British Dream, for all its problems, at least offers a foundation for dialogue on how this might be achieved.

Andrew Wilbur
University of Texas at Austin