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To Stay or Return? Explaining Return Intentions of Central and Eastern European Labour Migrants

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This paper describes and tries to explain return intentions of Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian labour migrants in the Netherlands. Previous research has often emphasised the temporary or ‘liquid’ character of Central and Eastern European labour migration. We find that a substantial number of labour migrants intend to stay in the Netherlands for many years, and sometimes forever. Data from a survey of Central and Eastern European (CEE) labour migrants (Poles, Romanians, Bulgarians) in the Netherlands (N = 654), is used to test three hypotheses about return intentions. Economic success or failure is not found to be related to the return intentions of migrants. Apparently, some migrants return after being successful in migration, whereas others return after having failed. Migrants with strong links with Dutch society have less strong return intentions, whereas migrants with strong transnational ties intend to return sooner.

Keywords: return migration; labour migrants; Central and Eastern Europe; the Netherlands

Introduction

The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 resulted in significant new migration flows in Europe.¹ Fassmann et al. (2014) calculated that by 2011, almost 5 million citizens from Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries resided in the ‘old EU’ (cf. Okólski, Salt 2015). This study focuses on CEE labour migrants in the Netherlands. According to official statistics, the Netherlands hosted almost 180 000 CEE migrants in 2012 (Statistics Netherlands 2012). However, as these figures are based on Dutch population registers (GBA) and many CEE labour migrants do not register, the actual number of CEE migrants in the Netherlands is probably much larger. Recent research, using advanced statistical estimation techniques, estimated that in 2010 about 340 000 CEE nationals were present in the Netherlands, either temporarily or permanently, and either registered or not (van der Heijden, Cruyff, van Gils 2013).

A crucial question, in addition to the size, is the nature of the new East–West migration in Europe, particularly regarding the politically sensitive issue of return migration. Are CEE labour migrants only temporary residents or are they here to stay, like many ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s and 1970s? Looking back at the history of guest worker migration to Europe, several authors argue that the permanent settlement of guest workers and their families only followed after the recruitment of guest workers ended and the borders were

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de facto closed for them (Sassen 1997; Engbersen 2012). If this is correct, we may expect current CEE labour migrants to settle to a lesser extent than the former guest workers did. After all, the borders in the EU are and will remain open. Polish research shows that the massive migration of the post-accession period was indeed accompanied by significant reverse flows of return migrants (Kaczmarczyk 2013).

This paper further explores this issue by using survey data from 654 Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian labour migrants in the Netherlands, whose return intentions are examined by testing hypotheses based on four migration theories: the neoclassical economy; New Economics of Labour Migration; cultural assimilation theory, and transnationalism theory. The research question is: to what extent can the return intentions of CEE labour migrants in the Netherlands be explained by their economic success or failure, their transnational activities and/or their socio-cultural integration? The remainder of this article first describes some peculiarities of CEE migration to Western Europe, in particular the question of return migration. The next section elucidates the four theories, discusses recent findings on the topic and presents three hypotheses. The survey and the methodology used in the analyses are described before the main research findings are presented, and these are followed by the conclusion and discussion.

**CEE labour migration and the question of return**

Various authors argue that CEE labour migration to Western Europe is different from previous migration flows because many current CEE labour migrants do not intend to settle permanently. As Okólski (2001, 2012) describes, Poland has a tradition of temporary labour migration as workers from rural areas in Poland worked in urban industries, or later abroad, while still residing in their villages. This resulted in ‘incomplete migration’: a sort of circulation of individual household members, often repeated, and characterised by short-term employment abroad and a very high proportion of earnings remitted or repatriated to the migrant’s home country, where the costs of living was substantially lower (Okólski 2012: 35; cf. Okólski 2001). This migration is ‘incomplete’ in the sense that it does not result in settlement. Moreover, individual trips of workers are usually of very short duration, although migrants may be abroad for a large part of the year as a result of repeated journeys (Okólski 2001: 107). Wallace (2002) also points out the tradition of circular and temporary labour migration in Central Europe: rather than permanent one-way migration (the dominant pattern until recently) there has been a predominance of short-term, circulatory movements backwards and forwards across borders. This would be better termed mobility than migration (Wallace 2002: 604). Note that both authors refer to patterns of temporary and circular migration that existed prior to the EU enlargement.

Favell (2008: 703), writing about post-accession migration, also emphasises the temporary nature of these migratory movements. Rather than immigrants, CEE labour migrants are ‘regional free movers’: more likely to engage in temporary circular and transnational mobility, governed by the ebb and flow of economic demand, than in long-term, permanent migration. Other authors label the specific transient character of CEE labour migration with concepts like ‘liquid migration’ (Engbersen, Snel, de Boom 2010; Engbersen, Snel 2013), ‘intentional unpredictability’ (Eade, Drinkwater, Garapich 2007; Drinkwater, Garapich 2015) or ‘deliberate indeterminacy’ (Moriarty, Wickham, Salomonska, Krings, Bobek 2010). All authors agree that the specific context of East–West migration in Europe enables this new, transient character of migration: the history of circular labour migration in some CEE countries; the relatively short distances combined with the differences in wages and prosperity between sending and receiving countries; but above all, open borders in Europe that enable frequent movement. Moreover, many CEE labour migrants do not have fixed ideas about the duration of migration and tend to keep their options open. For instance, as Isański, Mleczko and Seredyńska-Abou Eid (2014: 5) found for Polish labour migrants: many of the participants travelled to more
than one country, their stays either abroad or in Poland were usually temporary, and they frequently returned to Poland for short periods of time. This new pattern of multiple returns replaces the former trend of settlement in the destination country. Finally, also Fihel and Grabowska-Lusinska (2014: 30) also found ‘repeating migration patterns’ typical for Polish labour migrants: Polish nationals still tend to engage in temporary, back-and-forth mobility for employment, also because of the significant costs of moving their family to the destination country (cf. Anacka, Matejko, Nesterowicz 2013; Fihel, Górny 2013; Kaczmarczyk 2013; Krings, Bobek, Moriarty, Salamońska, Wickham 2013).

Others nuance this idea of transient East–West migration in Europe and point to indications of a long-term or even permanent settlement of CEE nationals in Western Europe. For instance, as Holland, Fic, Rincon-Aznar, Stokes and Paluchowski (2011) showed, the current economic recession in the main receiving countries combined with moderate economic growth in sending countries like Poland has not yet resulted in the expected massive return migration. Previously, Eade et al. (2007: 33–34) showed, in a study on Polish migrants in the UK, that Polish migrants have various migration strategies including single, short-term migration to earn money to be spent upon return (‘hamsters’), circular migration alternating between work abroad and at home (‘storks’), open-ended plans for the future (‘searchers’), but also settlement (‘stayers’). Engbersen, Leerkes, Grabowska-Lusińska, Snel and Burgers (2013), in a later article, also point out the variety of migration patterns of CEE labour migrants: in addition to temporary, circular and transnational migration, they also found long-term settlement. In a study about Polish migrant workers in Norway, Friberg (2012: 1601–1602), shows that many Polish labour migrants settle in Norway. Friberg describes three ‘stages’ in Polish migration to Norway. Initially, many migrants go abroad to earn money for a better life for themselves and their families in Poland, without planning permanent relocation. However, not all migrants return. Some enter the ‘transnational commuter stage’: going to Norway regularly to earn money, but with their families and friends still in Poland. The third stage is that of settlement, when the primary household moves from Poland to Norway. Although Friberg observes all three ‘stages,’ this contradicts previous assumptions of CEE labour migration as typically a temporary or ‘liquid’ phenomenon. As White (2011, 2014) found in her study of Polish families in the UK after EU accession, particularly Polish families do not return. As Kaczmarczyk (2013: 112) observes, for many Polish migrants ‘return’ can often mean only a short break between periods spent abroad. This, again, highlights the liquid or fluid character of CEE labour migration (Anacka et al. 2013; Fihel, Górny 2013; White 2014).

Migration theory and return migration

Although migration research has traditionally focused on immigration to Western countries, there is a growing literature about return migration (Constant, Massey 2002; Cassarino 2004; de Haas, Fokkema 2011; Carling, Pettersen 2014; van Meeteren, Engbersen, Snel, Faber 2014; de Haas, Fokkema, Fihri, 2015). Some of these studies focus on actual return migration, others examine return intentions of previous migrants. Return migration may be defined as the movement of emigrants back to their homelands to resettle (thus not for vacation or extended visits without the intention of remaining at home) (Gmelch 1980: 136). Gmelch’s definition does not mention the possibility of temporary return as a break between two periods of working abroad. However, as we shall see, only a small minority of the respondents in the present research intend to move to another EU country after leaving the Netherlands. The research seeks to exclude the possibility of short-term temporary return or back-and-forth movements to the home country by asking respondents how long they intend to stay in the Netherlands. The focus of this article is the return intentions of CEE labour migrants. Obviously, return intentions are often at variance with actual return behaviour – as the ‘myth of return’ of many former guest workers clearly shows. However, various authors claim that return intentions
Economic migration theories

Dominant economic migration theories contain divergent assumptions about return migration and the determinants of return decisions (Constant, Massey 2002; Cassarino 2004; de Haas, Fokkema 2011; Holda, Saczuk, Strzelecki, Wyszyński 2011). Neoclassical economics (NE) explains migration as the result of individual cost–benefit trade-offs. Migrants decide to migrate or to return in order to maximise expected net lifetime earnings (Borjas 1989). If the expected lifetime benefits of migration (the wage gap between the origin and destination country) are higher than the costs (transport, first settlement in the destination country), migration is a rational choice. From this perspective, it is expected that economically successful migrants will settle permanently in the destination country and eventually have their spouses and children come over from the origin country. Return migration, on the other hand, is a sign of ‘failed migration.’ Return migrants are the ‘losers’: migration did not bring them the expected lifetime earnings or the costs were too high (Constant, Massey 2002). As de Haas and Fokkema (2011: 757) put it boldly, while ‘winners’ settle, ‘losers’ return. Regarding return intentions, we can hypothesise that the greater the migrants’ economic success, the less they intend to return (NE hypothesis).

The New Economics of Labour Migration theory (NELM) contains opposite ideas about return migration. NELM interprets migration as a strategy of households and extended families to spread income risks and to overcome market constraints in the sending country. Migration provides an additional income gained elsewhere (Stark 1991). Migrants generally leave for limited periods of time to meet certain income targets. From this perspective, migrants are seen as ‘target earners’ and are expected to stay in the destination country as long as they are unable to meet the income target, for instance because of unemployment or high costs of living. Migrants who have saved and remitted enough financial or human capital to realise their investment plans are expected to return. NELM views return migration not as ‘failure’ (as NE does), but rather as an indicator of economic success (de Haas, Fokkema 2011: 759). The NELM hypothesis is thus: the greater the migrants’ economic success, the sooner they intend to return.

Previous research on return migration and return intentions has produced mixed outcomes about both economic hypotheses. The findings of Constant and Massey (2002: 27) are more consistent with NE rather than NELM: migrants with stable, full-time employment are more likely to stay; unemployment or marginal employment strongly predicts return migration. However, holding this factor constant, a higher socio-economic position in terms of earnings or occupational prestige does not contribute to stronger return intentions. This outcome is not in line with NE. Also, their finding that sending remittances is strongly associated with return migration is – in their opinion – related to NELM. Constant and Massey therefore argue that the two economic arguments are neither mutually exclusive nor contradictory. Some migrants are ‘target earners’ who return after having reached their earnings target, others are ‘income maximizers’ who will stay when eco-
nominally successful (*idem*). De Haas and Fokkema (2011: 771) also find mixed outcomes with regard to the economic determinants of return intentions and conclude that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ theory is unlikely. Return migration and return intentions are likely to depend on initial migration motives, opportunities in both sending and receiving countries, and specific features of immigrant groups. In a recent study of Moroccan migrants in several European countries, de Haas et al. (2015) find that return intentions are more closely related to socio-cultural integration (or assimilation) than to structural or economic integration. Carling and Pettersen (2014) report similar findings: after incorporating factors like cultural assimilation and transnational ties in the analyses, the socio-economic indicators of employment status and financial stress hardly contribute to the explanation of return intentions.

Despite these previous research outcomes, the present research anticipates that in the specific case of CEE labour migrants in Western Europe, economic success in the host country increases the propensity to stay and thus decreases their return intentions. The reason is that the relatively short distances and open borders in Europe make it easy for successful CEE migrants to stay in the host country and simultaneously have frequent and intense contacts with the country of origin. The following hypothesis will therefore be examined:

*The greater the economic success achieved by CEE labour migrants from Poland, Romania and Bulgaria in the Netherlands, the less they intend to return soon (H1).*

**Socio-cultural integration theory**

While economic theories explain return migration and return intentions primarily with reference to economic factors, the third theoretical perspective focuses on the socio-cultural dimension of immigrant integration. Socio-cultural integration theory (SIT) postulates a negative relation between the socio-cultural integration of migrants and return intentions. ‘Socio-cultural integration’ can be understood in terms of identification with the host country, social contacts with native citizens, participation in social institutions of the host country and speaking its language (Snel, Engbersen, Leerkes 2006; de Haas, Fokkema 2011). SIT also assumes a negative association between the length of stay in the destination country and return intentions. The longer migrants stay, the more they become integrated in the receiving country, the more difficult return becomes in practice (in terms of both financial and emotional costs), and the more they are inclined to settle permanently. Therefore, the SIT hypothesis proposes: The stronger the socio-cultural integration of migrants, the less they intend to return.

Several studies confirm the assumption on socio-cultural integration and return migration. Constant and Massey (2002: 20) find negative relations between various indicators of attachment to Germany (like having a spouse in Germany or ‘feeling German’) and the likelihood of return migration. De Haas and Fokkema (2011: 771, 773) also find a negative relation between the level of socio-cultural integration (measured in terms of friendship with natives, participation in native organisations, language fluency, and having ‘modern values’) and return intentions. In their study about Moroccans in various European countries, de Haas et al. (2015) found a clear negative association between socio-cultural integration (measured by indicators such as watching Moroccan television, attitude towards mixed marriage, contacts with non-migrants and feelings of belonging) and return intentions. However, as they argue, the causality is not clear. Migrants who intend to return soon may feel less motivated to integrate into the host society. Most studies find the expected negative relation between duration of stay and return migration (Borjas 1989; Dustmann 1993; Waldorf 1995; Constant, Massey 2002: 19; Jensen, Pedersen 2007). Carling and Pettersen (2014) combine socio-cultural integration and the transnational ties of migrants. They find that migrants with strong socio-cultural integration and weak transnational ties are less inclined to return. Return intentions are most prevalent among migrants
with strong transnational ties and weak socio-cultural integration. However, the weakness of this analysis is that it says nothing about the independent effects of socio-cultural integration and transnational ties on return intentions.

The socio-cultural integration of CEE labour migrants can be expected to increase their inclination to stay. Migrants who have frequent contacts with Dutch natives in the host country, who speak the Dutch language and who are interested in Dutch news and Dutch developments, will be less inclined to return. The present research will therefore test the following hypothesis:

*The greater the socio-cultural integration of CEE labour migrants from Poland, Romania and Bulgaria in the Netherlands, the less they intend to return soon (H2).*

**Transnationalism theory**

The fourth theoretical perspective is transnationalism theory (TT). Transnationalism refers to the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc 1994: 7). Transnational ties and activities as such are not new, as the classic study The Polish Peasants in Europe and America by Thomas and Znaniecki (1918–1920) shows. However, modern transport and communication technologies enable cheaper and far more frequent communication and travel between sending and receiving countries than previously. As a result, contemporary migrants can be integrated in the receiving country and also have strong attachments to the sending country. The point here is that, according to TT, transnational ties and participating in transnational networks also affect migration intentions and migration decisions (Samers 2010: 95–97). For instance, involvement in migrant networks makes migration cheaper and thus more likely (Massey 1990). With regard to return migration, TT postulates a positive relation between the transnational activities of migrants (sending remittances, frequent home visits, intensive communication with the ‘folks back home;’ cf. Snel et al. 2006) and return migration, independently of economic success or failure in the destination country. More generally: According to transnationalists, returnees prepare their reintegration at home through periodic and regular visits to their home countries. They retain strong links with their home countries and periodically send remittances to their households (Cassarino 2004). The central TT hypothesis regarding return intention proposes: the more migrants are engaged in transnational activities, the more they intend to return. The TT hypothesis thus mirrors the SIT hypothesis. Whereas a strong attachment with the host country results in a weaker inclination of migrants to return, strong attachments with the origin country contribute to stronger return intentions.

Various studies observe a positive relation between migrants’ transnational activities and return migration. Duval (2004: 52) finds a positive link between home visits and return migration which he sees as the completion of the migration cycle. Others nuance this view by saying that return migration is not necessarily the end of a ‘migration cycle’ (King 2000; Ley, Kobayashi 2005; Sinatti 2011; Oeppen 2013). Besides permanent return, there are various forms of temporary return. All the same, all these authors report strong positive relations between transnational ties or involvement and temporary or permanent returns. Constant and Massey (2002: 20) also found that having a spouse and children in the origin country and sending remittances to friends and family back home contribute to the likelihood of return. Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002: 738) and later Bilgili (2014) find positive relations between various forms of economic and socio-cultural transnational activities and return intentions. However, using similar indicators, de Haas and Fokkema (2011: 772) come to different conclusions. In their study, transnational ties or transnational economic activities like sending money or goods to the home country are not related to return intentions. They only find a strong positive relation between investments in the origin country and return intentions. Again, one can ask what the causali-
ty is. Do migrants who invest in their origin country have stronger return intentions or is it the other way around? In their recent study, de Haas et al. (2015) again find positive relations between investments and, to a lesser extent, social ties to people in Morocco and return migration intentions.

Also in the case of CEE labour migrants, a positive relationship between their various transnational activities and their return intentions is to be expected, although this relationship may have different backgrounds for CEE migrants in Western Europe than for other (non-EU) migrant groups. For CEE migrants, transnational activities are not just a means to maintain contact with or to support the wider family, as applies to many other migrant categories. Some CEE labour migrants have their spouse and children still at home. For them, home visits and financial transfers to the home country are part and parcel of their own family life. In general, we assume that CEE labour migrants generally do not send remittances or invest in the home country only to support extended family members or a local community but also for their own future plans in the country of origin – after having returned. This is in line with the pattern of ‘incomplete migration’ in the EU pre-accession period (Okólski 2001). Moreover, White (2014) found that Polish families who settle in the UK scale down transnational practices, such as return visits to Poland and keeping well-informed about Polish current events. The following hypothesis will therefore be tested:

The greater the transnational activity of CEE labour migrants from Poland, Romania and Bulgaria in the Netherlands, the more they intend to return soon (H3).

Survey and measurements

The data used in this article are derived from a survey among labour migrants from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania in the Netherlands (N = 654). The fieldwork explicitly focused on recently arrived labour migrants and not on CEE nationals in general. Labour migrants are migrants who came to the Netherlands with the intention of working. The survey examined the labour market position and incorporation of CEE labour migrants (Engbersen et al. 2013; Snel, Faber, Engbersen 2014). The interviews were conducted between October 2009 and February 2011 in various Dutch municipalities, including Rotterdam and The Hague, two medium-sized cities (Breda, Dordrecht) and some rural towns (in agricultural areas). The field work took a year and a half because CEE labour migrants were interviewed in ten municipalities one by one. The face-to-face interviews were held in the mother tongue of the respondents. Native-speaker interviewers recruited respondents at places frequented by CEE labour migrants, such as Polish shops or churches, or on internet fora. Respondents were also approached in the street by the interviewers upon hearing their mother tongue or by identifying their car’s nationality plates. The respondents were deliberately selected from diverse sources; for example, care was taken not to overuse certain locations. Respondents were also recruited by snowball sampling. At the end of each interview, respondents were asked whether they knew of fellow nationals who could be interviewed. A structured questionnaire was used containing 213 questions about issues such as the migration history of respondents, their labour market and housing conditions, social integration in Dutch society, their transnational activities, and future plans.

Return intentions

A crucial survey question for this analysis concerns the expected duration of stay in the Netherlands. The answer categories for this question ranged from only three months to ‘more than 10 years’ and ‘forever.’ Here, responses are grouped into four categories: (0) ‘up to 2 years;’ (1) ‘2 to 10 years;’ (2) ‘more than 10 years/permanently;’ and (3) ‘don’t know.’ The latter category will be treated not just as ‘missing’ but as
a meaningful category. Migrants who don’t know how long they will stay embody the ‘intentional unpredictability’ which is assumed to be typical for post-accession CEE migrants (Eade et al. 2007).

**Economic success**

Two indicators were used to measure migrants’ economic success: (1) labour market participation; and (2) occupational status. First, respondents were asked about their current labour market situation. Possible answers were: employed on a permanent contract; employed on a temporary contract (including employment through an employment agency or another intermediary); self-employed (‘having own business’); working on an informal (‘verbal’) contract; work in one’s own household; searching for a job; being a student or a pupil; or something else. Respondents in the latter category could specify what they were doing at the moment. A new variable was constructed containing five categories: (0) employed on a permanent contract; (1) employed on a temporary contract; (2) (registered) self-employed; (3) working on a verbal/informal contract; and (4) non-working.

**Occupational status**

Second, respondents were asked about their occupation in an open question. The answers were categorised according to the Erikson Goldthorpe and Portocarero (EGP) occupational class scheme (Erikson, Goldthorpe, Portocarero 1979; 1983). The EGP scheme consists of eight occupational categories: (I) higher-grade professionals; (II) lower-grade professionals; (III) routine clerical non-manual workers; (IV) small employers and independent workers; (V) manual supervisors and foremen; (VI) skilled manual workers; (VIIa) semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture); and (VIIb) (unskilled) agricultural workers. For this study a final category was added to the EGP scheme: ‘survival strategies,’ which refers to informal income-generating activities such as being a street musician or selling newspapers on the street (probably street newspapers). The official EGP scheme does not take these informal work strategies into account. For interpretation reasons, the variable occupational status was reduced to four categories: (0) high (occupational categories I to III); (1) medium (IV to VI); (2) low (VIIa, VIIb and ‘survival strategy’); and (3) non-working. Respondents who had no job at the time of the interview were categorised as persons with no occupational status. This number of inactive respondents is the same as the number of inactive respondents for the variable ‘labour market situation.’

**Socio-cultural integration**

The survey contained questions about three aspects of socio-cultural integration: (1) frequency of contact with Dutch natives (at work, in the neighbourhood and during free time); (2) speaking the Dutch language at work (with the boss/manager or with colleagues) and with friends/acquaintances during free time; and (3) following Dutch news and developments in the Netherlands through various channels (colleagues, friends, TV, internet, radio, newspapers). The response categories for the first two sets of questions ranged from (0) ‘never’ to (4) ‘very often;’ for the last set of questions the range was (0) ‘daily’ to (4) ‘never.’ An extra category ‘not speaking the Dutch language’ was added to the questions about Dutch language proficiency, for people with no command of Dutch at all. The three aspects were combined in a scale to measure the socio-cultural integration of respondents in the Netherlands. The answers to the questions about following Dutch news and Dutch developments are reversed in such a way that they point in the same direction as the other two sets of questions. A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 12 items of the
three sets of questions; the results are presented in Table A1 (in the Annex 1). Only one item (contact frequency with native Dutch at work) has a small factor loading (0.340). After deleting this item, the remaining items load high enough on the first component, representing socio-cultural integration. A scale taking the mean of the 11 items was constructed, including only respondents with valid answers on at least nine items (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.812). The lowest score on the scale is 0; the highest score on the scale is 4.27. The higher the score on the scale, the stronger the migrant’s socio-cultural integration in Dutch society.

**Transnational activities**

The survey contained several questions about the transnational ties and activities of CEE migrants in the Netherlands. The focus was on transnational activities defined as cross-border activities of an economic, political or socio-cultural nature (Snel et al. 2006). Three indicators of transnational activities often found in transnationalism studies were used:

- frequency of contact with friends and family in the origin country; in two questions respondents were asked how often they are in contact with (1) family and (2) friends and acquaintances back home;
- frequency of home country visits: number of times per year a migrant visits the home country;
- sending remittances: respondents were asked what proportion of their monthly income they spend to support their family, friends or others. If this question was not answered, the proportion was calculated by dividing the amount of money they remit by their income.

An index based on the four above-mentioned questions was constructed by assigning scores (0, 1 or 2) to the different variable categories (note that the separate effects of the three types of transnational activities were not analysed). Table A2 (in the Annex 1) shows the distribution of these scores, which were summed creating an index with a minimum of 0 (no transnational activity) and a maximum of 8 (high transnational activity). As some respondents did not answer all four questions, the sum was divided by the maximum score that a respondent could reach (for example, if a respondent only answered three questions, his or her maximum score was 6). This created a more reliable index, ranging from 0 (no transnational activity) to 1 (high transnational activity). The higher the index score, the more CEE migrants are transnationally active.

**Duration of stay**

The duration of stay in the Netherlands is measured by the total time elapsed since the respondent’s first visit to the Netherlands for work (thus including periods possibly spent in the home country or elsewhere outside the Netherlands). The duration of stay was measured in months because this is a more exact measurement than years, and because some respondents first came to the Netherlands to work less than a year before the interview. The average duration of respondents’ stay is 27.5 months (slightly over 2 years).

**Personal characteristics**

The analysis takes account of personal characteristics such as sex, age, educational level and origin. Males are coded with (0), females with (1). Ages range from 18 to 64 years. Educational level is divided into four categories: (0) low (no education, only primary or lower secondary education – up to the age of 15); (1) medium (higher secondary education, including high school); (2) high (higher vocational (polytechnic) and academic education); and (3) other. The latter category contains people who are still studying and people who reported an unclear educational level. The origin of respondents refers to their home country (Poland, Romania or Bulgaria).
Findings

The respondents

Table 1 shows the personal characteristics of the respondents (N = 654). More than half of them were Polish (58 per cent); the others came from Bulgaria (25 per cent) and Romania (17 per cent). Compared to the number of registered migrants from these three countries in 2011, relatively few Polish migrants were interviewed, whereas Romanians and particularly Bulgarians were somewhat over-represented. More men than women were interviewed (respectively 57 per cent and 43 per cent). The majority of respondents are quite young; almost 53 per cent are aged 30 or below. Bulgarian respondents are on average slightly older compared to the Poles and Romanians in the sample. With regard to educational level, Table 1 clearly shows that current CEE labour migrants – in contrast to a previous generation of labour migrants (‘guest workers’) from the 1960s and 1970s – are generally well educated. Only a minority of respondents (16 per cent) have a low level of education in the sense that they completed only primary or lower secondary school (up to the age of 15). Only Bulgarian respondents more frequently have low educational levels. Almost two-thirds of the respondents (64 per cent) have a medium-level education: they have finished high school or a similar education up to the age of 18. One-fifth of the respondents (one-third of the Romanians) have completed a university or polytechnic education. Compared to the Poles, Romanians and Bulgarians have on average lived somewhat longer in the Netherlands. More than one in five Polish respondents first arrived in the Netherlands two years at most before the interview took place. Only about one in seven respondents had lived in the Netherlands for four years or more. The latter outcomes seem to be in line with previous analyses that emphasise the temporary nature of CEE migration (Wallace 2002; Okólski 2012; Engbersen et al. 2013). However, it may also be that the relatively short migration history of most CEE labour migrants does not yet allow for longer residence in the Netherlands.

Return intentions

Table 1 also shows the return intentions of respondents, the central dependent variable in the analyses. Respondents were asked how long they intend to stay in the Netherlands. Most migrants in the sample intend to leave the Netherlands in two to ten years’ time (30 per cent). 18 per cent of respondents, most of them Polish nationals, wanted to leave the Netherlands earlier, within two years. When asked where they intend to go after leaving the Netherlands, the vast majority (almost 80 per cent) of the latter category said they want to return home. Only the minority intend to work in another EU country after leaving the Netherlands (14 per cent). About a quarter of all respondents want to live in the Netherlands for at least ten years or permanently. A relatively large proportion (28 per cent) doesn’t know yet if and when they will return to their origin country. Especially Bulgarian respondents (more than 40 per cent of them) often don’t know whether they will stay in the Netherlands or return to their home country, and when.

Explaining return intentions

The main research question in this study asks how the return intentions of CEE labour migrants in the Netherlands can be explained. Table 2 shows the outcome of a multinomial logistic regression analysis that estimates the return intentions of respondents with various (personal) characteristics. The return intentions are categorised in the same way as those in Table 1. Respondents who intend to return within two years (first column), within two to ten years (second column) or who don’t know if and when they want to return (third
column) are compared with respondents who intend to stay in the Netherlands for at least ten years or permanently (reference category). For each category, two models are estimated. Model 1 incorporates only the personal characteristics of respondents (origin country, sex, age, education and duration of stay); Model 2 is the full model that incorporates all relevant independent variables.

Table 1. Personal characteristics of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Romanian</th>
<th>Bulgarian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N = 378 (57.8%)</td>
<td>N = 112 (17.1%)</td>
<td>N = 164 (25.1%)</td>
<td>N = 654 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return intentions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-2 years</td>
<td>22.6 (85)</td>
<td>17.1 (19)</td>
<td>7.9 (13)</td>
<td>18.0 (117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-10 years</td>
<td>31.6 (119)</td>
<td>25.2 (28)</td>
<td>28.0 (46)</td>
<td>29.6 (193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>until retirement/forever</td>
<td>24.7 (93)</td>
<td>25.2 (28)</td>
<td>23.8 (39)</td>
<td>24.6 (160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don’t know</td>
<td>21.0 (79)</td>
<td>32.4 (36)</td>
<td>40.2 (66)</td>
<td>27.8 (651)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour market participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanent contract</td>
<td>3.7 (14)</td>
<td>11.7 (13)</td>
<td>6.1 (10)</td>
<td>5.7 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>temporary contract</td>
<td>75.5 (284)</td>
<td>54.1 (60)</td>
<td>12.3 (20)</td>
<td>56.0 (364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-employed (registered)</td>
<td>8.5 (32)</td>
<td>8.1 (9)</td>
<td>11.7 (19)</td>
<td>9.2 (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verbal contract/informal work</td>
<td>5.9 (22)</td>
<td>18.0 (20)</td>
<td>56.4 (92)</td>
<td>20.6 (134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inactive</td>
<td>6.4 (24)</td>
<td>8.1 (9)</td>
<td>13.5 (22)</td>
<td>8.5 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>7.1 (27)</td>
<td>26.8 (30)</td>
<td>13.4 (22)</td>
<td>11.8 (77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td>15.9 (60)</td>
<td>27.7 (31)</td>
<td>27.4 (45)</td>
<td>20.8 (136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>70.6 (267)</td>
<td>37.5 (42)</td>
<td>47.0 (77)</td>
<td>59.0 (386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none (inactive)</td>
<td>6.3 (24)</td>
<td>8.0 (9)</td>
<td>13.4 (22)</td>
<td>8.4 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural integration (mean)</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational activities (mean)</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of stay (mean)</td>
<td>26.40</td>
<td>30.05</td>
<td>28.38</td>
<td>27.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>60.5 (228)</td>
<td>56.3 (63)</td>
<td>49.7 (81)</td>
<td>57.1 (372)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>39.5 (149)</td>
<td>43.8 (49)</td>
<td>50.3 (82)</td>
<td>42.9 (280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>13.5 (51)</td>
<td>37.5 (42)</td>
<td>20.7 (34)</td>
<td>19.4 (127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td>75.3 (284)</td>
<td>47.3 (53)</td>
<td>48.2 (79)</td>
<td>63.7 (416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>10.6 (40)</td>
<td>11.6 (13)</td>
<td>9.9 (49)</td>
<td>15.6 (102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>0.5 (2)</td>
<td>3.6 (4)</td>
<td>1.2 (2)</td>
<td>1.2 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (mean)</td>
<td>29.66</td>
<td>32.13</td>
<td>33.45</td>
<td>31.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dataset Central and Eastern European Migrants, N = 654.
Table 2. Relative risk ratios (exp(B)) from a multinomial logistic regression analysis of return intentions (reference category is ‘more than 10 years/permanently’)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0–2 years</th>
<th></th>
<th>2–10 years</th>
<th></th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.865</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>3.127</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>1.594</td>
<td>1.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (ref = low)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.101</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.305</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.432</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.366</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>5.423</td>
<td>6.125</td>
<td>-- 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-- 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of stay</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.944</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin (ref = Bulgarian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>2.545</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.233</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>2.653</td>
<td>1.896</td>
<td>0.732</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour market participation (ref = permanent contract)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>temporary contract</td>
<td>1.056</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.857</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.672</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-employed</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.107</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verbal/informal contract</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.869</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.626</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inactive</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational status (ref = medium)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>1.232</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none (inactive)</td>
<td>-- 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-- 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-- 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational activities</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>1.056</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>1.043</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural integration</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R-square</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed)
1 Cell is empty.
2 Redundant because category has already been taken into account in labour market participation.

Source: Dataset Central and Eastern European Migrants.

We first compare the odds that respondents intend to return to their home country in the short term (within two years) with the odds that they intend to stay for ten years or longer (reference category). Looking at Model 1, various personal characteristics (country of origin, sex, age and duration of stay) seem to have significant effects. Note that the educational level of migrants has no effect on their return intentions. However, when including other relevant independent variables (labour market participation, occupational status, transnational activities and socio-cultural integration) in the analysis in Model 2, the significance levels of some of the personal characteristics change. Two of the personal characteristics (country of origin and duration of
stay) lose their significance, and one of the categories of education (‘high’) gains significance. Taking all other factors into account, Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian respondents no longer differ in their return intentions. Duration of stay loses significance because it is significantly related to the level of socio-cultural integration, one of the new variables in Model 2 (Pearson’s $r$: 0.34; $p = 0.000$). In other words, it is not so much the duration of their stay as such that affects migrants’ return intentions as their level of socio-cultural integration in Dutch society. Two other personal characteristics remain significant in Model 2: age and sex. The older the respondents, the smaller the odds they intend to return to their home country within two years, compared with the odds of intending to stay for at least ten years (odds ratio: 0.91). The odds that male respondents intend to return within two years is three times higher than the odds that female respondents intend to do so (odds ratio: 3.13). Moreover, the category ‘high educational level’ gains significance: Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian labour migrants with a high educational level are more likely to intend to stay for just two years at most (compared with the odds that they intend to stay for at least ten years) than those with a low educational level.

In addition to these personal characteristics, two other factors included in Model 2 affect the return intentions of respondents: their level of socio-cultural integration and their transnational ties. The more respondents are involved in transnational activities and have transnational contacts with friends and family in their country of origin, and the less their socio-cultural integration into Dutch society, the higher the odds they intend to leave the Netherlands within two years, compared to the odds that they intend to stay for at least ten years (odds ratio 1.04 and 0.15 respectively). The two socio-economic factors included in the analysis in Model 2 play a limited role in the respondents’ return intentions. The sizes of the odds ratios of the occupational status’ categories are relatively large, however, the effects do not appear to be significant.

The next column in Table 2 compares the odds that respondents intend to stay in the Netherlands for a medium-to-long period (leaving in between two and ten years) with the odds that they intend to stay for at least ten years or permanently (reference category). Model 1 shows that of the personal characteristics, only age has a strong effect on the return intentions of respondents: the older they are, the greater the odds that they intend to stay in the Netherlands for at least ten years or permanently. This effect remains significant in the full model (odds ratio 0.92 in Model 2). Duration of stay also seems to affect the return intentions of respondents in Model 1, but this factor loses significance in Model 2. On the other hand, level of education gains significance in Model 2: higher-educated and medium-educated respondents are more likely to intend to stay in the Netherlands for a medium-to-long period than lower-educated respondents. Model 2 also shows that both the level of socio-cultural integration of migrants and the intensity of their transnational activities and contacts significantly affect their return intentions. The more respondents are involved in transnational activities and the less their socio-cultural integration in Dutch society, the more they intend to leave the Netherlands in between two and ten years’ time, compared with the odds that they intend to stay in the Netherlands for ten years or longer (odds ratio 1.06 and 0.29 respectively). Here as well, the socio-economic position of respondents is only related to their return intentions to a limited extent. Labour market participation is not related to return intentions at all. With regard to occupational status, only people with a low occupational status have smaller chances of intending to stay for a medium-to-long period (compared with the chance of staying for at least ten years) than people with a medium occupational status.

The final comparison is between the odds that respondents say they ‘don’t know’ how long they will stay in the Netherlands – what Eade et al. (2007: 34) call ‘intentional unpredictability’ – and the odds that they intend to stay for at least ten years or permanently. As previously, duration of stay seems to affect respondents’ return intentions in Model 1, but this factor loses significance in the full model. This is not the case with the other two personal characteristics that affect return intentions: country of origin and age. With all relevant factors taken into account, Bulgarian respondents significantly more often don’t know when they
will return to their home country than Poles (compared with the odds that they will stay in the Netherlands for at least ten years or permanently). The same goes, obviously, for younger respondents: the younger they are, the more respondents are inclined to leave the future open. As in the two previous comparisons, both transnational involvement and socio-cultural integration appear to affect migrants’ return intentions. Respondents with more transnational activities and contacts and those who are less socio-culturally integrated in Dutch society are more inclined not to know how long they will stay in the Netherlands, compared with the odds that they intend to stay for at least ten years or permanently (odds ratios 1.04 and 0.33 respectively). Note finally that the socio-economic position of respondents does not appear to be related to their return intentions.

Conclusion and discussion

This article explores the return intentions of CEE labour migrants in the Netherlands. As several million CEE nationals went to the ‘old’ EU to work, the central question now is whether CEE labour migrants will remain only temporarily and then return, or are here to stay like many of the former ‘guest workers’ of the 1960s and 1970s. It is migrants’ return intentions rather than actual return that are explored here, as figures on the actual return migration of CEE labour migrants are scarce. Although return intentions will deviate from actual return, some authors argue that return intentions are significant in their own right. Return intentions show the return motivations of migrants, even if social, economic and political constraints prevent actual return, and can also affect migrant behaviour other than actual return (de Haas, Fokkema 2011; Carling, Pettersen 2014).

Following general migration theories, three hypotheses about return migration and return intentions were formulated at the outset of this research (H1, H2, H3). Neoclassical economic migration theory (NE) expects that successful migrants will intend to stay longer. New Economics of Labour Migration theory (NELM) suggests the opposite: economically successful migrants will return soon (as they have met their income targets) while failed migrants need to stay on. This article argues that in the specific case of CEE labour migrants in Western Europe, NE theory will be more valuable than NELM theory. Given the relatively short distances and the open borders in Europe, there is little reason for economically successful migrants to return, which would be expected to produce a negative association between economic success and return intentions (H1). Socio-cultural integration theory (SIT) expects that not socio-economic success or failure, but socio-cultural integration will be negatively related to return intentions (H2). Transnationalism theory (TT), on the other hand, expects that transnational activities and contacts will be positively related to return intentions (H3). A first and general outcome is that socio-economic factors (the labour market position and occupational status of migrants) does not appear to be related to return intentions at all. Whether or not CEE labour migrants are economically successful in the host country does not affect their return intentions. This means that both NE and NELM fail to explain the return intentions of CEE labour migrants. This finding is in line with several previous studies that also found no or mixed effects of economic success on the return intentions of migrants (Constant, Massey 2002; de Haas, Fokkema 2011; Carling, Pettersen 2014; de Haas et al. 2015). One possible explanation is that migrants return for a variety of reasons. Some return home after a successful migration, whereas others return after their migration has failed (Cerase 1974; Carling 2004). This is in line with Bijwaard and Wahba (2014) who found that intensities of return migration are U-shaped with respect to migrants’ income, implying a higher intensity in both low- and high-income groups. Another explanation could be that the indicators of ‘economic success’ ignore the dual reference frame of many labour migrants (cf. Waldinger, Lichter 2003; Wills, Datta, Evans, Herbert, May, McIlwaine 2010). CEE migrants with uncertain jobs and a low occupational status may be less successful according to the standards of
the receiving society and the prevailing academic classification schemes, but may be very successful in their own eyes.

The research findings confirm the other two hypotheses. First, the expected positive relation was found between migrants’ transnational activities and their return intentions. CEE migrants who maintain frequent contact with friends and family back home, who pay frequent home visits and who spend larger sums on remittances, intend to return to the home country sooner than migrants who are less transnationally engaged. Second, a negative relation was found between the socio-cultural integration of migrants and return intentions. Labour migrants who are strongly connected with Dutch society in several ways are more inclined to stay in the Netherlands for longer periods of time or even indefinitely than less integrated migrants, even after controlling for the duration of stay in the Netherlands. A more general conclusion of the analysis is that it is socio-cultural factors (socio-cultural integration and transnational activities) that can explain variation in return intentions, rather than the socio-economic success or failure of migrants as postulated by the economic migration theories (NE, NELM).

The research also found that higher-educated CEE labour migrants intend to stay in the Netherlands for shorter periods of time (up to two years or between two and ten years rather than ten years or longer) than lower-educated labour migrants. A possible explanation is that foreign workers who work below their level of training, as many highly skilled CEE labour migrants do, have stronger intentions to return because they do not want to do this work indefinitely (Pungas, Toomet, Tammaru, Anniste 2012). Some higher-educated foreign workers may also be more transnationally oriented and ‘hop’ from one country to another. This may also explain why they intend to stay in the Netherlands for shorter periods of time. Another unexpected outcome is that many Bulgarian respondents, more often than Poles or Romanians, don’t know how long they will stay. A possible explanation could be that the Poles in the sample relatively often work for temporary employment agencies (with clear expectations and agreements about how long they will stay in the Netherlands), whereas many of the Bulgarians are working informally. Obviously, there is less clarity for them about how long they will manage to survive working ‘off the books.’

Finally, there are some limitations to this study. Since the analysis is based on ‘return intentions,’ which is different from actual return behaviour, it is important to complement the study of return intentions with studies on migrants who have actually returned or settled permanently in the host country. Another limitation is that the causality of the relationships is not obvious. Clear associations were found between transnational activities and socio-cultural integration on the one hand and return intentions on the other. However, it is not clear what the causality is. Do strong transnational activity and weak integration within Dutch society cause strong return intentions of CEE labour migrants in the Netherlands? Or is it the other way around: do strong return intentions make CEE labour migrants more transnationally active and less integrated into Dutch society? Or is there another factor at work, such as the migration strategies of migrants, that affects all other factors? For instance, target earners may intend to stay for shorter periods of time, have fewer contacts with Dutch society and retain stronger transnational ties with the home country than other migrant types. The cross-sectional survey data used in this research does not enable these questions to be answered.

Notes

1 In 2004, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia acceded to the EU, followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.
2 Some respondents reported to be self-employed, but appeared to be active in informal work (for instance, street musicians or domestic cleaners) because they were not officially registered as self-employed.
The sample is adequate for running PCA: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO) = .792. The correlations were large enough for running PCA: Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ² (55) = 2466.243, p < .001.

According to Statistics Netherlands, ample 91,000 Poles, Romanians and Bulgarians (foreign born) were registered with Dutch municipalities in 2011; 71 per cent were Poles, 16 per cent Bulgarians, and 13 per cent Romanians (source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline; own computations). Bulgarians were oversampled because the cities of Rotterdam and The Hague had special interest in this category.

References


**Annex 1**

**Table A1. Results of principal component analysis (PCA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact frequency with native Dutch</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>% of variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How often do you have contact with (native) Dutch at work?</td>
<td>(0) never – (4) very often</td>
<td>deleted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often do you have contact with (native) Dutch in the neighbourhood?</td>
<td>(0) never – (4) very often</td>
<td>0.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often do you have contact with (native) Dutch in your free time?</td>
<td>(0) never – (4) very often</td>
<td>0.625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaking Dutch language</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>% of variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How often do you speak Dutch at work with your boss/manager?</td>
<td>(0) Do not speak Dutch – (1) never – (5) very often</td>
<td>0.735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often do you speak Dutch with your colleagues?</td>
<td>(0) Do not speak Dutch – (1) never – (5) very often</td>
<td>0.769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often do you speak Dutch in your free time with friends/acquaintances</td>
<td>(0) Do not speak Dutch – (1) never – (5) very often</td>
<td>0.771</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Following Dutch news and developments in the Netherlands</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>% of variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please indicate how often and in which manner you keep yourself informed about Dutch news and developments in the Netherlands?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Colleagues</em></td>
<td>(0) never – (4) daily</td>
<td>0.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Friends</em></td>
<td>(0) never – (4) daily</td>
<td>0.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Internet</em></td>
<td>(0) never – (4) daily</td>
<td>0.534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>TV</em></td>
<td>(0) never – (4) daily</td>
<td>0.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Radio</em></td>
<td>(0) never – (4) daily</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Newspapers</em></td>
<td>(0) never – (4) daily</td>
<td>0.573</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Initial Eigenvalue | 3.269 |
| % of variance | 29.961 |

Source: Dataset Central and Eastern European Migrants.
Table A2. Index score distribution transnational activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency of contact with family</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every day</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than once a month</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency of contact with friends and acquaintances</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every day</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than once a month</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage remittances of income</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–25%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–50%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51–75%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76–100%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%+</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home visits</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 times a year</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2 times a year</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 times a year or more often</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dataset Central and Eastern European Migrants.
Production and Transnational Transfer of the Language of Difference: The Effects of Polish Migrants’ Encounters with Superdiversity

Anna Gawlewicz*

While Polish migration to the UK has attracted much academic attention, there has been less discussion about the consequences of Polish migrants’ encounters with difference in socially diverse UK contexts. In particular, relatively little has been written about how Polish migrants describe or refer to ‘visible’ difference in terms of ethnicity, nationality, religion, class and gender. This reflects a broader tendency in migration studies to frequently overlook the production and transnational transfer of migrant language. In this article, I explore how Polish post-2004 migrants to the northern English city of Leeds produce ‘the language of difference’ and how this migrant language is passed on to non-migrants in Poland. I distinguish two types of language of difference – the language of stigma and the language of respect. I note that migrants construct both speech normativities through engaging with rhetoric existing in the Polish and/or the UK context as well as through developing ‘migrant slang’ of difference. I further argue that the language of stigma and the language of respect are transferred to Poland via the agency of migrants. The article draws upon a broader study of Polish migrants’ values and attitudes towards difference and the circulation of ideas between these migrants and their family members and friends in Poland. It contributes to emerging debates on Polish migrants’ encounters with difference and social remittances between the UK and Poland.

Keywords: difference; encounter; migrant language; social remittance; Polish migrants to the UK

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Since 2004, when Poland entered the European Union (EU), we have witnessed an unprecedented East–West migration of Polish people, and Central and Eastern Europeans more broadly (Black, Engbersen, Okólski, Pantiru 2010). A telling example of this intra-European mobility is Polish migration to the United Kingdom (UK) (Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski 2008; GUS 2010). The UK is a postcolonial society and has been described as ‘superdiverse’ because of relatively undisturbed immigration throughout the 20th and early 21st century (Vertovec 2007). Poland, on the other hand, was arguably ‘isolated’ from ethnic, national and religious diversity from the 1940s until the late 1980s as a result of the Second World War (WWII) and the communist regime (Borowik, Szarota 2004). As a consequence of this profound ‘closure,’ Poles are likely to first encounter increased cultural diversity when they cross the border into the UK (Jordan 2006). Since many Polish migrants come from relatively homogeneous environments (Podemski 2012), in the UK they frequently face substantially different normativities, lifestyles, values and attitudes. The everyday experience of such contact is likely to impact on their understandings of diversity, as well as on their capacity to live with and among difference.

Despite increased academic interest in Polish migrants to the UK, the effects of their encounters with difference and the language they employ to make sense of diversity have received less attention. In this article, I addresses these issues from a human geography perspective and draw attention to how crucial they are to greater understanding of Polish people’s migration experiences. I stress that research into migrant language referring to difference, and its transnational transfer, is of particular importance for Polish society. Indeed, migrant transfers are likely to actively shape language as well as values and attitudes towards immigrants, refugees and broadly understood difference in the Polish context. This is of increasing relevance given the accelerated immigration to Poland that has followed the Russian–Ukrainian conflict and the European migrant crisis. In everyday life, language – understood not only as an accumulation of words, but also as a way of articulating them – inevitably expresses the intentions, views, values and attitudes of the speakers (Collins, Clément 2012; Thomas, Waring 1999). The aim of this article is to explore how Polish post-2004 migrants to the diverse UK city of Leeds produce and pass on to their significant others in Poland expressions which describe and relate to ‘visible’ difference in terms of ethnicity, religion, class and gender. I collectively label the body of these terms ‘the language of difference.’ In the article, I particularly address the following questions: what kinds of language of difference do Polish migrants employ? How is the language of difference produced? And how is it transferred to the Polish context through the agency of migrants?

I build upon original empirical material I collected for a broader research project looking at Polish migrants’ values and attitudes towards difference and the circulation of ideas between these migrants and their significant others in Poland (Gawlewicz 2014a, 2014b; 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Gawlewicz, Narkowicz 2015). In doing so, I innovatively explore narrative accounts of both migrants and their non-migrant family members and friends. Although I focus on Polish language, I explain certain usages in order for non-Polish speakers to appreciate my argument.

I begin the article with discussing the theoretical framework of the study. I particularly refer to encounters with difference, the transnational circulation of ideas and the interplay of migration experience of difference.
and language. I then outline the methodologies I employed and explain the chosen context of Leeds. Further in the article, I firstly focus on the types of language of difference found in the collected empirical material. Secondly, I illustrate how and in what circumstances these speech normativities were constructed by Polish migrants. Finally, I investigate how the ‘migrant slang’ of difference was passed on to non-migrant significant others in Poland.

Migrant encounters with difference and the circulation of ideas across borders

In this article, I draw upon human geography research of encounters with difference in terms of ethnicity, nationality, religion, class and gender (see e.g. Valentine 2008), which offers an insightful and innovative way of understanding migrant encounters with socially diverse host societies. It has relatively rarely been applied to Polish migration to the UK, and therefore refreshes ongoing debates about the effects of post-2004 migrations on the lives of Polish migrants and Polish society more broadly.

While the term ‘encounter’ builds on Goffman’s (1961) research into social interactions, it was relatively rarely employed until the 2000s when human geographers started to utilise it in academic debates on multiculturalism, social diversity and difference (Andersson, Sadgrove, Valentine 2012; Fincher, Iveson 2008; Hemming 2011; Matejskova, Leitner 2011; Valentine 2008; Wiesel, Bigby, Carling-Jenkins 2013; Wilson 2013). In these contexts, the concept of encounter has been used to describe (social) interactions and relations between, and among, the residents of global cities diversified in terms of ethnicity, nationality, religion, class, sexuality, gender, age and (dis)ability. Despite this understanding, the concept remains broad and has been utilised to explore bodily as well as symbolic encounters with ideas, places, societies, nature and art (Donish 2013; McNally 2013). Migration researchers have increasingly applied it to investigations of migrant encounters with diversity and difference of, and within, host societies (Cook, Dwyer, Waite 2011; Nowicka 2012; Phillips 2012).

Said (2003[1978]) famously argued that difference is intricately tied to sameness, as for every category of identification there must exist a constitutive outside or otherness (in his original claim he juxtaposed ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’). This was further discussed by Young (1990) who spoke of a ‘neutral citizen’ of modern societies – White, male, heterosexual, able-bodied and bourgeois. This coding of the ‘neutral’ or ‘natural’ marks non-White, female, non-heterosexual or disabled bodies as different, so that difference remains in constant relation (yet open-ended and never complete) to what tends to be conceptualised as ‘normal.’ It does not exist as such – rather, it is produced and reproduced through historical and cultural processes as well as geographies (Young 1990).

International migration and migrant encounters with ‘the different,’ ‘the new’ or ‘the unknown’ open up possibilities of disruption and negotiation of various aspects of identity and everyday life (Silvey 2004). Siara (2009), for instance, speaks of migration from Poland to the UK as an opportunity to rework values and norms in relation to gender and ethnicity. While a number of research informants in her study reaffirm the patriarchal model of male/female roles (dominant in the Polish context), others advocate a change in the perception of gender roles of women and more equality for them (Siara 2009: 180). Furthermore, Siara looks into relationships between Polish women and men of different ethno-national and religious backgrounds. Although some, mainly male, participants tend to stigmatise Polish women involved in such relationships, expressing racist views, others produce a discourse of ethnic tolerance and openness towards difference. This study, as well as further research involving Polish migrants’ responses to diversity (e.g. Burrell 2009; Datta 2009; Ryan 2010; White 2010), demonstrates that understandings of gender, ethnicity, and other axes of difference are likely to be challenged through migration to diverse societies such as the UK.
Recent migration and transnationalism literature suggests that many migrants maintain close contact with their relatives and friends in sending societies (Metykova 2010; Nedelcu 2012). Information and communication technologies alongside inexpensive telephone services and increasingly affordable air travel facilitate relatively frequent information exchanges and sustain long-distance relationships (Vertovec 2009). This contributes to the transnational exchange of information and ideas.

Over a decade and a half ago Levitt (1998) famously claimed that migrants affect their origin communities through so-called social remittances – the ideas, practices, discourses and behaviour that travel from host to home societies through the agency of migrants. This was further reflected in a number of studies inspired by this conceptualisation (e.g. Elrick 2008; Kubal 2015; Pérez-Armendáriz, Crow 2010; Vlase 2013). Over time Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011, 2013) extended this original claim to the idea of both migrant and non-migrant communities mutually influencing each other across national borders. However, while our knowledge of how ideas travel across national borders has increased, we still know relatively little about how understandings of difference are passed between migrants and non-migrants as a consequence of migrant encounters with superdiversity.

Migration and language

Given that migrant identities, lifestyles, values and attitudes are continuously negotiated, it is unsurprising that the language migrants employ to refer to ‘the new’ or ‘the different’ of the host societies is also constantly in the making. Discussions of (migrant) language have largely built upon 1980s and 1990s research within linguistics, social psychology and social anthropology (Giles, Johnson 1981, 1987; Lippi-Green 1997; Thomason, Kaufman 1988; van Dijk 1987). Many of these debates draw upon psychological theory of social identity (Tajfel, Turner 1986 and intergroup contact (Allport 1979[1954]), and imply the role of language as marker of identity and belonging (e.g. the ethnolinguistic identity theory or the concept of ethnic labelling, see Giles, Johnson 1981, 1987; Thomas, Wareing 1999). There is also a longstanding tradition within what is known as contact linguistics of exploring language contact involving speakers of different languages interacting closely and developing ‘hybrid’ languages as well as practices such as pidgins or code-switching (Sebba 1997; Thomason, Kaufman 1988). Bhabha (1994) argues that the act of translation (of not only language, but also ideas and culture) contributes to the emergence of ‘in-between’ spaces, or ‘hybrids.’ Through the constant negotiation of the cultures and languages of home and host societies, migrants are particularly prone to participate in the production of such spaces.

Against the backdrop of Polish migration to the UK, discussion has emerged about the ‘migrant slang’ called ‘Ponglish’ (Nowicka 2012). ‘Ponglish’ involves crosslinguistic influences (Heine, Kuteva 2005; Jarvis, Pavlenko 2008), and embraces what could be called ‘polonisation’ of English words and the ‘anglicisation’ of Polish terms and language more broadly. ‘Polonisation’ makes English language ‘sound’ Polish through the declension of nouns, pronouns and adjectives, the inflection of verbs and phonetic writing (e.g. the English term ‘office’ is written as ‘ofis’). ‘Anglicisation’ may include, but is not limited to, the frequent usage of English lexical borrowings and the avoidance of Polish diacritical marks (such as ą, ć, ę, ń, ó, ł, ż, ź). Whist hybridisation of language as the consequence of transnational experience has been increasingly debated (e.g. Dylewski, Jagodziński 2012; Harris, Rampton 2002; Sanchez-Stockhammer 2012), less attention has been paid to the production and cross-border transfer of the language of difference (with regard to Polish migration it has been discussed by Horolets 2013 and Nowicka 2012).

Indeed, language is one of the primary means through which attitudes, stereotypes, stigmatising discourses, and inclusive and exclusive behaviour can be explicitly or implicitly communicated and transferred (see e.g. Augoustinos, Every 2007; Carnaghi, Maass 2007; Greenberg, Pyszczynski 1985; Mange, Lepastourel,
Georget 2009; Ng 2007; Thomas, Wareing 1999; Tyrpa 2010). It is furthermore inextricably linked with every form of prejudice, (...) transmits prejudice, reveals prejudiced beliefs, distorts perception, and can be the basis of prejudice or a tool for change (Collins, Clément 2012: 389). Therefore, the investigation of encounters with and values and attitudes towards difference is only partially relevant without the study of the language used to describe it and refer to it. Collins and Clement (2012) argue that language and prejudice intersect in two basic ways. First, language can be shaped by the prejudice one holds; it is the verbal expression of prejudiced attitudes. Second, particular language usage may impact on understandings of difference by activating certain prejudiced or non-prejudiced associations. Importantly, the interplay between both is moderated by third variables within the communication context (Collins, Clément 2012: 378), such as social norms which suggest whether a particular expression is appropriate in a given situation or not (Greenberg, Pyszczynski 1985).

However, this basic typology is necessarily disturbed in the case of migrants who often transgress cultural boundaries, socially constructed norms and understandings. Migrants may be, for example, unaware of the social reading of certain expressions within the host society. They are also likely to have different associations with certain terms or discourses from the people ‘born and bred’ in a distinctive national (or cultural) context. In her recent paper exploring the perceptions of ethnic and racial ‘otherness’ of Polish migrants to the UK, Horolets (2013) suggests that for people socialised to live within a relatively homogeneous society (such as Poland) migration to a superdiverse society (such as the UK) may be an experience of profound uncertainty and confusion. This experience tends to be further intensified by limited knowledge of ethno-national or religious difference. Against this backdrop, one strategy for coping with uncertainty is the tendency to copy overheard expressions regarding difference (see also Greenberg, Pyszczynski 1985). This explains why certain rhetoric (which I explore further in this article) may proliferate within Polish migrant communities. The other strategy for coping with uncertainty that may accompany encounters with difference is, according to Horolets (2013), a propensity to devalue ‘the different’ by depriving him or her of agency, autonomy and personal history. To a certain extent this is why some migrants homogenise, racialise and orientalise difference (Said 2003[1978]), in particular with regard to ethnicity and skin colour.

**Study outline**

In this article, I employ a case study approach allowing an in-depth analysis of highly contextualised lived experience and the intricacies of human relations (Berg 2007). I draw upon 14 case studies each involving one migrant participant and up to three of his or her significant others in Poland. A total of 33 participants made up the study sample – 14 migrants and 19 non-migrants.

Migrant participants were recruited from the Polish community in the northern English city of Leeds and diversified in terms of gender, education, occupation and length of stay in the UK. Their ages varied between 20 and 50 reflecting the age structure of post-2004 Polish migration to the UK (Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski 2008). Migrants actively assisted in the recruitment of their significant others in Poland. The significant other sample involved people with whom migrants had what could be described as meaningful and mutually influential relationships – family members and/or friends.

While in the original study I used a range of qualitative methods (including semi-structured and unstructured interviews, audio-diaries and visual methods), for the purposes of this article I focus on multiple interviews (at least two) with migrant participants (n = 32) and single interviews with non-migrants (n = 19). The interviews lasted between 50 and 180 minutes and were conducted in Polish and carefully translated into English (Gawlewicz 2014a). Migrant participants were particularly asked about their values and attitudes towards difference prior to and post-migration and how these values and attitudes were influenced by rela-
tionships with significant others. Non-migrants were asked about their own perceptions and experiences of difference as well as how, in their opinion, the values and attitudes of their migrant relative or friend had developed through his or her migration. Both migrants and non-migrants discussed ways in which ideas and language about difference were negotiated and exchanged in transnational social space. In line with the argument of Somers and Gibson (1994: 38–39) that people construct identities (however multiple, intersecting and changing) by locating themselves or being located within a repertoire of em plotted stories, I used narrative analysis to explore the empirical material.

I chose Leeds as a research site because it offers a range of possibilities of encounters with difference alongside the axes of ethnicity, nationality, religion, class and gender (Piekut, Rees, Valentine, Kupiszewski 2012; Stillwell, Phillips 2006). It is one of the largest cities in the UK, with a proportion of minority ethnic population close to the national average (15 per cent against 14 per cent in England according to the 2011 census). A crucial aspect of its ethno-national diversity is the size of the Pakistani and British Pakistani community which together with Indian, Bangladeshi and other South East Asian groups constitute over half of the city’s non-White population (according to the 2011 census). Leeds is also situated in close proximity to Bradford which is home to substantial Pakistani and British Pakistani communities. Although its transition from an industrial city into the post-industrial ‘metropolis’ was successful, the city does nonetheless include areas of deprivation and exclusion shaped by class dynamics and ethnicity (Stillwell, Phillips 2006). Crucially, it also has a significant association with Poland that can be traced back to WWII-era settlements (Sword 1996) as well as the establishment of the Polish Catholic parish in 1951. These arrivals have been recently reinforced by the influx of Polish immigrants following the 2004 accession of Poland to the EU (Cook, Dwyer, Waite 2008).

Types of the language of difference

In the interviews both Polish migrants in Leeds and their significant others in Poland used a very rich language to refer to difference in terms of ethnicity, nationality, religion, class and gender or the intersections of these categories. The collected empirical material involved two types of speech normativities: stigmatising expressions which homogenised, essentialised or racialised difference; and inclusive ways of speaking about difference which did not draw upon stereotypes and orientalist imaginary of ‘otherness.’ In this article, I refer to the former as ‘the language of stigma’ and the latter as ‘the language of respect.’ Although the language of stigma was dominant in the collected material (which is reflected in my discussion below), the sample is too small to claim any broader trends in that respect. This disproportion could be, nonetheless, linked to the circumstances in which the language of difference was developed (intensified uncertainty and confusion experienced by many Polish migrants in the superdiverse UK society; see also Horolets 2013).

I would also like to draw attention to the fact that the language of stigma was frequently used unintentionally while the language of respect was used in a deliberate manner. The users of the language of stigma were by and large unaware of its derogatory or discriminatory (and often racist) undertones and tended to utilise it in positive contexts. On the other hand, the users of the language of respect were aware of the discriminatory nature of the language of stigma and ‘chose’ to use the expressions they considered non-prejudice-loaded and inclusive. This complicates the discussion about the connection between prejudiced language and actual prejudice, and suggests that the language of stigma can be used in unreflective ways and by non-prejudiced speakers. Conversely, it appears that the language of respect may be used by speakers who actually hold deep-seated prejudices, but ‘perform’ being respectful or ‘politically correct’ (LiveDifference 2014). Because of that complexity, in this article I focus on the language the research participants utilised without unconditionally connecting it to the actual attitudes towards difference they held.
Production of the language of difference

The research participants constructed both the language of stigma and the language of respect in three concurrent ways. First, the majority of respondents used expressions that existed (or could have existed) in Polish language and context more broadly. Second, a number of informants developed new terms or assigned new meanings to existing terms to describe or refer to difference. Third, some participants absorbed and employed the linguistic expressions of difference that circulated in the UK context. Importantly, certain categories of difference were subject to greater discursive attention than others. The research participants in this study were particularly preoccupied with non-White people, people dressed in a way which revealed their attachment to non-Christian religions and, more broadly, people whose appearance could be socially regarded as non-normative in the Polish context (e.g. people with extensive tattoos). The saliency of such themes could be linked to the relative homogeneity of Polish society in terms of ethnicity, nationality and religion (Podemski 2012) and the ‘standing-out-ness’ of non-White or non-normative bodies in the Polish context (Gawlewicz 2014b). In predominantly White societies such bodies tend to attract attention because they are, as Ghorashi (2010) put it, ‘hyper-visible.’ According to Goffman (1990[1963]), the social ‘visibility’ of difference contributes to its stigmatisation.

Language of stigma

As I have noted, the language of stigma frequently involved rhetoric that existed in the Polish language. This is illustrated in the quote below, in which Ela elaborates on the ethno-national structure of UK society. While she seems to appreciate diversity, the language she employs to express her favourable feelings has an explicitly stigmatising undertone.

Here [in the UK] men hold hands and fat girls wear mini-skirts and you have Murzyni [Negros/Niggers/Black people] and skośnoocy [the slant-eyed, meaning Eastern Asian people] and Pakistańcy [derogatory of Pakistanis] and Indiańcy [derogatory of Indians] and everybody else. (…) If you grow up in such an environment, this is normal to you. You know lots of Murzyn or skośnoocy [the slant-eyed, meaning Eastern Asian people] (…) And you don’t divide [people]. It’s different in Poland. In Poland the vast majority of people are Poles (Ela, migrant, female, in her 30s).⁴

Clearly, by picking upon skin colour (Murzyni) and other phenotypical features such as eyes (skośnoocy) Ela racialises ethnic difference. For instance, the word Murzyn, particularly challenging to translate into English (for details see Gawlewicz 2014a), has predominantly negative social connotations in the Polish context and addresses racist stereotypes (Ząbek 2007). In addition, Ela uses augmentatives to describe (British) Pakistani or (British) Indian nationals (Pakistańcy, Indiańcy). The usage of the augmentative in Polish implies valorisation (i.e. assigning a negative value) and has been therefore argued to have either derogatory or grotesque undertones (Puzynina 1992).

Apart from expressions that lexically or grammatically exist (or could exist) in Polish, several research participants employed the language of difference which they had developed or absorbed through encountering difference in the UK context. Many respondents extensively narrated their encounters with (British) Pakistani and South East Asian groups more broadly. In doing so, they argued that they had never or rarely encountered these minorities in Poland. In order to name what they recognised as ‘the new’ or ‘the unknown’ some participants utilised terms such as ciapaci, ciapasy, ciapaje or ciapki – none of them trans-
latable into English (Gawlewicz 2014a). This is demonstrated in the quote below in which migrant Iga recalls selling her car in Leeds.

_We wanted to sell our car... So, we posted an ad on Gumtree [online classified ads website] and one day two ciapki came. They checked the car and bought it. It was quick and smooth. (...) They’re really OK people_ (Iga, migrant, female, in her 30s).

The circulation of these terms has been also noted by other researchers of Polish migration to the UK (Horolets 2013; Nowicka 2012). Although the linguistic origins of the expressions remain unclear, it has been suggested that they are related to the type of Indian/Pakistani flatbread called _chapatti_ (Nowicka 2012). The analogous employment of food-related ‘labels’ to impose certain identities was described by Valentine and Sporton (2009) who looked at the construction of the Somali community in Sheffield, UK and in Somalia. The authors mention the usage of the phrase ‘fish and chips’ to stress the reading of one’s identity as British rather than Somali.

While often used in positive contexts, as in the case of Iga above, the terms _ciapaci, ciapasy, ciapaje_ or _ciapki_ are employed to draw identity boundaries and stem from orientalist and essentialist conceptualisations of the ‘Asian’ Other (Said 2003[1978]). It is important to stress here that the majority of research participants who used them admitted mistaking (British) Pakistanis for other South East Asian nationalities or British Asian people. This suggests that the primary function of these expressions was to racialise difference, to designate a certain racial belonging (i.e. ‘brown’ people).

In a similar vein, other stigmatising expressions stemming from sensory (predominantly visual), ethnic or religious difference were used by some research participants. Muslim people, for example, were sometimes referred to as _Muslidy_. The term _Muslidy_ is an English borrowing replacing the Polish equivalent of the word Muslims (_muzułmanie_). It is not explicitly derogatory, but its usage suggests that the speaker draws clear identity boundaries between the imagined ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In addition, the figure of a Muslim woman dressed in burqa/abaya – the embodiment of otherness in many European societies (Ghorashi 2010; Razack 2004; Tarlo 2007) – was referred to as _ninja_ or _letter-box_. Curiously, Muslim men were not discursively distinguished in any particular way.

_I don’t like what I call a ninja. Do you know what a ninja is? It is a woman dressed in black and you can see only her eyes. (...) Last year we went shopping. And, a man leaves Morrisons [a chain of supermarkets in the UK]. Handsome. Because, unfortunately, these darker men are handsome. Elegant. (...) I remember it well – blue shirt, light trousers, flip-flops. And there he walks, oh God! ‘Look how handsome I am!’ That was how it looked. Jesus – I look and just after him there’s this ninja. With a trolley. That’s not all. So, a trolley with shopping, a pushchair with a kid and, well, some two other bags in her hands. So, I don’t like it. We [Polish women] are brought up in a completely different culture. (...) I don’t think we [women] were born to stand among the pots and please the men. (...) She shouldn’t have blinkers on her eyes and just listen to whatever the master and the king has to say. I don’t like it! And I’d never agree to such a treatment_ (Irena, migrant, female, in her 50s).

[About Bradford] It is a place occupied in some 90 per cent by Pakistanis and all sorts of Muslidy [Muslim people]. (...) Lots of women in letter-boxes (Marek, migrant, male, in his 30s).

While the terms _Muslidy_ and _letter-box_ could be regarded as the elements of ‘new’ migrant language, the use of the expression _ninja_ is more complex. Indeed, the word _ninja_ referring to the figure of a Muslim
woman in a burqa/abaya exists in the British context. It has, nonetheless, completely different connotations. In his personal account of being involved in Islamic activism, Husain (2007) describes how his fellow male college students – teenage Muslims (and/or British Muslims) – labelled as ninjas their female peers who started wearing burqas as a sign of their devotion to radical Islam. In the eyes of these boys, their ‘ninja sisters’ embodied authenticity of, as Husain put it, truest Muslims and as such evoked the desires of many of a brother (2007: 69). ‘Ninja sisters’ were, indeed, attractive, popular and cherished.

The recognition of this teenage slang has implications for the study of the production of the language of difference among Polish migrants to the UK. First, it seems that rather than being adopted by the migrants, the term ninja has been accommodated and internalised by them through their engagement with British society and encounters with Muslim communities. Second, it appears that whereas for some Muslim or British Muslim people the expression ninja seems to have rather positive connotations, it has largely negative associations for Polish migrants. This is very well exemplified in Irena’s narrative above in which she expresses her unease about the supposed oppression of Muslim women who wear burqas/abayas (Razack 2004; Tarlo 2007). While Irena is critical of what she views as unequal gender relations, the narrative reveals her essentialist understanding of Muslim communities and Islam.

Another example of the internalising of the language of stigma by Polish migrants to the UK is the use of the expression chavs to designate White working-class people in the UK context. The term chav became popular in the UK in the early 2000s when the British media increasingly used it to refer to an anti-social (and predominantly male) youth (Nayak 2006; Valentine, Harris 2014). It has been, however, criticised for implying denunciation of social exclusion and poverty (Jones 2012). The debate around the social production of chavs resembles to a significant degree the discussion about dresiarze in the Polish context (Dąbrowski 2005; Piekut, Valentine, in press).

In the quote below Iga, cited earlier, suggests that her neighbourhood in Leeds tends to be falsely associated with chavs with whom she does not wish to be identified. By employing this term she distances herself from what she understands as ‘troubled’ English working-class youth. Similarly to the case of the expression ninja discussed earlier, the narrative illustrates that migrants are likely to come across the language of difference in the host society and further recycle it.

*If you say Middleton [neighbourhood in Leeds] – the first thing that comes to your mind is: ‘not a very nice neighbourhood.’ But, there are two sides of a coin so to speak. On the one side, you have many young English people there – the so-called chavs... So, there are many robberies. Whereas I do live in this quieter part... It’s an estate – detached houses. And, well, I must admit it’s the best apartment we’ve had so far* (Iga, migrant, female, in her 30s).

The significance of place remains crucial for the production of the language of stigma. The proximity of Leeds to Bradford was frequently reflected in migrant narratives. When referring to Bradford some research participants used either the Polish expression Pakilandia or its English counterpart Pakiland.

*When we were moving [to Bradford] we were told that we were going to Pakilandia. I didn’t know how to understand it – I completely couldn’t imagine possibly moving to what was called Pakiland. What was that supposed to mean?! I arrived there and I saw... Apart from brown skin colour, it’s hard to spot a White person there* (Marek, migrant, male, in his 30s).

The interchangeable usage of the terms Pakilandia and Pakiland suggests that, like in the case of ninja or chavs, the respondents seem to pick it up and use it in a broader UK context (i.e. not only within the Polish
migrant community). Indeed, both terms consist of an English ethnic slur *Paki* and draw upon the essentialist imaginary of Bradford as an ethnic enclave. This further confirms that alongside the usage of the language of stigma that exists in the Polish context and the tendency to develop ‘new’ language to label difference in the UK, some Polish migrants absorb and utilise the language of stigma with which they become familiar through interacting with British society more broadly. Furthermore, as the case of Irena illustrates, migrants may assign new meanings to expressions existing in the context of the host society. While the term *ninja*, discussed earlier, may have predominantly positive connotations for British Muslim youth, it can convey very negative associations for some Polish migrants.

**Language of respect**

Like the language of stigma, the language of respect was used by respondents prior to as well as after migration to the UK. Tomek, for example, admitted that his favourable attitudes towards social diversity, as well as language referring to difference, were mostly shaped in the Polish context and influenced by his uncle, a social worker engaging with disabled people, Roma and socially excluded youth. This is how Tomek recalled growing up in a relatively homogeneous town in Poland.

> Speaking of difference in terms of nationality or skin colour – we [he and his family] didn’t discuss it [while living in Poland]. It just wasn’t present when I was 10 or 15 years old. People didn’t talk about it. It was very hard to meet *osoba czarnoskóra* [Black person, neutral term] or *osoba z Azji* [Asian person/person from Asia, neutral term] in my place [in Poland] (Tomek, migrant, male, in his 20s).

Other users of the language of respect, however, admitted that they internalised certain terminology through working in diverse workplaces, personally engaging with difference or adopting the speech normativities they encountered in the UK. This often involved a decision to stop using certain expressions such as *Murzyn* [Negro/Nigger/Black person], discussed earlier. Filip, for instance, after finishing his degree at a UK university, worked in several positions which involved direct contact with clients. In each of his workplaces, he was trained to offer inclusive and respectful service. As a result, he not only started to use the language of respect while speaking English, but also began to utilise such language in Polish. This is reflected in the two quotes below.

> There was this *osoba czarnego koloru skóry* [Black person, neutral term] – my colleague from work. I think difference is something difficult to talk about. This man had a very dark skin colour and when people wanted to refer to him in a conversation they kept saying: ‘Yeah, go to this guy with glasses – he’s kind of short.’ And if somebody kept asking: ‘But, who do you mean exactly?’ people replied: ‘Well, the guy with short hair.’ And he was the only *czarnoskóra osoba* [Black person, neutral term] in our office and the only person of darker skin colour. So he was very recognisable. Somehow, it was very hard to predict how the people would react if we called him in this direct way: *czarnoskóra* [Black person, neutral term]. And, all the people just couldn’t say this simple thing in a direct way. They couldn’t say: ‘OK. He’s Black – that’s his skin colour. That’s just one of his features.’ And he had, indeed, a very dark skin colour. Very cool. And, it was surprising because we knew who that was all about – and yet the people in the office couldn’t just say it (Filip, migrant, male, in his 20s).

> I must admit that everybody who taught in that school... They weren’t people of a different skin colour. They weren’t people of a different religion. They were always *ludzie białoskórzy* [White people, neutral
term], either ateiści [atheists, neutral term] or chrześcijanie [Christian people, neutral term]. No muzułmanie [Muslim people, neutral term] for example. I find it surprising now that I’ve lived in the UK for a while (Filip, migrant, male, in his 20s).

In the first quote, Filip elaborates on the tendency among his colleagues to avoid referring to skin colour while describing the appearance of people different from themselves in terms of ethnicity. In doing so, he uses a range of ‘neutral’ terms such as osoba czarnego koloru skóry, czarnoskóra osoba, ciemnoskóry (all translatable as ‘Black person’). In the other quote, Filip recalls meeting British people in one of the English language schools in his home town in Poland. While reflecting on these memories, he uses several expressions indicating ethnicity and religion/belief. Interestingly, to refer to a White person, Filip uses a phrase that is rarely used in Polish in such a context. The phrase he employs – osoba białoskóra (translatable as ‘White person’) – is constructed by analogy to the phrase osoba czarnoskóra (translatable as ‘Black person’). In using expressions that are constructed according to the same lexical rule, Filip seems to stress his commitment to social equality.

Transnational transfer of the language of difference

In the study, the language of difference was not only used within the Polish migrant community in Leeds. It was frequently passed on to non-migrant family members and/or friends in Poland. While both the language of stigma and the language of respect were transferred to Poland, the latter was passed on to a lesser degree (which is perhaps related to the disproportion between the production of the language of stigma and the language of respect among migrants). The language of difference seemed particularly likely to be spread during non-migrants’ visits to the UK when they encountered increased social diversity and discussed it with migrants. These speech normativities were then likely to travel with non-migrants back to Poland and to be used in the Polish context.

Although in this article I focus on one-way transfer of the language of difference (i.e. from migrants in the UK to their relatives and friends in Poland), I wish to stress that this trend is not exclusive and non-migrants can also affect migrant language of difference (I explore how such mutual influences contribute to the broader process of circulation of values and attitudes elsewhere - see Gawlewicz 2015c).

Language of stigma

A number of non-migrant participants in this study tended to employ arguably offensive and/or discriminatory expressions that they had become familiar with through their migrant family members or friends resident in the UK. Like many migrant participants, they mostly used this language in unprejudiced contexts without intending to stigmatise or discriminate, still less to offend. This is illustrated in the two quotes below.

[About Indian/Pakistani immigrants encountered while visiting the UK]: I was asking like this: ‘Iga, what nationality is this?’ And she replied: ‘Ciapaty.’ And, she said that they were OK. That there were so many of them there [in the UK] (Krystyna, the mother of migrant Iga, in her 50s).

[About Muslim women in burqas encountered while visiting the UK]: Marek calls them ninjas, right? [she laughs]. I guess that’s how [British] people call them colloquially. They are these women dressed in black, all covered (Aga, the sister of migrant Marek, in her 30s).
Both respondents seem to believe that the terms they became familiar with through the migrants are commonly used in the UK context. They appear unaware of their stigmatising nature and assume their validity. Furthermore, the quotes imply that the language of stigma is unintentionally passed on to significant others in Poland, leading to the unreflective use of arguably racist language.

As migrants do not tend to recognise the language of stigma they employ as discriminatory and offensive, expressions such as *ciapaci* or *ninja* are routinely passed on to non-migrants in Poland. Moreover, they are frequently passed in ‘neutral’ or positive contexts, which results in an assumption on the non-migrant’s part of the correctness and validity of that language. As I have argued elsewhere (Gawlewicz 2015c), non-migrants are likely to consider migrants as trusted experts and because of that they may be reluctant to question migrant attitudes and behaviour towards difference. It appears that in the case of language, this mechanism is likely to encourage the use of arguably racist ‘migrant slang’ among non-migrants in the home society.

**Language of respect**

Crucially, alongside the transfer of the language of stigma, there were a number of instances when the language of respect was passed between migrants and non-migrants. Filip, for example, quoted earlier, admitted openly challenging his father’s language which he started to consider, as he put it, ‘inappropriate.’ This is reflected below in the quote of Katarzyna, the mother of Filip. As Filip’s father is fluent in English, Filip questioned not only the Polish word *Murzyn* his father would use, but also the English term ‘*Negro*.’

> Wojciech [Filip’s father] used to say ‘Negro’ in English when he referred to [Black] people. And once Filip says: ‘Dad, you shouldn’t say so, because that’s not appropriate. (…) It’s not correct, politically correct and you offend the whole group. So, at least when you’re in my company – be more careful what you say.’ It’s a sort of admonishing. I think that Wojciech will think twice now before he uses this word again. He’ll think twice because somebody’s told him that some people may feel offended to hear such an expression (Katarzyna, the mother of migrant Filip, in her 50s).

The empirical material on which this study is based suggests that the language of respect is likely, similarly to the language of stigma, to travel between Poland and the UK through the agency of migrants. Unlike the language of stigma, however, the transfer of the language of respect appears to be largely intentional. As such, it may involve challenging significant others and their use of particular expressions (as in the case of Filip and his father).

**Conclusions**

The production and transnational transfer of the language of difference is an intricate social phenomenon. In this article, I have explored the ways and linguistic means through which Polish migrants to the UK describe their encounters with difference. I have also considered how the language of difference travels across national borders through the agency of migrants.

I have distinguished two types of language of difference – the language of stigma and the language of respect. The language of stigma, which draws upon essentialist and orientalist understandings of difference, dominated among the research participants, perhaps because it was largely produced in what arguably are circumstances of intensified uncertainty and confusion (Horolets 2013). It includes expressions already existing in the Polish language, ‘migrant slang’ developed to label difference and the rhetoric absorbed by migrants through their interactions with UK society. However, I have also emphasized that a number of
respondents who employed the language of respect either ‘brought it along’ from Poland or picked it up in the UK. Both speech normativities, though the language of respect to a lesser degree, were then passed on to significant others in Poland. The language of stigma was often transferred unintentionally while the language of respect in a deliberate manner.

The unreflective use of arguably racist language by migrants and non-migrants was particularly striking across the study. While the users of the language of stigma may appear ‘racist’ because of the language they employ, the vast majority of them do not seem to intentionally stigmatise or offend (or to hold prejudiced attitudes). This suggests that there is a very meaningful discrepancy between the language they use and their actual feelings (values and attitudes) towards difference. It needs to be acknowledged in future research.

Unlike the users of the language of stigma, the users of the language of respect make an informed choice to utilise the expressions they consider ‘appropriate,’ inclusive or ‘politically correct’ (LiveDifference 2014). Thus, the language of respect appears to be developed in profoundly different circumstances to the language of stigma (i.e. through awareness of and/or familiarity with difference or social norms). This, in turn, partly explains why the language of respect is frequently transferred in a deliberate manner while the language of stigma is passed unintentionally and incidentally. The awareness, lack of awareness and/or (un)willingness to adapt to social norms of diversity and equality seem to differentiate the users of both types of the language of difference.

This article demonstrates how far-reaching the consequences of migrant encounters with difference are likely to be. In discussing the production of the migrant language of difference which to date has rarely been considered in broader academic disputes, it adds a significant layer to broader migration and social diversity literature and contributes to ongoing debates regarding Polish migrants’ responses to superdiversity in the UK context (e.g. Burrell 2009; Cook et al. 2011; Datta 2009; Ryan 2010; Siara 2009; White 2010).

Furthermore, it contributes to the emerging literature on social remittances and transnational circulation of ideas including language (Boccagni, Decimo 2013; Elrick 2008; Kubal 2015; Levitt 1998; Levitt, Lamba-Nieves 2011; Vlase 2013). It draws attention to what could be termed ‘linguistic remittances’ between Polish migrants to the UK and non-migrants in Poland. In doing so, it shows the extent to which Polish and English are likely to influence each other (Jarvis, Pavlenko 2008) and shape the understandings of difference of their speakers. While this issue remains underexplored, it is potentially of great importance for predominantly ‘sending’ societies such as Poland. Such transfers are, for instance, likely to impact on language, values and attitudes towards ethnicity, nationality, religion, class and gender in Poland. As such, they may actively contribute to how difference is perceived and referred to in the Polish context.

Notes

1 In the article, I engage with a few theoretical debates within human geography and migration research (i.e. encounters with difference, social remittances and migrant language) which enable a limited reflection on language and identity. Those who seek in-depth linguistics and social psychology discussions on language contact, ethnic labelling, ethnolinguistic identity theory or social identity theory are encouraged to refer to e.g. Carnaghi, Maas, 2007; Giles, Johnson 1981, 1987; Greenberg, Pyszczynski 1985; Heine, Kuteva 2005; Jarvis, Pavlenko 2008; Sebba 1997; Tajfel, Turner 1986; Thomason, Kaufman 1988; Thomas, Wareing 1999.

2 All the quotations in this article come from translated transcriptions of the interviews with Polish migrants and their significant others in Poland. All names are pseudonyms to ensure participants’ anonymity. Three ellipsis dots in round brackets indicate that I have removed a section of text to facilitate
readability. I use square brackets to include English translation of the language of difference and further explanatory notes (for a detailed description of translation procedure see Gawlewicz 2014a).

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References


Intercultural Neighbourly Encounters in Warsaw from the Perspective of Goffman’s Sociology of Interaction

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Neighbouring as a type of social interchange and multi-dimensional social phenomenon is of fundamental importance in the social sciences and problems associated with intercultural and interethnic neighbouring are currently on the increase. Contemporary migration processes and ethnic diversity in Poland are relatively new issues that are reflected in the experiences of both migrants and representatives of the host society. The aim of this article is to analyse intercultural neighbourly contacts between Poles and migrants in Warsaw in the context of Erving Goffman’s sociology of interaction. These contacts and the social processes they involve are of great importance when it comes to migrants’ integration in their new place of residence. The article considers how glances, gestures and behaviours are interpreted, leading to the formation of specific opinions and attitudes between migrants and Poles. Both ‘unfocused’ and ‘focused’ interactions are analysed, with an emphasis on expectations and definitions of tactful behaviour in intercultural neighbourly encounters and the concept of ‘polite indifference.’ Conclusions are based on semi-structured interviews conducted with Poles and migrants from Vietnam, Turkey and African countries living in Warsaw, Poland.

Keywords: interaction; intercultural contact; neighbourly contact; Goffman; Warsaw

Introduction

Culture – as a social phenomenon – constitutes a fundamental resource of values, opinions and interpretations that influence individuals’ ways of perceiving and experiencing the world, and their interactions with others. Intercultural contacts occur when people of different cultural backgrounds interact with each other, such as when migrants and representatives of the host population come into contact but follow their own specific, culturally grounded norms and conventions of behaviour. Such encounters can be diverse in character and take place in various social settings. One such setting is the neighbourhood, where people of different nationality or ethnicity, holding different values or speaking different languages, live in close proximity to each other. In the social context of the neighbourhood these neighbours perceive and identify each other, interpret each other’s actions, define mutual obligations or expectations and undertake more or less direct interactions (see also Winiarska 2012).

The aim of this paper is to investigate intercultural contacts and encounters between Poles and Vietnamese, Turkish and African migrants in neighbourhood settings in Warsaw, Poland, from an interaction theory

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It examines how Poles experience contact with ‘others’ in their neighbourhood and how these ‘others’ experience contact with Poles. The analysis, based on qualitative research, will focus on the process of interaction, different meanings that Poles and migrants attribute to each other’s behaviours and especially interpretations of gestures and eye contact, as well as neighbourly greetings and chat.

The context for interaction is specific because diversity is not commonplace in Poland, a highly homogeneous country in terms of ethnicity and religion; thus various aspects of intercultural encounter remain unacknowledged. Warsaw cannot be called a multicultural city in the Western European sense, as immigrants constitute only around 2–3 per cent of the population. However their numbers are growing and various migrant groups are slowly becoming more visible, which is focusing attention on issues of adaptation, integration and migration policy. The Polish case study is therefore significant, as it deals with contemporary ethnic diversity as a relatively new phenomenon, reflected in the experiences of both migrants and representatives of the host society, with intercultural contact becoming more and more important despite a lack of significant multiculturalism in either the descriptive or political sense. Although there have been numerous studies of the increasing presence of migrants in Poland, intercultural encounters from a micro-sociological perspective seem somewhat under-researched and this study aims to complement existing literature in this respect. Such perspective is especially important given the fact that much of the contact between migrants and hosts takes place at local level – in neighbourhoods and in public spaces – and it is everyday encounters that may facilitate, or impede, mutual understanding and integration.

The situation of migrants, as newcomers settling among the host population, resembles the position of ‘strangers’ in Alfred Schutz’s (1944) sense: people who are aware of the diversity and relativity of existing cultural norms due to the fact that they observe specific behaviours, habits and lifestyles, and experience norms of conduct which might be surprising or strange to them, both in a positive and negative way (Ossewaarde 2007). Even when migrants comply with the social norms pertaining in their new country (which often requires abandoning norms that they previously held), it is often difficult for them to be accepted as ‘locals.’ Intercultural encounters constitute an important experience not only for ‘guests’ but also for representatives of the host society. For Poles, unexpected contact with ethnic difference in their place of residence might cause surprise or interest, or lead them to reflect on specific social definitions and rules of conduct in neighbourly relations. Intercultural contact on a micro-sociological scale can thus influence ways of perceiving and interpreting the surrounding world, and can both support and hinder the integration of migrants in the host society.

I intentionally refer here to the concept of ‘intercultural contact,’ which I sometimes use interchangeably with the notion of ‘interethnic contact’, though these terms emphasise somewhat different aspects of the social situation of contact. Ethnicity is related mostly to descent, identity and sense of community. Interethnic contact emphasises interactions between representatives of groups that are diverse in terms not only of culture, but often also of physical – visible – characteristics. Intercultural contact accentuates differences resulting primarily from tradition, customs and ways of thinking about the surrounding world. It is these different interpretations and perceptions related to culture that are the focus of this paper. The concept of ‘interculturalism’ emphasises processes that take place between culturally different individuals during their encounter (such as communication and cooperation) and thus represents one of the challenges of multiculturalism that have recently started to be debated in Poland. However, intercultural dialogue remains closely associated with tolerance, which manifests itself in a readiness to engage in contact with diverse others (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2002).

This study draws on the theoretical concepts inspired by Erving Goffman’s sociology of interaction and developed in later works by various authors. I will explore perceptions of neighbourly encounters among representatives of different cultural groups in an urban context. Neighbouring will be defined as a specific,
multi-dimensional social phenomenon resulting from physical proximity in the place of residence. In this sense social interactions between neighbours constitute the essence of neighbouring. I will explore how the behaviours and motivations of both Poles and migrants (both in establishing and in avoiding contact) are influenced and organised by the meanings they ascribe to the actions of their neighbours. The study aims to contribute to current micro-sociological work that draws on Goffman’s theories (e.g. Jensen 2006; Wessendorf 2014), which focuses on the analysis of common rituals and behaviours, rather than on more indirect forms of contact and the definitions of specific everyday occurrences given by social actors. In drawing distinctions between different forms and aspects of interaction, the study seeks to develop existing research by further nuancing issues of encounter.

The theoretical introduction to the paper references interaction theories to situate the research in a classic sociological context, while also considering current debates concerning the micro-sociological issues of contact, encounter and intercultural interaction, with a particular focus on neighbouring. The specific context of Warsaw will be outlined with reference especially to issues of migration and attitudes towards different groups of migrants among the host society. The research findings presented are based on interviews with Poles and migrants from Vietnam, Turkey and African countries living in Warsaw. A strictly micro-sociological perspective will be adopted throughout the text, and intercultural neighbourly contact will be analysed in the specific context of Goffman’s interaction theory. Conclusions will be focused on insights into migrant integration in the host society at local level.

Erving Goffman’s sociology of interaction and contemporary perspectives on issues of encounter

The concept of interaction as the mutual influence of individuals on each other is related to the extensive field of humanistic sociology and interpretative theories in the social sciences, which develop the notion of ‘self’ and focus on social processes of ascribing meaning to actions. Interaction denotes a type of social action where individuals interrelate through communication – they interpret each other’s behaviour and modify their conduct according to how they define the situation (see Halas 1981: 111), which is a continuous process. Symbolic interactionism regards people in interaction as the basis for all interpersonal relationships. A most important characteristic of such relations is that participants during their contact take each other into account, where taking another person into account means being aware of him, identifying him in some way, making some judgment or appraisal of him, identifying the meaning of his action, trying to find out what he has on his mind or trying to figure out what he intends to do (Blumer 1986: 109). Individuals organise their conduct on this basis, sometimes restraining certain tendencies or inclinations, and taking into account specific definitions ascribed to the situation as well as judgments and expectations concerning the actions of interaction partners. In neighbourly relations this type of social control mechanism often manifests itself in such questions as What will the neighbours think? or What will the neighbours say? Individuals may also be aware of the existence of informal rules, norms or standards of conduct but knowingly violate them, stating: I don’t care about the neighbours (see Vaitkus 1994).

Erving Goffman, widely regarded as representing the dramaturgic perspective within symbolic interactionism, states that interaction exchange (interchange) seems to be a basic concrete unit of social activity and provides one natural empirical way to study interaction of all kinds (Goffman 2005: 20). Goffman identifies two main types of interaction: ‘unfocused’ and ‘focused.’ The first is defined as a type of interpersonal communication where two or more people are co-present, observe each other and adjust their behaviours according to these observations (Goffman 1963: 24; see also Goffman 1961). The second takes place when two or more people effectively maintain for a certain amount of time a single visual and cognitive focus of attention, as when talking to each other (Goffman 1963: 24; see also Goffman 1961).
In the case of unfocused interaction individuals do not come into direct encounter, although they are aware of each other’s presence, manage this co-presence and gather information about the other person *by glancing at him, if only momentarily, as he passes into and then out of one’s view* (Goffman 1963: 24), as when neighbours pass each other in the corridor or observe each other through the window. In the second situation, participants of the interaction engage into some form of direct contact (e.g. conversation), during which they *openly cooperate to sustain a single focus of attention* (Goffman 1963: 24). Goffman refers here to the concept of encounter, which begins when individuals become aware of their co-presence and ends when they mutually acknowledge the fact of their disengagement from the interaction (Goffman 2005).

In many social settings individuals perform specific interaction rituals and in the case of neighbourly relations this ritual begins with mutual recognition of individuals as neighbours – people who live in spatial proximity, in one building or neighbourhood. A next step is the manifestation of this recognition through greetings and courteous conversation. In order for such actions to be possible, the existence of an ‘occasion’ is essential. Erving Goffman (1983: 6) defines an occasion as a situation in which an individual *comes into an other’s response presence*. He also states that *situations begin when mutual monitoring occurs, and lapse when the second-last person has left* (Goffman 1963: 18). During social occasions contact can occur in the form of a glance, greeting or conversation. Such contact transforms an unfocused interaction (in which individuals are co-present in a public place, where they can observe each other and organise their behaviour based on these observations) into a focused interaction, where individuals maintain a common focus of attention. Neighbourly conversation constitutes a fundamental form of face engagement which sustains the encounter.

The course of the encounter is governed by certain rules, which are relativised according to specific contexts (Woroniecka 2010: VIII), both social and cultural. Culture, tradition, social conventions and norms constitute a frame of reference within which individuals select strategies of conduct in a given situation. Goffman (1986) points to the existence of interpretation frames within which interactions take place. These frames are socially constructed and constitute a resource of definitions used by individuals in the course of negotiating mutual perceptions of the contact situation and possible ways of performing their roles in it. Individual behaviour is influenced by various personal experiences, opinions and beliefs; however, during the interaction actors are embedded in a specific social and cultural structure, which they take into account in both their intentional and unconscious interpretations and choices (see Goffman 1986; Manterys 2008). It should be added that these structures *don’t ‘determine’ culturally standard displays, merely help select from the available repertoire of them* (Goffman 1983: 11). In other words, these structures do not directly determine how a given interaction ritual should be performed in a particular culture, but they constitute a frame for selecting possible ways of doing this.

The social context in which interaction takes place is thus of great significance, as it provides ‘interpretation frames’ for the encounter. In the case of intercultural neighbourly contact – in the specific social context of the neighbourhood – migrants and representatives of the host society often have different definitions of how actors ought to behave. Concurrently these frames, which include appropriate and acceptable modes of conduct or ways of being, constitute a ‘cultural obviousness’ (Slodownik 2006) for representatives of each group. What is important in this context is that research shows that there are clear expectations in Polish society that migrants will adapt to the values and norms of the host population (Nowicka, Łodziński 2006). On the other hand, researchers also observe a process of ‘getting accustomed to strangeness’ when it comes to encounters with migrants, which evokes feelings of familiarity towards ‘others’ and their ways of being present in different social arenas (Nowicka, Łodziński 2001; see also Wessendorf 2013; Wise 2005).

Many authors, inspired by Goffman’s work, now focus on specific forms of encounter in diverse urban settings – or even ‘super-diverse’ in Vertovec’s (2007) sense – and explore the patterns and practices of ‘eve-
ryday multiculturalism’ (Wise, Velayutham 2010) and living with difference that include identity management tactics as well as strategies for dealing with diversity, whether physical, social, ethnic or cultural (Nowicka 2006; Piekut, Vieten, Valentine 2014; Valentine 2013; Wessendorf 2013; Wilson 2014). An important concept in many studies is the notion of ‘conviviality’ explored among others by Susanne Wessendorf (2014), who develops the idea of ‘commonplace diversity’ drawing on such concepts as ‘civility towards diversity’ (Lofland 1989) or ‘cool conviviality’ (Neal, Bennet, Cochrane, Mohan 2013), conceptualising this type of attitude as an avoidance of deeper engagement in the encounter in order not to evoke inter-ethnic tensions. Such strategies help people co-exist when their cultural values and interpretation frames are to some extent incompatible.

Contemporary studies focus also on habitual practices and ‘routinised civic virtues’ developed in response to living in culturally diverse settings (Noble 2013), and refer to Goffman’s (2005) notion of ‘face-work’ that implies appropriate face engagement and social obligations to demonstrate recognition and respect towards others during social interactions (Wessendorf 2014). Researchers apply this concept to everyday practices of mobility in cities (Jensen 2006) and explore the existence of specific social norms, such as the occurrence of an ‘ethos of mixing’ in diverse communities (Wessendorf 2013). It should be emphasised however that some authors indicate that courteous encounters do not necessarily lead to ‘meaningful contact’ (Valentine 2008; see also e.g. Devadason 2010; Watson 2006) that can transform attitudes and lead to actual, not merely manifested, interest, engagement and respect for difference.

Given the fact that social context influences the course of interaction, authors have distinguished and investigated various zones of contact and encounter (Mayblin, Valentine, Andersson 2015; Wood, Landry 2007). One such setting is the neighbourhood, conceptualised as a specific form of semi-public or ‘parochial’ space (Wessendorf 2014) where specific types of encounter occur (Blokland 2003). Amin and Thrift observe that the everyday city provides the prosaic negotiations that drive interethnic and intercultural relations in different directions (...). Its sites of banal encounter and embedded culture are central in any attempt to foster interethnic understanding and cultural interchange (Amin, Thrift 2002: 292) which corresponds with the need to research local micropolitics of everyday interactions (Amin 2002). Although studies of neighbouring as social interaction can be found in Western European and American literature (see e.g. Unger, Wandersman 1982, 1985), in Poland such work still needs to be developed.

The basic research question set in this study concerns experiences of neighbourly contact in Warsaw, on the part of both Poles and migrants from three specific groups: Vietnamese, Turks and Africans. The aim of this paper is to focus on perceptions, meanings and definitions of gestures and behaviours constructed by social actors, while less emphasis will be put on everyday practices, habits or routines, which have been thoroughly explored by other scholars. Of particular interest are indirect – or, using Goffman’s terms, ‘unfocused’ – interactions, and especially the interpretation of particular gestures or glances in the context of neighbourly contacts. Facial expression and body language seem to be fundamental in establishing (intercultural) contact, because by sustaining a publicly oriented composition of his face and a suitable organisation of the more material aspects of his personal appearance, the individual shows himself a person ready for social interaction in the situation (Goffman 1963: 194–195). Focusing on these aspects of interaction may give insight into attitudes and motivations that influence encounters between migrants and representatives of the host population at local level.

Warsaw as context for intercultural neighbourly encounters

As Poland’s capital city, Warsaw has experienced steady population growth in recent years due to immigration – both internal and external. Data from the 2011 national census indicate that around 20 per cent of all
foreigners residing in Poland live in Warsaw, where the largest groups of migrants include Ukrainians, Vietnamese, Belarussians, Russians and Chinese (GUS 2013). The actual number of foreign migrants to Warsaw is very difficult to estimate, since most migration is temporary and includes also a number of irregular migrants who do not hold a legal residence or work permit (see Górny, Toruńczyk-Ruiz 2011); however rough assessments suggest it could be around 2–3 per cent of the city’s population (Winiarska 2014). Some migrant groups, especially those who are culturally remote from Polish society such as the Vietnamese, tend to form clusters (Halik 2011). However this does not take the form of strictly ethnic enclaves due to the quantitative dominance of the host population.

Foreign migrants to Warsaw can be divided into two specific groups, conceptualised by Aneta Piekut (2012) as ‘invisible’ and ‘visible’ ethnic others. The first group includes highly skilled expatriates from Western Europe and the United States, whose encounters with representatives of the host society are limited, while the second group includes economic migrants from Eastern European, Asian and also African countries, who often encounter Poles in their daily lives, in their local areas, in shops or markets, institutions and public space (Piekut 2012). Another division – to a large extent coinciding with the one above – concerns attitudes to foreigners within the host society. Surveys show that Poles have more positive attitudes towards representatives of Western and Central European countries, but more negative attitudes towards representatives of Eastern European, African and Asian countries (CBOS 2014). The three migrant groups included in this study belong in many cases to similar analytical categories (‘visible’ others, coming from the ‘East,’ most often economic migrants, culturally and religiously remote from Polish society). They will therefore often be referred to jointly, as ‘migrants,’ as opposed to Poles as representatives of the host population.

It should also be stressed that recent studies indicate a general declared increase in acceptance of representatives of the largest national immigrant groups settled in Poland (CBOS 2014, 2015), although attitudes are polarised (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2007). Until the occurrence of political and social events in Poland, evoked by the refugee/migrant crisis of 2015, overt racism was relatively infrequent, and both researchers and non-governmental institutions pointed to the relative openness of Polish society to migrants already present in the country. Nevertheless they indicated that some foreigners – especially those ‘visible’ among the host population – occasionally experience discrimination (also on the part of institutions), verbal aggression, and sometimes even physical violence, although the scale of such incidents was still relatively minor compared to other European countries (Klaus, Wencel 2008; Lotocki 2009). The social distance declared by Warsaw residents towards foreigners seems very small, with 95 per cent of respondents stating that they would accept a person of different nationality, skin colour or religion as their neighbour (Barometr Warszawski 2013). It might be presumed, however, that such declarations are to a large extent based on abstract conceptions, due to Poles’ experiences of a highly homogeneous society and limited actual experience of diversity. This last assumption is corroborated in recent social debate concerning the European ‘refugee/immigration crisis,’ where highly negative attitudes towards the settlement of new groups of foreigners in Poland, especially from African and Arab (Muslim) countries, have been exposed. The research presented in this paper, however, was conducted before these events occurred.

A brief look at neighbourly relations in Poland in general provides the background for the analysis of intercultural neighbourly encounters in Warsaw. Studies show (e.g. Borowik 2003; Kaltenberg-Kwiatkowska 2002; Lewicka 2004) that such relations are often limited, especially in cities, to conventional and courteous exchanges, with neighbours very rarely engaging in any common activity. Declarations, however, suggest neighbourliness that manifests itself in talking to the neighbours and spending time together is valued by Warsaw residents (Badanie jakości życia… 2013). Interethic neighbourly contact has recently been of interest to researchers, whether quantitatively or qualitatively (Górny, Toruńczyk-Ruiz 2011; Winiarska 2012).
Initial analyses show that such contacts in neighbourhoods are limited, and at the same time that neighbours play a more important role for immigrants than for representatives of the host society.

(Intercultural) neighbourly encounters: method

Empirical findings presented in this paper are based on interviews conducted by the author between 2009 and 2011 with Poles and migrants from Vietnam, Turkey and African countries, living in Warsaw. The full research material includes a total of 61 semi-structured interviews, 5 of which 52 were individual interviews and 9 were conducted with dyads of respondents (who were family or friends). 39 interviews were conducted in Polish, 21 in English and one half Polish and half English. During the interviews, neighbouring practices were discussed, together with perceptions concerning neighbours and meanings attached to their different behaviours. The group of respondents included 18 Poles (10 women and 8 men) – who declared having migrant neighbours, 16 migrants from Vietnam (8 women and 8 men), 20 migrants from Turkey (5 women and 15 men) and 16 migrants from African countries (1 woman and 15 men), such as Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Cameroon, Congo or Senegal. These foreigners had diverse migration histories (although all were first-generation migrants) and had been living in Poland for periods ranging from a couple of weeks to over 30 years. In this study I also include additional empirical material based on interviews conducted in 2009 and 2010 by students attending a research workshop run by the author at the Centre for Cross-Cultural Relations, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw.

It should be stressed that respondents resided in different parts of Warsaw, as the research did not concentrate on any specific area of the city. There were two reasons for this. First, my focus is interpretations and perceptions of neighbouring as a form of social relation in general. Scholars emphasise the important influence of personal characteristics on neighbourly relations, regardless of the features of the place of residence (Kaltenberg-Kwiatkowska 2002), so the aim was to focus on the diverse perspectives of people living in different parts of the city (most of them in blocks of flats and apartment houses). Second, immigrants constitute a very small minority of the population of Warsaw, but it is difficult to give precise numbers due to limited administrative data and to undocumented migration on a significant scale. The exact areas of residence for foreigners are also difficult to assess, though existing data show that migrants generally tend to reside in central districts of Warsaw (see Winiarska 2014), or else on the outskirts of the city, near trading locations. Although some ethnic groups, such as Vietnamese, clearly prefer living close to each other, this concentration of groups does not make for strictly ethnic enclaves, which distinguishes the Warsaw case from those of Western European ‘superdiverse’ societies, as it does not have strictly multiethnic neighbourhoods within the city.

Intercultural encounters and the neighbourly interaction ritual in Warsaw: findings

Initially, it should be explained that although the research concerned three diverse groups of foreigners – Vietnamese, Turks and Africans – in many cases they will be referred to jointly as ‘migrants,’ as opposed to Poles. There are two reasons for this binary, which complement the ones indicated earlier. First, the social context positions migrants as guests or even ‘strangers’ (who may also have a visibly different appearance) and Poles as hosts in culturally and ethnically homogeneous Poland. Second, migrants from all three groups could be perceived as representatives of rather collectivistic cultures, whose expectations of social relations in the neighbourhood are different to those of the more individualistic Poles. The research proved that opinions and experiences of many interviewees from all three migrant groups were in many cases convergent. Where more cultural sensitivity is necessary, nuances will be acknowledged in the text.
Unfocused interaction – non-verbal acts (glances and gestures)

People co-present in a specific social situation (e.g. neighbours passing each other in the corridor) take account of and refer to each other, if only by exchanging glances or avoiding intrusive observation of others. This mutual monitoring complies with certain culturally sanctioned rules and conventions that define appropriate ways of behaving and communicating and thus organise the interaction (Manterys 2008). Mutual recognition and neighbourly greetings proceed according to specific, informal rules, which can be differently interpreted by Poles and migrants. Much of neighbourly conduct is non-verbal in character, and actors (neighbours) form attitudes towards each other by interpreting these signals, which in turn enables them to define their mutual relations. In the following paragraphs I aim to distinguish mutual expectations and the meanings ascribed to non-verbal acts by both Poles and migrants.

Migrants in the research study described the reactions of Poles, ranging from friendliness to aversion, on identifying them as neighbours. Neighbourly attitudes were defined largely on the basis of observations of glances, gestures, body language and behaviour on the part of Poles. Eye contact proved to be a very important element of interaction and both its lack and excess (‘obtrusive observation’) were perceived by migrants as negative. Many interviewees, especially Africans and Turks, disapproved of the fleeting glances and lack of greeting which they interpreted as a manifestation of indifference. This might constitute a confirmation of Goffman’s thesis (after Georg Simmel) that eye contact plays a specific role in social communication – for many migrants, establishing such contact is an important step towards positive neighbourly relations in the host society. Poles avoiding eye contact and not exchanging glances in neighbourly interactions can be viewed as withdrawing from any closer kind of engagement, which is not necessarily their actual intention.

While migrants perceived reluctant and ‘closed’ attitudes, some Poles explained they were attempting to show ‘polite indifference’ – or, in Goffman’s terminology, ‘civil inattention’ – and deliberately not showing excessive interest in foreigners, so that they could feel at ease in their new environment. The same behaviours were thus accorded different meanings, depending on the interpretation frame applied. Tactful behaviour, often culturally influenced, can be misunderstood by people whose expectations of the rituals of neighbourly interaction are different.

At the same time, many Poles observed their migrant neighbours closely, drawing conclusions about their lifestyle, daily routines and everyday activities. Although in many cases direct – or focused – interaction was missing, the accumulated resource of knowledge about neighbours situated them in specific categories and social roles and led to specific judgments (such as that the Vietnamese are hard-working people). This indicates that the interviewees took their neighbours into account in everyday actions and we might assume that this knowledge gave Poles a sense of security and ‘acquaintance’ with foreigners living in their neighbourhood. We may define this situation as some form of unfocused interaction (although participants may not even be directly co-present in a situation). However, migrants were not necessarily aware of the existence of such observations and may or may not have adjusted their own behaviours in the light of co-presentation in the neighbourhood. The following interview excerpts are indicative of Polish interviewees’ observations:

_The Vietnamese, I mean men, appear late afternoon, early evening. In my common sense I think that it’s related to their working routine, they leave very early in the morning, I also get up early, at five, six in the morning they’re already pushing their carts and going somewhere, yes (male, 36, Polish)._

_And they have their stall there, where they trade. It’s like that with them. They leave very early, then they come back, but at early dawn they quietly leave. With those bags, everything. And come back at around_
2 p.m., because that’s about when it ends, they close it. Because it’s quiet. And later in the evening they apparently wake up and do something. Cook or prepare themselves or something. Because you can hear that (female, 70, Polish).

Certain activities on the part of migrants were interpreted through the lens of values held by representatives of the host society, who attributed meanings that were ideological or religious in character, as in the case of the following interview excerpt:

I know that although he is from somewhere in Africa – I don’t remember the country – I know he is a Christian. I mean he didn’t tell me, but I saw him go to church with an Easter basket. And that surely means something (female, 28, Polish).

Observing neighbours does not necessarily lead to establishing interaction, and the research material shows that for Poles this is often the case. Many migrants, especially those of Turkish descent, attempted to maintain courteous relations with their neighbours, and the perceived lack of reciprocity in this respect was felt as a personal insult. Erving Goffman (1963) notes that to treat others as if they were not there, as well as using intrusive glances (staring) and ‘unseeing eyes’ (ignoring), is to treat individuals worse than other ‘ordinary’ actors, often to perceive them as non-persons. In the case of interethnic neighbourly interactions, however, it is difficult to pinpoint whether such behaviours are a manifestation of hostility, inappropriately low engagement in the situation or actually a form of ‘civil inattention’ which is an important and culturally influenced element of unfocused interaction.

The discomfort experienced by some migrants in neighbourly interactions might result from the fact that some of their expectations are not met. Goffman (2005: 6) writes that if the encounter sustains an image of him that he has long taken for granted, he probably will have few feelings about the matter. If events establish a face for him that is better than he might have expected, he is likely to ‘feel good;’ if his ordinary expectations are not fulfilled, one expects that he will ‘feel bad’ or ‘feel hurt.’ It may be that migrants expect friendly interest from their neighbours in the form of specific ‘rituals of respect’ that prevail in the migrants’ cultures, but are not typical for Poles who tend to keep their distance in neighbourly interactions. Foreigners feel uncomfortable when these expectations are not met and this was especially the case for Africans and Turks who, unlike the Vietnamese, often have no other migrants living in their immediate neighbourhood, who might take up social acts of this kind.

These differences in approach, with distance experienced as negative by many migrants, can appear positive to Poles where – from the Poles’ point of view – migrants are unexpectedly ‘open.’ Some Polish interviewees remarked that even indirect contact with foreign neighbours can positively influence interpersonal relations in the neighbourhood, especially when it comes to friendliness and smiling, and this was particularly apparent in the case of the Vietnamese. We could assume that Poles particularly noticed such behaviours because they are not a common element of neighbourly interaction in the country: ‘better’ treatment than expected makes people ‘feel good.’ Furthermore, friendliness can create an obligation to reciprocate, and reactions can be spontaneous, as in the following case described by a Polish woman:

They [the Vietnamese] were always smiling so wide in the corridor, that these smiles and good humour were contagious. Many times after meeting them I kept smiling to myself. (...) I sometimes notice, I’m speaking sarcastically now, that some neighbours also start to smile. Unnaturally, but they try! And that is an improvement. Poles are very gloomy and we could learn a lot about cheerful mood and politeness from Asians (female, 40, Polish).
Contrary to many migrants’ impressions, some Poles say they would like to interact with their foreign neighbours, but have difficulty in finding culturally acceptable ways of doing this. One of the interviewees expressed her need to manifest friendliness towards a migrant neighbour from an African country and admitted to feeling curious about this person. She noticed, however, that the foreigner behaved in a way that made starting a conversation difficult, which she perceived as reluctance to establish any form of more direct interaction or closer encounter. The situation here is thus the reverse of those described earlier, however interpretation schemes seem similar. Using Goffman’s terminology we might say that the person who is reluctant to enter the encounter self-distances, applying specific strategies to avoid engagement, such as passing by quickly, behaviour characterised by the interviewee as ‘sneaking’ or ‘fleeting,’ and avoiding eye contact. The Pole then feels anxious that starting a conversation might be perceived as intrusive or as a way of stigmatising the visible otherness of the neighbour. On the other hand, the interviewee’s observations lead her to the conclusion that the foreigner feels like a stranger in the neighbourhood. In this case avoiding engagement might thus be a form of defensive behaviour. We might assume that the African is experiencing some form of acculturation stress which leads to the violation of standards of neighbourly conduct.

Well I have the impression about these people in general that they are a bit frightened… For example when I see him, I am very happy that I have a neighbour who looks different… I feel benevolent about it that somebody from Africa has appeared in our neighbourhood and lives here, this is so… unusual and… that his black-skinned child is going to grow up here. I have a lot… I would like to make him feel welcome here and that generally it’s good that he’s here. And I have the impression that he is kind of ambushed. Maybe not exactly sneaking… but he walks quickly and doesn’t look around. He doesn’t look for… really I would be really willing to talk to him… what he’s doing here… where he’s from… somehow welcome him… and he definitely doesn’t demonstrate such a willingness. So I decided not to be obtrusive either, because it’s also some form of discrediting and stigmatising him if I would start fraternising with him… Does he somehow mark out, I think that due to this attitude, that he passes so quickly, as if he were not at home (female, 33, Polish).

We might consider this last interview excerpt with reference to an opinion expressed by an African interviewee that mutual distance between Poles and foreigners is a kind of vicious circle resulting from various assumptions present in the heads of the participants in the interaction. The ‘guests’ do not want to commit a faux pas or manifest tactlessness, while the hosts do not want to seem intrusive or disturbing and sometimes also feel apprehensive towards ‘strangers.’ In the opinion of this informant, Poles keep their distance towards foreigners, but at the same time are open to contact if such an initiative should come from the other side. It seems that Poles wait for foreign guests to be the first to ‘become available’ in the interaction ritual: We keep a distance to them because we are the guest, they keep a distance or don’t want to disturb, or are afraid… these are such various… such internal… in the head (male, 54, Somalian). The opinion of a Vietnamese woman confirms these observations and interpretations. The interviewee states that Poles lack socially sanctioned ‘justifications’ to initiate contact, and taking the role of hosts they expect newcomers to make the first move.

Poles rarely want to meet new Vietnamese neighbours, because they are afraid… that… they won’t be able to communicate, or that… there is no basis, because nobody introduced them, and why would I have to go to them really. They are the new ones after all, and also foreigners, so they should come to me and not like that… (female, 20, Vietnamese).
Many migrants, observing the kinds of behaviour described above, think that Poles lack readiness for interaction, although whether they accurately assess this readiness – or rather the lack of it – is questionable. The elements of non-verbal communication (glances, facial expressions, gestures, and so on) comprising what Goffman (1963) describes as ‘body idiom’ make up a form of conventionalised discourse. In social relations we usually expect that others will demonstrate tact, courtesy and friendliness through their physical actions, at the same time reaffirming the existing norms of social conduct. Goffman notes that there is typically an obligation to convey certain information when in the presence of others and an obligation not to convey other impressions, just as there is an expectation that others will present themselves in certain ways. There tends to be agreement not only about the meaning of the behaviours that are seen but also about the behaviours that ought to be shown (Goffman 1963: 35). Migrants expect to see manifestations of friendliness on the part of Poles, but often interpret the latters’ facial expressions and gestures as demonstrations of indifference or even aversion. We need to establish whether such manifestations on the part of Poles are intentional (in other words, whether they constitute meaningful actions), and also whether Poles’ interpretations of their own behaviours coincide with those of foreigners – which, as the examples above show, is not always the case, due to different interpretation frames.

**Focused interaction – neighbourly greeting and conversation**

Greetings are a very important element of the neighbourly interaction ritual from the point of view of many migrants. An interviewee coming from an African country noticed that Poles often look surprised when a stranger greets them in the street, while for immigrants such behaviour is often obviously appropriate. Erving Goffman’s analysis of neighbourly exchanges of courtesies includes the concept of a ‘nod line.’ He concludes that:

> any community below the line, and hence below a certain size, will subject its adults, whether acquainted or not, to mutual greetings; any community above the line will free all pairs of unacquainted persons from this obligation. (Where this line is drawn varies, of course, according to region.) In the case of communities that fall above the nod line, even persons who cognitively recognise each other to be neighbours, and know that this state of mutual information exists, may sometimes be careful to refrain from engaging each other (Goffman 1963: 132–133).

From this perspective exchanging situational courtesies is a matter not of spontaneous friendliness or good manners but of institutionalised relations that bind people into specific gatherings. Neighbourly interaction rituals thus include greeting others near home, in communal corridors and when getting into or out of the lift. Some Poles (especially older people) saw this as fundamental to good manners and politeness in neighbourly relations, but younger Poles also noticed such behaviours:

> About such rules, well when I first came to Warsaw, I noticed such a thing that when you get on the lift you say ‘good morning.’ And when you get off you say ‘thank you’ though I don’t know for what. And this habit spread also to Bemowo [a district of Warsaw], because I came across this when I was living in... [a street in Warsaw]. And this spread also to Bemowo, though on Bemowo it’s rather ‘good morning’ and ‘goodbye’ and over there it was more ‘thank you’ (female, 23, Polish).

This expectation was shared by many migrants, who saw the absence of greeting and conversation on the part of neighbours as a sign of Poles’ reluctance and ‘closed’ attitude towards them (see also Winiarska
2012). It can thus be assumed that a friendly greeting will be perceived as a sign of positive relations. In this context the opinion of a Vietnamese man who had been living in Poland for many years seems especially interesting. This man, together with his Polish wife, had moved to Warsaw some years previously and settled in a residential district where some other Vietnamese people also live. This interviewee can be classed as a representative of the first wave of Vietnamese migration to Poland, while his younger neighbours represent the second wave. In such a case Vietnamese tradition requires that the latter should initiate a greeting in the street. Migrants did show initiative in this matter, but only in relation to the Polish woman (the interviewee’s wife), at the same time ignoring the Vietnamese man, which he regarded as impolite. The interviewee justified his countrymen’s behaviour by explaining that their intention was probably to gain acceptance in their new social surroundings, and assuming that he himself – due to his Vietnamese origin – was seen by these neighbours as a representative of the ‘in group’ whose goodwill and positive opinions did not need to be sought. Once again we may refer here to Goffman’s observations that each individual can see that he is being experienced in some way and he will guide at least some of his conduct according to the perceived identity and initial response of his audience (Goffman 1963: 16). In this situation the Vietnamese obviously identify that Poles expect them to behave courteously, whereas they do not have the same attitude towards their countrymen.

When we moved into this block and we sometimes met in the street or in front of the block with these Vietnamese, they always gave greetings to my wife but never to me (laugh) (...). In our culture the custom is that the younger should simply give greeting to the elder, so if they don’t say ‘good morning’ to me then of course I don’t say it back. But they do say it to my wife (laugh).

Researcher: What does this result from, what do you think?

I think that they simply try to ingratiate themselves more with the locals than with their own. With your own you don’t have to (laugh) (...) That’s what I think because there is simply no other explanation (male, 53, Vietnamese).

Such thinking would suggest that the Vietnamese in Poland perceive neighbourly greetings as an important contribution to their positive image and to gaining acceptance in their Polish milieu: Even if I don’t know somebody I also say ‘good morning,’ sometimes I don’t know if this person actually lives in our block or not, but just in case (laughter) (male, 53, Vietnamese). On the other hand, Poles seem to appreciate such behaviour, although at the same time in many cases they do not demonstrate any inclination to establish closer relations with foreigners: They smile, say hello and that’s completely enough for me, because I don’t have any contact with them. Apart from saying ‘Gut-morning’ [the interviewee relates here to the distinct pronunciation of Vietnamese] in the lift (male, 70, Polish).

At this point we should return to the issue of who should initiate a greeting and possibly also conversation in a neighbourly contact situation. Both Poles and migrants from all three researched groups believed that the initiative should be on the side of the ‘guests,’ because they are new to the neighbourhood, often also younger than most of the other residents, so they should be the first to introduce themselves. Some migrants seem convinced that unless they take the initiative themselves, Poles will fail to offer any kind of neighbourly greeting. It should be added that initiating contact does not necessarily need to involve striking up a conversation – sometimes a meaningful glance is sufficient. Goffman observes that:
an encounter is initiated by someone making an opening move, typically by means of a special expression of the eyes but sometimes by a statement or a special tone of voice at the beginning of a statement. The engagement proper begins when this overture is acknowledged by the other, who signals back with his eyes, voice, or stance that he has placed himself at the disposal of the other for purposes of a mutual eye-to-eye activity... (Goffman 1963: 91–92).

Thus for an interaction to be established, actions initiating contact should, first, be noticed and acknowledged, and second, there must be some form of response to these actions.

As stated earlier, conversations between neighbours (Poles and immigrants) most often take place in communal corridors or lifts. Such contacts however typically do not lead to inviting neighbours into one’s home, and if such an offer should occasionally be expressed by Poles – for example when organising a party – then neighbourly ritual rather suggests the invitation should be politely declined, since this is usually a form of courtesy that plays an important ceremonial role in sustaining the social relation, not an actual attempt to establish personal contact. Goffman remarks that a person can thus make himself available to others in the expectation that they will restrain their calls on his availability and not make him pay too great a price for being accessible (Goffman 1963: 106). There is a kind of implicit agreement to manifest mutual openness and an assumption that the parties will not actually put relations to the test by accepting the apparent invitation to establish closer contact. In this context a Turkish woman notices that Poles say ‘good morning’ to their neighbours but do not take it further by asking ‘how are you today?’ showing, in her view, that neighbourly contact is actually insignificant. As a Polish woman suggests, questions about personal feelings might open the way to a conversation that could violate the boundaries of ‘ordinary’ neighbourly contact: Just a purely polite ‘good morning,’ ‘goodbye,’ but not ‘how are you doing?’, because in the case of ‘how are you doing?’ the subject might expand (woman, 43, Polish).

An important conclusion here is that courteous neighbourly conversation in Poland does not usually lead to an exchange of personal information or even names. Goffman refers to this kind of strategy as ‘thinning out’ the encounter: participants intentionally do not exchange names in order to keep the contact impersonal (Goffman 1963: 139). This is most often the case in fleeting encounters, when although social norms suggest entering into a polite casual conversation, participants might not want to identify each other as acquaintances in the future. In the neighbourhood setting, however, even if conversations are fleeting, a mutual recognition and localisation in common space does nevertheless take place, so any reluctance to manifest recognition in the future might be seen as inappropriate behaviour.

An interesting observation is that migrants sometimes intentionally ignore differences in neighbourly interaction rituals, acting instead in accordance with their own norms, even if they fail to observe any reaction to their actions on the part of Poles. The story of a Turkish man who consistently said ‘good morning’ to an elderly neighbour until one day he finally received a courteous reply might serve as an example here. A Somalian man expressed his opinion that a foreigner is like a mirror – if he smiles and acts in a friendly manner, then Poles will do the same. This interviewee emphasised that migrants should create a positive image of their own country abroad, spreading positive views about it to conquer existing stereotypes. This suggests migrants’ possible motivations for initiating interethnic contacts in their neighbourhood. However, intercultural neighbourly encounters in Warsaw do not seem meaningful in terms of changing attitudes, although at times they are an important part of people getting accustomed to each other.
**Intercultural neighbourly encounters: conclusions**

Intercultural neighbourly encounters from a micro-sociological perspective seem under-researched in the context of Poland, where diversity is a relatively new phenomenon. The city of Warsaw is ethnically highly homogeneous, and researchers are only just beginning to take an interest in the intercultural interactions that occur in semi-public spaces between neighbours.

A micro-sociological analysis of individuals’ perceptions of their contacts with neighbours provides valuable insights into how interpretation of gestures and behaviours causes specific opinions and attitudes to be formed between migrants and representatives of the host society. Throughout this paper Erving Goffman’s sociology of interaction has been used to analyse intercultural neighbourly encounters, taking into account both non-verbal actions such as gestures and glances, and verbal actions such as greetings and conversation. These constitute the two main aspects of interaction – unfocused and focused. The analysis has enabled us to ascertain that although neighbourly contact in an urban setting appears to be characterised by mutual indifference (see also Winiarska 2012), neighbours do actually take each other into account, if only by observing each other’s actions and forming opinions on this basis. This analytical distinction complements existing studies on encounter which often emphasise direct contact, overlooking more indirect aspects of interaction and social actors’ own definitions of such occurrences.

An important social norm in neighbourly contacts is tact, and participants in the encounter, in their eagerness not to commit a *faux pas*, often refrain from conversation or even greeting in order not to appear intrusive. Moreover, the encounter needs to be started in a socially acceptable way, and both sides have specific expectations concerning the rules of initiating contact, the interaction ritual apparently assuming that foreign ‘guests’ make the first move. This corresponds with the fact that migrants usually have a greater motivation to initiate encounters in neighbourhood settings than representatives of the host society, which has been observed in other studies. Furthermore, as ‘ordinary’ neighbourly contact in Warsaw requires personal boundaries to be maintained and undue intrusiveness avoided, a façade of openness on the part of Poles can be observed, which is sometimes inconsistent with migrants’ expectations of neighbourly rituals. Encounters in this case can lead to changes in everyday practices on both sides – migrants may refrain from their habitual ways or Poles may take up non-standard ways of behaving when it comes to neighbourly greetings or conversations.

From the migrants’ point of view, eye contact and small gestures are highly significant and are used to interpret Poles’ attitudes towards them and provide guidelines for managing neighbourly conduct. Some migrants interpret Poles’ lack of response to their greetings as a sign of aversion, a desire to exclude or even a manifestation of non-acceptance in the neighbourly community. We should, however, also consider how Poles interpret their own actions. Moreover, we should remember that Goffman’s considerations relate to American culture; the ‘nod line’ will be differently defined and situated according to culture. This is illustrated by a Polish person’s surprise at being greeted by a person whom they do not cognitively recognise as a neighbour, since the high degree of anonymity in neighbourly relations in Warsaw limits the exchange of courtesies.

As the research shows, gestures intended to show tact and courtesy can sometimes be perceived as unfriendly or ‘closed’ when different interpretation frames are applied. Poles’ and migrants’ interpretations of ‘body idiom’ in Goffman’s sense sometimes differ when it comes to assessing readiness to engage in encounters. From the Poles’ perspective their conduct is frequently a manifestation of ‘polite indifference,’ closely associated with the concepts of ‘conviviality’ or ‘civility’ towards diversity that have been developed in the literature (Wessendorf 2014). From the migrants’ point of view, however, these gestures can be interpreted as a demonstration of negative indifference, rather than desirable ‘civil inattention.’ This proves that
specific, often implicit, social norms governing neighbourly interaction rituals do exist and, due to different cultural interpretation frames, can become evident in interethnic relations, potentially influencing integration processes at the local level. Although diverse expectations can at times cause misunderstandings or negative experiences, both focused and unfocused neighbourly interactions do nevertheless play an important role in getting accustomed to each other both by Poles and representatives of migrant groups.

Notes

1 Parts of this paper were presented at the 15th Congress of the Polish Sociological Association What After Crisis? that took place at the University of Szczecin on 11–14 September 2013, within the research group: ‘Poles’ intercultural contacts’ chaired by Agata Bachórz and Krzysztof Podemski.

2 Precise estimates are difficult and this issue will be elaborated on below.

3 Elżbieta Hałas points to existing doubts as to the definitive classification of Goffman within the symbolic interactionism perspective (see Hałas 2006, 2007).

4 Social tensions have risen in Poland in relation to the European ‘refugee/immigrant crisis’ of 2015. Extensive public debate on these issues has exposed highly negative attitudes towards refugees and migrants, especially Muslims, and opinion polls show a decrease in acceptance of these groups in Poland.

5 The empirical data and further analysis are part of a doctoral thesis written by the author.

6 All interviews cited in this paper were originally conducted in Polish and translated into English for the purpose of this text by the author.

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References


The Expulsion of European Union Citizens from the Host Member State: Legal Grounds and Practice
Solange Maslowski*

The last decade has witnessed the development of a growing phenomenon, the expulsion of European Union (EU) citizens from a host Member State. While the EU encourages its citizens to use their fundamental right of freedom of movement, citizens moving to other Member States continue to encounter legal obstacles, in some cases leading to expulsion. Recently, there has even been strong political pressure in some Member States to reconsider the benefits of the principle of free movement, which has been built progressively since the foundation of the European Community. This restrictive approach has arisen against the background of the global economic crisis, which occurred just after the enlargement of the EU to economically poorer countries of Central and Eastern Europe, leading to more nationalistic and protectionist measures, which have legal consequences for EU citizens on the move. This article analyses the legal grounds for expulsion under EU law and the safeguards that protect EU citizens residing in host Member States. Examples of expulsions from Member States in recent years are noted, and possible ways of overcoming current issues are proposed.

Keywords: expulsion; EU citizens; social tourism; free movement of persons; restrictions

Introduction

The last decade has witnessed the development of a growing phenomenon, the expulsion of European Union (EU) citizens from a host Member State. While the EU encourages its citizens to use their fundamental right of freedom of movement, those moving to other Member States continue to encounter legal obstacles, in some cases leading to their expulsion. The exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of movement and residence, and its restrictions, is mainly regulated by the so-called Citizenship Directive, Directive 2004/38/EC. It seems that at the present time freedom of movement in the EU, far from developing, is becoming restricted. Recently, there has even been strong political pressure in some Member States to reconsider the benefits of the principle of free movement, which has been built progressively since the foundation of the European Community. This restrictive approach has arisen against the background of the global economic crisis, which occurred just after the enlargement of the EU to economically poorer countries of Central and

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Eastern Europe, leading to more nationalistic and protectionist measures, which have legal consequences for EU citizens on the move.

Until now, foreigners from third countries have been the principal targets, but it is now EU citizens residing in host Member States, mainly those who are economically inactive, who are perceived as a burden to the host country. The economic crisis has tested the host Member State’s ability to maintain a satisfactory level of public services, and thus preserve social cohesion (Iliopoulou 2011). An increasing number of Member States are tempted to expel more and more people on economic grounds. A positive exception to this general tendency to restrict freedom of movement has been the removal of the transitional period for the citizens of Romania and Bulgaria since the beginning of 2014.

The fundamental right of freedom of movement is neither full nor absolute. While workers still enjoy full freedom of movement, it remains limited for those EU citizens who are economically inactive. People moving from new Member States are subject to a transitional period as far as the labour market is concerned and do not enjoy full freedom of movement. Although the latter limit is temporary, the former is not. Some authors like Marie Gautier (2011) regret the harmful consequences of such limitations while understanding the necessity of derogations from the principle of freedom of movement. According to Gautier this principle lies at the heart of the right of residence. Similarly, Sara Lafuente Hernandez (2014) argues that privileging workers serves to diminish the European ideal with its associated concepts of European Union citizenship and freedom of movement.

Legally, the freedom of movement of persons may be restricted in cases of fraud, abuse of rights, threats to public policy, public security or public health, and unreasonable burden on the social security system of the host Member State. The latter legal ground mainly targets economically inactive mobile EU citizens. Their right to stay in the host Member State for more than three months but less than five years is subject to their possessing sufficient resources and health insurance. Host Member States are not obliged to provide social security benefits to economically inactive mobile EU citizens who do not fulfil the conditions of Article 14-1 of Directive 2004/38/EC on the retention of the right of residence. They are even allowed to terminate the stay of such citizens if all the material and procedural safeguards are fulfilled.

Expulsion is certainly the most serious limitation on freedom of movement and, for this reason, it is very well regulated by various international, European and national instruments. Legal residents in host countries which subscribe to international agreements can be expelled only when the relevant legal conditions are met. Expulsion is an exception not only to the free movement and residence of persons, but also to the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality. Indeed, Member States are not allowed to expel their own citizens, but may expel citizens from other EU Member States. The expulsion of foreigners, whether EU citizens or not, remains a sovereign power of Member States. This sovereign power is limited only by respect for EU law and general principles, as well as being subject to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This national margin for manoeuvre by Member States explains several national provisions that run counter to the letter and spirit of Directive 2004/38/EC. Indeed, failure to respect the material and procedural safeguards during expulsion is considered to be the third main problem with the adoption of Directive 2004/38/EC by Member States.

This article begins with an analysis of the legal framework for expulsion of EU citizens, including a typology of the legal grounds for expulsion and of the safeguards associated with it. Examples of expulsion practices in some Member States over the last few years are given. Finally, ways of overcoming current issues are suggested.
Part 1: The legal framework for the expulsion of EU citizens

An EU citizen can only be expelled on the legal grounds enshrined in EU law, which are: threats to public policy, public security or public health, abuse of rights, fraud and unreasonable burden on the national social security system. These grounds for expulsion are clearly listed but insufficiently defined by the European legislature.

Typology of the legal grounds for expulsion

The legal grounds for expulsion are of three types: those linked to non-fulfilment of entry and residence conditions; the abuse of rights; and those linked to a threat to public policy, public security or public health.

Non-fulfilment of entry and residence conditions

EU citizens are free to move to and stay in the territory of other Member States as long as they respect those EU entry and residence conditions. While there are almost no requirements for a stay not exceeding three months, a longer stay requires additional conditions to be fulfilled (comprehensive health insurance, sufficient resources, administrative requirements, period of residence), which vary according to the citizen’s status (temporary or permanent resident). Restrictions, ranging from a mere fine to an expulsion order, can be imposed by Member States when these conditions are not fulfilled. Since expulsion is such an exceptional and serious measure, only a serious breach of the conditions of entry and stay, such as the person representing an unreasonable burden on the social security system of the host Member State, can lead to it. The legal basis for this statement is Article 14-1 of Directive 2004/38/EC, which states that Union citizens and their family members shall have the right of residence as long as they do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State, and Recital 16, which states that as long as the beneficiaries of the right of residence do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State they should not be expelled.

As Directive 2004/38/EC does not define ‘unreasonable burden,’ leeway is given to Member States to develop their own definition (Minderhoud 2013: 26–33). Article 14-4 targets mainly non-economic agents, as it states that in no case should an expulsion measure be adopted against workers, self-employed persons or job-seekers as defined by the Court of Justice save on grounds of public policy or public security. According to Recital 16 of Directive 2004/38/EC, recourse to the social security system should not automatically result in expulsion. In determining whether or not the beneficiary constitutes a burden, the host Member State should consider whether the individual’s difficulties are temporary and take into account the duration of residence, personal circumstances and the amount of aid granted. Relevant factors are duration of employment, education, qualifications and potential for future employability, as well as the unemployment rate in the region of residence.

Abuse of rights and fraud

According to Article 35 of Directive 2004/38/EC, Member States may adopt the necessary measures to refuse, terminate or withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in the case of abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of convenience. Abuse of rights is not defined in the Directive (which gives the single example of marriages of convenience) and only partially defined by the Commission as artificial conduct entered into with the sole purpose of obtaining the right of free movement and residence under Community law.
The Commission also defines fraud as deliberate deception or contrivance made to obtain the right of free movement and residence, such as forgery of documents or false representation of a material fact concerning the conditions attached to the right of residence.

**Threat to public policy, public security or public health**

Chapter VI of Directive 2004/38/EC (Article 27 and the following articles) deals with restrictions on the right of entry and the right of residence on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.\(^\text{16}\)

**Public policy and public security.** Public policy and public security can serve as grounds for expulsion of EU citizens who have resided in the host Member State for less than five years. Public security is considered a more serious ground than public policy and is therefore used with more caution. Those with more than five years’ residence (eligible for permanent residence) can only be expelled on serious grounds of public policy or public security. A long-term resident, who has resided in the host Member State for the previous ten years, may be expelled only on imperative grounds of public security as defined by Member States.

**Public health.** Of all the legal grounds for expulsion of Union citizens, public health is certainly the best defined by Directive 2004/38/EC. According to Article 29:

*The only diseases justifying measures restricting freedom of movement shall be the diseases with epidemic potential as defined by the relevant instruments of the World Health Organisation and other infectious diseases or contagious parasitic diseases if they are the subject of protection provisions applying to nationals of the host Member State.*

The Directive is, in fact, allowing WHO to determine which diseases with epidemic potential can be considered a threat to public health. As far as infectious or contagious diseases are concerned, Member States benefit from a larger margin of interpretation.\(^\text{17}\) In any case, diseases occurring more than three months after the date of arrival shall not constitute grounds for expulsion from the territory. The limitation on threat to public health is in fact more a condition for refusal of access to the territory of the host Member State than a ground for expulsion, the main objective of this ground being the fight against diseases coming from abroad and not the protection of the finances of the national public health service (Carlier 2007: 87). Nevertheless, public health has been used by Belgium as a reason to limit the number of French students in Belgian universities. In the Bressol and Chaverot case (C-73/08) the Court held that European Union law precludes, in principle, a limitation on enrolment by non-resident students in certain university courses in the public health field. However, such a limitation is compatible with EU law if it proves to be justified on grounds of the protection of public health.

**Insufficient definition of the legal grounds**

The legal grounds for expulsion are insufficiently or perhaps ‘rather broadly’ defined by primary and secondary law. For this reason, Member States are responsible for defining them. It is to be hoped that Member States’ margin of interpretation of legal grounds allowing expulsion is not absolute, as it could lead to abuse of law by national governments. In the absence of a Community definition there are two main limitations to this power, the importance of which have many times been underlined by the Commission and the Court of Justice: respect for EU law and standards; and the control of the ECJ.
The lack of a Community definition

While Article 27 of Directive 2004/38/EC allows Member States to expel EU citizens on the grounds of public policy and public security, the Directive does not define these two notions and neither do European law or European institutions. One reason for this lack of a Community definition is the traditional sovereign power of Member States on such sensitive subjects as public order and public security. The Directive only makes a distinction between the ‘serious grounds of public policy’ and the ‘imperative grounds of public security.’ The 2009 Communication of the Commission nevertheless reminds that it is crucial that Member States define clearly the protected interests of society, and make a clear distinction between public policy and public security. The latter cannot be extended to measures that should be covered by the former. The overly broad provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC make it necessary to define these two notions to avoid inconsistency in the use of these legal grounds.

The Member States have been tasked by the European Commission and the ECJ with defining these notions, and in doing so, they are required to respect EU law and are subject to the control of the ECJ. EU institutions contribute by drafting non-binding documents, in the form of guidelines from the European Commission (EC) and the resolutions of the European Parliament.

Communications from the European Commission. The July 1999 Communication on special measures concerning the movement and residence of citizens of the European Union justified on grounds of public policy, national security or public health is one of the first documents relating to the application and interpretation of the concepts of public policy, public security and public health. It states:

As regards the definition of the notions of public policy, public security and public health, Member States are free to determine the scope of these concepts on the basis of their national legislation and case law, but within the framework of Community law. However, any measures taken on grounds of public policy, public security or public health must be justified by a real and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society and must be in conformity with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and with the proportionality principle.

This document is still valid today and was the basis for the Commission’s 2009 Communication, a non-binding document aimed at guiding Member States in their implementation of Directive 2004/38/EC. It begins by stating that Member States retain the freedom to determine the requirements of public policy and public security in accordance with their needs, which can vary from one Member State to another and from one period to another. Then it offers a framework definition to Member States, specifying that public security is generally interpreted to cover both internal and external security along the lines of preserving the integrity of the territory of a Member State and its institutions. Public policy is generally interpreted as preventing the disturbance of social order.

The resolutions of the European Parliament. The European Parliament often also reacts to incorrect applications of Directive 2004/38/EC and their effect on EU citizens. In its 2008 Resolution, for example, it calls on the Commission to develop in its guidelines a uniform interpretation mechanism of the normative categories of ‘public policy,’ ‘public security’ and ‘public health.’ It also recalls that the public policy exceptions cannot be invoked to serve economic ends or to pursue general preventive aims, contrary to the recent practices of some Member States.
Definition by EU Member States

The task of defining ‘public policy’ and ‘public security’ has been given to Member States, granting them an important margin of interpretation. Some of them define these terms in their national legislation, some do not, and others merely include an unclear and vague definition.26

The margin of interpretation by EU Member States. A questionnaire on the transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council27 was sent by the Commission in 2009 to all Member States inquiring about their national interpretation of the legal grounds for expulsion.28 The Czech Republic, which does not define these terms in its national legislation, explains that in general, it should be stated that State security and public policy are ‘indefinite’ legal terms that must be construed according to the specific situation.29 In Romania, expulsions can take place if there is an ‘imminent danger’ to public policy and national security, while the meaning and scope of this category is not developed in Romanian law. Other states, like France, provide a very broad definition of a threat to public policy. Transposing Article 27 of Directive 2004/38/EC in Article 63 of its Law of 2011,30 the French legislature added Article 65,31 providing an extensive definition of this notion. According to the latter, a threat to public policy can be constituted by The fact of being liable to prosecution for certain offences such as trafficking in drugs, human trafficking, pimping, and robbery, exploitation of begging and illegal occupation of land. All these additional legal grounds are clearly contrary to Article 27 of Directive 2004/38/EC and might very easily lead to the expulsion of EU citizens.

Likewise, national interpretations of the notion of an ‘unreasonable burden to the social assistance system of the host Member State’ vary and the conditions of a resulting expulsion (Article 14, Recital 10) are uncertain in many Member States.32 While some Member States do not specify how they control the fulfilment of the criteria of unreasonable burden (for example, Austria merely states that it takes all relevant criteria into account),33 others, like the Czech Republic, appear to have created a detailed national scale. Failure to comply with this scale represents ‘an imperative reason of security’ that allows limitations to the right of entrance and residence of EU citizens.

Some Member States are misinterpreting the notion of abuse of rights, as is the case with the French Law on Immigration of 2011, which states that it is an abuse of rights to renew stays less than three months in order to stay on the French territory while the conditions required for a longer stay are not fulfilled, and also to stay in France with the essential aim of benefiting from the social security system. This definition of abuse of rights is totally incompatible with the spirit of Directive 2004/38/EC.

Control of national definitions by the European Court of Justice. The ECJ has had many opportunities to intervene on the outlines of expulsion orders issued by Member States against EU citizens. At the request of national courts, the Court has indeed interpreted the legal grounds mentioned in Directive 2004/38/EC. It has exercised what Stephane Leclerc (2009) calls its creative role of law, appearing as an extra legislator and a substitute legislator alongside the tripartite Commission–Council–Parliament. ECJ jurisprudence prior to 2004 has been incorporated into the text of Directive 2004/38/EC by the European legislature and now forms the main safeguard against expulsion. All decisions of the ECJ are in fact important elements contributing to a better definition of the notions of public policy and public security, potentially leading in the future to Union-wide definitions.

The ECJ even gives concrete examples of what can be considered as a threat. With regard to public security, the Court has held that this covers both Member States’ internal and external security,34 including threats to the functioning of institutions and essential public services, the survival of the population, the risk of a serious disturbance to foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations, a risk to military interests,35 and sexual exploitation of children.36 As far as the ‘serious grounds of public policy or security’ are
concerned, the Court has stated that ‘imperative grounds’ of public security is a considerably narrower concept than ‘serious grounds,’ and that the EU legislature clearly intended to limit it to ‘exceptional circumstances.’ The concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ presupposes that such a threat is of a particularly high degree of seriousness. The Court held that, in its opinion, trafficking of narcotics as part of an organised group could reach a level of intensity that might directly threaten the peace and physical security of the population as a whole or in part. In the P.I. c/ Oberburger case, the Court was asked to interpret the term ‘imperative grounds of public security’ that may justify the expulsion of an EU citizen who has been a resident in the host Member State for more than ten years. The Court referred to Article 83-1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) for the enumeration of crimes constituting a particularly serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society. According to Article 83-1 TFEU, those areas of crime are the following: terrorism; trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children; illicit drug trafficking; illicit arms trafficking; money laundering; corruption; counterfeiting means of payment; computer crimes; and organised crime.

As far as health policy is concerned, the Court held that the protection of public health is one of the overriding reasons of general interest which can, under Article 46-1 EC, justify restrictions of freedom of establishment. It follows from the case law that two objectives may be more precisely covered by that derogation in so far as they contribute to achieving a high level of protection of health: maintaining a balanced, high-quality medical or hospital service open to all; and preventing the risk of serious harm to the financial balance of the social security system.

Safeguards against expulsion

Since the expulsion of EU citizens is considered the most serious limitation of the freedom of movement and residence, according to Recital 23 of the Preamble of Directive 2004/38/EC, there are many safeguards designed to protect them against abusive practices by Member States. Safeguards against expulsion are found in primary and secondary EU law, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in international instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights. The latter focuses on the protection of fundamental rights such as the respect for privacy and family life, the prohibition of discrimination, and the right to a fair trial.

In spite of the economic crisis and the questioning of the principle of freedom of movement, the ECJ, which decides cases of conflict in this matter, is continuing to strongly support this fundamental freedom. It continues to repeat the need for a very strict interpretation of the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC, allowing the expulsion of an EU citizen, and a broad interpretation of the safeguards protecting citizens against expulsion. Safeguards against expulsion are numerous and can be divided into three main categories: general safeguards, individual safeguards and procedural safeguards. Most of them are listed in Article 27 and following articles of Directive 2004/38/EC.

General safeguards

General safeguards are related to general principles that should be respected, independently of the situation of the expelled person. They concern the prohibition of automatic and collective expulsion, respect for the principles of proportionality and of the best interest of the child, and the prohibition of expulsion for economic reasons or as a consequence of a penalty.

No automatic expulsion. Directive 2004/38/EC does not expressly include a general prohibition of automatic expulsion of EU citizens. However, Article 14-3 states that an expulsion measure shall not be the au-
tomatic consequence of an EU citizen’s, or his or her family member’s, recourse to the social security system of the host Member State. Despite this, some Member States tend to arrange automatic expulsions, without considering the appropriate steps of a fair trial or the individual circumstances of the expelled migrants. Two Member States, Italy and Finland, even provide in their national laws for automatic expulsions of EU citizens convicted of serious criminal convictions or having committed a crime of certain gravity.

No collective expulsion. Collective expulsion is prohibited by Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, by Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and by Article 27 of Directive 2004/38/EC, which states that justifications that rely on considerations of general prevention shall not be accepted. Despite this, the national legislation of many Member States does not contain any reference to the prohibition of general preventive aims, as is the case of Hungary and Romania. In 2011, the European Committee of Social Rights determined that the expulsion of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens from France in 2010, accompanied by a so-called voluntary scheme of Humanitarian Aid Returns consisting of financial assistance of 300 euros per adult and 100 euros per child, was a disguised form of collective expulsion. The French authorities were automatically expelling all Romanian and Bulgarian citizens of Roma origin found to be lodging in illegal settlements without taking into account their personal conduct and background. In 2012, this collective expulsion took on a different face with the establishment of collaboration between the French and Romanian governments based on a two-year pilot scheme for the repatriation to Romania of around 80 Roma families living in France.

No economic ends. Article 27-1 of Directive 2004/38/EC states that these grounds (public policy, public security and public health) shall not be invoked to serve economic ends. A Member State is not allowed to expel EU citizens to serve economic ends, such as the protection of its national economy or the protection of its labour market. Some Member States like Estonia and Hungary have not yet incorporated this provision of Directive 2004/38/EC into their national legislation. Other Member States do have such provision but are tempted not to respect this prohibition in period of economic crisis.

Respect for the principle of proportionality. Limitation on freedom of movement should be subject to the principle of proportionality as required by Recital 23 of Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 52-1 of the Charter and Article 27-2 of Directive 2004/38/EC. Such limitations may be applied only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. The principle of proportionality is met if the restrictive measure (in this case, the expulsion of an EU citizen) is appropriate and necessary to achieve the national objective pursued (for example, preservation of the national budget or of the national public order). A national restrictive measure is considered necessary if no other restrictive measure that would be less damaging to the citizen is available in pursuit of the same national objective. Such national restrictive measure is appropriate when the relevant objective can be achieved through the restrictive measure. In addition to the necessity and the appropriateness of the restrictive measure, the principle of proportionality requires Member States to provide a case-by-case evaluation of the alleged offence.

Thus, expiry of the identity card or passport on the basis of which the person concerned entered the host Member State and was issued with a registration certificate or residence card shall not constitute a proportionate ground for expulsion from the host Member State (Article 15 of Directive 2004/38/EC). In the Czech Republic, it appears that the most frequent criminal law penalty imposed on foreigners is expulsion, if this is required for the safety of persons or property or other public interest. In Italy, Article 235 of the Italian criminal code provides for the expulsion of non-nationals sentenced to ten or more years’ imprisonment. In both cases, the issue of compliance with the proportionality requirement of the Directive may be raised.
**Best interest of the child.** Article 28-3b of Directive 2004/38/EC states that an expulsion decision may not be taken against EU citizens, if they are minors, unless the expulsion is necessary for the best interests of the child, as provided for in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989. Whenever an expulsion order by the host Member State concerns a child, the expulsion is allowed only if it is in accordance with the best interests of the child and of its links with its family (Recital 24).

*No expulsion as a penalty or legal consequence of a custodial penalty.* According to Article 33-1 of Directive 2004/38/EC, expulsion orders may not be issued by the host Member State as a penalty or legal consequence of a custodial penalty, unless they conform to the requirements of public policy, security policy or health policy. This article refers to expulsion on account of a criminal offence.\(^{42}\)

**Individual safeguards**

Individual safeguards tend to impede automatic or collective expulsions by taking into account personal conduct and the background of the expelled person.

*Personal conduct.* According to Article 27-2 of Directive 2004/38/EC, measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. Justifications that are isolated from the particulars of the case or that rely on considerations of general prevention shall not be accepted. While expelling Romanian and Bulgarian citizens in 2010, the French authorities did not take into account this safeguard. Indeed, the French expulsion orders were motivated by standardised allegations not reflecting the personal conduct of each migrant. Most of these allegations were arguing the precarious conditions of existence, the absence of a job, the insufficient resources and the lack of health insurance of the EU mobile citizens concerned.

*Level of integration in the host Member State.* The more integrated an EU citizen is, the more difficult his or her expulsion from the host Member State will be. The initial aim of the European Commission, during the drafting of Directive 2004/38/EC, was to exclude the expulsion of permanent residents who should be totally assimilated among the nationals of the host Member State. Nevertheless, the Council and the Member States refused to give such a privilege to permanent residents. The expulsion of a long-term resident is still possible, but the legal grounds allowing it will be stricter. Article 28-1 of Directive 2004/38/EC states that the host Member State shall take into account considerations such as: the length of the residency in the host Member State; the social and cultural integration into the host Member State; and the extent of his or her links with the country of origin. The advantage enjoyed by long-term residents is most visible where grounds of public health are concerned. Article 29-2 of Directive 2004/38/EC states that diseases arising more than three months after the citizen’s date of arrival shall not constitute grounds for expulsion from the territory. Similarly, permanent residents can be expelled only on serious grounds of public security or public policy, and those with more than ten years’ residence in the host Member State can be expelled only on imperative grounds of public security.

*Personal circumstances: age, health, family and economic situation.* Article 28 of Directive 2004/38/EC states that before making an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy or public security, the host Member State shall take into account considerations such as his or her age, state of health, family and economic situation. According to the spirit of the Directive, it is very important to individualise each case of expulsion as much as possible. The gathering of such information requires, at a minimum, a time-consuming inquiry by the host Member State. For this reason, many Member States prefer to omit this safeguard and issue standardised expulsion orders.

*The character of the threat.* Directive 2004/38/EC and the ECJ highlight three main characteristics of the threat: it must be sufficiently serious and genuine. According to Articles 27-2 and Article 33-2 of Directive
2004/38/EC, the personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a present threat. The Directive prohibits previous criminal convictions being considered as grounds for expulsion measures unless there is a likelihood of reoffending. The seriousness of the threat is related to the affection of one of the fundamental interests of society. Even multiple convictions are not sufficient, in the absence of additional factors showing that the presence of the migrant constitutes a serious threat to public security. The ECJ has judged sufficiently serious crimes to include the use of drugs, prostitution, belonging to an organised and armed group, and the non-payment of fiscal debt, but it has denied the characteristic of a threat to public policy to crimes such as non-fulfilment of formalities of the right of entry and stay. Finally, the genuineness of the threat excludes presumed threats.

**Procedural safeguards**

An EU citizen who is the object of an expulsion measure is also protected by various procedural safeguards, such as notification in writing to the person concerned of the expulsion decision (Article 30-1), including specifying the legal ground of expulsion (Article 30-2), the conditions for lodging an appeal and judicial review of the expulsion decision (Articles 30-3 and 31), and the time allowed to leave the territory of the host Member State. Respect for these procedural safeguards applies to any ground for expulsion, as Article 15-1 of Directive 2004/38/EC states.

**Contentious proceedings: control by the European Court of Justice**

The Court has to ensure that Member States comply with their obligations under the treaties and respect EU law and standards. To do so it will first check if the legal ground invoked by the Member State adheres to the authorised limitations of freedom of movement. The ECJ will then check that the principle of proportionality and the safeguards have been respected by the Member State which has issued an expulsion order against an EU citizen. Examining the proportionality allows the Court to find the right balance between two contradictory claims (the expulsion of the citizen claimed by the host Member States versus the right to stay claimed by the citizen) and objectives (preservation of the national budget or of national interests by the host Member State and the exercise of the citizen’s fundamental right to freedom of movement). In doing so, according to Sara Lafuente Hernandez (2014), the Court provides the necessary reconciliation between autonomy of states and the rights of citizens of the EU. Lafuente Hernandez (2014) is critical of the Court’s interpretation of the principle of proportionality. According to her, this principle should not be used in such an asymmetric situation which sets the potential financial burden of the inactive migrant for the host Member State if there is recourse to social assistance on one side against the burden caused by the expulsion of an EU citizen on the other.

**Part 2: The use of the power of expulsion**

Many Member States have already exercised their power of expulsion. Some do it with discretion and expel a limited number of EU citizens, while other Member States’ expulsion practices are more mediatised because of the huge number of expelled migrants. In the last ten years, cases of expulsion of EU citizens have become increasingly common and mainly concern two types of migrants: EU citizens of Roma origin and non-economic migrants who pose an unreasonable burden for the host Member State.
The case of EU citizens of Roma origin

It should be noted that the situation of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens of Roma origin is very specific because there are a number of different reasons for restrictive measures taken against them. First, until January 2014 they belonged to one of the less favoured categories of EU citizens as far as freedom of movement is concerned – the category of citizens from new Member States subject to a transitional period as regards access to the labour market. Second, most of them belong to the category of economically inactive EU citizens. Third, they are subject to certain restrictive national practices because of their ‘Roma ethnicity.’ A study by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on the situation of Roma EU citizens moving to and settling in other Member States, clearly proves that poverty and racism are the main factors pushing these citizens to leave their country of origin. They unfortunately encounter the same problems in the host country.

Expulsion of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens of Roma origin from France

In 2010, hundreds of citizens of Romania and Bulgaria belonging to the Roma minority received an order of expulsion from French authorities. Most of them were living in France in illegal settlements or in abandoned flats, without financial means or jobs. Romanian and Bulgarian citizens still needed a work permit in France in 2010, as well as a residence permit. Most of them were unable to gather the necessary documents and, for this reason, were unable to find a job. After being expelled from illegal settlements, most of them received an expulsion order from the French prefectures. To facilitate and speed up the departure of Roma migrants, the French authorities used a mechanism normally reserved for removing illegal migrants from third countries: the technical and financial services of the Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration. The Office organised, for example, the repatriation of Romanian citizens by charter to Romania and provided the migrants, personae non gratae, with financial help to leave France (300 euros per adult and 100 euros per child).

This practice has been widely criticised. As already stated, you cannot put a price on freedom of movement. Following criticism from European institutions (the European Parliament and European Commission) and organisations (Council of Europe), non-governmental organisations and the French Défenseur des Droits, France was supposed to improve its national implementation of Directive 2004/38/EC (Law 2006-911 of 24 July 2006 on immigration and integration and Decree 2007-371 of 21 March 2007 incorporated into Title 2 of the French Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile – CESEDA). A year later, the French legislature adopted Law 2011-672 on immigration, integration and nationality. Unfortunately, many provisions of the new law are still incompatible with the spirit of Directive 2004/38/EC. The task of correctly applying the provisions of the Directive remains, in practice, in the hands of French administrative judges, who do not hesitate to cancel national orders to leave French territory when inappropriate.

French arguments for expelling Romanian and Bulgarian citizens

Unreasonable burden on the French social security system. France has expelled citizens from Romania and Bulgaria who had been in France for less than three months on the ground of being an unreasonable burden on the French social security system. Such ground is not suitable for such short-term residents who are not supposed to receive any social assistance. These migrants could not even apply for welfare assistance (housing, health insurance, Revenu de solidarité active) because only regular migrants (in possession of health insurance and sufficient resources) could apply for it (Lhernould 2011: 115). The French social welfare sys-
tem benefits migrants who are already in possession of a certain amount of resources, but it excludes those who have nothing. The latter is often the case for EU citizens of Roma origin. Any abuse of law concerning social assistance cannot be attributed to the short-term resident but rather to the host Member State which has decided to treat migrant Union citizens more favourably than set out by Directive 2004/38.

Non-fulfilment of the requirements for a right of residence of more than three months. Article 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC requires economically inactive persons to possess health insurance and sufficient resources. In 2010, French regulations calculated sufficiency of resources according to the age of the migrant: (1) for migrants under the age of 65, sufficient resources were equivalent to the monthly amount of the French RSA – Revenu de solidarité active (received by economically inactive persons in France) amounting to 483 euros; (2) for migrants over 65, sufficient resources were equivalent to the monthly ASPA – Allocation de solidarité aux personnes âgées (received by elderly people on low incomes in France), amounting to 788 euros.

Most of the Romanian and Bulgarian citizens in France were living on financial resources that were less than the amount required by French law. Lack of financial resources was used by French prefectures as a legal ground for orders of expulsion to Romanian and Bulgarian citizens. This practice was even approved by the French Conseil d’État, which declared in its decision of 26 November 2008 that it results from these provisions that the insufficiency of resources may be opposed by the préfet to take an order of expulsion against a Communitary citizen who is residing in France since more than three months while this person has not been yet taken in charge by the French social assistance system. The ground of lacking sufficient resources that has been used by the French authorities is obviously in contradiction to Directive 2004/38/EC which allows the retention of the right of residence only if the EU citizens become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the Host Member State.

Threat to public policy and to public security. The French authorities accused the Romanian and Bulgarian citizens of being a threat to public policy and to public security. According to French administrative law, a threat to public policy (ordre public) is a threat to good order, public security, salubrity and quietness. According to French immigration law, especially Article 65 of the French Law on Immigration of 2011 (incorporated into CESEDA under Article L-213-1), a threat to public order can be assessed in relation to the commission of a crime subject to prosecution on the basis of articles of the Criminal Code or if the foreigner has violated French labour law. Article 65 allows the French authorities to consider as a threat to public policy any suspicion of the crimes listed in this article, a formal conviction not being necessary! The illegal occupation of property and stealing in landfills was considered to be a threat to public policy by the French authorities and the French legislature, at least when this concerns migrants, even EU citizens. It is in contradiction to the established jurisprudence of the ECJ and French jurisprudence, according to which the illegal occupation of a settlement, even in circumstances constituting a risk to health policy, is not sufficient to qualify as a threat to public policy. Indeed, many administrative French appeal courts have held that the illegal occupation of a settlement is not sufficient – in the absence of exceptional circumstances – to establish that the stay of a Romanian citizen in France constitutes a threat to public order.

Abuse of law. Abuse of law is another ground invoked by the French legislature to justify the expulsion of EU citizens under Article 39 of the Law on Immigration of 2011 (incorporated into the CESESA under Article L-511-3-1). Article 39 is a very extensive interpretation of Article 35 of Directive 2004/38/EC, visibly contradicting the spirit of the Directive. According to Article 39, a suspicion by the French authorities that the EU citizen is residing in France with the secret aim of benefiting from the French welfare system justifies his or her expulsion. Merely imputed motives can be grounds for an expulsion order. This is totally unacceptable, especially considering that even effective recourse to the French social system is not sufficient to justify an expulsion order, according to Directive 2004/38/EC (Article 27). An anticipated recourse to the
French social system, in this case, cannot be a justification for expulsion. The European Court of Justice itself has weighed in many times on this subject, underlining that the threat has to be real and not hypothetical.\textsuperscript{48}

The French authorities have also used the ground of abuse of law to sanction Romanian citizens renewing stays of less than three months in France. In recent years, French administrative judges have tendency to cancel the \textit{Ordre de quitter le territoire français} based on abuse of law because of the lack of sufficient proofs.\textsuperscript{49} In its decision of 16 May 2012, the administrative court of Lyon refused the qualification of abuse of law rendered against a Romanian citizen because the French \textit{préfet} is not bringing any element proving that the concerned person has had renewed many times stays of less than three months,\textsuperscript{50} and by merely quoting that the conditions of living of the latter are insecure and that he does not have sufficient resources, the \textit{préfet} does not provide enough precise and objective elements in order to establish the existence of an abuse of the welfare system. Similarly, the French Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, in its opinion of March 2012,\textsuperscript{51} wonders what advantages an EU citizen would gain by renewing short stays in France and travelling between France and the home country. Such a person staying less than three months in France is not registered in France as a resident and is not allowed to receive benefits. However, there can be no abuse of law when there are no benefits for the migrant, according to the jurisprudence Emsland-Starke.

All the above grounds cited by the French authorities have been severely criticised by European institutions and non-governmental organisations. Nevertheless, the EC finally decided not to start any infringement procedure against France. Surprisingly, the Commission has not challenged the French legal grounds for expulsion of the Romanian and Bulgarian citizens which were highly debatable due to their lack of conformity with the material and procedural safeguards against expulsion provided in Directive 2004/38/EC. The EC threatened the French government with infringement procedures on the basis of other legal grounds such as ethnic discrimination and collective expulsions. The French expulsion orders have been accused of violating the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, particularly its principles of non-discrimination and respect for minorities, and its prohibition of collective expulsions. It seems that such expeditious orders of expulsion have been issued automatically against EU citizens of Roma origin, their being Roma constituting the essential motive for arrest and expulsion.\textsuperscript{52} It is a pity that the Commission did not express an opinion on the legality of the grounds used by the French authorities.

The expulsion of EU citizens of Roma origin is not limited to France. It has also been seen in Italy, where expulsion seems to be disproportionately practised against nationals of one particular Member State, Romania, the country of origin of most Roma. Some more cautious Member States still expel Roma migrants, but they are very careful not to show any evidence of discrimination against the Romani community by grounding their expulsion only on the basis of lack of financial resources or burden on the social security system. Since 2010, there have been other problematic cases of expulsion of citizens of Roma origin. Most of them were resolved during bilateral meetings between Member States and the EC, which led to amendments of inconsistent national measures. In other cases, the Commission has started actions for infringements. Nevertheless, non-governmental organisations such as the European Roma Right Center are still today very worried about the growing number of expulsions of EU citizens of Roma origin.

The case of non-economic migrants

Non-economic migrants are the next targets of Member States that are seeking to protect their social security system and national finances. On 23 April 2013, the German, British, Austrian and Dutch ministries of internal affairs sent a letter to the Presidency of the EU denouncing the abuse of the free movement of persons in
matters commonly referred to as ‘social tourism’ and the inefficiency of Directive 2004/38/EC. The Schengen system has been questioned because of the massive migration flows to which it has led, and social tourism is the new target of some host Member States which are ready to take repressive measures against those abusing the law, who are considered to constitute an unreasonable burden. The repressive measures proposed are the expulsion of offenders and the prohibition of their return to the host Member State, which are very serious sanctions that have been reserved until now for third-country nationals. The political reaction of the four ministries has to be taken seriously for a number of reasons. First, it reflects a big step backward in matters of the freedom of movement of EU citizens, placing them on the same level as immigrants from third countries. Second, this opinion could be shared by more Member States in the future.

The EC’s response to the four ministers was two-fold. First, in order to evaluate the magnitude of the problem, the Commission asked for details of the number of EU citizens considered to be an unreasonable burden in these Member States. Second, it reminded the Member States of the safeguards against the abuse of law that already exist in Directive 2004/38/CE. For these reasons, the question of how to nationally manage non-economic migrants staying for more than three months in the host country without fulfilling the conditions laid down in Article 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC (sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness insurance) is of great importance. Two cases will be examined in this article: Belgium’s expulsion of EU citizens constituting an unreasonable burden on its social security system; and Germany’s expulsion of EU citizens based on social tourism.

**Cases of unreasonable burden in Belgium**

Over the last few years, Belgium has expelled many EU citizens on the ground that they were placing an unreasonable burden on its social security system. In 2013, 2,712 EU citizens, including long-term residents, were returned to their home countries. Even though Belgium is expelling more EU citizens from Romania and Bulgaria, it does not hesitate to expel also citizens from the older Member States such as Spain, Italy and France. All these citizens have been accused of being an unreasonable burden on the Belgian social security system. Two categories of people have been affected by the Belgian measures: students and economically poor citizens (families with insufficient resources, job seekers, and so on).

Many of Belgium’s administrative practices towards EU migrants have been criticised. First, the automatic refusal of stays to EU citizens who have not provided proof of sufficient resources in time is certainly a disproportionate sanction. Second, Belgium is also accused of systematically controlling the economic situation of economically inactive Union migrants. Indeed, as soon as the migrants are granted Belgian social welfare or professional reintegration status, an alert system is triggered to allow the Belgian administration in charge of foreigners to retry their right of stay after three months on the ground of unreasonable burden to the Belgian social security system.

It is also interesting to note that Belgium could not find a better place to enshrine its regulation of the right of EU citizens to benefit from the Belgian RIS (*Revenu d’Intégration Sociale*) than in its amendment of the legislation related to the entry of asylum seekers. Of course, and fortunately, this kind of assimilation of EU citizens to asylum seekers, as well as their assimilation to third-country nationals by the four ministers in 2014, does not have any legal effect and remains more at a formal level.

**Cases of social tourism in Germany**

Many Eastern European citizens have migrated to Germany in the last few years without sufficient resources and health insurance. Germany is worried about the cost of this economic migration, deemed ‘benefit or wel-
fare tourism.’ In March 2014, just after the general lifting of restrictions to labour markets for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, a government panel recommended that Germany screen job seekers from other Member States for ‘welfare tourism’ or those who might qualify for unemployment benefit and then proceed to their expulsion and block their return for a fixed period (EurActiv 2014). Here, Germany goes further than mere expulsion as it proposes denying re-entry to ‘fraudsters’ for a certain period. After complaints from ‘overburdened’ German cities,61 some German politicians, such as Andreas Scheuer,62 claimed in 2013 that ultimately (the EU) just wants Germany to extend its social services to poor immigrants. The German government claims that it does not discriminate against poor immigrants, but is differentiating between sufficient and insufficient qualifications of the immigrants. Germany’s main argument for expelling EU citizens is based on Article 14 (i.e., on the efforts of the migrant to seek employment and on his or her capacity to find a job). Unqualified migrants, such as Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, are considered to be fraudsters. As the EU Commissioner for Social Affairs, Laszlo Andor, advocates in response to the complaints of the German cities, individual assessment is essential to determine whether or not there has been an abuse of law.63

The ECJ had the opportunity recently to consider a case of social tourism in Germany. In the Dano case (C-333/13), the Court held that economically inactive EU citizens who go to another Member State solely in order to obtain social assistance may be excluded from certain social benefits. The Dano case is very typical of cases of social tourism and should be read as such. Indeed, Mrs Dano, a Romanian citizen who had migrated to Germany with her son, was clearly not seeking employment in Germany. Moreover, her capacity to find a job in the future was almost non-existent as she had never worked in her country of origin or in her host country. She had not been trained in any profession either. Mrs Dano did not fulfil the criteria of Article 14 (i.e., on the efforts of the migrant to seek employment and on his or her capacity to find a job). Nevertheless, the inactive resident, despite not being having total equality with national residents, still benefits from freedom of movement and residence (absolute during the first three months and then conditional thereafter). The less favoured is certainly the inactive resident lacking necessary resources, and this has been the case for most of the EU citizens who have been expelled.

Conclusion

Freedom of movement has been built progressively since the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957, starting with the freedom of movement for workers and expanding to all EU citizens in 1993. It is still under way in 2015. Many steps have been taken to facilitate EU citizens’ entry to and residence in other Member States. The status of EU citizens residing in a host Member State is becoming increasingly similar to that of nationals of the host Member State, even if total equality of treatment is still not possible in some areas, such as social assistance. EU law privileges integrated migrants64 and economically active residents65 who will benefit from more advantages than the temporary resident and the inactive resident. Nevertheless, the inactive resident, despite not being having total equality with national residents, still benefits from freedom of movement and residence (absolute during the first three months and then conditional thereafter). The less favoured is certainly the inactive resident lacking necessary resources, and this has been the case for most of the EU citizens who have been expelled.

At this stage of progress, when the hardest work has already been done, some Member States, such as the United Kingdom, are willing to go back to the time when freedom of movement for economically inactive citizens was not automatic. They attempt to class economically inactive EU citizens as the same as third-country migrants or asylum seekers. Discrimination against poorer migrants is very regrettable for the EU and its citizens. A solution to the problematic migration of the poorest EU migrants is needed if we are to avoid the drifting of some Member States back to the situation of 30 years ago, when free movement was reserved only for economic agents (Schumacher 2013). The restrictive approach of some Member States was criticised in 2013 by the Commission,66 which noted, based on figures communicated by Member States and its
study *The Impact of Mobile EU Citizens on National Social Security Systems*, that: (1) on average the employment rate of mobile EU citizens (67.7 per cent) was higher than among nationals (64.6 per cent) and free movement of citizens stimulates economic growth; (2) EU law already provides safeguards regarding access to social assistance for economically inactive mobile EU citizens, designed to protect host Member States from unreasonable financial burdens, and leading to expulsion if all the criteria are met; and (3) in most Member States mobile EU citizens are net contributors to the host country’s welfare system. They are more likely to be economically active than nationals and less likely to claim social benefits.

If we are not prepared to accept this retrograde step, we must take account of the political claims of Member States fearing for their national interests. States such as France (expulsion of EU citizens of Roma origin), as well as Belgium and Germany (expulsions based on unreasonable burden on the national social security system and social tourism) are fighting to protect their national finances, national administrations and social security systems, while facing the arrival of a large number of economically inactive EU citizens. Their aim is legitimate, but their practices are not as long as their solution is to use the most serious restriction on the right of residence: expulsion. One has to remember that expulsion should remain as a restriction used in very limited cases because it has direct consequences for migrants’ right to free movement, family rights and private rights. Where possible, alternatives to expulsion should be used.

The abuse of expulsion powers by Member States is primarily for political and legal reasons. In times of economic crisis, Member States are tempted to exaggerate the scale of the problem and accuse foreigners, including EU citizens, of responsibility for their socio-economic difficulties. The legal reasons for the abuse of Member States’ powers of expulsion are linked, first of all, to an incorrect or insufficient transposition and implementation of Directive 2004/34/EC. Either fundamental provisions of the Directive have not been incorporated into national law, generating a dangerous legal vacuum, or the national legislature misuses the obligation of transposing the Directive to add new provisions contrary to its spirit. Second, the absence of a comprehensive definition of the legal grounds (unreasonable burden, abuse of law and threats to public policy and public security) for expulsion in Directive 2004/38/EC is also very problematic, giving Member States the opportunity to abuse their margin of interpretation. This abuse is visible at different levels: at the level of the national legislature, which will have an extensive interpretation of the European legal grounds for expulsion, and at the level of the national administration which will put the national grounds extensively into practice. The lack of an EU-wide definition generating various national definitions is also endangering the uniform application of freedom of movement, allowing differential treatments in all the Member States.

The following policy recommendations for the European Union and Member States seek to avoid the increasing questioning of freedom of movement of persons with which we are now faced.

**Rethink the concept of European integration and European citizenship in a context of crisis and enlargement.** Should the European Union develop the intra-European solidarity that would allow a more social Union citizenship that does not exclude non-active citizens? Should it standardise the distribution of social assistance by Member States? Two elements should be considered in answer to these questions: the existence of a common appetite for further social integration within the EU; and the ability of the EU and of the Member States to cope with such social challenges.

**Make a clear distinction between abusers and integrated migrants.** As the European Commission has noted, Member States already have all the legal instruments they need to deal with abuse of law in matters of social assistance. Moreover they are not obliged, in any case, to provide social assistance to economically inactive migrants who are not permanent residents or integrated migrants. They can distinguish between abusers of law (not fulfilling the conditions of stay and not seeking employment, such as in the case of Mrs Dano) and inactive EU migrants who are genuinely seeking employment and are integrated into the host society. The level of integration into the host society of the economically inactive EU citizen is a good tool.
to avoid abuse of law such as social tourism. The integration link with the host Member State has to be examined *in concreto* for an economically inactive EU citizen who stays in the host Member State between three months and five years (Carlier 2013: 245). For the permanent resident, this link will be of course presumed.

*Sanction the abusers of law.* The very recent jurisprudence of the ECJ is moving towards this objective. According to the Court’s decision in the Dano case (C-133/13), from November 2014 (Rubio 2014), economically inactive EU citizens who go to another Member State solely in order to obtain social assistance (without the intention of integration) may be excluded from certain social benefits. Sanctions can range from the simple refusal of social assistance to expulsion in very exceptional cases when all conditions are met including respect for the safeguards.

*Use expulsion of EU citizens very exceptionally.* As Dimitry Kochenov has stated, deportation is potentially harmful to the status of EU citizenship and an indication of its structural weakness. It also has disruptive effects for the individual. Similarly, Sara Lafuente Hernandez (2014) estimates that restrictions such as expulsion are not proportionate when targeting non-active EU citizens accused of being an unreasonable burden on the social security system of the host Member State. According to her, expulsion is too costly a sanction for the individual concerned compared with the potential financial benefit to the host Member State.

*Aim to better integrate Romanian and Bulgarian citizens of Roma origin both in their country of origin and in the host Member State.* The ultimate aim would be to consider EU citizens of Roma origin not as victims or abusers of law but as ordinary citizens wishing to enjoy freedom of movement. First, however, these EU citizens have to become ordinary citizens enjoying the same rights as other nationals in their country of origin. If they are able to work and earn a living in their home country, they are as likely to enjoy freedom of movement as any other EU citizen. This is a very difficult challenge. The EU together with the Member States has established various integration programmes in the host country (prevention and integration in the fields of education, employment, accommodation and access to health services as proposed by French non-governmental organisations) and reintegration programmes in their country of origin.

But as Sergio Carrera (2014: 34, 61) points out, integration and reintegration have been designed as a policy mechanism for avoiding responsibility for discrimination against the Roma and exclusion because of their differences, cultures and nomadic ways of life. It is a way of preventing them from re-exercising their freedom to move and discouraging an unwelcome form of cross-border nomadism.

**Notes**

1 According to Articles 21 and 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Freedom of movement originally applied exclusively to workers and has been extended to any EU citizen (economic agent or not), since the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht. Nevertheless, this freedom of movement shared by all EU citizens still favours the economically active.

2 Freedom of movement of persons is considered by EU citizens as their favourite fundamental right. Despite much progress in this field, many obstacles remain, ten years after the adoption of Directive 2004/38/EC. Those obstacles are partly the result of insufficient transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC by Member States and national administrations.

The economic crisis has also pushed Union citizens from eastern and southern parts of Europe, suffering from unemployment and job insecurity, to migrate to better economically endowed Member States.

For more details on the relationship between enlargement and freedom of movement, see Nagy Boldizsar (2006: 127).

Directive 2004/38/EC does not grant total freedom of movement to all Union citizens. After three months of stay, only workers are entitled to an automatic right to stay. Economically inactive EU citizens are subject to the conditions of sufficient resources and health insurance and do not receive the same treatment as nationals of the host Member State, especially in respect of the granting of social assistance. Inactive EU citizens are in this regard discriminated against.

These limitations are allowed by articles of the treaties such as Articles 45 and 21 TFEU, Article 52.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (which is legally binding on the EU) and Article 27 of Directive 2004/38/EC.

Besides the refusal of entry, of exit, denial of social assistance and jail.

See all the international instruments to which Member States of the EU are parties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 (Article 9), the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights of 10 May 1966 (Article 13, protocol 7) as well as European instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 4) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 19). For more information on the role of the European Court of Human Rights in matters of expulsion, see Guimezanes (2013).

This after problems related to the entry and stay of family members and to the issue of visas and cards to family members who are nationals of third-countries.

The only requirement being the possession of an ID or a passport.

The non-fulfilment of administrative requirements such as the absence of registration in the host Member State cannot lead to expulsion.

European law has its own definition of the job seeker, differing from national definitions. In matters of free movement, job seekers are treated the same as workers as long as they can prove that they are seeking employment and that they have a genuine chance of being taken on. Job seekers might be first-time job seekers or persons who are no longer workers or self-employed persons and retain the status of workers after involuntary unemployment.

The Commission stated that the definition of marriages of convenience can be extended by analogy to other forms of relationship contracted for the sole purpose of enjoying the right of free movement and residence, such as (registered) partnership of convenience, fake adoption or where an EU citizen claims to be the father of a third-country child to convey nationality and a right of residence to the child and its mother, knowing that he is not the father and is not willing to assume parental responsibilities. Marriage of convenience is commonly used as a reason to terminate the stay of family members of third-country nationals and is less likely to be used for EU citizens.


Threat to public policy, public security and health policy is already enshrined in Articles 45-3, 52 and 62 of TFEU for economically active citizens and in Article 21 TFEU for all EU citizens.

Some Member States might consider HIV an infectious or contagious parasitic disease constituting a legal ground for expulsion of the EU citizen. If so, the host Member State should expel the citizen during the first three months of his/her residence.
The European treaties merely give a ‘negative definition’ of public policy, quoting situations when public policy cannot be evoked. Public policy is mentioned eight times in the TFEU but never defined.

For more details on notions of public policy, see Emmanuelle Néraudau-d’Unienville (2006).

In the Rutilli case (C-36/75), the Court stated that Member States are continuing, in principle, to be free to determine the requirements of public policy in the light of their national needs.

In the Van Duyn case (C-41/74), the Court stated that it should be emphasised that the concept of public policy in the context of the Community and where, in particular, it is used as a justification for derogating from the fundamental principle of freedom of movement for workers, must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without being subject to control by the institutions of the Community (paragraph 18).


Communication of the Commission on guidance for improved transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.


For more details on the definition of public policy and public security, see the report of the European Parliament of 2009, pp. 10–11.

See Annex of European Parliament Resolution of 2 April 2009 on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.

Questions regarding expulsion were as follows: Does your MS restrict free movement on grounds of ‘public policy,’ ‘public security’ or ‘public health’? Please provide details on: definitions in national law and jurisprudence; authorities involved; possibility of expulsion orders being issued or other measures taken on these grounds; whether any illness constitutes a ground for expulsion (for instance HIV); methods of assessment; implementation of the requirement for personal conduct of the individual concerned to be a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society; of the prohibition for previous criminal convictions not to constitute grounds for restrictive measures, etc. How does your MS take into account the provisions of Article 28-1 before taking an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy and public security? How does your MS define ‘serious’ and ‘imperative’ grounds of public policy or public security to order the expulsion of permanent residents, residents of more than 10 years’ standing and minors? How many expulsion orders have been issued so far? Please provide quantitative and qualitative data available by ground for expulsion, nationality, age, etc.


Article 63 of the French law mentions that expulsion is justified when the personal behaviour of the migrant represents a real, actual and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. This article has been incorporated into the French Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA) under Article L.521-5.
Article 65 has been incorporated into the CESEDA under Article L.213-1.


The Austrian answer to the questionnaire states that: According to administrative data and case-law, a person would become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system if the purpose of their entering the country was in order to draw social benefits. Where there is no early indication of abuse, an individual assessment is made, whereby all relevant circumstances – especially the duration and purpose of stay (entry for employment purposes or as a student, etc.) – are taken into account.

See, inter alia, case C-273/97 Sirdar, paragraph 17.

See, inter alia, case C-398/98 Commission v Greece, paragraph 29.

See case P.I. c/Oberburger, C-348/09.

See recital 24 in the preamble to Directive 2004/38/EC.

See the Tsakouridis case, C-145/09, mainly para. 40 ff.

For more details on the ground of public security, see Henri Labayle (2012) and Anne Rigaux (2013).

See the case of Bressol et Chaverot (C-73/08), paras 67 and 68: In that regard, it cannot be ruled out a priori that a reduction in the quality of training of future health professionals may ultimately impair the quality of care provided in the territory concerned, since the quality of the medical or paramedical service within a given area depends on the competence of the health professionals who carry out their activity there. It also cannot be ruled out that a limitation of the total number of students in the courses concerned – in particular with a view to ensuring the quality of training – may reduce, proportionately, the number of graduates prepared in the future to ensure the availability of the service in the territory concerned, which could then have an effect on the level of public health protection. On that point, it must be acknowledged that a shortage of health professionals would cause serious problems for the protection of public health and that the prevention of that risk requires that a sufficient number of graduates establish themselves in that territory in order to carry out there one of the medical or paramedical occupations covered by the decree at issue in the main proceedings.

See the Hartlauer case (C-169/07), paras 46 and 47.

It is interesting to note that Czech law, unlike EU law or international law, distinguishes between ‘administrative expulsion’ ordered by the foreign police and ‘penal expulsion’ ordered by a criminal judge.

In the Czech Republic, for example, in 2013, EU citizens from Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Germany received expulsion orders.

For more details on the expulsion of EU citizens of Roma origin from France, see Lhernould (2010: 1024–1036) and Sergio Carrera (2014).

The 2013 Commentary of the French CESEDA notes that French legislation has developed many legal instruments to restrict the stay of foreigners (expulsion, deportation, obligation to leave French territory, administrative and judicial prohibition to enter French territory, transfer to another Schengen state and so on). The high number of these procedures unfortunately leads to confusion regarding which instrument should be used in a particular case and French law is very often misused by regional and local authorities (for example, abuse of the notion of urgency that allows the French authorities not to motivate their decision and to execute the expulsion order without delay).

The interpretation by Member States of the notion of ‘sufficient resources’ under Article 7-1-b of Directive 2004/38/EC is often unclear, while most Member States require that evidence of sufficient resources be given.
For example, the appeal court of Versailles – 15 July 2009 and the Court of appeal of Lyon – 4 November 2011.

See, *inter alia*, the *Boucherea* case (C-30/77).

See, for example, the judgments of the administrative court of Lyon dated 2 May 2012 and 16 May 2012, No. 1203741, No. 1203740, No. 1201114, and those of the administrative appeal court of Douai dated 25 October 2012, No. 12DA00853.

Romanian citizens being EU citizens do not need a visa to enter and leave France. For this reason, it is very difficult to prove the renewal of many stays and the dates of arrival and departure.

*Avis sur le respect des droits des «gens du voyage» et des Roms migrants au regard des réponses récentes de la France aux instances internationals*, point 39.

It has been proved that many French *gendarmes* had received written orders to concentrate on foreigners of Roma origin.

This is confirmed by the language used by the ministers, not using the word ‘citizens of the Union’ to designate citizens from other Member States, but describing them as ‘immigrants,’ a term generally used to designate citizens of third countries.

For more details on expulsions of EU citizens from Belgium, see Jean-Yves Carlier (2014: 172–173).

The number of EU citizens expelled amounted to 2,407 in 2012, 989 in 2011 and 343 in 2010. Belgium is one of the rare Member States which are not afraid of publishing the exact number of EU citizens it has expelled. In many Member States such information is confidential and not made available in the public domain.

See the Spanish *indignados* petition brought to the European Parliament in April 2014 against the Belgian migration law allowing forced expulsions of European citizens and Belgian practices of systematic control over foreigners in contravention of Directive 2004/38/EC, especially its provision regarding burden on the social assistance system leading to discriminatory treatment of European migrants, especially those from Southern and Eastern Europe where the economic crisis has hit harder.

In 2013, 177 French citizens were deprived of their right of residence in Belgium.

This was the case of Caroline, a French student who arrived in Belgium in 2010 and received the *Revenu d’intégration* from 2013. The fact that she benefited from Belgian social assistance while not being able to find a job (according to the Belgian authorities) led to her expulsion because of her long period of inactivity. According to Article 14-4b of Directive 2004/38/EC, job seekers are allowed to stay on the territory of a host Member State for three months. After three months, *the Union citizens and their family members may not be expelled for as long as the Union citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged*.

This was the case of a French family with four children (*Delbarre-Chauvin*), resident for three years in Belgium, who were threatened with expulsion for not having sufficient financial resources. The father lost his job while the mother works in a retirement home and has her low salary topped up by the Belgian *Revenu d’intégration sociale*. The Belgian *Office des étrangers* considers that these six persons are an unreasonable burden on the Belgian social security system.


These German cities complain that their health and welfare systems are *unable to cope with the number of unemployed Eastern Europeans*.

CSU Secretary General.

*When an EU citizen is denied social welfare after the mandatory three months, there should be an individualised assessment to see where the person’s habitual residence is. The location of a person’s habitual
residence is crucial in determining whether they are entitled to claim social benefits in another EU Member State. To determine it, one has to take into account family situation, housing situation, reasons for the move and the duration of residence in the affected Member State.

According to Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC, permanent residents shall enjoy total equal treatment with the nationals of the host Member States.

According to Article 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC, workers or self-employed persons have an automatic right of residence for more than three months, whereas inactive residents should have sufficient resources and comprehensive health insurance.


For example, provisions on prohibitions of collective expulsions are not incorporated into some national legislations.

For example, Article 39 of the French Law on Immigration of 2001, resulting in a very extensive interpretation of Article 35 of Directive 2004/38/EC.

See Kochenov and Pirker (2013: 378).

See Bigo (2011: 81–82): The issue is not the Roma people’s attitude, or their integration, but is first of all that attitude of our governments as regards free movement of persons and human rights in Europe, with a debate that has the observance of their previous EU commitments at its core.


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References


Female Migrants’ Work Trajectories: Polish Women in the UK Labour Market

Karima Aziz*

The present paper examines how, at a time of post EU-enlargement migration, female Polish migrants in the UK act within, despite and against the social structure of gender regimes in the origin and host societies and how female migrant agents are actively mediating structures in a quest to fulfil their aspirations. Biographical narrative interviews conducted with female Polish migrant workers in the UK and semi-structured expert interviews provide the empirical data for the analysis of how employment trajectories in migration can challenge or reinforce gender roles, and of the role of female migrants’ agency. The paper shows how some women are limited in their opportunities by gender roles and familial obligations, while others are able to progress professionally either by entering a typical ‘migrant’ sector, by undertaking UK education, or by starting their own businesses, challenging the gendered expectations they face. The paper thus contributes to the discussion on female migrants as disadvantaged migrant workers or as active agents of change.

Keywords: female migration; gender; work trajectories; women’s employment

Introduction

In May 2014 a report published by the Migration Policy Institute and the International Labour Organisation (Frattini 2014) suggested even in its title Moving up the Ladder? the changed reality of migrants’ employment trajectories. While discourses around downward social mobility and brain waste had for some time dominated in relation to post-accession Polish migration to the UK, these findings suggest that migrants are in fact able to move up the occupational ladder. The present paper looks into these potential dynamics in the experiences of female Polish migrant workers in the UK and asks how Polish women perform as agents in the UK labour market.

Post-accession female Polish migrants to the UK have been described as young women often migrating alone and thus as mobile female workers characterised by reliability, efficiency, cheapness and commitment (Slany 2008). This could potentially challenge or reinforce the Polish nationalist version of femininity as represented by Mother Pole (Matka Polka) – a figure limited to procreation and domesticity (Ignatowicz 2012: 125). Polish gender relations are far more complicated than this simplified ideal might suggest. While during the socialist era the labour market participation of Polish women far exceeded that of women in Western European countries, this development has faced something of a backlash during the more recent transformation, with female workers turning out to be the losers through the capitalist dynamics of a changing system and the revival of this nationalist, sexist ideal. The present paper examines this dynamic and its

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relevance to the phenomenon of female Polish labour migration to the UK and the role migration can play in challenging or supporting prevalent gender relations.

Therefore the following research questions are being pursued: How do the work trajectories of female Polish migrant workers in the UK challenge or reinforce gender roles? How are employment trajectories actively mediated by female Polish migrant workers in the UK? In pursuit of these questions the present paper obtains insights from literature on Polish post-accession migration, on female migration, and specifically on female Polish migration. In conceptualising the phenomenon, the construction of Polish women is examined and combined with a view of the career trajectories of female Polish migrants. Quantitative data on Polish women in the UK and their characteristics, putting the research into context, is followed by an examination of in-depth biographical narrative interviews. These biographies enable migration and work trajectories to be analysed and the role of female migrants’ agency to be examined.

Polish post-accession migration to the UK and the feminisation of migration

The phenomenon of Polish post-accession migration to the UK has, in the light of its numerical significance, new politico-institutional developments and broad spectrum, attracted a substantial amount of research into various aspects of its dynamics. Following accession in 2004, the UK opened up its labour market for citizens of the new member states and the number of Polish migrants in the UK has risen significantly. Although a certain amount of return migration has been detected and researched since the economic crisis beginning in 2007 (Anacka, Matejko, Nesterowicz 2013), the implementation of the European principle of freedom of movement has affected the size of the Polish population in the UK so substantially that Polish is deemed to be the second most widely spoken language in England (Booth 2013). In 2011 Poland was estimated to be the top country for citizenship of foreign citizens, at 15 per cent, and the second country of birth for foreign borns, at 8 per cent (Rienzo, Vargas-Silva 2012). The 2011 census data for England and Wales list a Polish-born population of 579 000, constituting 52 per cent of all Central and Eastern European migrants (Migration Observatory 2012). Migration from Poland to the UK has proved to be of interest across a wide range of academic disciplines, has been a topic of great concern to local authorities across the UK and has loomed large in general public and media debates about immigration (Burrell 2010: 297). Such studies have revolved around key themes of academic research such as staying, returning, working and living (Burrell 2010). Economic reasons such as high unemployment in Poland have been identified by pivotal studies as the main migration driver, characterising this movement as economic migration (Drinkwater, Eade, Garapich 2006). Certain demographic characteristics have been ascribed to the new Polish migration to the UK, seen as consisting of young (White 2010), highly educated people, whom Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich (2006) describe as ‘searchers’ looking to meet new people and to improve their English language skills. Hence observers have not merely conceptualised life strategies in economic terms, but have also taken account of the social and cultural capital of migrants (Burrell 2009: 298). Attention has been paid not only to standards of living and mobile young people (Cieslik 2011), but also to family strategies and migrant workers. In parallel with the description of Polish migration to the UK as economic migration, Polish migrants have generally been defined as workers undertaking work migration (Burrell 2010: 300). Whether about opportunity, vulnerability or integration, most reports and studies acknowledge work as central (Burrell 2010: 301). Researchers such as Galasińska and Kozłowska (2009), Rabikowska (2010) and Lopez Rodriguez (2010) have established that Polish migrants do not argue that their move is to do with the search for a ‘better’ life, but for a ‘normal’ life: ‘normal’ referring to the perceived standard of living of Europeans. Kaźmierska, Piotrowski and Waniek (2011: 143) illustrate this desire with an image introduced by Morawska (1985) of migrating ‘for bread with butter’. The idiom ‘bread and butter’ refers to one’s basic income or
livelihood and migrating ‘for bread’ referred to the push factor of survival, whereas the modification to ‘for bread with butter’ expresses the migrants’ economic and social expectations acting as pull mechanisms (Kaźmierska et al. 2011). While different types of migrants have been identified, some agreement has been reached that post-accession migrants are a diverse, not entirely predictable, population, all existing within the same economic framework but formulating different strategies of migration and return (Burrell 2010: 299).

In addition to Polish post EU-enlargement migration to the UK being researched extensively as a specific migration phenomenon, for the present paper another dynamic within migration research becomes relevant: the focus on women as migrants. Kofman, Phizacklea, Raghuram and Sales (2000) detect blindness to the diversity of the female experience, articulating that there are many migration movements in which women are not simply the followers of men as wives or partners. The feminisation of migration has been widely acknowledged. While gender studies are located in an interdisciplinary area of research, there have been sociological studies of gender and migration, which include analyses of national data sets on country of origin, global studies linking micro and macro causes of migration, national-level studies of immigrant groups, and refined case studies of immigrant groups in a single locale (Moch 2005: 95). The structuralist perspective focuses on immigrant women in work, mainly in the informal and secondary sector in which they are the underdog in the world capitalist system (Moch 2005: 97), pushed by patriarchy into the least desirable positions (Anderson 2000; Morokvasić 1984). Less structuralist research has studied immigrant women as actors with varying degrees of agency in families or communities. Mobility has the potential to impact on the position of women in society (Morokvasić 1984). Adopting a transnational approach, researchers thus conceptualise women as agents of change for their countries of origin, on the one hand having stronger ties than men to their home countries, leading to high remittances, and on the other hand having a higher level of participation in the receiving communities (Kofman 2004). Including gender in migration research enriches and deepens the study of movement and its consequences (Moch 2005). In order to understand migration experiences a gendered perspective appears to be relevant, since migration can be different for men and women, possibly changing gender relations or entrenching traditional inequalities. Research on mobility has found that for some women in Europe migration has become a lifestyle choice and a strategy for gaining social status (Ignatowicz 2012). This conclusion appears to be overly optimistic, when looking at the main sectors in which immigrant women find employment, since these often reproduce traditional gender relations and the intersection with class and ethnicity. Various forms of intersecting inequalities – being a migrant, a woman and a member of an ethnic group – have been detected (McCall 2005). The feminisation of the labour market, its continued segmentation, and the occupational segregation between men and women in the UK, is the context within which migrant women seek employment and combine their reproductive and gainful work (Aufhauser 2000).

While the transition phase following 1989 has triggered mobility, including that of women (Morokvasić, Münz, Metz-Göckel 2008) employed in low-paid jobs in the service sector, female emigration from Poland has a long history and has been associated with economic and family factors (Ignatowicz 2012: 36). Past research (Coyle 2007; Cyrus 2008) shows that mobility plays an important role in enhancing opportunities related to paid and unpaid work (Morokvasić et al. 2008) and at the same time creates a hybrid existence in the receiving and origin countries (Cyrus 2008). Cook, Dwyer and Waite (2010) illustrate additional advantages of migration to the United Kingdom.

For some Polish women their new life abroad had opened up the space for them to critically review their own attitudes and beliefs. (…) Gender and ethnicity remain important factors in the lives of A8 migrants. The act and experience of migration offers new individual and collective opportunities and potentially opens up spaces for people to negotiate structural constraints and reconfigure aspects of their identity (Cook et al. 2010: 73).
While female emigration from Poland has not been fully investigated [and] much of the previous research on gender and migration concentrated on females with families, neglecting the young, single and childless migrants (Ignatowicz 2012: 37), some new research has been published recently by Duda-Mikulin (2013) on Polish women actively exercising their EU citizenship rights. For Polish migrants and female Polish migrants in the UK, the labour market situation has become diverse in terms of occupational levels and industry sectors.

**Polka – the construction of Polish women**

To understand the social construction of Polish women it is necessary to understand the interconnectedness of the role of women, gender relations and the tragic history of Poland. Following the traumatic experiences of the Second World War, the socialist leadership was perceived as being external, which sustained the dichotomy of ‘us’ against ‘them’ and thus prevented the internalisation of the socialist ideal of gender equality. Instead, traditional understandings of gender roles prevailed, combining the image of the sacrificing *Matka Polka* with traditions of Polish aristocratic society portraying men as knights and women as ladies. Aristocratic gender relations were referred to as ‘soft patriarchy’ in which women were valued highly and treated in a gentlemanly fashion, but at the same time subordinated and assigned to the private, female sphere, clearly separate from the public-political, male sphere. During the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795, which ended the existence of an independent Polish state until 1918, the family and the church had been the only spaces in which a Polish national consciousness could be created and upheld under foreign rule, rendering the role of the self-sacrificing *Matka Polka* a political one as well. In this role women kept the national identity alive within the family and supported their husbands’ struggle for independence by efficiently taking on all other necessary duties (Janion 1996). This gender solidarity in the fight against the ‘others’ led, following Polish independence in 1918, to the acknowledgement of the role of women by the extension of the franchise to women without their needing to fight for it; during this interwar period women also participated actively in the attainment of higher education. In times of Polish autonomy it seemed that the idea of the emancipation of women progressed and the ideal of the *Matka Polka* was less powerful than later on, when the genders were faced once more with a common enemy (Pickhan 2006). During socialist rule the equality of men and women was propagated and discrimination against women was denied. The state would take over the work of caring for children and thus declare women free to work as if there were no need for reproductive work in the household. In contrast to some patriarchal Western countries following a sole-wage-earner model, whereby women could only earn additional pocket money, in Poland men and women earned the same. However, neither would be able to maintain a household alone, since the wages were basically cut to 50 per cent of living expenses, creating co-dependency which, combined with other economic problems such as housing shortages, supply shortfalls and poverty, worsened the situation of women (Petrowa-Wasilewicz 2006). The emancipation of women ‘from above’ during socialist times collapsed in parallel with the collapse of the socialist system and was due to a lack of functioning organisations with the power to prevent the closure of kindergartens or the introduction of a law prohibiting abortions.

In collective memory the role of women during the uprisings and demonstrations of *Solidarność* was merely a supportive one. Although they were even asked not to disturb the men during their struggle, it was established that women were able to irritate the authorities even more than did the oppositional male actors (Graff 2006). Following transformation the unemployment of women rose faster, their wages decreased in relation to those of men, and it took them longer to find new positions, being asked routinely about their personal life plans during job interviews. Nevertheless a higher degree of equality has been achieved and sustained in contrast to some other Western democracies in which patriarchy dominated (Petrowa-Wasilewicz 2006). It is suggested that the backlash in women’s equality after 1989 was connected to the circumstance that these
rights were not perceived as specifically women’s rights, but were taken for granted and rather seen as needing improvement. Some years had to pass before changes in the area of women’s rights could be conceptualised as part of the neoliberal transformation project. On the one hand the idea of women’s rights being rooted in socialist ideology led to their rejection, but at the same time the extreme form of economic liberalisation and the focus on fiscal arguments led to their weakening. The closing of kindergartens and the referral of care duties back to women were understood both as ways to save money and as ways to encourage women to exit the labour market and therefore reduce unemployment amongst men. The discontent of some women with these developments led to the foundation of various NGOs, but it took 20 years for the women’s movement to be strongly organised within the Women’s Congress (Kongres Kobiet) in the fight for women’s rights. Most recently media debates have dealt with public criticism of gender ideology and its proclaimed dangers by Polish priests and some politicians (Fuszara 2014).

Employment trajectories of female Polish migrants

As stated above, there has been little research on the employment trajectories of female Polish migrant workers. Studies relating to this issue would either focus on certain sectors and include various migratory backgrounds or investigate the female experience as wives and mothers. Nevertheless some studies have been undertaken in relation to the employment trajectories of Polish migrants and within these the researchers also examined the differences between men and women. In their research on the meaning of migration for careers, Grabowska-Lusińska and Jaźwińska-Motylska (2013) detected differences between men’s and women’s approaches to migration. They found women to be more determined and to make better use of the opportunities that arise in connection with staying abroad. The migration experience helps women to achieve radical changes in their employment trajectories. Migration therefore becomes a step in their careers which does not depend on their position or family situation. For men, by contrast, migration is more of an interlude than a part of their career, which they use to achieve other goals. The researchers explain these differences in terms of the greater challenge migration poses to women than to men, because their more difficult position in the labour markets of their origin as well as of their host societies calls for greater determination. While men were found to take a more conformist approach and subject themselves to institutional conditions, women have been innovative in using their opportunities for professional development and have reacted quickly to changing conditions (Grabowska-Lusińska, Jaźwińska-Motylska 2013). In addition to these insights, a typology was created in relation to the employment trajectories of migrants in general. Grabowska-Lusińska (2012) developed four types of employment trajectories of migrants, featuring a basic differentiation between stable and changing careers and an assessment of the different influences of structure and agency. She distinguishes both the ‘fixative’ and the ‘project’ trajectories as stable types, with the ‘project’ being realised by a higher level of agency. The ‘coincidence’ and the ‘exploration’ on the other hand represent changing career paths, with the latter in need of more individual enforcement.

The present paper makes use of two insights provided by these studies: the need for a greater determination on the part of female migrant workers and the relevance of individual agency for Polish women’s performance in the UK labour market.

Quantitative data: Polish women as migrants and as female workers

Before moving on to the qualitative exploration of interview data, which is the core of the present paper, it is necessary to put the phenomenon into context and take a look at the available quantitative data on female Polish migrant workers in the UK.
As mentioned earlier, after 10 years of EU enlargement, the picture of Polish migrant workers is highly diverse. When looking at available data, certain limitations have to be taken into account. First, freedom of movement and the development of circular migratory patterns have led to a dynamic picture, in which data can only provide an idea of the situation at a certain point in time. The definition of a migrant is itself challenging and is always accompanied by constraints. In most studies Polish migrants are understood as persons whose country of birth is Poland; some studies are based on the country of citizenship, and others on the intended length of stay. The only reliable large-scale data set is the British census, the most recent one undertaken in 2011, but this does not show what has happened in the years since it was conducted. The other means of accessing information of this kind is to look at the Labour Force Survey, but here the problem, especially with migrant groups, lies in the small sample size.

The census of 2011 shows that in England and Wales 51 per cent of the Polish-born population is female and 49 per cent is male, with a total number of 579,121 Polish-born people living in England and Wales, constituting 1 per cent of the total population. As described earlier, this group is characterised as rather young, with Polish women appearing to be slightly younger than men and predominantly aged 20–29, which mirrors the previous picture of mobile, young, single women, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Polish-born population by age and sex in England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Female (per cent)</th>
<th>Male (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16–19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–29</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 60</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 2011 for England and Wales.

When we examine the information on economic activity in Table 2, Polish women appear more likely to be employed part-time, at 16 per cent, compared to 4 per cent for Polish men, but at the same time they are less often employed part-time than female residents in general (21 per cent). While Polish-born men are more often in full-time employment, at 64 per cent, compared to 47 per cent for Polish-born females and male residents in general, they also have a higher percentage of self-employment, at 16 per cent compared to 9 per cent for Polish women. In relation to full-time employment, it is interesting that Polish women are employed full-time as much as men in general and far more than all female residents, with 31 per cent. Polish-born women dominate in the gendered category of ‘looking after home or family’ at 9 per cent, in stark contrast to 1 per cent for men. These data on the one hand show the gendered dimension of economic activity as between Polish men and women in the UK, in the differences in part-time and full-time employment as well as in the category of ‘looking after home and family’. On the other hand they reflect the characteristics of this population as migrant workers with lower rates of members in retirement or economically inactive, and higher rates of those in employment.
Table 2. Polish-born population and all usual residents by economic activity and sex in England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic activity</th>
<th>Polish-born female (per cent)</th>
<th>Polish-born male (per cent)</th>
<th>All residents female (per cent)</th>
<th>All residents male (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part-time employees</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time employees</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking after home or family</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other economically inactive</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 2011 for England and Wales.

Figure 1 highlights the circumstance that while distribution, hotels and restaurants still form the biggest employment sector, accounting for 27 per cent of all Polish migrants in the UK, it is undeniable that these migrants are also a relevant population in other sectors, such as manufacturing (18 per cent), finance (17 per cent), and public administration, education and health (12 per cent). The data on industry in Table 3 show, on the one hand, the relevance of traditional migrant sectors and, on the other hand, the differences between men and women, following the gendered division of the UK labour market. In manufacturing, for example, there are many more Polish-born employees, and while there are fewer Polish women (15 per cent) than Polish men (22 per cent), these represent many more than women in general, with only 5 per cent. Other migrant sectors for the Polish born appear to be accommodation and food services, and administrative and support services, and for Polish-born men transportation and storage as well as construction. While Polish-born women outnumber Polish men in traditional female industries such as administration, health and education, they are less likely to be working in these than female residents in general.

Figure 1. Polish-born population by industry in England and Wales

Source: Census 2011 for England and Wales.
Table 3. Polish-born population and all usual residents by industry and sex in England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Polish-born female (per cent)</th>
<th>Polish-born male (per cent)</th>
<th>All residents female (per cent)</th>
<th>All residents male (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation and food service activities</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and support service activities</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human health and social work activities</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and storage</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, scientific and technical activities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 2011 for England and Wales.

Polish migrants are represented at all occupational levels, with 52 per cent in skilled and semi-skilled employment and half as many managers, professionals and technical staff (16 per cent) as in elementary occupations (31 per cent). However, as Figure 2 shows, in contrast to the general population it appears that Polish migrant workers are less often in managerial and professional occupations and more likely to be in elementary employment. Polish women are less often employed in skilled and semi-skilled occupations, with 44 per cent, than Polish men, with 59 per cent, and they are also better represented in elementary occupations, with 37 per cent, than men, with 27 per cent. These data suggest that Polish women are often not able to progress professionally or to have their Polish education acknowledged in the UK labour market. Nevertheless the number of Poles in skilled and semi-skilled as well as managerial, professional and technical occupations shows that they are not exclusively low-paid migrant workers. The study by Frattini (2014) suggested that within sectors such as hotels and restaurants, migrants from the new EU member states were able to move up the occupational ladder.

Figure 2. Polish-born population and all usual residents by occupation and sex in England and Wales

Source: Census 2011 for England and Wales.
These data paint a picture of Polish women as migrant workers, slightly younger than their male counterparts and more economically active than their female counterparts in general. While they do engage in certain gender-specific activities, such as a greater degree of part-time employment and looking after home and family, compared to Polish men, at the same time they are more nearly equal to men in general than all female residents. This is further reflected in the data on industry, where first and foremost they are migrant workers and better represented in migrant sectors, but secondly they are female and outnumber Polish men in traditionally female sectors. The same pattern can be observed in the data on occupation. This information supports the suggestion that migration can have an emancipating effect, challenging traditional gender roles, with Polish female migrant workers being better represented in certain employment types, industries and occupations than women in general. At the same time gendered divisions of the labour market still exist and might reinforce gender roles, with Polish women being overrepresented in traditional female sectors and gendered employment categories in contrast to Polish men. For the present paper four relevant sectors for Polish migrant workers were chosen for sampling: manufacturing; distribution, hotels and restaurants; local government, education and health; and banking and finance.

Research design

In order to understand the phenomenon of female Polish migrant workers in the UK labour market the present paper takes a qualitative approach. On the one hand the available quantitative data do not provide enough insight into employment trajectories; on the other hand the role of these trajectories, the way women make use of opportunities, and how this relates to gender relations cannot be explored by a merely quantitative approach. In this section on research design data collection and analysis methods are discussed.

By using a biographical narrative interview approach (Schütze 1983) the researcher can analyse the complex dimensions of migrants’ aspirations and realities. This method also helps to ensure theoretical sensitivity during the data collection stage, avoiding the imposition of theoretical ideas through the formulation of interview questions. Another argument in favour of biographical narrative interviews is the observation, gained from semi-structured pilot interviews, that some interviewees were aware of the issues and knew what a researcher might want to hear; they were too interview ready. Because the phenomenon of Polish migration to the UK has attracted much public, political and media debate, respondents are aware of the discourse and might be influenced by it in their responses.

The biographical narrative interview has three stages, starting with the spontaneous main narration, following the researcher’s request for the whole life story. Only after the independent completion of the narration does the second phase of questioning start: first with supplementary, internal narrative questions, and finally with theoretical, external narrative questions based on ideas constructed beforehand. By combining a transnationalism approach with biographical research perspectives, Apitzsch and Siouti (2007) illustrate how this framework is useful for investigating processes of change and the mingling of individual and societal positionings and identity constructions in migration processes. The embeddedness of gender and migration as well as generational relations become visible through the biographical perspective (Apitzsch, Siouti 2007: 19).

Thirty-one biographical narrative interviews were conducted with female Polish migrant workers in the UK. The sample consisted of women working in the sectors outlined above, with and without trade union membership, in order to detect possible differences between individual and collective agency. Besides the sector focus and an approximately half/half sampling in terms of trade union membership, the sample is very diverse as regards educational background, age (ranging from 20 to 54), length of stay (ranging from 2 years to 14 years), occupational level and family status. The interviewees come from rural areas, industrial regions...
and cities in Poland and now live in the same variety of geographical locations in the UK. They were accessed through initial contacts with stakeholders such as trade union officers and community organisers, followed by snowballing and advertising on online forums and on Facebook. In the use of snowballing a researcher has to be careful, since there is a risk of accessing only respondents with a similar profile, but the method also enables contact with people who might not be organised within other categories, such as online or community groups. In the case of the present research these additional contacts have led to a very diverse set of respondents, who would otherwise have been difficult to reach. Interviews were carried out either at the respondents’ homes or in coffee shops throughout England. The biographical narrative interviews were conducted in Polish, with the exception of one interview in which the respondent felt more comfortable speaking English. Eleven semi-structured expert interviews, following an interview outline tailored to the specific respondents, were conducted in English with trade union officers, community activists and organisers, as well as with academic experts, which provided additional insights into the subject matter and further reflection on the developments observed.

The method of data analysis follows the basic ideas of grounded theory, which aims at the generation or discovery of a theory from data (Glaser, Strauss 1968). The grounded theory approach used here aims at the creation of analytic codes and categories developed from the data while providing theoretical sensitivity (Charmaz 2006). In the present analysis, this theoretical sensitivity is mainly derived from concepts related to the social construction of Polish women and the Matka Polka as well as to the work trajectories of migrant workers. Nevertheless, the data coding and analysis were not directed, but rather informed, by these ideas, and the coding process was realised by developing themes directly from the data, including a variety of in vivo codes, which use the participants’ own words. Constant comparisons of the cases and their individual persons, places, conditions and so on help to refine a ‘grounded theory’ model.

Employment trajectories between feeling stuck and moving up

Following the conceptualisation of the topic of female Polish migrant workers in the UK, this section examines in depth the findings retrieved from the fieldwork conducted from January to May 2014. Here insights from the biographical narrative interviews as well as from the semi-structured expert interviews are drawn and analysed within the framework of the research questions on how the work trajectories of female Polish migrant workers challenge or support prevalent gender relations and how employment trajectories are actively mediated in the quest to fulfil their aspirations. The analysis follows patterns and pathways of work emerging from the data and reflects upon their meaning for the respondents.

The notion of a proactive female migrant worker aware of her rights and opportunities had already emerged during the pilot phase of the research. This high level of determination, also described by Grabowska-Lusińska and Jaźwińska-Motylska (2013), was reflected upon during an expert interview by a senior expert with long years of experience in researching female Polish migrants, and was connected to the Matka Polka ideal as having to confront structural constraints in the attempt to sustain the Polish household.

The women seemed very sure of themselves, really quite confident, doing things that I would find scary. You know, going across Europe, starting a new job. There is definitely, I mean it’s a cliché, but there is definitely this sort of strong Polish woman, that is not afraid to speak out for herself. Historically there is this Matka Polka, this confident strong [woman]. (...) You know, you get a woman from Poland speaking much more straightforward, which maybe actually works quite well in Britain (Expert interview with senior researcher).
The *Matka Polka* traits of being efficient and taking care of everything are reflected in the action of female Polish migrants confidently moving to the UK, where their direct way of expressing themselves might even promote their occupational progression. However, many Polish women are unable to move up the occupational ladder, experience professional stagnation and feel stuck.

**Feeling stuck**

As outlined above, the sample for the present paper is very diverse in terms of work experience in Poland prior to coming to the UK. The younger respondents in particular, who came to the UK immediately after graduation or often as a working break from university, but ended up not going back, had no previous work experience in Poland. Those who had worked prior to migration had either encountered problems living on their wages, changed work a couple of times, or recently lost their job due to structural changes such as the closure of workplaces or staff redundancies. Highly educated respondents found it particularly difficult to find employment in their professions. Migration provided a way to sustain livelihoods and in some cases to realise career ambitions.

Despite these negative examples of work experiences in Poland, some interviewees expressed their appreciation of their former jobs. Beata, who is 54 years old, reflected upon her 27 years of work as a teacher in a very positive way. While she only came for a few months to work in the food packing industry, her move initiated a migration process for her whole family, who one by one joined her in the UK and in the same occupation. For Beata, the family situation and especially her gendered role, the expectations placed on her, and her familial obligations, prevented her from going back to Poland even though she disliked life in the UK and suffered health problems due to the physical nature of her employment.

*And at that moment, if I wanted to go back to Poland I would no longer be able to, because I could not leave my family here. (...) I am a very caring mother maybe too much, I have to know everything, to control everything, but absolutely not such a control that limits any activities of the children, but I like to do a lot. I like to help and probably take on a little too much, like the care of the grandchildren and I started my small business with home-made dinner delivery since nearly three months now (Beata, 54 y, food packing and own small business).*

While Beata feels stuck in her work life and in the UK, she pursues other endeavours in order to fulfil herself personally. She co-created a women’s forum for Polish trade union members, but has taken a back seat since starting her own small business preparing and delivering home-made Polish dinners for the Polish community in her area. This entrepreneurial project, on a sometimes formal, sometimes informal level, can represent an alternative or supplement to formal employment.

Kinga also had a very positive experience with work in Poland, which made starting in the UK especially problematic for her. However, her husband was already working and living in the UK and they have a son, whom she cared for on her own during the time of geographical separation. Following an ultimatum she joined her husband and felt that giving up her job in Poland was like a punishment. Added to this experience of sacrificing her professional career for the sake of the family, her work in the UK has not been satisfactory, starting with work for an agency, and now working in the food packing industry. She tries to have a more active social life through involvement in her trade union branch, but she does not necessarily connect this to her working life. This arena is devoted more to socialisation with other Polish women than to efforts at collective organisation. Kinga is trying to find a new job, ideally in her profession.
In September it will be seven years working in food packing including the time with the agency. (...) It is true that I am looking for a new job. I started last year, I do not want just another job immediately, because I have this job, I’m looking just for something better (Kinga, 35 y, food packing).

People caring for a family are less able to risk becoming unemployed or to move somewhere else to look for a better job, so Kinga is looking for a new position and going for interviews at the same time as working in a physically demanding job. In her case and in Beata’s, the local geography of an industrial region is relevant, since it imposes limits on opportunities which they cannot overcome due to their family’s permanent settlement there and a lack of mobility within the UK. The notion of feeling stuck, which seems to be influenced by the gendered role of the respondents within their families and the expectations placed on them, in some cases corresponding to age progression and geographical location, was also reflected upon during an expert interview by a Polish community organiser.

Yes, there were women, probably younger ones, who were very ambitious and went to English classes and they really treated this job [cleaners in hotels] as only something temporary, knowing that they, they have a plan. They have a plan that they will move on, but then I also met a lot of women in their late 30s, 40s, who were stuck in this job. I think they initially thought the same, that it would only be a temporary thing, but they actually stay in the same place and there is not much movement going on in their lives and they feel a bit stuck (Expert interview with community organiser).

As Grabowska-Lusińska (2012) explains in her concept of the stable ‘fixative’ trajectory, these feelings arise in the face of structural constraints, especially the gender role as influenced by age, family situation and geography. In this context female Polish migrants correspond to the ideal of the Matka Polka by sacrificing their opportunities in order to take care of their families (Janion 1996). Nevertheless the women who reported feeling stuck showed agency in innovative ways, such as trade union activism and building their own businesses.

Moving on and moving up

Most interviewees experienced some kind of occupational movement, often connected to their length of stay. While the present sample was diverse in length of stay, most had at the time of the interview already lived for two to seven years in the UK. The women who had been in the UK less than two years had lived in the UK before, but had gone somewhere else in the meantime. One went back to Poland and managed a shop and then a restaurant, but came back after its closure; the other managed a hostel in a different country and came back to fulfill her professional career goals. Both respondents, after their return to the UK, started out again at lower levels of employment than previously but had very clear goals of progressing within one to two years. The majority of respondents had been in the UK longer and had either progressed within their sector, moved to and often progressed in a different sector – sometimes having completed additional further education, less often by gaining recognition of their Polish educational qualifications – or in some cases pursued additional informal or formal entrepreneurial endeavours.

Moving up within the same sector

Female Polish migrant workers in the present research project had a high likelihood of progressing within their sector and thereby ‘moving up the ladder’ (Frattini 2014). Sara, for example, came to the UK during her
studies and ended up staying. First she, together with her partner at the time, moved to an area in the UK where they had friends, later moving to Scotland. Her early work experiences are characterised by low-paid, labour-intensive jobs, during which time decisions on movement were made together and were somewhat dependent on benefits for both partners. Sara started out in typical low-paid ‘migrant’ jobs as a cleaner, waitress and salesperson, and initially changed her job frequently, but these changes were later on embedded in a career path. Sara is following what Grabowska-Lusińska (2012) called the ‘project’, that is a stable trajectory which needs proactive engagement.

*I started as a sales assistant, and then went on to be a cashier. Then I moved up to head cashier and then there I was already head cashier. And then I moved to another store as supervisor and then moved up to assistant manager. And then I moved to another store on the same position, but only due to the fact that I wanted to go back to fashion. (...) That’s why I decided to move into the same position and then I moved up to the store manager here (Sara, 28 y, store manager).*

Sara is finally talking about bringing some stability to her working life. As a store manager she now has fewer opportunities for progression, so her more recent plans include buying a flat together with her new partner. While Sara experienced rapid occupational progression, it all took place in a traditional ‘migrant’ sector. On the one hand she progressed as a strong-minded woman taking risks and often changing places and jobs, while on the other hand she remained within the realm of opportunities available to migrants.

Respondents who had actively involved themselves in trade unions sometimes connected their professional progression with this engagement, especially in relation to the training they received from their unions.

*They took me into catering and I worked in catering selling coffee, tea, that sort of thing, and in the meantime I did courses because when you work in a college, a lot of these things are for free for staff. I have higher qualifications from Poland, but it is not translatable here too easily, so I did it again, a GCSE in mathematics, in general to refresh my mind, I did a diploma in employment law, because I am also in the trade union, and customer service; well all of these courses that were available for free. And after three years of work in just catering I was promoted to hospitality supervisor (Klara, 38 y, catering staff and hospitality supervisor in higher education institution).*

Klara also moved up the occupational ladder in the traditional ‘migrant’ sector of catering, making use of the limited opportunities available to her. Neither Sara nor Klara had family responsibilities or reflected on expectations they might have to fulfil as women. The fact that they could forget about their gender roles supports the idea of migration and upward employment trajectories as challenging these traditional roles. However at the same time they are employed in jobs that are marked by the gender segmentation of the UK labour market fulfilling the gender construction of the host society (Anderson 2000). As the case of Klara also shows, most women reported problems in getting their Polish qualifications acknowledged by employers and would often refer to a wish to work in their own profession (*w swoim zawodzie*).

*Moving on and often up in a different sector*

The experience of moving on and often upwards in a different sector was also very common among research respondents. For some it fell more into line with Grabowska-Lusińska’s ‘exploration’ (2012) of new possibilities because of problems in their prior employment. For others it was part of a career path which was
always pursued, but with an interlude in a lower position as a newly arrived migrant. As mentioned above, most interviewees were unable to find work in areas suited to their Polish qualifications and thus often worked in typical migrant sectors. The case of Lydia shows that, despite these constraints, some migrants can be successful in this endeavour. Although she liked her work in a warehouse and was offered a position as supervisor there, it was more important for her to seek personal fulfilment through a job in her profession.

*I very dearly remember [my former job], I still have contact with the majority of the people. (...) But there came the moment that I knew what I came here for and that I want to look for work in my profession. They offered me a position as a supervisor. (...) During this time I started to look for a new job and in fact in my profession, I sent out my CV (Lydia, 30 y, food analyst).

Lydia was successful in finding a job in her profession, but most respondents have not been so lucky. They are still regarded first and foremost as migrant workers in the UK labour market.

A different pathway of moving on and up in a different sector was experienced by Klara, who was not prepared to start over again by proving herself to her new superiors. The notion of having to start again or to start from scratch was very often cited by respondents, not necessarily in connection with the migration experience, but frequently in relation to starting a new job. It was not associated with a positive vision of freedom to start over and leave all problems in the past, but rather with the need to build up one’s reputation and career again from zero. Moving on to another sector and often progressing within it usually requires a high level of agency. In most cases the old place of work would have been easy to stay in and would have provided the workers with a livelihood, but their personal and/or professional fulfilment was more important, which shows a reluctance to conform to a given situation and negotiating structural constraints (Cook et al. 2010).

*Moving on with further education*

Another way of moving on for many of the respondents was additional and further education in the UK, often followed by a position in their newly acquired profession. In the case of Lidia this further education provided her with an escape from a cycle of exploitative and unfulfilling work. Lidia’s case is interesting because she came to the UK immediately after taking her A-levels in Poland and was accompanied by and still lives with her mother. In this context, her mother fulfils the Matka Polka ideal of sacrifice by providing, through her demanding work as a care worker, the opportunity for her daughter to study.

*We realised that the person that was running the place, was expecting basically slave labour. Very demanding for very low pay and I wasn’t ready for that, to put up with that. So we sort of changed jobs a couple of times. (...) And I worked for a year as a care assistant and my mum actually still works there, eight years later. (...) I made an agreement with my mum that I would work for a year and I would save all the money and I would save up enough to go to college, cause obviously I wanted to continue with my education (Lidia, 27 y, local government office worker).*

Despite the efforts Lidia had to make to achieve her goals – working and saving up money for a college course (which she explained was a very difficult one, with only two persons passing the final exams), plus the challenge of studying in English, and the additional circumstance of her mother having to provide for them both during this time – she does not associate this achievement with her successful agency, but rather declares that it was due to luck. The respondents often understated their abilities by making this connection between success and luck. This was also the case in relation to the migration movement, which Lidia and
many others reflected upon as a spontaneous rather than premeditated action, not requiring any decision making. As Grabowska-Lusińska and Jaźwińska-Motyńska (2013) state, migration, especially for women, needs some degree of determination, but the ideal of the subordinate woman might interfere, as here, with the women’s self-perception. Despite the women knowing what they want, going for it and being successful, it is all explained as coincidence and luck. Nevertheless Lidia’s mother is fulfilling the ideal of the sacrificing Polish mother, while Lidia mainly acts as a migrant worker with high aspirations.

However, not all respondents were able to take on additional education in the UK, because of time constraints imposed by long working hours and caring responsibilities, together with the high costs of study. Wera is 30 years old and managed to progress professionally after simultaneously working and studying for some years. For most respondents who pursued further education in the UK, it was clear that they had to work at the same time to support themselves, which was also the case for many women who had studied in Poland.

And during these four years and until graduation I worked in the same place. (...) And then I graduated, which went very well. And immediately after graduation that company for which I worked for closed, I found a temporary job but generally I was in the mindset that I would like to do something in the field of my studies (Wera, 30 y, office worker in finance department).

Wera went on to find a job in her newly acquired profession, as did all respondents who gained additional education in the UK. This dynamic shows that female Polish migrants are first and foremost perceived as ‘low-skilled’ migrant workers, despite possibly holding Polish academic degrees. The women who were able to work and study at the same time, then attain a higher position in their profession, were acting despite the expectations of their families and origin communities that they would settle down and start a family. They challenged the ideal of the Polish mother by either deciding against having children or by postponing this experience in order to fulfil their professional aspirations (Cook et al. 2010).

Entrepreneurial endeavours

Some respondents, in addition to regular employment, were actively pursuing more informal small businesses: Beata with Polish home-made dinners and Ewa, 20 years old, with translation services. Despite the low income associated with these activities, both women saw their businesses as potentially successful ventures for the future. While Beata lacked the capital to open her own Polish restaurant, her work was a path to self-fulfilment and building up a customer base; for Ewa her translation work was perceived more as a community service and as experience that might help her achieve her goal of working for a trade union. These informal businesses can be a source of additional income which is more compatible with family responsibilities, reinforcing the gender role of the women. While structural constraints were the reason for some women to engage in those activities, others would pursue such entrepreneurial endeavours for other reasons, such as greater autonomy and personal fulfilment. Kaja’s endeavour is the most formalised; since returning to the UK, she has been building up her own care business with a colleague. Before that she had moved away from the UK in order to help her then partner fulfil his wish to run a hostel in another country. She came back in order to pursue her own professional goal.

So I’m still, I’m not married, I don’t have children, my parents ask: when will you get married, when will you have children, when this, when that? Every year already you lose money, also with this business. They worry, but they are not negative. I would like to just get them away from that kind of thinking, you
She actively reflects upon her gender role and the expectations of Polish society and her family that she should get married and have children, but chooses to build up her business and live her own life. Kaja therefore challenges the established Polish gender roles with her migrant employment trajectory (Ignatowicz 2012).

**Conclusion**

This paper has examined research questions on how work trajectories in migration can challenge or support prevalent gender roles and how female Polish migrant workers in the UK are actively mediating their pathways. The empirical analysis has shown that various factors determine work trajectories, which are interconnected with gender roles and at times reflect a conservative ideal or undermine traditional roles by actions, and at other times actively reflect upon, challenge and act against societal expectations. If gender roles are challenged they are those from the origin country, while the status of migrant worker dominates the experience and the gendered segmentation of the UK labour market is continued. Some respondents feel stuck in their employment situation, which is often related to geographical location, age and the family situation, while many pursue what Grabowska-Lusińska (2012) called a stable ‘project’ or a more flexible ‘exploration’. These two pathways require active agents, who either pursue personal and professional fulfilment and have made conscious decisions as to what this trajectory should be, or are not willing to put up with unsatisfactory work conditions and want to explore what they can achieve elsewhere. Age and family situation are also relevant to experiences before, during and after transformation, which can shape aspirations and the idea of decent work.

**Figure 3. Sketch of a ‘grounded theory’ model of female Polish migrant workers in the UK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influencing factors</th>
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<td>- length of stay</td>
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<tr>
<td>- educational background</td>
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<tr>
<td>- geography</td>
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<tr>
<td>- age</td>
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<td>- family situation / caring responsibilities</td>
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<td>- ...</td>
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<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Gender regimes</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Post-accession labour migration from Poland to the UK</td>
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<tr>
<th>Possible dynamics</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Reinforcing gender roles</td>
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<td>- Challenging gender roles</td>
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<tr>
<th>Work trajectories</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Being stuck</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Moving on and/or up</td>
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<td>- Entrepreneurial endeavour</td>
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<tr>
<th>Consequences</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Feeling stuck</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Pursuing professional fulfilment</td>
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Source: own elaboration.
A more complex answer to the research questions is outlined in Figure 3, a sketch of a ‘grounded theory’ model. In the context of prevailing gender regimes and post-accession migration, the model represents how the possible dynamics of reinforcing or challenging gender roles by work trajectories in migration are influenced by different factors and can lead to feeling stuck or pursuing professional fulfilment. The model is not supposed to simplify complex developments and experiences; therefore it is important to point out that all the dynamics discussed and especially those in the model are not static or case-specific, but rather change continuously within cases and themes as well as within trajectories, which themselves are not clear-cut, but overlap.

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Notes

1 These interviews were conducted as part of the fieldwork for a PhD research project from January to May 2014.
2 In addition to Poland the following countries joined the EU in 2004: Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Citizens of these countries were allowed access to the UK labour market, and the Workers Registration Scheme, which ran out in 2011, was implemented in an attempt to track EU migrants.
3 Following the landslide success of the Solidarność movement during the partially free elections of 1989 the political system in Poland changed from socialist to an open democracy and was followed by a harsh economic transition to a capitalist society.

References


Ukrainian Migration to Greece: Patterns and Challenges of Remaining and of Return

Marina Nikolova*

The aim of the paper is to describe the main patterns and challenges of Ukrainian migration to Greece with reference to the consequences of the recent economic and social crisis in the host country on the migrants’ lives. Specifically, the paper discusses the impact of the legal framework related to migration in four different periods. Historically, Greece was one of the first destinations attracting Ukrainian migrants, but the migration flows have strongly decreased during the last years and a tendency for return migration has emerged. Among the key features is the fact that the migrant’s experience is deeply influenced and shaped by Greece’s policy response to migration. The paper will therefore specifically examine the impact of the legislative measures on the mobility of the migrants.

Keywords: Ukrainian migration; Greece; economic crisis; return migration; family reunification

Introduction

Ukrainians are among the oldest and most populous migrant groups in Greece during the last two decades. They are an important group to be studied as nationals of a country that belonged to the ex-communist societies with a state-controlled economy; consequently, some of the characteristics of their patterns of migration are perceived as representative for the migrants from Eastern European countries. Furthermore, the largest part of the Ukrainian migrant population – approximately 80 per cent, is women, making it essential to include the gender perspective.

At the same time, the Ukrainian community in Greece has been decreasing in size over the last five years. Already a tendency before the eruption of the economic crisis, this trend became an even more striking phenomenon during the crisis. In order to explore the dynamics and the key issues regarding the Ukrainian migration to Greece since its beginning in the 1990s, this paper will focus on the patterns and challenges related to each different period during the last twenty years. The periodisation of the migration is defined by the author; each period starts with a key event such as new legislation or a new wave of migrants due to other reasons related to e.g. changes in the socio-economic environment in their home country.

Hofmann and Reichel (2011) suggest the following typology of the broader patterns of Ukrainian migration during the last twenty years: migration of ethnic minorities; legal and irregular labour migration to Western European countries; and short-term circular migration, whether regular or undocumented, to Western Europe as well as to neighbouring countries. Regarding the socio-economic profile of the Ukrainians

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fleeing abroad, the majority were workers from urban areas who had lost their jobs; however, from 1997 the migration is mostly from villages and from small towns. The abolition of exit visa requirements in January 1993 was a step towards the liberalisation of intra-national mobility for Ukrainians. Thus, during 1994–1998 emigration increased with Greece as one of the first European countries preferred by the Ukrainians as a destination for longer-term economic migration. The majority of the Ukrainians presently in Greece are long-term migrants who came during the 1990s.

The first publications in the 1990s and early 2000 by Greek researchers referred to migrants from the ex-USSR countries in general, including Ukrainians, although the research mostly focused on the Greek repatriates. After the population census of 2001 and the analyses of the data of immigrants who had submitted applications during the first regularisation programme in 1998, by nationality, it became obvious that migration from Ukraine had a strong female character. Apart from ethnic Ukrainians, among the migrants were ethnic Greeks and Mariupol Greeks that started repatriating during the same period (Kaurinkoski 2008). Migration to Greece began from the western areas of Ukraine, with people from the central areas starting to follow later on and from the eastern and southern parts of the country by the mid-1990s, although Mariupol Greeks migrated from Eastern Ukraine and Pontic Greeks mainly from Crimea and the southern part of Ukraine (Kaurinkoski 2008). At that time Greece was seen as a cheap destination where one could easily find work in the informal labour market, which explains the magnitude of the flows.

The decade of the 1990s for Greece as a new migration destination is mainly characterised by the arrival of migrants from the former socialist countries – either neighbouring countries or countries with a Greek diaspora. Mostly these were Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Georgians and Romanians. However, about 60 per cent of the migrants came from a single country: Albania. Over 70 per cent of the Ukrainians were female (a proportion that has not changed much over the years) while almost all of the Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian migrants were male. Most of the migrants from the former socialist countries came on a visa which they overstayed, continuing to work and live in Greece for years without proper documents. The migration to Greece in the decade of 2000 displays patterns typical for the Mediterranean countries: 1) South–North movements from North Africa to Southern European countries, 2) South-East-North movements, meaning migration from Asian countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, 3) North-East-West movements, which refers to the former socialist countries (Baldwin-Edwards 2007).

To explore the key issues regarding Ukrainian migration to Greece since its beginning in the 1990s, the paper focuses on the different patterns and challenges associated with migration. The article also identifies key moments or events to differentiate different periods of migration and the socio-demographic characteristics of Ukrainian migrants.

Methodology
The article is based on primary and secondary research data. The primary research data includes analysis of a number of key informant interviews with relevant actors (community organisations, NGOs and governmental agencies) and interviews with immigrants conducted during two research projects in 2013 and in 2008–2009. The interviews were conducted before the crisis in Ukraine, triggered by the government’s last-minute rejection of the association agreement with the European Union and which subsequently developed into an armed conflict.

The scope of the interviews with community leaders in the two stages of the field work was to understand the current migration dynamics, the role of the community and the challenges faced by community members at different stages of migration. The questionnaires addressed the migrants’ choice for Greece as a destination country, the working and living conditions throughout the years spent in the host country, and their plans
for the future. Following these thematic cycles of the questionnaire, questions were asked about the role of the family, the networks and the authorities. Specifically, in 2008 six interviews were conducted with community leaders or other individuals active in the Ukrainian communities (four women and two men). In 2013, five qualitative interviews were conducted using open questionnaires with active members of the Ukrainian communities (three of whom were questioned previously in 2008) and four interviews with migrants (females, holders of residence permits living in Athens).

The secondary research data derives from relevant literature on Ukrainian migration to Greece and statistical data. The statistical data depict the demographic characteristics of Ukrainians in Greece and their labour market situation, and were provided by relevant authorities: the Hellenic Statistical Service (ELSTAT) and the Social Insurance Institute (IKA). The literature review focuses on the characteristics of migrants’ flows to Greece, the changes in the flows’ composition and reasons behind those changes, the migration policies implemented in Greece, and the impact of these policies on the migratory routes and trajectories.

Overview of the different phases/periods of Ukrainian migration to Greece

First, to delineate the boundaries of different periods and to analyse the patterns of migration and the results of the policies, some concepts of the migration systems approach will be introduced and the factors that influence the dynamics of the various migration patterns defined. Countries in a migration system are not only connected by people but also by other types of linkages between countries that stimulate, direct and maintain international flows of people (Fawcett 1989). These might also be non-people linkages. Fawcett classifies them in four categories: 1) the state-to-state relations, 2) mass culture connections, 3) family and personal networks, and 4) migrant agency activities. He furthermore identifies three types of linkages within those categories: 1) tangible linkages, 2) regulatory linkages, and 3) relational linkages. The present analysis will use Fawcett and Arnold’s idea regarding the categories of linkages and not the types, as the author mainly aims to discuss the dynamics that occur within the certain migrants group and not to make analyses based on the classification of the linkages by type.

According to Fawcett and Arnold (1987), the migration systems approach has the advantage of focusing attention on both ends of a migration flow, of examining one flow in the context of other flows or one destination as part of a set of alternative destinations. A migration systems approach furthermore reveals the diverse linkages between places such as transactions involving information, goods, services and ideas. The present article focuses on the function of the framework to identify interactions that might be critical for the understanding of the dynamics, referring to the interaction between regulatory linkages and family networks (Fawcett, Arnold 1987). The analysis of the Ukrainian migration dynamics over time will concentrate on 1) the state policies in both countries, their separate national legislations and whether there are state-to-state agreements that either facilitate or discourage migration, 2) social and family networks influence, and 3) other factors, such as intermediaries and mass culture images and information.

With the above in mind, the following four periods can be distinguished in the Ukrainian migration to Greece.

The period before 1991

Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, marking the end of an important historical period and the rise of a new nation-state. Still, it is important for the sake of the background history of migration to mention that in the mid-1980s, with the introduction of perestroika by Mikhail Gorbachev, the last return wave of political emigrants of Greek origin started from the territories of Ukraine (Kaurinkoski 2008).
This last period of emigration, but mainly the reason for it – i.e. the political developments that led to the disintegration of the USSR – coincides with the start of a new type of migration which is not driven by political but by economic reasons, with a mass wave of labour migration in the late 1990s (Malynovska 2004). From a legal perspective, it is nonetheless important to mention the restrictive exit visa regime that applied in the country which existed in Ukraine until January 1993, when the obligation for Ukrainians to apply for exit visas each time when travelling abroad was abolished. The repatriated Greeks, or palinostoundes as they are called in Greece, belonged to one of the groups that returned to Greece in the first phase. Also, Ukrainian women who met their Greek spouses in the 1980s while they were students in Ukraine and subsequently got married were amongst the first migrants to settle in Greece.


As an introduction to the second period: a representative of the Ukrainian community in Athens, a journalist, remembers that in the first years of the 1990s the Ukrainians were very few people in Greece. We were gathering for Christmas, for the celebrations, we were 40 people all in all, very few. After 1992–1993 the first migrants appeared mostly from Western Ukraine, because the access was easier, says Anna in an interview held in 2008.

The second period begins in 1991 when Ukraine declares its independence and, at the same time, the first Law on entrance and work is enacted in Greece, referring to the first migrants who started entering the country after the end of the Cold War. Characteristic for the period is that migrants arrived in Greece with tourist visas which they overstayed in order to start working in the informal labour market, mainly in the sector of domestic care. Although Greece was not a key destination for Ukrainian migrants, it had been among the first Mediterranean countries to receive immigrants since the mid-1990s. A major pull factor was the demand for cheap labour in the informal labour market of Greece, at a time when the rest of the European Union countries implemented restrictive migration policies (Castles, Miller 2003), with the exception of some countries like Italy and Portugal. In brief, the last decade of the 20th century as the transitional period to a free economy in Ukraine brought significant changes, and the sudden collapse of the state system of production led to massive unemployment. After the first few years of poverty, many Ukrainians decided to migrate to the richer Western European countries and mostly by chance (Anna, 2008) – at least in the beginning before the networks were established – it was Greece that hosted the first long-term Ukrainian migrants. Before that all the Ukrainians in Greece had residence permits, but the newcomers were as a whole without papers. Therefore, many people, the majority of them women found themselves in conditions of slavery, says Anna (2008).

In the first years of the 1990s in Ukraine, the difficulties of day-to-day life due to the sudden changes that people had to deal with, and the corruption of the public authorities and lack of legislation, led to practices of exploitation and the creation of mechanisms and networks in the shadow economy. In that context, an issue arose with major implications for society, namely the trafficking of women from Ukraine for purposes of sexual exploitation. One of the main final destinations for a few years (at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000) was Greece (Hughes, Denisova 2003; Emke-Poulopoulos 2003).

Practices of exploitation were also observed in Greece, when the immigrant women who had assumed the responsibility of financially supporting their families back in Ukraine needed to find jobs. Mainly in Athens, but also in Ukraine, offices were established for the recruitment of low paid domestic workers – cleaners, nurses, baby-sitters – in the informal labour market. Many of these women had difficulties at first on account of the language and their ignorance of how to do things, for instance when searching for a job and how to avoid the risk of being exploited. Most of them worked as domestic workers with one free day in the week.
Their way of coping with the situation was to gather each Sunday on a central square of Athens and to share the problems they had in common, and to obtain reliable information on the legal issues pertaining to residence permits and work insurance. From the start of their arrival in the 1990s until today, migrants find a great source of support in a community formed by Galina Masliuk-Kaku, who also published a newspaper aimed at reliably informing Ukrainians in Greece on all matters relevant to their stay in the country.

Third period – 1998–2007

An important turning point was the implementation of a few regularisation programmes for immigrants who were living and working in Greece without the relevant documents, for the first time in 1998. Most of the Ukrainians had been living and working without residence permits in Greece for years, without expecting that the state would conduct a regularisation programme. When the newspapers of the community started to report the upcoming law, most of the people were suspicious at first. However, after overcoming their fears and applying for a residence permit, the people were subsequently able to improve the quality of their lives and their working conditions. Later on, the residence permits proved important for the Ukrainians as it entitled them to health insurance and allowed them to walk the streets without fear. However, it didn’t have any impact on their social status or their opportunities at getting better jobs in other sectors of the economy. In the following years, a total of three regularisation programmes took place – in 2001, in 2005 and in 2007. Despite the heavy administration mechanisms, many Ukrainians managed to obtain residence permits.

As mentioned above, the publication of the results of the population census in 2001 made clear that the number of Ukrainian women prevailed significantly over the number of men. As a result, the researchers focused their attention on investigating that tendency, recognising the women as the breadwinners in their families. The survey of KETHI reveals that in most cases the push factor for the migration are the low incomes in the home-country, but the respondents also reported being attracted to the opportunity to explore another way of life (KETHI 2007). Another strong motivation was the need to support the family and, though less so, the difficulty of finding a job.

Fourth period – from 2007 to today

The fourth period starts in 2007, marked by the end of the regularisation programmes and with another important turning point in 2010, starting with the economic crisis which in some aspects redefines the working and living conditions and the related challenges. In that period most of the Ukrainians are holders of long-term residence permits and are working legally, with social and health insurance. An end to new migration flows to Greece is already evident since 2008, as a result of the combination between the tightened visa regime, signs of stabilisation of the Ukrainian economy and rising salaries, but also the possibility for women to retire in their country – which was not an option in Greece (Nikolova, Maroufof 2010).

According to the Greek Ministry of the Interior, in December 2011 the total number of Ukrainians holding a valid residence permit was approximately 17 000, of whom 81 per cent were women. In that period, the reason for staying in the country is obvious from the type of residence permit. Most of the stay permits are: 1) for dependent employment, 2) on the grounds of marriage with EU citizens – mainly with Greeks: approximately 5 500 stay permits, of which 5 000 were issued to women, and 3) long-term residence permits, numbering about 18 per cent. Last but not least, under the Presidential Decree 131/06 on the Harmonisation of the Greek legislation with Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, some 1 317 permits were issued for family unification purposes by the end of 2011 (796 to women and 521 to men) (Nikolova 2013).
Socio-economic characteristics

According to the census of 2011, the Ukrainians in Greece number 17,006 individuals, of which 3,601 are men and 13,405 are women. The data provided by the census point to an increase in the number of Ukrainians in Greece within the timeframe of a decade. After all, the 2001 census had counted 13,500 Ukrainians in total. Despite their shortcomings, census data on immigrants provide the most comprehensive picture of the population (Kasimis 2012). Other reliable sources of data for the number of migrants and the reasons for migration are the residence permit statistics provided by the Ministry of the Interior. It must be noted that the current economic crisis in Greece and growing xenophobia among the citizen population is reported to reduce immigrant registration (Kasimis 2012). In terms of the share of the Ukrainian population in the total of the migrant population, the data from Labour Force Survey for the fourth trimester in 2012 shows that the Ukrainians of working age account for 1.35 per cent of the total, whereas the data for the valid stay permits issued to third-country nationals reveal that the Ukrainians make up 3.79 per cent of the total of registered migrants in December 2012 (Triandafyllidou 2013).

Table 1. Residence permits per year in 2005–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>20,854</td>
<td>22,295</td>
<td>22,995</td>
<td>22,210</td>
<td>22,178</td>
<td>21,523</td>
<td>20,959</td>
<td>16,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>452,119</td>
<td>547,507</td>
<td>589,086</td>
<td>592,626</td>
<td>610,809</td>
<td>596,241</td>
<td>582,112</td>
<td>440,118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Greek Ministry of the Interior.

According to the data on residence permits issued in the period 2005–2012, a sharp decline in the number of migrants is observed in 2012. As mentioned earlier, in 2005 the third ‘amnesty’ or regularisation programme was implemented, giving irregular migrants the opportunity to obtain residence permits. Consequently, many migrants without documents had the opportunity to register and, in the following years, managed to obtain long-term stay permits.

The types of residence permits granted to the nationals of non-EU countries since 2006 permit ten years of stay. Also, many permits were issued on the grounds of family reunification, which was not as an option before 2006. In August 2014, the total number of Ukrainians holding a valid residence permit was 17,754, with 83 per cent obtained by women. Most of these were issued for family reunification; a significant share are holders of long-term residence permits or ten years with right to employment (in Figure 1 under the category ‘Other’); the third-largest category was clearly on the grounds of employment; and a very low percentage for studies. Under the Presidential Decree 131/06 on the Harmonisation of the Greek legislation with Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, some 9,285 permits were issued for family reunification purposes by August 2014 (8,082 to women and 1,203 to men).

Furthermore, some findings from interviews during the field work, confirmed by the statistics, reveal a cessation of new migration flows. Residence permits do not precisely register trends. The decline in the numbers of documented migrants for Ukrainians (and other migrant groups) may indicate the return of some due to difficulties related to the crisis (one can observe a peak in the number of residence permits in 2009 when the economic crisis was not an issue), but could also reveal the loss of legal status since residence permits are still largely connected to formal employment, which means that if migrants are unemployed they may not be able to renew their residence permits. The unemployment figures among the Ukrainians indicate that the unemployment rates increased to 18 per cent in 2012, and the share of unemployed people over the total migrant population reached over 30 per cent.
Estimates by community organisations on the number of Ukrainians in Greece do not differ drastically from official figures, with the remark that the community leaders who were asked for their opinion on the number of population also included those who have acquired Greek citizenship and no longer appear in the statistical data as Ukrainians, while about 3 000 to 5 000 people live and work without proper documents (Interviews with key informant 2 and 3) (Nikolova 2013).

As mentioned above, the population increased over the course of ten years (according to the censuses in 2001 and 2011). The ratio between women and men is visually presented in Figure 2, with the number of women in active age prevailing, making up 81 per cent of the total Ukrainian population.

Ukrainians were mostly employed in the sectors of domestic work (52 per cent), retail trade and repair of motor vehicles (17.4 per cent), in the period 2007–2012 (LFS, ELSTAT), in hotels and catering establish-
ments (17.4 per cent), and in construction (10.2 per cent). Generally, the Ukrainians remain steadily in the same sectors of employment, with a small exception of increased percentages of those employed in the hotel and catering industry since 2008. The majority of employed Ukrainians are insured. The largest part of the population is concentrated in the area of Athens and its vicinity (60 per cent of the population). There is also a steady number of Ukrainians in the region of Central Macedonia, Peloponnesse and the island of Crete. As a general remark, the preferred regions of settlement remain the same, but with an increasing number of migrants in the area of Central Greece. With regard to the origin of the Ukrainians, most of them come from the cities in Western Ukraine – Lviv, Ivano-Frankovsk, Uzhhorod – but also from the central and eastern regions of the country.

The overall educational level of Ukrainians is relatively high, especially of the women. The data from Labour Force Survey for the last trimester of 2012 reveals that one third of Ukrainian immigrant women residing in the country hold degrees of higher technical education, while some four per cent are university graduates (Nikolova 2013). The female character of migration has not changed since the first arrival of Ukrainians in the 1990s. The percentage of women varies between 72 per cent and 82 per cent on the total.

Patterns and challenges of remaining

Given that the Ukrainians are not a homogenous group and each individual follows different patterns of integration into the society, the present article attempts to identify the threats arising from the crisis and the tense socio-economic conditions, their impact on the family plans, and to track the strategies of coping with the present situation. The main problem of the Ukrainian community is the lack of jobs and that’s why the people cannot have social security stamps and medical insurance, says Tatiana (2013). The threat of losing one’s job is followed by decrease in the social security stamps that the migrants pay each month, and if they cannot collect enough insurance stamps, this could eventually lead to a failure to renew their residence permit, thus becoming even more vulnerable.

It is very difficult to find a job. The companies go bust. For example, this is the third time I am jobless. All the businesses I was working for go bankrupt. Recently, in January (2013), they closed our shop. I have been uninsured for the last one and a half to two years. Of course, I have documents to stay, because my residence permit is for ten years and is valid till 2017. I don’t know what I am going to do and what will happen. It is difficult, because if there is no job, there is no health insurance. But, on the fair side, we haven’t realised it or faced it yet, because it is still too early. Time will show (Lina, 2013).

The lack of documents determines the economic activity and the concentration of women in the domestic work niche, according to a 2008 study by Psimmenos and Skamnakis. As a rule, immigrant women make a great effort to regularise their residence status and most of the estimates agree that the Ukrainian community is generally characterised by a very low number of irregular migrants. Despite the changing legislation and the obstacles of the bureaucracy, many Ukrainians managed to get long-term residence permits. Still, one of the issues, even if there are efforts to resolve the problem with legislative initiatives, remains the payment of insurance contributions. A new system of paying the social security contributions through ‘ergosimo’ introduced not very long ago to address this problem appears to not be very popular. The concern on the part of the employers is that their salaries are cut down, so they reduce the payments of their domestic workers.

Each employer is saying ‘my salary was cut down; I don’t have money, so I won’t buy ergosimo for you too...’ (...) As much as I am aware – those who had paid insurance contributions, they are not entitled to
Those insurances anymore. Or those who were paying and were always steady with that, now have such reduced salary that they can’t manage to pay for it (Tatiana, 2013).

When it was self-insurance, it was easier... the employee had insurance. Because of ‘ergosimo’ things are worse. It’s much worse. Because Greeks do not want to buy ‘ergosimo,’ they do not want this – why? Because of fear... Fear of the tax offices, because they do not want to be found?! Who knows...Some of them do not know what it is, do not want to know, but they say it is messy, others do not have the time to go and buy it. All sorts of excuses... (Sonya, 2013).

Since 2010, things have somehow settled in the sector of live-in domestic workers from Ukraine. Here, salaries range between 400 to 500 euros. The older women prefer to work as live-in domestic helpers as it is cheaper for them, while the younger women choose external jobs because of their family commitments mostly. Most women working as domestic helpers, especially live-in, spend years in Greece in the same employment sector. Before the crisis, they were attracted by a fixed salary, on-time payments, permanency of the job and minimum language requirements (Nikolova 2013). But now the wages have been reduced and the migrants who couldn’t cope with their living costs preferred to return to Ukraine rather than to look for work as live-in domestic helpers. Most of the women working as maids prefer to send money home for their daughters even in cases when they are grown-up adults with their families, and to forbid them to come to Greece and follow their pattern of living. ‘I’ve tried it, I do not want my children to do that’, is what the women say. But those who are really poor are still coming; God forbid, if someone gets sick in the family and the family needs more money, then girls come from there, yes, says Sonia from the Ukrainian community (2013).

If one considers that most of the Ukrainians were successfully issued ten-year residence permits in the first years after 2007, it means that they have a more extensive timeframe to find a solution and re-think their plans in case of losing their job in Greece. Still, thinking pro-actively, the migrants still worry about the issue of renewing their residence permit when that time comes around. The Ukrainian families also worry about the process of the re-integration of their children in the homeland in case of their return. In 2009 there was one Ukrainian school working on a weekly basis, and by 2013 three schools were offering training in language and knowledge of the history and geography of Ukraine. There is a need. Many parents thought that they might have to return to Ukraine and they have turned to the Ukrainian schools. Whereas, five to ten years ago, many immigrants living in Greece thought that it is enough for their children to go to Greek school only, says Tatiana (2013), who is director of a Sunday school.

The results of a research conducted in Greece in 2008 by Nikolova and Maroufof (2010) revealed that the women engaged in domestic work without residence permits in Greece face obstacles in their access to public services, which restricts their movement and their interaction with friends and relatives, which also has a direct impact on their relationships with families left behind in Ukraine. Lacking official documents for stay and work for years on end has had, as an indirect consequence, a rising number of divorces and a lack of options to be officially reunited with their children, that is, to invite them for visits or to live in Greece with them. Some of the women managed years ago to bring their children by other means, thus not through the official way of family reunification, which has repercussions in the present day when the children have become independent family members: Because they came without visa, afterwards they can’t apply for a residence permit. But also they can’t return, because they are strangers there and their families are here, Tatiana (2013) says.
Those years when they needed to go and be with their children, they couldn’t... it’s a drama. Now it is easier for the children to come. Many migrants bring their children for a month, before they would do the same, but they were not letting them. In some cases women hadn’t seen their children for four to five years. It is not easy for a woman to work here without support. Even the families of the employers were accepting the children for a month in the summer to stay in their houses with the parent. Because when the person is happy, things work better (Anna, 2013).

One very important issue for the migrants is to keep as much as possible a firm relationship with their families back home, as was already highlighted above. Most of the time, they prefer to invite their relatives to visit them rather than to go back home. Some years ago it was much difficult to obtain visa from the Greek consulate, but according to monitoring reports of the Ukrainian organisation Europe Without Barriers, lately Greek consulates are among the top five consulates in Ukraine in terms of speed of processing documents and a drop in the refusals (Europe Without Barriers 2014).

Patterns and challenges of return

The decision to return appears to be planned and organised much longer before the actual return, if it happens. If it could be compared with the period that passes between the initial decision to migrate from Ukraine and the act of departing and arriving in Greece, it seems to be much better scheduled and the people seem to prepare themselves and their family much longer for the return. Also, it seems that the factors which have impact on the decision to migrate to a foreign country are mostly due to unemployment, low wages, support for the family, etc., but the factors prompting a return are mostly internal and psychological, driven by deeper individual needs or ambitions. This can also be claimed to apply to factors driving an eventual re-migration back to Greece, as the arguments below indicate. Basically, there are two distinct and crucial elements which are basic to the analysis of the decision-making before migrating, returning or re-migrating: the timeframe for the organisation of the journey and the perception of the possible future impact on their life of some external factors.

The signs of the coming economic crisis gradually appeared during the second half of the 2000s, beginning with a downturn in the construction sector, where many migrant men were either losing their jobs or their monthly wages decreased or the working days per month were reduced. One of the characteristics of the last period of Ukrainian migration to Greece (starting in 2007) is the return of migrants back home, while Greece is no longer a destination for new Ukrainian migrants.

According to recent research, female immigrants engaged in domestic work who came to Greece as early as in the 1990s tend to remain in the country, while even if they return to Ukraine this is often for a short period of time before coming back to Greece (Levchenko, Malynovska, Shvab, Trofymenko 2010). The men are those who are leaving. Also elder women return, those who work as domestic helpers. Or, those who are without documents, or don’t want to obtain residence permits. Or who lose their jobs. But those who have residence permits are also leaving nowadays, says Tatiana (2013). The situation seems to have been uncertain even before the outbreak of instability and violence in Ukraine, and some degree of movements ‘back and forth’ seem to occur once long-term legal status has been obtained (as in the case of older women who may return for a while and then move back to Greece).

Later arrivals (in 2006–2007) stayed for a shorter period and nearly all returned, with men more often than women tending to spend shorter periods of working in Greece, usually about three years or less, to then return to Ukraine (Levchenko et al. 2010). As the financial crisis intensified since 2010, Ukrainians found it harder to keep their jobs or to find new ones, which may explain the outflow of many families to Ukraine.
According to a representative of the Ukrainian community in Greece, the families followed several strategies to cope with the crisis. One interviewee mentioned cases of mixed families (Ukrainian women with their Greek partners) departing to Ukraine with the aim to settle there (Interview with key informant 4). In this respect, a common strategy to prepare for a smooth return to Ukraine is to send children to a Ukrainian school in Athens, in order to learn the language, so the children will be more prepared for the new environment upon return.

Some families returned to Ukraine and appeared unable to adjust psychologically, so that led them back to Greece. After 15 years spent in Greece, a family went back to Ukraine aiming to remain there, but after two months they came back. They faced difficulties to adjust to the new ways of doing things in Ukraine, so they preferred to return to Greece and to try to handle their lives here, rather than to be oppressed by their own fellow citizens there (Interview with key informant 4). Many of those who left for Ukraine held long-term residence permits from Greece, so they had some time for a trial period in Ukraine, leaving the door open in case they should wish to return to Greece (Nikolova 2013). Migrants might be reluctant to return because they have developed new habits and a way of living, which in different studies of Ukrainian migration is associated with the duration of stay as a decisive factor.

According to some interviewees (Interview with key informant 2), some older women who return to Ukraine tend to come back to Greece after a short period of time, because they are used to the way of life there and still have the opportunity to work as domestic helpers for about 400 euros a month. In another case, an elderly woman – mother of an interviewee – returned because her spouse needed care. In 2010 she had obtained a residence permit for ten years, but it is almost definite that she will not return, says her daughter Iryna (Interview with key informant 7). The parents of Iryna in Ukraine have pensions – per month they receive approximately 260 euros which is enough for them, because they don’t have other expenses, she explains. In addition, the mother has worked 15 years in Greece paying her social security contributions and according to Iryna, she expects to receive a small pension from Greece when she turns 67. That story is one of the many for women over 55 who tend to return to their homeland. Before the return, my mother was saving money to have for an emergency situation, she didn’t go back with nothing in her pocket (Interview with key informant 7).

The case of the young single women is different. If they don’t find employment in ‘external’ jobs, they prefer to leave for Ukraine and in some cases from there to re-migrate either to Poland for seasonal agricultural jobs, or in other cases to Russia, as baby-sitters or domestic helpers (Interview with key informant 2).

**Concluding remarks**

During the first period of migration, with the abolition of the obligation to obtain an exit visa, the Ukrainians started to migrate firstly for a short period of time to the neighbouring countries and later to more distant destinations. Greece was the first of the Mediterranean countries to host Ukrainian labour migrants in 1993. It seems that at first, the newcomers somehow randomly decided to choose Greece as a destination, but then it became easier to obtain visa in the 1990s and it was also cheaper through the whole package of services provided by tourist offices. The labour immigrants in Greece stayed for a few years without documents until 1998, when the first regularisation law was enacted by Parliament. In the next years, a few amnesty programmes were implemented and most of the Ukrainians managed to obtain residence and work permits. That gave them the freedom of movement in the cities, without fear of being arrested and deported back, and it also gave them access to labour and social rights and allowed them to travel back and forth for the summer holidays or for family reasons.
In the middle of the decade of 2000, many migrants were still entering the country for work, but in most cases they chose Greece because they had relatives there and at least initially could rely on their support. At that period the laws in Greece were favourable for the regularisation of the migrant population that had already settled in the territory, but at the same time the state tightened its visa policies. Possibly, the Ukrainians who came after 2007 were not keen to work in the grey economy – hard physical work for low pay – because the quality of life in Ukraine had improved, and so the basis of comparison changed the terms of negotiations.

After 2007, many Ukrainians managed to obtain ten-year residence permits. Many of them returned to Ukraine, especially families and elderly women. The families tend to return for economic or emotional reasons, and the elderly women usually for family reasons. In that respect, the long-term residence permit is favourable, as people in vulnerable situations – be it through unemployment or for family reasons – have the option of returning for some time to Ukraine, but being able to go back to Greece in a legal manner. As both the primary and secondary research show, return remains problematic for many migrants as long as there is no suitable economic environment in Ukraine. Further crucial factors that motivate them to go back to Greece again are the economic and political conditions in the home country. The legislation of the European Directive on family reunification has been important for the migrants, as it helped preserve the unity of the family and enabled them to take decisions while together in the same place. We may therefore note, at a general level, that the family reunification and the long-term residence permits are probably the two most important legislative provisions for both the mobility and temporality of the migration. These afford the migrant with both the opportunity and the timeframe to make a well-considered choice, motivated by his or her own perceptions of well-being in the old versus the new home country.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for critical comments on an earlier version of this paper as well as for pointing out to studies and data that have been incorporated here. Naturally I am solely responsible for all errors and omissions.

Notes


3 With the provision of Article 24 of Law 3863/2010, for the first time the system of paying social contributions through ‘ergosimo’ was introduced. This brought significant changes in the way of wage and insurance payments for the employees in the sector of domestic work who perform work paid by the hour or by the day, on a regular basis, either to one or to more than one employer for the same payroll period covered by IKA insurance. The same applies to workers in the sector of agriculture covered by OGA insurance... The ‘ergosimo’ corresponds to a specific monetary value which includes the amount of the employee’s remuneration and the amount of contributions to the social security institution. Gamvroudi V. (November 2011). Journal Epitheorisis IKA – Insurance and Labour Laws. Online: http://www.eaed.gr/
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Academic publishing, like so much else in life, operates in cycles: edited collections (whether of original or reprinted material) are for a period popular with publishers, who launch (and often do not complete) series – and then they fall out of favour. We are currently in a period where they seem very attractive to many of the major publishers, including some – such as Edward Elgar – for whom they have seemed to dominate their catalogues for substantial periods. The *International Handbook on the Economics of Migration* is a product of one such boom-time.

Evaluating such volumes is rarely straightforward. Often it is difficult to determine the precise intended audience for relatively expensive books, many of which – because of time lags between the initial idea, followed by recruiting authors and getting recalcitrants to deliver, obtaining (in this case at least) expert referees’ reports, editing and then printing – seem obsolete by the time they reach the purchaser. Given the pace of publication through other media in many subject areas and students’ increasing preference for the shift from ‘reading for a degree’ to ‘googling for a degree,’ the rationale for such books is hard to identify. But they keep coming.

In many ways this book is no exception to the general tone of this (mild?) criticism. The editors’ introduction presents no raison d’etre for the book and its contents: indeed, like so many such introductions, it does little more than summarise the contents of the remaining chapters and provides no over-arching structure. The second chapter – Migration and ethnicity: an introduction – does little better, after rather bewildering the reader by introducing a second concept – ethnicity – that is not in the book’s title. Migration, or rather those elements of migration with which the book is concerned, is not defined, but it is implicitly clear that the dominant focus of interest is international, and especially international economic, migration. Intra-national migration, let alone intra-city migration, is (albeit never explicitly) largely excluded from consideration, although much of that movement too is economic in its rationale. Indeed – as the editors admit – the book’s focus is really on the economic integration of immigrant ethnic minorities, though with some reference to identity, perceptions and attitudes.

The book’s chapters are structured into four main sections. The first contains five on The move – ranging widely from modelling individual migration decisions through the economics of circular migration, the international migration of health professionals, independent child labour migrants, and human smuggling. The second contains seven on Performance and the labour market, and the third a disparate eight on New lines of research – including one on Happiness and migration. The seven chapters in the final section – Policy issues – are similarly wide-ranging. In many ways this range is part of the book’s strength and appeal: chapters on, for example, migrants’ access to financial capital, their experience of risky occupations, their wages and obesity, their experience of natural disasters, and the economic effects of inter-ethnic marriages are all beyond what one might consider the core issues of migration studies and as such introduce a breadth of perspectives that many comparable volumes lack.

In terms of orientation and content the individual chapters vary considerably. Some are – as expected – reviews of the recent literature and the current state of knowledge. Others are little more than individual research papers, such as that on Ethnic hiring. The latter have specialist value, but do they have a place in an (expensive) handbook?
Whether this volume is of value to economists and their students of (international) migration and ethnicity is not possible for a non-economist to judge. For the student of migration and ethnicity from another disciplinary perspective it has considerable value in directing attention to issues and literature that might otherwise be overlooked if they were not brought together in a volume such as this. But whether that is justification for the effort in its creation is doubtful, especially given the price: if I had not been invited to review it I would certainly not have bought it, would probably not have suggested its purchase to my university library – indeed would probably have been unaware of it. There has to be a quicker and cheaper way to keep the scholarly community up-to-date.

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Over the last five years, the Arab world has undergone significant transformations. The Arab Spring, which began in 2011 with the escape of Tunisian president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia, not only led to profound changes in the political sphere in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa (hereafter MENA), but also shook the fundamentals of social divisions and questioned the existing methods of regional management of cultural and religious diversity. At the same time, the Arab revolutions attest to the failure of Arab governments to deal creatively with the problems of societal pluralism, including issues of minorities. As a consequence, many previously ignored or taboo political and social issues were brought up and publicly debated. The recently published book Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the Arab World, edited by Will Kymlicka and Eva Pföstl, is very useful at a time when the international community is closely observing frequently turbulent transformations of the states and societies in the MENA region. In some sense it follows Kymlicka’s efforts to assess how Western ideas on the management of ethnic/religious diversity influence and relate to other social and political contexts. However, it also goes further, by aiming to explore how ‘identity politics’ functions and how minority rights are understood and debated in the region.

Some of the key questions the editors and contributors address in the book are the ones which touch upon the main concepts used in the region to describe issues of ethnic diversity, and models or historic precedents invoked as examples of success or failure. They also ask what hopes or fears drive Arab societies’ response to minority claims and what criteria are used to distinguish fair from unfair accommodations, or progressive from regressive claims, or deserving from undeserving minorities. The reviewed volume aims not to catalogue the various laws and policies that have been adopted in relation to minorities in different Arab countries, but rather to provide in-depth assessment of the cultural frameworks and normative assumptions that shape how state–minority relations are debated, and to identify which options are thereby opened up or foreclosed. It does not fully achieve this ambitious goal, among other reasons due to the complexity of the problems at stake, lack of comparative conclusions and wider implications, especially in the light of transformations instigated by the Arab Spring.

Similarly to earlier assessments of multicultural arrangements in other parts of the world co-edited by Kymlicka, the book starts with an introductory chapter that not only clearly sets out the main goals of the publication but also points to the key issues and problems in the theoretical and empirical studies of ethno-cultural diversity in the Arab world, understood in the book as largely overlapping with the 22 member states of the Arab League. One of the important dimensions of the regional cultural heterogeneity is, of course, directly related to the fact that the Middle East is the birthplace of the three global monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Hence, one of the types of diversity taken into account in the book is a religious heterogeneity which most commonly relates
to people of the region who are Arab but not Muslim (under this category fall **inter alia** several Arab Christian communities (including the Copts, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Protestants) as well as various Muslim sects, notably the Shi’a, Alawis, Druze, and Isma’īlis). The second type of minorities discussed in the book are those composed of Muslims who are not Arab (in particular the Kurds, Amazigh/Berbers, Turkomans, and Circassians, as well as Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants in the Gulf). Lastly, the volume also takes into account the third type of minority groups in the region, who are neither Arab nor Muslim (e.g. the Jews, Armenians, Assyrians, Southern Sudanese and Indian, Filipino and Nepalese immigrants in the Gulf). Importantly, the editors emphasise that they do not treat these identities as fixed but rather as cultural residues that give people at least a provisional sense of belonging and which can be reservoirs for politicisation.

Kymlicka, one of the important intellectual contributors to the global discourse on multiculturalism adopted in recent decades by various international organisations (e.g. the UN, EU, UNESCO) and formulated in several international declarations on minority and indigenous rights, acts in the volume in his capacity of an analyst who assesses the influence of the international norms on the Arab states. Together with other contributors to the book he reflects on whether minority politics, which are viewed with distrust (if not outright repression) in the region, can serve as a vehicle for a general transformative politics supporting a broader democratic transformation and challenging older authoritarian, clientelistic, or patriarchal political tendencies. One of the overall conclusions reached in the text is that the Arab states have very skilfully managed to divorce minority accommodations from broader social and political change. Some of the key barriers to the new minority politics aptly identified in the book are the legacies of the Ottoman millet system and the colonial rule, as well as imperatives of postcolonial state-building. Their impact lies in being interconnected and serving as a sufficient reason for the hostility to minority politics in the region. The most interesting element seems to be the legacy of the millet system inherited in the region after 500 years of Ottoman rule, which for some contributors plays a very constructive role in development of more inclusive citizenship and minority rights systems, while for others it is one of the major obstacles to development of modern societies in the region.

The reviewed volume is divided into two parts: one examining the issues of minority rights from broad historical and theoretical perspectives and the other providing detailed case studies. The first part begins with a chapter by Janet Klein on how the discourse on minorities and the category itself have been constructed in the region over the last two centuries, and in particular during the late-Ottoman period and in the post-Ottoman realities. She clearly shows how colonialism contributed to the creation of certain groups as ‘minorities’ (while excluding others from this category), as well as how it fed the processes through which some groups came to be branded as threats to regional nations and their national unity. One such group is the Kurds, spread throughout the Iranian, Iraqi, Syrian and Turkish territories, to whom the author devotes particular attention. While Klein makes the reader aware of the burdens of history that complicate efforts to address minority issues in the region today, the next contributors, Joshua Castellino and Kathleen Cavanaugh, emphasise the potentially positive contributions that the legacy of the Ottoman millet system can offer instead. In contrast to some of the outspoken critics of the millet-type order, who view it as inconsistent with modern conceptions of equal citizenship, national unity and democratic accountability, Castellino and Cavanaugh instead emphasise the potentially positive contributions that the legacy of the Ottoman millet system can offer. They argue that the millet legacy, which above all enabled many groups to maintain their autonomy, can serve as an instructive lesson not only for protecting various minority groups, but also for building more inclusive national identity and more representative public institutions. At the same time, they stress that it can do so only if concerted dialogue at a national level takes place between the various communities that constitute the
state. This vision, however, seems over-optimistic, taking into account the fact that so far the region has only one country – Tunisia – where such dialogue takes place and which is truly democratic. The fact that it is one of the most culturally and religiously homogenous countries of the Arab world has clearly played some role in this.

The next contributor to the volume, Zaid Eyad, in a somehow more realistic manner draws the readers’ attention to the contemporary situation of minorities in the Arab world and the regional models and methods of management of cultural diversity. He analyses various ways of this management, including the traditional and modern Islamic model, liberal multiculturalism and consociationalism, pointing out their limits in the regional context. In his view, the optimal model for the region should draw on the three models: the contemporary Islamic theorising on the idea of the religion-neutral state and territorial citizenship, the multicultural acknowledgment of the different intersecting affiliations and forms of identification, and the consociationalist emphasis on grand coalition and proportionality principles. While such a mixed approach seems to overcome the shortcomings of each of its constituent models, its empirical feasibility is a different matter. It seems that for numerous reasons including the politicisation of religion by state and non-state actors in the region and difficulties in fulfilling sometimes minimal liberal-democratic principles it would be very hard to carry it out. In the following chapter, Corrao and Maffettone convincingly argue that liberalism should be prior to multiculturalism, and that many Arab states have not yet achieved the minimal liberal-democratic threshold, and thus the multicultural discourse makes little sense to many of their citizens.

The second part of the book, exploring more empirical case studies, begins with the chapter by Jacob Mundy on one of the most protracted territorial disputes in Africa today, concerning Western Sahara. His analysis of how Moroccan authorities and Sahrawi nationalists present the conflict leads him to the conclusion that problematising the conflict as an ‘Arab problem’ needing a specific ‘Arab solution’ fails to elucidate the fact that the Arab world is already deeply penetrated by global power structures, and hence the solution must also span both local and global contexts. The following contribution, by one of the book’s editors, Eva Pföstl, concentrates on another minority group from North Africa – the Amazigh (Berber) minority. It explores the group’s growing importance in Algerian politics and its potential to be truly transformative vis-à-vis the Algerian state. Pföstl rightly emphasises the key role that transitional justices can play in the restructuration and democratic transformation of the largest African country. She defines transitional justice as an instrument of broad social transformation that rests on the assumption that societies need to confront past abuses. This instrument seems absolutely crucial, not only in countries with substantial ethnic-cultural-religious minorities (e.g. Algeria, Egypt, or Morocco, analysed earlier), but also in more homogenous ones, for instance Tunisia, where the transitional justice executed by L’Instance Vérité & Dignité (Truth and Dignity Commission) in the majority of cases concerns members of the Islamist opposition persecuted and imprisoned during the rule of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Alas, as with territorial autonomy in Western Sahara, transitional justice is often viewed in the Arab world (including Algeria) as an alien and dangerous importation.

A book on multiculturalism and minority rights in the Arab world would be incomplete without a chapter on the large group of migrant workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries that do not fit the typical model of a minority. Nicholas McGeehan’s contribution to the volume aptly describes the population of at least 10 million immigrants in the Gulf (above all from such countries as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines) and the system that regulates their employment. His analysis focuses on the treatment of foreign workers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where mistreatment of workers in the labour intensive sectors, including construction, has been significantly better documented than the same practices in other countries of the region. Apart from showing how kafala, or the sponsorship system,
facilitates the exploitation of foreign labourers in the region, he also searches for the underlying reasons that maintain this system. In his view, shared by many other researchers, the persistence and the signification of domestic slavery in the region explains some of the most serious cases of exploitation of mainly manual workers. The notions of citizenship and multiculturalism so far have little applicability to the case of immigrants in the Gulf; however, something that should be added to the chapter is that they have great significance in the case of, for example, Bahrain’s Sunni–Shia power struggle.

The Palestinians are an ethnic group that has dominated the media news from the region and pre-occupied international attention for more than half a century. In the next chapter, Hassan Jabareen describes how some Palestinians became Arab Israelis – a minority in Israel – as well as how they were introduced into the new polity and how their citizenship was created and constrained. He clearly shows the way the terms of state loyalty shape Arab-Israelis’ rights and how the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict affects their position in Eretz Israel. Although they make up 20 per cent of Israeli society, their impact on the processes of decision-making remains very limited. Jabareen argues that relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel remain defined by a ‘friend–enemy’ polarity that undermines not only the national rights of the Arab minority but even their basic individual citizenship rights. What is not made very clear in the text is that the level of this polarity is a direct result of the Israeli policy towards Palestinians in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza in a given moment, which then has its own repercussions on Palestinians in Israel. The author, on the other hand, shows vividly that the more the Arab Israelis use their ‘right talk,’ the greater the antagonism between them and the Jewish majority.

The reviewed book concludes with two chapters that touch upon issues including the extremely complicated situation in Iraq after 2003, when Saddam Husain was toppled by the US troops, and where a decade later local jihadists started to form strategic alliances which culminated in the formation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in June 2014. The first one analyses the process of the federalisation of Iraq and compares it with developments in Sudan over that last decade. Its author, Brendan O’Leary, proposes looking for answers to why Sudan broke up and Iraq has continued to hold together (although today large parts of it are under ISIS control) in the differences between the two Arab majorities, Iraqi and Sudanese. In his view, the internal divisions amongst Arabs in Iraq created political possibilities for minorities that were not present in Sudan. From today’s perspective, we know that these divisions also contributed to the emergence of ISIS. The second chapter – concentrating on Iraq – analyses the situation of Assyrian-Chaldeans in the country. However, this last chapter of the book, by Joseph Yacoub, is much broader in character, touching upon some of the key issues addressed by the volume, which is the perception of multiculturalism and treatment of minorities in the region. He very aptly notes that the Arab world has been anxious about concerns of ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities ever since the establishment of rigid and ultra-centralised nation-states following World War I. Some change in the Arab perceptions of multiculturalism and minorities was visible in the recent revisions to the Arab Charter of Human Rights (its first version was created in 1994 to be updated in 2004 and came into force in 2008 when seven member of the League of Arab States ratified it. As of the end of 2014 it had been ratified by thirteen Arab states). Nevertheless, the Arab Spring has caught up the region in issues long denied, which has resulted in its substantial destabilisation. He is right to stress that a change in the Arab world in the areas of democracy and liberation can come only if various concerns of its minorities are properly addressed.

The volume edited by Kymlicka and Pföstl is a very good starting point for anybody interested in the issues of multiculturalism and minority rights in the Arab world. It has some fine observations, many detailed descriptions of different minority groups in the region and useful conceptual elaborations. At the same time, the complexity of identity politics in the
region that comprises multiply geographies disrupts any singular analysis of minority rights and makes it impossible to fit into any volume. Some examples of the important issues that the books fail to address (mainly due to its limited size) are elaborations of the situation of the largest Christian minority in the region – the Egyptian Copts – or the place of Palestinian refugees and their right of return in regional politics. Moreover, the reviewed book is not as neatly organised as the one which started Kymlicka’s comparative effort (Kymlicka, Opalski 2002), and more uneven with some repetitions. In spite of these minor shortcomings it is definitely a must-read for anybody seeking a better understanding of the complexities of this turbulent part of the world.

Notes
1 This assessment started most significantly with the publication of Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (Kymlicka, Opalski 2002) and followed with the publication of Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Berman, Eyoh, Kymlicka 2004) and Multiculturalism in Asia (Kymlicka, He 2005).
2 Except such countries as Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania and Somalia, where Arabic is an official language but not a social majority language.
3 Some of the most important are: the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992), the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992), the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) and UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001).
4 The millet system refers to the system of management of cultural diversity in the Ottoman Empire characterised by the existence of separate legal courts pertaining to personal law under which minorities were allowed to rule themselves (in cases not involving any Muslim) with fairly little interference from the central government.
5 Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.

References

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