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Introduction: Migration and Mobility in the Context of Post-Communist Transition in Central and Eastern Europe

Agata Górny*, Paweł Kaczmarczyk*

It is already three decades since the political and economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) began. This period is marked by massive changes in almost all spheres of socio-economic realities in CEE countries, including mobility and migration. At the beginning of the transition period, the majority of countries in the region could be classified as typical emigration countries, with a low (or extremely low) scale of immigration and (relatively) homogenous societies in ethnic terms. Since then, however, a few important shifts have been observed. First, international migration from the region has increased substantially, along with a significant reduction in the importance of barriers to mobility (Górny and Ruspini 2004; Okólski 2004). Second, a remarkable transformation of mobility forms towards more temporary and ‘liquid’ flows has been observed (Engbersen, Snel and de Boom 2010). The crucial context for these changes is the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2006 which set a new framework for mobility into and from the CEE region that resulted in the establishment of ‘new diasporas’ of Central and Eastern Europeans in major Western European countries (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010; Okólski 2012). Third, as the process of social and economic development progressed – a process also clearly linked to membership in the European Union – a growing group of countries in the CEE region have become migration magnets, with some transformed into net receiving areas. All these developments make CEE a fascinating area of migration research after 1990 and, particularly, after 2004.

This special section opens a two-part collection of articles, to be published in two consecutive issues of CEEMR in 2019, looking at various aspects of migration from and into CEE that address the links between mobility and political and economic transition in the region. Its goal is to discuss, on the one hand, the contribution of the migration research conducted in CEE to the broader migration literature and, on the other, to demonstrate region-specific topics. An important inspiration for the preparation of this issue is the 25th anniversary of the Centre of Migration Research (CMR) at the University of Warsaw; this is accompanied by some reflections on how migration studies have developed in Poland and other CEE countries during these years of...
transition. Since the very beginning, the idea that guided research conducted in the CMR was to analyse migration in a broad socio-economic context and to develop cooperation with the best international teams of migration scholars. Therefore, for this special collection, we invited contributions which demonstrate the development of scientific collaboration between CMR researchers and outstanding European and non-European scholars, as well as articles by international researchers from all over Europe which focus on specific migration topics intersecting with post-communist transition in the CEE region.

The concept of Central and Eastern Europe is not an unproblematic one, though it is frequently used to refer to all post-communist countries. Some authors differentiate, however, between the Commonwealth of Independent States and Central Europe – the latter comprising the Baltic States, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic (Czechia), Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and former Yugoslav countries (Górny and Ruspini 2004). The accession of most countries from the latter group to the European Union accentuated this division of the region by shaping a distinct development path for new EU members with regard to migration, when compared with non-EU countries – e.g. the ex-USSR countries. Consequently, this division is acknowledged in the contributions included in this special section, where CEE countries are usually given equal treatment to those from the Eastern part of the European Union.

The above approach is echoed in the article by Russell King and Marek Okólski, Diverse, Fragile and Fragmented: The New Map of European Migration, which reviews past and contemporary political events and economic forces shaping migration in Europe. The article provides a rich political and socio-economic context for migration transitions in Europe and the position of the CEE region in these processes. While reconstructing five phases of European migration in 1945–2015, the authors stress the unpredictability of developments in migration flows and patterns. As regards the last distinguished (contemporary) period of 2005–2013, i.e. the post-enlargement period, they identify four main migration channels. Two are directly related to migration from and to the CEE region – namely, migration from ‘new’ EU countries to ‘old’ EU countries and from non-EU European countries with a sub-type such as migration to ‘new’ EU countries (e.g. Ukrainians to Poland and Slovakia). In the conclusion to the article, King and Okólski question the future role of the CEE region as a reservoir for the labour forces of other European countries in the light of the expected Brexit outcome – shrinking economic differences between western and eastern countries of the European Union and demographic dynamics in the CEE countries.

The contribution to this special section by Anne White and Izabela Grabowska, Social Remittances and Social Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Embedding Migration in the Study of Society, takes a closer look at one migration channel identified by King and Okólski – migration from ‘new’ to ‘old’ EU countries. White and Grabowska focus on one of the most important and commonly overlooked aspects of international migration, namely the role of social remittances embedded in these flows in the socio-economic post-communist transition in the CEE region. They argue that freedom of mobility within the EU, as a consequence of EU enlargements, gave CEE citizens a unique opportunity not only for migration but also for the transfer and diffusion of social remittances. Referring to numerous studies relating to CEE migrants, the authors provide a detailed account of the mechanisms governing the transfer of social remittances and argue that it can be particularly effective in the case of familial links and especially important for the inhabitants of small cities when compared to other channels of social and cultural diffusion. They also argue that migrants can be perceived as agents of change in transforming post-communist societies but that the final social outcomes of migration strongly depend on structural conditions at the point of origin.

Similar perception of migrants as potential agents of change can be found in the article by Iryna Lapshyna, Do Diasporas Matter? The Growing Role of the Ukrainian Diaspora in the UK and Poland for the Development of the Homeland at Times of War. However, she addresses another channel of European migration, namely that from non-EU countries (Ukraine) to both ‘new’ and ‘old’ EU countries. The author argues that,
although the Ukrainian diaspora in the UK and Poland is internally extremely diversified, its willingness and ability to mobilise in order to enhance development in Ukraine as a consequence of political events, particularly the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, can be observed. At the same time, Lapshyna stresses that, in order to translate this mobilisation into a real impact on the development of the Ukrainian economy, the Ukrainian government would have to engage more in relations with the diaspora and to acknowledge this group as an important stakeholder.

The final contribution of the special section, by Tibor Meszmann and Olena Fedyuk, *Snakes or Ladders? Job Quality Assessment among Temp Workers from Ukraine in Hungarian Electronics*, also addresses Ukrainian migration but, in this case, to a ‘new’ EU country – Hungary. The authors address a topic which becomes increasingly important as a factor reshaping migration to CEE countries: the role of recruitment agencies in shaping and transforming the migration of foreign workers. It can be argued that the growth of their activities in countries like Hungary or Poland contributes to the diminishment of what can be called the ‘unmanaged circularity’ prevalent in temporary labour migration to CEE countries, especially from Ukraine, in the last 20 or 30 years (Górny 2017; Gorny and Kindler 2016). Meszmann and Fedyuk focus on the modes of operation of temp agencies, arguing that, while these latter support migrants entering the Hungarian labour market, they also limit their opportunities for professional and social advancement. The authors also claim the existence of universal ‘subcontracting practices in the core capitalist countries – and on the periphery of the EU – involving and connecting temp agencies and migrant workers’. Therefore, this contribution demonstrates an important element of the convergence between ‘new’ and ‘old’ EU countries, as it focuses on the practices and structures of the European labour market(s).

Note

1 To date, only two former Yugoslav countries have accessed the EU: Slovenia (2004) and Croatia (2011).

Conflict of interest statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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References


Diverse, Fragile and Fragmented: 
The New Map of European Migration
Russell King* and Marek Okólski**

In this paper we review the significant political events and economic forces shaping contemporary migration within and into Europe. Various data sources are deployed to chronicle five phases of migration affecting the continent over the period 1945–2015: immediate postwar migrations of resettlement, the mass migration of ‘guestworkers’, the phase of economic restructuring and family reunion, asylum-seeking and irregular migration, and the more diverse dynamics unfolding in an enlarged European Union post-2004, not forgetting the spatially variable impact of the 2008 economic crisis. In recent years, in a scenario of rising migration globally, there has been an increase in intra-European migration compared to immigration from outside the continent. However, this may prove to be temporary given the convergence of economic indicators between ‘East’ and ‘West’ within the EU and the European Economic Area, and that ongoing population pressures from the global South, especially Africa, may intensify. Managing these pressures will be a major challenge from the perspective of a demographically shrinking Europe.

Keywords: Europe; phases of migration; political events; asylum-seekers and refugees; migration policy

Introduction

In this paper, two long-standing students of European migration combine to explore the complexity of recent and current trends in international migration across the continent. Although we have long recognised and cited each other’s work, this is the first paper we have written as co-authors. It brings together an economist and a geographer whose perspectives are distinct yet overlapping and mutually reinforcing, for the economist appreciates the inherent spatiality and regional patterning of migration, and the geographer acknowledges the economic forces underpinning most migration flows and decisions. In any case, the quintessentially interdisciplinary field of migration studies, as sociologist Robin Cohen (1995: 8) has memorably emphasised, encompasses scholars from a number of disciplines (anthropology, economics, geography, history, sociology, etc.)
who talk to each other across subject fields, languages and cultures, and whose research and writings are part of the webbing that binds global academic society.

Yet the research field of European migration has become intensely overcrowded as books and articles pour forth on an almost daily basis. Keeping up with this literature is a nigh-impossible task, especially when fitted in alongside teaching, administrative duties and one’s own research and writing projects. This is not the place, not least because there is insufficient space, for a full listing of the significant books on European migration published in recent decades. However, very briefly and with apologies for the inevitably subjective selection, they range from the early classics of the 1970s (Berger and Mohr 1975; Castles and Kosack 1973; Piore 1979; Salt and Clout 1976), through a lean period in the 1980s and 1990s (eg. Blotevogel and Fielding 1997; Castles, Booth and Wallace 1984; Rees, Stillwell, Convey and Kupiszewski 1996), to a veritable explosion in the late 2000s and 2010s, much of this recent output driven by the flourishing IMISCOE network on ‘International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe’ (amongst many others, see Boswell and Geddes 2011; Favell 2008; Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx 2016; Glorius, Grabowska-Lusinska and Kuvik 2013; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016; Lafleur and Stanek 2017; Raymer and Willekens 2008; Recchi 2015; Recchi and Favell 2009; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014). The authors of this paper have made their own contribution to this growing library on European migration, editing or co-editing several books (Black, Engbersen, Okólski and Pantiru 2010; Bonifazi, Okólski, Schoorl and Simon 2008; King 1993b, 1993c; King and Black 1997; King, Lazaridis and Tsardanidis 2000; Okólski 2012a).

Nevertheless, we see value in standing back from the vast array of extant and continuously expanding literature and trying to map out Europewide trends in a way that will appeal to students and scholars seeking a concise overview combined with new insights into evolving patterns. In doing so, we are aware that there are three main ways of slicing up our subject matter: a historical approach which involves identifying chronological periods of more or less intense migration, a geographical approach focusing on countries, regions and the spatial pattern of flows and stocks of migrants, and a third approach which identifies different types of migration – labour migrants, highly skilled migrants, lifestyle migrants, retirement migrants, refugees and so on. Due to the cross-cutting nature of these different approaches, a simultaneous three-dimensional analysis would be difficult to achieve. Hence, we privilege the ‘historical waves’ approach as our primary classification, documenting how each period of migration is characterised in terms of geographical flows and migratory types.

Europe: a continent of immigrants

There can be no doubt that, over the past few decades, Europe has become an important destination for global migration. Tomáš Sobotka (2009) estimates that, during the half-century 1960–2009, the 27 EU countries (i.e. excluding Croatia) saw a net population growth, due to international migration, of nearly 26 million people, of whom 57 per cent arrived in the last decade of that period (2000–2009). According to a European Commission assessment, in around 2010 one resident in three in the EU had a more or less direct experience of migration (Eurostat 2011).1 The Commission also estimated that, in 2015, of the half-billion people living in the EU, 52 million – more than 10 per cent – were born abroad, and 34 million – 7 per cent – had foreign nationality (Eurostat 2016).

Parallel and similar data on European migration are available from the International Organization for Migration’s ‘World Migration’ reports, the latest being for 2018. This data compilation includes the whole of Europe, not just the EU, and is sourced from the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs. According to IOM (2018: 18), Europe hosts 75 million, or 31 per cent, of the world’s ‘stock’ of 244 million migrants, substantially more than North America at 53 million or 21 per cent, although the US is the single largest host country with 47 million, followed by Germany, 12 million and the Russian Federation, 11 million. All the
above figures are for 2015. Of the 75 million international migrants living in Europe in 2015, over half (40 million) were born in Europe. The non-European immigrant population, 35 million, originates from a wide diversity of mostly poor countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America (IOM 2018: 67–69).

As a result of a number of diverse and divergent economic, social and political processes in recent decades, the current configuration of the forms and directions of migration has become extremely complicated. Our purpose in this article is to explore this complexity. We start with a brief backward glance at the period before 1945 and then, in the main part of the paper, describe five phases of European migration within the seven decades spanning 1945–2015. We follow this by two further time-based assessments: an overview of current dominant trends and a speculative view of the future.

Main patterns of European migration before World War Two

Until the early postwar years, the European map of ‘contemporary’ international migration was relatively uncomplicated. By ‘contemporary’, in this particular historical context, we mean migratory movements that were triggered or sustained by accelerated population growth connected to the demographic transition that began in Western Europe at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Such an interpretation was advanced by well-known population scholars such as Wilbur Zelinsky (1971) and Jean-Claude Chesnais (1986), to create a systematic explanation and synthesis of these movements across a range of migration/mobility ‘transitions’. As a result of steady growth in the rate of natural increase, the majority of the regions of Europe affected by this phenomenon became overpopulated in terms of the prevailing technologies of production at that time. To survive, many people had little option but to migrate. ‘Modern’ changes in Europe’s economic structure – the emergence and expansion of industry and the related development of cities and industrial settlements – came to the rescue of this ‘excess’ population. A massive shift of people from over-populated rural to labour-hungry industrial areas took place, mainly within countries but also involving some cross-border migration. In terms of European macro-regions, this urban-industrial development was widespread in the western and northern parts of the continent; the southern and eastern regions lagged behind, as they still do today.

Focusing now on international migration, one safety-valve was offered by distant overseas countries, above all North and South America, which offered land-starved rural migrants the opportunity to occupy and cultivate larger swathes of land. Later, when North America industrialised, there was a need for inflows of industrial workforce. Meantime, the Europe of that era was, to a significant degree, made up of multinational empires – British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, Austro-Hungarian and the last vestiges of the Ottoman. Each had its own structures of metropolitan centres and colonised or occupied peripheries. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, a number of stable migration corridors were established, whereby the excess population from the imperial centres and pioneering ‘modern’ countries emigrated mainly across the oceans, while the vacant, usually unattractive and seasonal, jobs in those migrant-origin countries drew in ‘replacement’ migrants from the remaining, mainly peripheral parts of Europe.

Typical migration corridors established within Europe included the following. The Irish (before their mass exodus to America) migrated across the Irish Sea to Britain; the Portuguese and Italians to France (the Italians also, somewhat later, to Switzerland); the Norwegians, Danes and Finns to Sweden; and the Poles to Germany (and later also to France and Belgium). With the outbreak of the First World War, these intra-European migrations were accompanied, and often surpassed in terms of numbers, by transoceanic migration – especially to the US, Argentina and Brazil. These long-distance migrations, particularly to North America, were first drawn overwhelmingly from Northern and Western Europe; then, starting at the end of the nineteenth century, from Southern Europe; at the turn of the century and after, from Central and Eastern Europe (King 1996; Walaszek 2007).
Five phases of European migration 1945–2015

There have been numerous attempts to chronicle the evolution of European international migration post-1945 into a series of waves, stages or phases (see, for example, Bonifazi 2008; Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014; 102–125; Fassmann and Münz 1992; King 1993a; Triandafyllidou, Gropas and Vogel 2014; van Mol and de Valk 2016). Our periodisation presented here is in part a synthesis of other schemas and partly our own chronological categorisation in which we recognise, above all, the fact that European migration after the Second World War has taken place in the shadow of great political events. Undoubtedly the most important one, fundamentally shaping migration dynamics until as late as 1990, was the division of the continent into two opposing political blocs – ‘the East’ and ‘the West’ – divided by the Iron Curtain, which was not only a symbolic line separating two competing political, economic and existential ideologies but also a brutally effective migration barrier. Naturally the removal of that barrier, starting in late 1989, unleashed a new era of intra-European migration: in the words of Black et al. (2010), ‘a continent moving West’. Meanwhile, since the early postwar years, the Western bloc comprised two parts, defined by contrasting patterns of migration: the north-western – a magnet for immigration – and the southern – a reservoir of poorer people constrained to emigrate.2

Interwoven across the East/West binary have been other important political and economic processes which have impacted on the evolving map of European migration. Key here has been the formation, from its origins as the European Coal and Steel Community and then the Common Market in the 1950s, through progressive enlargements north, south, north again and then east of the European Union. With the ethos of the free movement of people – the so-called ‘fourth freedom’ after the free movement of capital, goods and services (Favell 2014; Recchi 2015) – EU enlargement as an ongoing process (Brexit apart) has correspondingly enlarged the ‘migration space’ across most of the continent. Even outside this space of free movement, from countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Albania, emigration to EU countries has been intense.

Alongside these geopolitical changes have been important economic events – postwar reconstruction and the Fordist industrial expansion during the 1950s and 1960s; the oil crises of 1973–1974 and, less impactful, 1979–1980; another ‘long boom’ which lasted from the mid-1990s until 2008; and the economic crisis of the last ten years, from which recovery has been slow and patchy. Finally there have been ‘external shocks’, impacting on migration flows into Europe from the outside. The most dramatic of these was the so-called ‘migration and refugee crisis’ of 2015–2016, triggered by civil war in Syria, which set in motion a desperate stream of refugees into and through the countries of South-East Europe (see Crawley, Duvell, Jones, McMahon and Sigona 2018).

In Table 1 we attempt to synthesise the five main phases of European migration across the 70-year period in question. As prefigured in our introduction, the main division of the schema is chronological but we also separate out both the regional effects (for the ‘West’, ‘South’ and ‘East’ of Europe) and the main types of movement at each stage.
Table 1. Main phases of European migration and their characteristics, 1945–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase and its main attributes or tendencies</th>
<th>‘West’ (Western and Northern Europe)</th>
<th>‘South’ (‘Mediterranean’ Europe)</th>
<th>‘East’ (Central &amp; Eastern Europe)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949–1973 (2) \nBipolar geopolitics. Cold War and arms race. Economic success in the West and inefficient economies in the South and East. Beginnings of Western European integration. Isolation of the East.</td>
<td>Recruitment of unskilled workers from the South and outside Europe, caused by labour shortages. Mass-scale, renewable extensions of temporary migrants’ stays. Gradual shift in the migration balance from negative to positive. Brain drain to the US.</td>
<td>Outflows of unskilled workers to the West and the US. High level of net emigration. Emergence or solidification of strong clusters of migrants in the West.</td>
<td>Administrative bans on emigration and limitations on immigration, even within the region. Shortage of internal migration; large populations kept in rural areas. Occasional waves of population movement for humanitarian reasons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration based on Okólski (2012b).
Phase 1: postwar migrations of ‘adjustment’ and resettlement

The first phase, which lasted for a few years after the war and ended, in principle, in 1948, mainly concerned the movements of people who had been left outside their countries of (ethnic) origin as a result of war events, including displacement or the establishment of new state boundaries. Some of these ‘resettlement’ movements bore the characteristics of ethnic cleansing. These so-called ‘adjustment’ migrations were especially large-scale in Germany and in a range of Central and Eastern European countries (Fassmann and Münz 1995). Estimates for these migrations provoked by the disruptions of war and new state-building are necessarily imprecise but Kosiński (1970) suggests a total of 25 million people, noting that, by 1950, West Germany contained 7.8 million refugees and East Germany 3.5 million. In the face of the difficult living conditions caused by wartime economic destruction, transoceanic migration restarted, mainly from ‘peripheral’ European countries and continuing into the 1950s and even 1960s in some countries such as Portugal, Greece and Italy.

Phase 2: mass labour migration, 1950–1973

The second phase in the schema set out in Table 1 is connected to the economic process of postwar reconstruction and rapid industrialisation, which lasted until the onset of the first, and most sudden, oil crisis in 1973. It played out differently in the three macro-regions of the continent. In the USSR and its satellite countries, economic reconstruction was guided by a policy of autarky. The mobilisation of the workforce and the provision of growing industries with the necessary labour were possible thanks to huge internal transfers from agriculture and rural areas to centres of construction, extractive and heavy industries and manufacturing which were developing in large urban agglomerations, industrial districts and mining areas. With a few exceptions, the remaining countries of Europe became beneficiaries of the large-scale economic support of the US-financed Marshall Plan. Moving from reconstruction to sustainable economic recovery led to a sharply increased demand for labour but supplies of this crucial factor of production were unevenly distributed across Europe. North-West European countries suffered labour shortages, due to wartime losses, declining fertility in the immediate pre-war and war years, and increasing shares of young people entering tertiary education, delaying their entry into the workforce and moving their aspirations away from manual jobs. Southern European countries had higher fertility rates and excess labour resources, especially in rural areas beset by physical obstacles such as mountainous terrain, soil erosion and climatic drought. To address this problem of labour shortage, the stronger industrialising economies of Western Europe (principally the UK, West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland) embarked on recruitment drives to import foreign workers (Bonifazi 2008; Collinson 1995). Two main groups of countries were involved as suppliers of migrant workers. The first group was Turkey and the Southern European countries – Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia (Livi Bacci 1972). The second was overseas colonial or former colonial territories in the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia. This latter group was especially important in the postwar pattern of labour recruitment to Britain but was also found in France and the Netherlands.

The mass labour migrations of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, which thus took place both within Europe and from outside the continent, had a profound effect on Europe’s overall migration balance, shifting it from a long-term historical pattern of net emigration to the rest of the world, to net immigration (Okólski 2012b). This ‘migration transition’ from negative to positive has continued ever since, although obviously not for all countries at all times.

One key aspect of Western Europe’s large-scale extraction of workers from other countries was the strategy of keeping them on a temporary status and employed on fixed-term contracts, thereby enabling the hosting states to claim that they were not ‘countries of immigration’. The West German Gastarbeiter (‘guestworker’)
policy was the clearest example of this – a migrant-labour management system reliant on the short-term rotational employment of mainly male factory and construction workers, ruling out the possibility of them bringing in family members. This dehumanising treatment of migrant workers, which included accommodating them in hostels in crowded conditions, eventually gave way to a more socially responsible acceptance of the ‘human right to family life’ and opportunities for family reunion, which we include as part of the third phase of our historical model (see below).

Within the Southern European countries at this stage, a dual process of migration was under way. Part of the excess labour from the rural sector was transferred via internal migration to their own industrial centres but the majority went abroad (Livi Bacci 1972). This is most clearly seen in the case of Southern Italy where, over the period between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s, parallel out-migrations led north to fast-growing industrial centres in Northern Italy and to France, Germany and Switzerland as the main destinations for intra-European migration (King 1993: 29–43). Italy at this time had the benefit of being a member of the original six-strong Common Market, so its citizens had the automatic right to move to the other five countries – France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. For Turkey and the other Southern European nationalities involved in this vast labour migration system (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Yugoslavia), migration was orchestrated via bilateral recruitment agreements which shaped the evolving geography of flows and, ultimately, the settlement of different ethno-national groups in each host country. To take two examples of major destination countries, France drew its migrant workers mainly from Italy, Spain and Portugal (plus the Maghreb countries, especially Algeria), whilst West Germany recruited guestworkers from Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. On the whole, this migration geography was based on a combination of territorial proximity and colonial dependency. The main exception to this explanatory rationale was Turkey, far away from Western Europe and with no colonial ties. Yet, Turkey soon became the main source of foreign labour for West Germany and also initiated a lasting migration to several other European countries, including Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Austria. Notable, too, is the case of Yugoslavia, the only communist country that allowed its citizens to participate in labour migration.

At the same time as Western Europe ‘imported’ millions of guestworkers, barely granting them minimal rights to citizenship and long-term residence – at least initially – some of these countries enabled or encouraged the in-migration of ‘ethnic kin’ living in exile abroad, who were granted full citizenship rights in their ancestral home countries. Andrea Smith (2003) refers to these ‘repatriates’ as ‘Europe’s invisible migrants’, many of whom came back to the colonial mother countries as a result of colonial independence and expulsion in countries such as Indonesia, Algeria, Angola and Uganda. Key examples discussed at length in her book are the Dutch Overzeese Rijksgenoten, the French Pieds-Noirs and the Portuguese Retornados. According to Smith’s estimates, approximately 300 000 migrants arrived in the Netherlands from the ‘Dutch Indies’ between 1945 and 1963, 1 million French from Algeria in the early 1960s and 800 000 Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s (2003: 13–15). Between 1950 and 1989 the Federal Republic of Germany received 2 million so-called ethnic Germans originating mainly from the European communist countries (Frey and Mammey 1996). Later, in the extraordinary year of 1989, West Germany facilitated the move into the country on the cusp of unification (Kemper 1993) of the categories of Übersiedler (344 000 Germans from the GDR) and Aussiedler (377 000 ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe).

**Phase 3: economic restructuring, family reunion and some return migration**

For the Western sector of Europe, the economic downturn provoked by the oil crisis of 1973–1974 caused a significant drop in the demand for unskilled labour and the active recruitment of foreign workers was abandoned. Efforts were made to encourage those workers recruited in earlier years to return to their countries of
origin – financial incentives were even offered – but with little effect overall. This was because, in the later years of the mass recruitment era, many workers had been able to repeatedly renew their temporary contracts, move into better housing and benefit from a relaxing of the exclusionary rules for bringing in family members. The result was a large wave of ‘family reunion’ migrants, coming especially from non-European countries such as Turkey and Morocco. Other migrants married and started families in their new countries of increasingly long-term residence, whilst yet others opted to stay on after 1974 rather than return-migrate, simply because they had nothing to return to in their home countries.

Whilst the closure and downsizing of many factories and construction sites in the wake of the recession rendered many migrant workers unemployed, some took the opportunity to move into other sectors of employment such as the catering industry and personal services (Bloatevoel and King 1996; King 1997). Nigel Harris (1995: 10) argued that immigrants ‘allowed many native workers to escape from the worst manual labour. For example, in West Germany between 1961 and 1968, 1.1 million Germans left manual occupations for white-collar jobs, and over half a million foreign workers replaced them’. As the Fordist industrial structure was partially dismantled, becoming more flexibilised and decentralised, migrants sought to reposition themselves in selected niches within this post-Fordist segmented labour market. A typical move was to open a restaurant, snack bar or shop. Whilst for some this was a route to prosperity, for others it was a more precarious means of survival.

This phase also sees the first implementation of integration measures for migrants in North-West Europe. Paradoxically, the policy of integrating migrants became a way to block further immigration. Put slightly differently, one condition of success for integration policy was a restrictive immigration policy. Philip Martin (1993: 13) called this a ‘Grand Bargain’ by which governments seek to reassure restrictionist-minded publics that immigration is under control whilst simultaneously directing more attention to integrating and thus ‘deproblematising’ the immigrants who are already ‘here’ and unlikely to return to their countries of origin. This has meant that, over time, integration policy has shifted through the gears, albeit in a different way in different European countries. A common sequence has been to pass from simple measures to encourage incorporation and adaptation, to multiculturalism and then on (or back) to a more cultural assimilationist stance. As Rinus Penninx has written: ‘This new cultural conception of integration for migrants was a mirror image of how the receiving society defined its own “identity” (as modern, liberal, democratic, laicist, equal, enlightened, etc.). In practice, these identity claims are translated into civic integration requirements and mandatory civic integration courses of an assimilative nature for immigrants’ (Penninx 2016: 25).

Moving now to the South or Mediterranean Europe, the period between the mid-1970s and the end of the 1980s witnessed a series of far-reaching political and economic changes. Greece (in 1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986) acceded to the European Community, joining Italy – hitherto the only southern member – and thereby advancing their process of economic integration with North-West Europe. These countries also underwent deep political transformations, bringing their systems out of right-wing authoritarianism and closer to Western liberal democracy. Under the influence of good economic performance, there slowly began to appear in these countries the shortages of workers that had earlier been seen in the North-West. Key sectors of shortage were construction, agriculture, tourism and domestic and care work; much of this labour demand was in the informal economy, which was a structural feature of the Southern European economic system (King and Konjhodzic 1996). The signals from the labour markets of these four countries were so clear that, even without the support of government or para-state recruitment channels, inflows of foreign labour began, initially from beyond Europe and later, to a growing degree, from Central and Eastern Europe.

In the countries of the Eastern part of the continent, there appeared an inclination for greater openness towards the outside world, already presaged by Yugoslavia’s relaxed attitude to emigration dating back to the 1960s. Economic cooperation was sought with the West and most of the communist states signed up to the pan-European security system at the 1974 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. More exchanges
took place in the fields of culture and education. As a result, in some of the Eastern countries and especially Poland, a liberalisation took place of many spheres of social life, including the cross-border mobility of people, which accelerated during the 1980s. During this period, intra-regional flows of workers also became quite popular. However, the key ‘opening’ consisted of travel and forms of ‘veiled’ or ‘proto-’ migration to the West. A typical arrangement was for tourist trips to enable contacts for work and business which later bore fruit in the form of informal migration (Okólski 2004).

**Phase 4: the collapse of communism, growth in asylum-seeking and ‘irregular’ migration**

The official blocking of further ‘legal’ immigration to Western Europe and the EU15 did not halt migration on the continent. Another wave of postwar migration, the fourth in our schema, dates from the end of the 1980s, a time which Castles and Miller, in the first edition of their landmark volume, identified as the start of their new ‘age of migration’ (1993: 2).

Several processes underpin the fourth wave. First, there was (and remains) the relative porosity of the EU’s southern border. With its long sea coast facing cross-Mediterranean access routes from North Africa, the southern EU countries were ill-equipped to stop both sea-borne migrants and others coming in by land and air on legal tourist visas but overstaying. Second, the buoyant informal economy in these ‘new’ countries of immigration, especially for casual jobs in construction, agriculture and tourism, offered multiple, if insecure and low-paid, job opportunities to migrants coming from poor countries who were desperate for paid work. Periodic regularisation schemes for these irregular migrants, which started in the mid-1980s in Spain and Italy and later in Portugal and Greece, helped to stabilise these rapidly expanding and diverse migrant populations, although they also arguably acted an incentive for more to arrive.

Third, more and more people arrived in Europe seeking humanitarian assistance, including refugee status. Until the mid-1980s, the annual number of asylum-seekers was of the order of tens of thousands but, by 1992, it exceeded half a million, most of whom were rejected. Illustrative of this overall increase is the case of Germany, the most popular destination for asylum-seekers: the number of people whose applications for refugee status were rejected grew almost seven-fold from 17 000 in 1985 to 116 000 in 1990, whilst the number of people to whom the status was granted fell by almost a half from 11 000 (65 per cent of applications) to 6 000 (5 per cent of applications) (Frey and Mammey 1996). A dual process was therefore being played out: on the one hand the criteria for acceptance were being administered more harshly, reflecting government policy to bear down on immigration numbers; on the other hand, increasing numbers of ‘ordinary’ or ‘economic’ migrants were pretending to be refugees.

The increased flow of refugees (most of whose ‘genuine’ nature could be questioned) resulted in large part from the collapse of the communist system across Central and Eastern Europe, from political turmoil on the south-eastern fringes of Europe and from the closure of popular and formerly accessible routes and forms of migration. This latter circumstance, which also included the tightening of rules for accepting asylum-seekers and granting them protection by many European countries in the early 1990s, sparked a sharp increase in irregular migration, including the clandestine transport of people across borders, often assisted by specialised international criminal networks (Salt 2000). The migration pressure from people in areas of origin – created by increased expectations fostered by migration networks and a specific ‘culture of migration’ instilled by earlier success stories of migrants – proved to be virtually unstoppable. Both the southern and eastern borders were also vulnerable to the irregular entry of migrants: the Southern European countries at this time operated a rather permissive control of their external borders, whilst controls along the continent’s eastern borders were weakened by the collapse of the communist regimes.
Summing up thus far, the processes described above across phases 2–4 created many changes in the map of European migration (cf. King 2002). From the late 1940s to the early-mid 1970s there was a dominance of inflows, initially constructed mostly as temporary, to North-West Europe; an inflow in which migrants from the European South and from former colonies largely prevailed. In West Germany additional important roles were played by numerically dominant Turkish migrants and by ethnic Germans living abroad ‘returning’ to their ‘homeland’. Over time, despite significant return migration related to economic downturns and to migrants’ personal life-stage plans, the guestworkers evolved into settled communities, although their integration into host societies was often a patchy process. The Southern European countries witnessed a remarkable migration transition from net emigration to net immigration: Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece in particular became targets for strong migration inflows after the 1980s, although the profile of the immigrants differed across each of these destinations. Whilst Italy and Spain received migrants from a wide range of African, Asian and Latin American countries, Portugal’s immigrant inflow came mainly from its former African colonies and Brazil, and Greece’s (after 1990) from Albania and Bulgaria (King 2000; Peixoto, Arango, Bonifazi, Finotelli, Sabino, Strozza and Triandafyllidou 2012). The East of Europe was largely cut off from these migration dynamics before 1990; however, after this date, substantial emigration flows were released. In proportion to their respective populations, outflows were particularly intense from the Baltic states of Latvia and Lithuania, from Poland and Slovakia and from Romania, Moldova and Albania. These outflows were directed, in different national combinations, to all parts of Europe – North, West and South (Okólski 2004).

**Phase 5: diverse migration dynamics in an enlarged Europe**

One of the most important political phenomena affecting recent migration processes in Europe has been the progressive integration of an expanding number of states into a single communal organisation embracing, eventually, 28 countries – or 27 pending the departure of the UK from the EU. Particularly significant was the creation, via the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, of European citizenship in the newly named European Union and the guarantee to all citizens of the (then) EU15 of unlimited freedom of travel and relocation throughout the entire area of the EU, which thus became a de facto internal migration space. Yet it is worth remembering that the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community, also enshrined the principle of free mobility of human capital, albeit only applying to labour. Subsequently, it was the 1985 Single European Act which created the real basis for free movement across the EU, then in the throes of its second enlargement, for all citizens of member-states, initiating the process of removing internal borders as well as the physical, technical and tax barriers to mobility.

These geopolitical changes at the level of the EU created the need for the coordination of national migration policies, particularly in relation to citizens of third countries. As a result, there was a gradual unification of the rules for asylum and migration across the years 1997–2004, expressed in events such as the shift of those issues from the third to the first pillar of EU policy.

The project of a ‘deep and wide’ European integration creates the institutional framework for the fifth and final phase of postwar migrations in Europe, marked by a growing importance of intra-EU flows as well as by ongoing external flows into the EU and a diversity of forms and types of migration and mobility. Having said that, there is still a survival of the traditional understanding of migration policy in Europe as guided by a powerful resistance to the idea of the continent being an area of immigration. The notion of ‘fortress Europe’, as critics of the EU’s and its constituent states’ migration policy described it, is still relevant and stands as a counterpoint to the desire to deal with spatial disequilibria in growth rates and labour demand within the EU through fostering internal migration/mobility.
The need for a greater intra-EU mobility of labour to address geographical structural imbalances was stressed, *inter alia*, in the Lisbon Treaty of 2000 and prefigured the mass East-to-West mobility that was soon to occur following the 2004 enlargement (Black et al. 2010). At this time, eight Central and Eastern European countries joined (Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), followed by two more in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and Croatia in 2013. As a result, the EU28 became a huge area in which there is full free movement encompassing – let us repeat – half a billion people (EU citizens and also ‘residents’ originating from ‘third’ countries3), now integrated across the ‘old’ or ‘Western’ EU15 and the ‘new’ ‘Eastern’ EU11, plus two small new EU countries of the ‘South’, Malta and Cyprus. These people’s movements within this area are fundamentally internal migration, even though they cross (largely invisible) international borders.

Despite the institutional encouragement for more intra-EU migration, the region as a whole is characterised by relatively low population relocations. For example, in 2010 the share who took part in intra-EU migration between the 27 member-states was just 0.3 per cent of the entire population, i.e. fewer than 1 in 300; for migration on an inter-regional basis (NUTS first-level regions) within countries it was 1.0 per cent (Riso, Secher and Andersen 2014). For comparison, the rates for the United States were higher (2.4 per cent for inter-state migration, 1.2 per cent between four major US regions). Of course, we have to bear in mind that there are linguistic and other cultural barriers to movement within Europe. Even so, neoliberal economists such as Klaus Zimmermann (2014) have argued powerfully for more intra-EU migration to ‘repair’ spatial disequilibria, enhance overall European economic growth and maximise aggregate human welfare through access to better jobs and higher incomes.

Eurostat assessments based on measurement of migration according to a uniform criterion (arrival from another country and residence of at least 12 months) show that, over the period 2008–2014, the percentage of citizens of third countries among all newly admitted immigrants in the EU27 fell from 49 to 42 per cent (Eurostat 2016). Because the total number of immigrants remained almost identical (about 3.8 million), this means an effective drop in the total number of new arrivals from outside the EU and a corresponding increase in intra-EU flows.

On the other hand, despite restrictive EU policy on inflows of migrants from third countries, there is a range of ‘back doors’ through which non-EU migrants arrive perfectly legally (OECD and EU 2016). Here are seven of them, of which the first five are mainly subordinated to narrow economic interests:

(i) preferences or special privileges for scientists and specialists (Directives 2005/71/EC and 2009/50/EC);
(ii) easier entry for interns and volunteers, and incentives to begin or continue tertiary education (e.g. Directive 2004/114/EC);
(iii) easier conditions or ‘quotas’ for seasonal and circulating migrants (e.g. Directive 2014/36/EC);
(iv) the permissibility or easing of inflows on the basis of special ‘regional neighbourhood’ agreements – e.g. as part of Eastern and Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships;
(v) easier procedures for ‘intra-corporate transfers’ (e.g. Directive 2014/66/EC);
(vi) the right of foreigners legally residing in one EU country to bring to that country members of their immediate family (Directive 2003/86/EC); and
(vii) the meeting of moral obligations by granting humanitarian aid (EU asylum policy).

The institutional measures listed above, allowing or promoting the inflow to the EU of citizens of third countries, have effects that go far beyond the intentions of these instruments. A clear example is EU asylum policy, which is certainly partially responsible for the so-called migration crisis that unfolded in 2015 and early 2016.
At the outset, the common asylum policy significantly broadened the concept of the protection of vulnerable foreigners as specified in the Geneva Convention of 1951 and its subsequent protocol of amendment in 1967; the policy created a uniform requirement for member-states to ensure ‘subsidiary protection’ for foreigners who do not qualify for refugee status, regardless of the institution of humanitarian protection – optionally applied in specific countries and not uniform in context. However, this broadening was not accompanied by adequate logistical solutions for verifying foreigners’ rights to receive various forms of asylum or assistance, or for preventing non-entitled foreigners from entering or remaining within the territory of the EU. There was also a lack of common purpose and solidarity in the relocation of asylum-seekers between the countries with external EU borders facing the routes of flight and entry, and the remaining states. Whilst Germany and Sweden seized the moral high ground in welcoming these mainly Syrian refugees, other countries were either non-receptive (the UK) or openly hostile (Hungary). In the end, a cynical trade-off agreement between the EU and Turkey was signed in March 2016, by which Turkey took responsibility for preventing further boat migrations from its shores towards the adjacent Greek islands and for taking back new arrivals into Greece. The other side of the ‘bargain’ was a payment of 3 billion euros to Turkey, the promise of visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens and the re-energising of Turkey’s accession process (Crawley et al. 2018: 138).

Dominant patterns of migration in Europe today

In light of the analysis presented above, it is no surprise that today’s map of European migration comprises a mixture of different elements and patterns, some formed under the influence of recent political and economic events, others reflecting more-established migration traditions and their inertial effects reproduced over time. It is also the case that, beyond labour migrants and refugees/asylum-seekers, there exists a diversity of types of migration/mobility, as was pointed out by King (2002) in delineating ‘a new map of European migration’. King specified an increasing trend for independent female migration, more high-skilled migrants and international student mobility, new migrations borne of ‘crisis’, new regimes of shuttle and circular migration, a rise in north-to-south international retirement migration and, last but not least, a recognition that people migrate for romantic and emotional reasons – ‘love migration’.

To demonstrate the differentiation between old and new patterns, we use the results of our analysis based mainly on data for 2005–2014 sourced from the ‘SOPEMI’ network and published in the latest International Migration Outlook 2017 (OECD 2017). By focusing on this decade, we start from the ‘historic’ year of 2004 when the major eastward enlargement of the EU took place and the European area of free movement was substantially extended, corresponding to the fifth phase of the scheme presented above. Our quantitative data refer to annual averages for the period in question. The analysis covers 26 countries which are part of the European Economic Area (EEA) plus Switzerland, for which data were available on the structure of inflows by country of origin. Later, we elaborate separately on the geographic pattern that emerged in 2015.

The first key finding is that there has been a notable increase in international mobility both into but particularly within Europe. For the latter trend, the key date was the first main ‘Eastern’ enlargement of 2004. Baláž and Karasová (2017) measure this by comparing the average annual stock of intra-European migrants during 1997–2004 (9.1 million) to that of 2005–2013 (13.7 million), a growth of 52 per cent in unrounded figures.

Second, a large majority of countries which were already established as net immigration receivers have continued as such. Again according to Baláž and Karasová (2017: 7), a ‘rich club’ of six main migration destinations (UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Spain) received 75.4 per cent of all intra-European migrants during the two periods specified above, whilst 15 destinations (the above six plus Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) attracted 95.9 per cent in the pre-2004 period and 95.8 per cent in the post-2004 period. This stability in the pattern of destinations occurred
despite the overall increase in total migrant stocks noted above, the rising unemployment and the fact that some of them were going through economic difficulties as a result of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and after. The worst affected by the crisis were Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, whose migration balances – positive before the crisis – turned negative after, although a positive balance was restored in Spain in 2015 and Ireland in 2016. In addition, a group of ‘Eastern’ countries where post-2004 emigration was not as pronounced – Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia – has gained a positive migratory balance and joined the group of European net immigration countries. Finally, in most of the countries not yet mentioned above – viz. the ‘Eastern’ countries of Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania – emigration has been continuously dominant since 2004, albeit at fluctuating rates over time and between these different source countries. These trends are either directly evident from the OECD and Eurostat sources already cited, or are deducible from other sources.

If we now turn back to Baláž and Karasová’s (2017) illuminating analysis, which is restricted to intra-European migration based on 31 countries (the EEA countries, minus Lichtenstein and plus Switzerland), three other interesting trends are uncovered beyond the overall 52 per cent increase in migrant stocks over the pre- to post-enlargement periods. First, their network diagrams of the origins and destinations of migrant stocks show the important rise of the UK, Spain and, less markedly, Italy as key destinations post-2004, whilst Germany maintains its position as the largest stock-holder of migrants across the two periods in question. Significant increases in stocks were also recorded by France, Switzerland and Belgium, though at much lower absolute levels. Second, the proportionate increase in migrant stocks is disaggregated by the four possible flows between the European ‘centre’ and its ‘periphery’. The largest increase was for periphery-to-centre flows – 109 per cent – or from 3.12 to 6.52 million. The lowest increase – 19 per cent – was for centre-centre flows, from 5.57 to 6.64 million. The two other flows, much smaller in absolute scale, were from centre to periphery (0.13 to 0.22 million, an increase of 68 per cent) and from periphery to periphery (0.24 to 0.35 million; 44 per cent). Third, Baláž and Karasová draw out some specifics of the changing geography of flows between clusters of origins and key destinations, based (but not always) on factors such as geographic proximity and language similarity. They confirm four major ‘modules’ based on nodes and supplies: (i) the Germany-centred module, supplied by Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece and Poland, (ii) the UK-based module, which combines the traditional contribution from Ireland with new inflows from Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic republics, (iii) a Southern EU module, with Italy and Spain fed by major contributions from Romania and Bulgaria, and (iv) a weaker and more diffuse French-Belgian-Dutch module.

Our own analysis confirms and complements this by combining EEA migration with third-country origins and making a comparison between these two source areas for migrants in Europe. This leads us to three major conclusions. Firstly, in the majority of countries, nationals of the EEA dominated, often comprehensively so. Referring to the period 2005–2014, in Iceland, Slovakia and Switzerland, nine of the top ten foreign-migrant nationalities were from the EEA; in Luxembourg, eight; in Austria, Belgium and Denmark, seven; and in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, six. In Iceland, Luxembourg and Switzerland, EEA nationals accounted for between two-thirds and three-quarters of all incoming migrants. At the other extreme there is Greece, where no EEA country figures in the top ten incoming migrant nationalities, whilst Italy and Poland have just one and Finland, two.

Secondly, in the majority of countries, there was a considerable diversity of immigrant countries of origin. Greece remains, once again, the extreme exceptional case: most of the immigrants to this country are from neighbouring Albania. Slovenia, Romania and Hungary are also at the monoethnic end of the spectrum, though these are countries with only small inflows from abroad. Their majority inflows are, for Slovenia, 39 per cent from Bosnia and Herzegovina; for Romania, 37 per cent from Moldova; and for Hungary, 35 per cent from Romania. Otherwise, in no country did the share of the largest country of origin exceed 30 per cent – in
12 of them it was less than 20 per cent. In the main countries of net immigration (except Switzerland), the share of the five leading countries of origin did not exceed 50 per cent; in most cases it oscillated within the range 30–45 per cent, reinforcing the principle of diversity or, as Steven Vertovec would have it, ‘super-diversity’ in migrant origins and characteristics (2007).8

Thirdly, an undeniably important role in the geography of inflows over the post-enlargement years 2005–2013 has been still played by migrants coming from outside the EEA and Switzerland. For the 26 countries of destination for which comparable data were available for the period in question, and amongst the list of top ten origin countries, there were 30 non-European countries, including just two highly developed ones (the US – in the top ten in five destinations countries – and Australia, in just one destination – the UK). Amongst the origin countries that appeared the most often in the 26 top ten lists were China (in 11 countries), India and Syria (8), the US and Iraq (5) and Afghanistan and Morocco (4). As many as 18 of these 30 sending countries featured in the top ten of origin in at least one of the 26 receiving countries.

In synthesis, in the geographical domain under consideration, we distinguish four main migration channels:

(i) intra-EU, from East to West, or more precisely from the ‘new’ EU countries (EU 10+2+1) to the ‘old’ EU countries (EU15) plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland;
(ii) intra-EU but limited to migration between adjacent countries (e.g. Ireland-the UK, Germany-Switzerland, Austria-Germany, etc.);
(iii) migration from non-EU European countries; this covers two subtypes: migration to ‘old’ EU countries (e.g. Albanians to Italy and Greece) and migration to ‘new’ EU countries (e.g. Ukrainians to Poland and Slovakia); and
(iv) migration from outside Europe.

A typical attribute of this four-fold geography of migration is that, in any given destination country, only one of these types is usually dominant; it is rare for two or three to occur on a similar scale.

The two intra-EU channels became the basic element in the newest mosaic of European migration. For Germany, the country with the largest labour market, Penninx (2016) points out that, over the period 2004–2011, the share of migrants arriving from EU member-countries increased from half to almost two-thirds. Meanwhile, Riso et al. (2014) showed that, during the period of the economic crisis (2008–2010), the employment of domestic-origin labour in the EU27 fell by 5.8 million (2.5 per cent) and of citizens of third countries by 272 000 (3 per cent) whereas the employment of citizens of other EU countries grew by 828 000 (14 per cent). Scrutinising these opposing tendencies, Riso et al. (2014: 18) concluded that ‘in an enlarged EU, and largely as a result of strong east-west flows, intra-EU mobility has replaced mobility from non-EU countries as the main source of migrant workers in the EU’.

During 2005–2014, the number of migrants from the ‘new’, post-2004 EU member-states who were resident in the 15 ‘old’ member-states at least doubled, although this increase was much higher in some countries – notably the UK – where it increased thirteen-fold, Denmark (nine-fold), Belgium and the Netherlands (six-fold), Luxembourg (five-fold), Italy (four-fold) and Germany (three-fold). The greater ‘responsibility’ for this growth came from two ‘new’ EU countries, Romania and Poland, respectively with 2.5 million and 1.8 million of their citizens established in other EU countries – the Romanians mainly in Italy and Spain, the Poles mainly in the UK and Germany. A different dataset from the EU Labour Force Survey shows that, for the period 1998–2009, the most significant outflows, measured in relation to the population of the country of origin, were from Romania (8.9 per cent), Lithuania (4.8 per cent), the Czech Republic (4.7 per cent) and Bulgaria (3.7 per cent); see Fihel, Janicka, Kaczmarczyk and Nestorowicz (2015).
As we indicated earlier, intra-EU mobility has a dual character: alongside the flow of migrants from the ‘new’ to the ‘old’ EU states, meaning East to West, it also involves movements into and between neighbouring states, often of higher-skilled migrants. Typical ‘neighbourhood effects’ are clearly evident in the following receiving countries (those in parentheses are the ‘suppliers’ within the top five origins for each destination): Luxembourg (Belgium, France, Germany), Switzerland (France, Germany, Italy), Austria (Germany, Hungary), Belgium (France, the Netherlands), Czechia (Germany, Slovakia), Denmark (Germany, Sweden), Finland (Estonia, Sweden), France (Italy, Spain), Slovakia (Czechia, Hungary), Estonia (Latvia), Germany (Poland), Latvia (Lithuania), Lithuania (Latvia), the Netherlands (Germany), Norway (Sweden), Poland (Germany) and Sweden (Finland).

Migration from outside the continent of Europe originates from a diversity of countries across the globe, especially from Africa north and south of the Sahara, South and East Asia and Latin America. If we once again refer to the criteria of the five largest migrant supply countries, we uncover a pattern which is rather ‘specialised’ along specific origin-destination channels. The Chinese, who are the most numerous nationality among migrants from third countries, have the most diversified ‘geographic portfolio’, being in the top five immigrant groups in several receiving countries – Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. Moroccans are likewise quite widely spread – amongst the top five in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain. The remaining non-European groups were in the top five in one or two destination countries: citizens of Iraq in Finland and Sweden, Somalia in Norway and Sweden, and Vietnam in Czechia and Poland with, finally, Algeria and Morocco in France, Australia and India in the UK, Brazil and Cape Verde in Portugal and Colombia in Spain.

For the final remaining group – non-EU Europeans, less numerous overall – the two key origins are Ukraine and Albania. Regarding the receiving countries in the ‘old’ EU, Ukrainians are within the top ten immigrant groups in Italy and Spain; Albanians in Germany, Greece (in Greece they are by far the most numerous group of immigrants) and Italy. Additionally, in Austria, Serbians are within the top ten and, in Finland, Russians are. It is worth recalling that there is also a ‘neighbour’ effect across the newly repositioned EU/’East’ divide. Thus Ukrainians are the most numerous immigrant group in Poland; they are second in Czechia, Estonia and Latvia, and third in Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia. A similar role is played by migrants from Belarus (in Poland and Lithuania), Russia (in Czechia, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland), Moldova (in Romania) and Serbia (in Hungary and Slovenia). Slovenia is something of a special case as, here, three of the four largest immigrant groups come from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, headed by Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the final part of this overview of the main patterns of migration in today’s Europe, we take a brief look at the unexpected changes in 2015 and after which introduced new elements into the geographic composition of the inflows into seven ‘important’ EEA countries. Indeed, vehement intensification of the inflow of asylum-seekers into the Schengen Area resulted in an almost immediate rise of new residents from among those new arrivals in seven EEA countries. Statistics of immigration flows that were recorded in 2015 in 28 European countries under consideration reveal a fundamental change of their geography in seven countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden – which is evidenced in Table 2. The table juxtaposes the top five countries of origin in 2015 and preceding periods (1990–2004 and 2005–2014). In these seven countries, Syrians have become the major immigrant nationality. In four countries a significant role has been assumed by people from Eritrea and, in two, by people from Afghanistan. None of those nationalities played an important role in the inflows to the seven countries in 1990–2004 and (with exception of Syrians in Sweden) 2005–2014. In turn, amongst the top five countries of origin, a spectacular decline of importance occurred in the case of Turks (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands), Moroccans (Belgium, the Netherlands) and (rather surprisingly) citizens of Iraq (Norway and Sweden). Tentative estimates for 2016 and 2017 tend to confirm a new pattern that emerged in these seven countries in 2015.
Table 2. Top five sending countries in selected European Economic Area countries; 2015 compared with 1990–2004 and 2005–2014

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Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook, various years.

Contrasting with those changes was the stability of the geographic pattern of inflows in a majority of remaining countries, particularly the largest (besides Germany) European immigrant receivers: France, Italy, Spain and the UK. France traditionally adhered to flows from Mediterranean countries (with the unchallenged
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lead of Algeria and Morocco), in Italy and Spain, Romanians followed by Moroccans retained their primacy (with a minor reshuffling of other important countries of origin) while, in the UK, amid rather ‘cosmetic’ changes, Romanians spectacularly moved from seventh position to the very top. All countries, including those receiving relatively fewer immigrants – such as Czechia, Iceland, Portugal, Slovenia and, above all, Switzerland – turned out to be somewhat immune to the unprecedented increase in the inflow of asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, Eritrea and Syria, at least in view of their migration statistics.

What next?

As we have attempted to demonstrate, the geographical directions and size of migration flows observed in Europe over recent decades and today are the result, to a large degree, of political conditions. These conditions change, both in an evolutionary way and, sometimes, quite suddenly. One of the most notable trends over recent years has been the increase, in both relative and absolute terms, of intra-EU mobility resulting from the eastward expansion of the EU. This has brought out into the ‘open market’ geographic contrasts in economic wellbeing between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ of the EU which can now act as incentives to migrate under the free movement provisions of the EU. However, this can be brusquely interrupted, as shown by the UK’s 2016 referendum result and the ensuing decision to leave the EU, which is already affecting the direction and scale of movements to and from the UK, including with the UK’s main ‘new’ EU migration supplier – Poland (Lulle, Moroşanu and King 2018; McGhee, Moreh and Vlachantoni 2017).

In fact, the weakening or even reversal of existing patterns and directions of intra-European migration may be supported by other circumstances, the long-term significance of which should not be underestimated. One of these is the narrowing of the gap in living standards between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ EU. For instance, during the period 2000–2014, GDP at constant prices$^{12}$ grew in the EU28 by 21 per cent yet, in Poland, the growth was 67 per cent, with a similar increase in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In fact the difference between GDP growth rates per capita was even greater because, whilst the overall EU population was growing, that of Poland declined. The gap also shrank in subjective perceptions of life challenges. Over the period 2005–2012, the percentage of households making ends meet ‘with (great) difficulty’ grew in the EU as a whole from 25.4 per cent to 27.7 per cent whilst, in Poland, the share fell from 51.2 to 34.2 per cent (CSO 2014). There are strong reasons to believe that the economic distance between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ of the EU will continue to narrow, thereby disincentivising migration; indeed, taking into account the improving quality of life and still-low cost of living in the ‘East’, East-West moves might even be reversed. The precedent is the much earlier ‘Southern’ enlargement of the EU in the 1980s, which helped to advance the economic indicators in Spain, Portugal, Greece (and Italy), bringing then much closer to ‘European’ levels from their prior ‘backward’ state (King and Konjhodzic 1996).

The second circumstance arises from ongoing and future demographic trends, which are much more predictable than economic scenarios and political events. According to Eurostat projections, over the fifty-year period 2010–2060, there will be a decline in potential labour supply (persons aged 15–64) of 15 per cent across the EU. This decline will be more marked in the ‘new’ member-states than it will in the ‘old’ ones where, in many cases, the internal labour reserve will increase. To take some specific examples, a predicted labour force growth of 10 per cent in the UK and 8 per cent in Sweden contrasts with decreases of around 40 per cent in Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria – in the latter cases due to the combination of young-adult emigration and falling (and sub-replacement) birth rates (Giannakouris 2008). Whilst evening out these growth imbalances is potentially one benefit that can be reaped from migration, this can also be viewed as a kind of ‘demographic engineering’ in order to rejuvenate a population, which may have only short- to medium-term effects and have problematic ethical implications (King and Lulle 2016: 19–20).
The part of the world destined to experience further long-term population growth – in contrast to other continents where population growth is decelerating – is Africa. Although there has been a long postwar history of emigration from the Maghreb to Europe, emigration from sub-Saharan Africa is still at an embryonic stage. Meanwhile, according to UN projections, Africa’s population will more than double – an increase of almost 1.3 billion people – over the fifty years 2015–2065; at the same time, Europe’s will decline by 50 million or 6 per cent (UN 2015). It is difficult to imagine that the ‘logic’ of migration pressure between these two adjacent continents, separated only by the Mediterranean ‘Rio Grande’, will not lead to increased flows – either managed or spontaneous and irregular (Montanari and Cortese 1993).

Other migration pressures bearing on Europe arise from the waves of irregular migration that follow political conflicts such as civil wars and ethnic cleansing in different parts of Africa, the Middle East and Asia. When such civil or international conflicts erupt, the boundaries between those who can be defined as genuine refugees and those who, in reality, are plain economic migrants fleeing poverty or who simply want to ‘be’ in Europe, become blurred. For example when, in 2015, the massive flows of Syrian refugees pouring out of their strife-torn Syrian cities and those living in camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon were set in motion, they were instantly joined by tens of thousands of ‘pseudo-refugees’ from other countries, seizing the opportunity to make it to Europe – which otherwise would be closed to them. According to Eurostat data, of the 1.26 million asylum requests made in European countries in that year, only 28 per cent were filed by Syrian citizens; 39 per cent came from migrants from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Albania and Kosovo, whilst the remaining 33 per cent were from people from dozens of other countries (Eurostat 2016).

Of course it is also true that the Syrian refugee crisis was exacerbated by the EU’s inability to orchestrate coordinated action in the face of the large numbers arriving across the narrow stretch of sea separating the Western Turkish coast and nearby Greek islands, and thence via the ‘Western Balkan route’ into Central and Northern Europe. It also revealed the political and humanitarian divisions between ‘welcoming’ Germany and Sweden and the defensive and even racist reactions of some of the Central and Eastern EU countries, led by Hungary. Indeed, it seems that attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism constitute a new cleavage separating some of the Western EU countries, with longer histories of immigration, and the new member-states, which are much less open to large-scale immigration or accommodating refugees (Lulè 2016).

Migration pressures from third-country citizens, especially from Africa, will probably also strengthen because of the ‘demonstration effect’ or the line of thinking which asks ‘If they could do it, why can’t we?’ This effect is amplified by the forces of globalisation, especially in the realms of culture and communication: the uniformisation of symbolic codes and mass cultures, the development of information technologies and increasing access to efficient means of transport.

Conclusion

The ‘map’ of recent, current and future migration in Europe sketched out in this article does not present a very stable picture. In truth, it is a combination of some stable patterns inherited from the past, overlain with new, diverse processes, some of which are likely to be ephemeral and others more long-lasting. On the one hand, as we have seen with the Syrian refugee crisis and with the ongoing desperate migration flows across the Mediterranean from North Africa, Europe – especially Southern Europe – continues to be the ‘soft underbelly’ for global movements of asylum-seekers and for many other population movements driven by strong feelings of deprivation among the residents of poorer parts of the world. The failure of migration policy to strike a balance between humanitarian morality, labour market and demographic needs and a sensible and effective management of inflows, bears some responsibility for this.
On the other hand, changes are afoot within Europe – and especially the EU – which will also probably reshape future migration trends. Here the ongoing economic improvement of the post-2004 member-states will be key: not only the objective economic indicators such as real incomes and employment trends but also issues of quality of life and the perceptions and aspirations of the younger generations who will wish to be mobile but not necessarily to migrate. It thus remains to be seen how long the ‘East’ of Europe will sustain its function as a labour reserve for the ‘West’ of Europe, especially bearing in mind the future demographic scenario of a shrinking population. Brexit remains another unknown element in the future map of European migration. Although controlling immigration from Europe was a major rhetorical plank in the ‘Leave’ campaign, the success of the British economy will continue to depend on supplies of flexible migrant labour across a whole range of sectors, from agriculture to tourism to health services.

The indicators, then, are that the inequalities and future trends in population and labour force potential and demographic dynamics will ratchet up the migration pressure on Europe from the populations of the global South – both those who are desperate to escape poverty and those who have more middle-class aspirations for mobility. It remains an open question whether Europe will be able to resist and manage these pressures in a more efficacious manner than hitherto.

Notes

1 To be more precise, more than 20 million people were citizens of ‘third’ (i.e. non-EU) countries, 50 million had citizenship in an EU country but had been born abroad, 25 million – though born in an EU member-country – had parents or grandparents born in another country and, finally, an additional 55 million had earlier experienced long-term stays abroad for work or studies (Eurostat 2011: 78).
2 This north/south division of Western Europe is not absolute. Ireland (with its large-scale emigration to Britain) and Finland (migration to Sweden) interrupt this division, leading some to suggest more of a core/periphery (see Seers, Schaffer and Kiljunen 1979).
3 Such ‘residency’ usually involves legally living in the territory of the EU for at least five years.
4 The SOPEMI ‘continuous reporting system on European emigration and immigration’ is a long-running organ for collecting and synthesising annual migration data – both flows and stocks – and is widely used by migration researchers who value its systematic recording of trends over time and its critical approach to the data sources used.
5 The EEA comprises all 28 EU countries plus Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. However, in our analysis no comparable data were available for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Lichtenstein and Malta. Data for Greece refer to 2003–2011 (OECD 2015).
6 For this analysis, Baláž and Karasová define ‘centre’ as made up of the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The remaining 16 countries in their dataset are classed as ‘periphery’.
7 Inflows from Albania to Greece are not well recorded, since a lot of the migration has been clandestine and also seasonal or temporary. However, various Greek and Albanian sources indicate a stock of around 500 000 Albanians in Greece although, in recent years, the severe Greek recession has probably reduced this number as a result of return and onward migration (see Barjaba and Barjaba 2015; King and Vullnetari 2012).
8 Beyond Switzerland as a main immigration country, the same holds for other net-immigration countries (Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland and Luxembourg) although these are not major players in the new map of immigration in Europe.
In addition, in 2015, immigrants from Syria appeared in the top ten countries of origin in Finland and Luxembourg (taking, in both countries, the eighth position).

In another country of destination listed in Table 2 (the Netherlands), Eritreans figured as No. 7.

Moreover, in Belgium and Sweden they took position No. 6.

Standardised by ‘purchasing power parity’ (PPP); data from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/main-tables).

This contrast was partly created by the decision of the German government to open its borders to offer shelter to incoming Syrian refugees a priori – i.e. before determining their eligibility.

Conflict of interest statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Social Remittances and Social Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Embedding Migration in the Study of Society

Anne White*, Izabela Grabowska**

Our article considers social remittances and social change in Central and Eastern Europe. We show how migration scholarship can be embedded into the wider study of social processes and relations. ‘Social remitting’ sometimes seems to be little more than a slippery catchphrase; however, this article defends the concept. If it is defined carefully and used cautiously, it should help the researcher to think about what, in addition to money, is sent from one society to another and exactly how, thus shedding light on important and insufficiently studied aspects of migration. A close-up view of the processes by which ideas, practices, norms, values and, according to some definitions, social capital and social skills are transferred by migrants across international borders helps researchers to understand more precisely how migration contributes to social change or, in some cases, prevents it from occurring. Our article reviews some of the most interesting arguments and findings presented recently by other scholars and discusses aspects of social remitting which particularly interested us in our own research. The context of our research is social change in Poland: we attempt to understand how migration has contributed to wider patterns of social change since 1989 and exactly how it intertwines with other social trends and globalisation influences. This entails a careful focus on both structural conditions and agency and therefore on social remittances.

Keywords: social remittances; Poland; CEE; migration impact; social change

Introduction

The aim of this article is to review the recent scholarship about social remittances – both the development of the concept and its operationalisation through empirical studies. In keeping with the theme of the special issue, we focus particularly on the ways in which the concept of social remittances is useful for studying wider
patterns of social change in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The article clarifies and justifies the use of the term, which we believe to be an essential analytical tool for understanding the impact of migration in any sending country, in the context of wider social trends. In recent years, research into CEE in particular has shed light on the different dimensions of social remitting, building on the foundation laid by Peggy Levitt (1998). The article draws on our empirical research and conceptual work but is also a literature review of the strands of social remittance research which we consider particularly relevant for CEE. We hope that the article will be equally interesting to migration scholars researching the impact of migration on particular countries, and to readers encountering the concept of social remittances for the first time.

Social remittances are understood variously by different authors but a working definition could include the ideas, practices, attitudes, values, norms, beliefs and identities which migrants bring from one society to another, as well as the non-economic capital of various kinds – knowledge, qualifications, social skills and useful contacts – which they acquire thanks to migration. Some scholars use the term more broadly, to encompass the indirect social effects of migration. For example, Boccagni and Decimo (2013: 1) write about the ‘myriad ways in which migrants affect their home societies’. However, it seems preferable to keep indirect impacts analytically separate from social remittances. We adhere to Levitt’s original idea, when launching the concept (Levitt 1998, 2001), that social remittances describe person-to-person transfers. Sometimes these can be deliberate but they can also be unintentional. They can be transferred not only between migrants and non-migrants but also between non-migrants.

Social remitting is more complex than its close cousin, economic remitting. Social remittances are not things taken out of a suitcase. The term is a metaphor, a reminder that economic remittances are not the whole story: migration has more than economic effects. However, the economic remitting parallel should not deceive one into supposing that only economic migrants can be social remitters. All kinds of migration and mobility, including short-term mobility such as internships and social or business visits abroad, can produce social remittances. Finally, social remitting is not simply an outcome – to be measured by quantitative research, as some scholars try to do – but also a process, with separate stages (Grabowska and Garapich 2016; Grabowska, Garapich, Jazwińska and Radziwinowiczówna 2017).

In keeping with the anniversary theme of this special issue, our article draws on research within the geographical context of the post-communist area. We focus mostly on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), referring also to Kazakhstan. The period of system transformation and its aftermath is an intriguing laboratory for studying social remittances and social change. Migration cannot be separated from general social relations and social processes. As de Haas (2014: 16), following Castles (2010), suggests:

*We can only improve our understanding of migration if we understand the broader change processes of which it is a constituent part. Migration studies, then, become an angle through which to improve our understanding of social, cultural and economic change. In other words: to understand society is to understand migration, and to understand migration is to better understand society. Such embedded understanding of migration also creates conceptual space to study causes and consequences of migration simultaneously, instead of conceptually separating them.*

By identifying the important social trends since 1989, one can begin to appreciate the overall context to which migrants contribute their micro-level changes (White, Grabowska, Kaczmarczyk and Slany 2018). However, trends and patterns are not always clear. On the one hand, the prevalent narrative of an East–West ‘catch-up revolution’ and the actual experience of the EU accession process created a backdrop to cultural change with the implication that societies in CEE were moving ‘West’. On the other, the phenomenon of catch-up is cast in doubt by the many endogenous sources of change in the region, while the assumption of unilinear progress
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is challenged by recent setbacks to democratisation in CEE, combined with weaknesses of democracy in the West. It is not surprising to find that survey evidence in CEE often presents a confusing picture. For example, in Poland, levels of generalised trust (trust in strangers) seem to be improving slightly, according to some measures, in the 21st century. This is what one would expect, given that the country has become more prosperous. According to other measures, however, levels of generalised trust remain stuck at a rather low level, which is typical for post-communist societies (Cybulska and Pankowski 2018).

One trend is incontrovertible: since the Iron Curtain was dismantled, new opportunities to travel and live abroad have transformed the lives and livelihoods of millions of people from CEE. Exactly how this happened and how these individual transformations have intertwined with the wider (but not unidirectional) system transformation is the subject of our article. Rather than adopting a catch-up approach, we see CEE and Western Europe as co-existing within multiple overlapping transnational and translocal social spaces. To some extent this is also already a single cultural space; however, there is also sufficient cultural diversity for migrants to want to transmit new ideas and practices from one location to another, in all directions of the compass.

The key research questions of this article are:

- How is the concept of social remittances important for understanding the way in which migration is embedded in society?
- How should we understand the intertwining of social remittances with economic and political ones to obtain a more holistic view of social changes in Central and Eastern European societies?
- How can social remittances reinforce existing social trends? Considering that, since the end of the Cold War, as just mentioned, millions of citizens in CEE have also experienced the period of system transformation as one of new, direct exposure to life in foreign countries, the co-existence and intersection of these two intense and often dramatic processes create a fascinating laboratory for studying how social change can happen in a transnational context in the contemporary world.

The article is structured as follows. We first discuss the concept of social remittances and the literature on social remittances in CEE. The remainder of the article presents some of our own research into aspects of Polish social remitting, based primarily on four projects, as outlined in the methodology section. Our topics are the stages and domains of social remitting, the features of successful remitters and resistance to social remitting (Grabowska); scaling up and how remittances circulate and reinforce other causes of social change (White). Our projects were based mostly on in-depth interviews with migrants, return migrants and stayers and on ethnographic observation.

The concept of social remittances

Receiving-society researchers tend to focus exclusively on the acquisition stage, when migrants pick up new ideas and practices abroad. Although such cases might equally well be regarded as examples of ‘acculturation’ or ‘integration’, this does not make the social remittances concept redundant, since acculturation and integration are concepts which call attention to the receiving society, whereas social remitting is a concept designed mostly to understand sending societies. Karolak (2016) suggests that acquired ideas are only ‘potential social remittances’ until they are transferred to the sending country. However, when a migrant acquires new ideas and practices abroad, this can already be considered a change for the sending society. Many mobile people today – including many Poles in Western Europe – should still be considered members of their societies of origin, since they are abroad only briefly and/or maintain close ties and identification with places and people in Poland. When they acquire new ideas, practices, values, norms and beliefs, this in itself represents a facet of Polish social change (White et al. 2018).
Nonetheless, social remittances can only be thoroughly understood if an attempt is also made to trace how they are transferred by migrants to non-migrants. This often involves some negotiation and re-interpretation of the original idea or practice. Nagy (2009: 10), writing about Romania, suggests that migrants ‘help impose foreign models but often with a double translation, linked to diverse local reinterpretations’. A final, mostly untouched, question is how social remittances travel even further into the sending society, passing from non-migrant to non-migrant: how they ‘scale up’, to use Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011: 19) terminology. If they are just local events, ‘migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion’, as defined in the title of Levitt’s (1998) article, they might appear rather trivial. Hence it seems helpful to consider whether they might also have some, presumably cumulative, regional or national effect. This could happen, for example, in the case of social or religious movements – influenced by foreign ideas – which manage to gather new followers in a sending society. We argue, however, that many social remittances are likely to be influential on a wider scale only when they coexist with and reinforce on-going social processes and that it is not their unique impact but rather their relationship with those endogenous processes which requires attention (White et al. 2018).

Levitt (1998, 2001) and Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011) presented a wide-ranging discussion of social remitting between Boca Canasta in the Dominican Republic and Boston, USA. Other scholars latched onto Levitt’s term, which described a familiar phenomenon, observable wherever migrants kept in touch with their countries of origin. Nonetheless, for all the detail and thoroughness of Levitt’s analysis, social remitting as a process continued to intrigue. So did the question of how far the specific Dominican–US pairing was typical of other sending and receiving societies – not least because the one country is poorer and less powerful than the other. Although Levitt has always stressed that she was not arguing for US superiority, the potential for a normative, neo-colonialist reading of social remittances rendered the concept open to criticism (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014: 79).

The issue of typicality is related to a broader question about interplay between agency and structure. Social remitting is an attractive term to researchers partly because ‘remitting’ highlights that migrants have agency. However, the contexts in which remitting occurs are also crucial to their success. Scholars’ discomfort with the possible ‘West is best’ implications of the term points to a broader dimension of power relationships between remitters and recipients. These power relationships are specific to each pair of individuals’ personality traits, experiences and networks but are also shaped by their geographical and social environment – for example, if the remitter lives abroad in a rich Western country and the recipient in a poorer Southern one. The power relations connected with social remitting are captured in Anthias’s (2012) concept of ‘translocal positionality’. Anthias considers social outcomes produced at the intersection of sending and receiving structures and positions and recognises the importance of the context and the situated nature of shifting locales (Anthias 2012: 107–108). She further argues (2012: 104) that people who are embedded within two social milieux often have to deal with conflicting expectations and forms of social control, hence their ‘translocal positionality’.

Social remittances research in CEE, with reference to political and economic remittances

The past few years have seen a spate of studies on social remittances, as well as several international conferences. Of particular significance was a conference under the auspices of the CMR in January 2015 which resulted in a special issue of the Central and Eastern European Migration Review (vol. 5, no. 2). Recent books and special issues focusing wholly or partly on CEE include Anghel, Fauser and Boccagni (in press); Boccagni and Decimo (2013); Grabowska and Garapich (2016); Grabowska et al. (2017) and Nowicka and Šerbedžija (2016). Not all social remittances research can be identified in library catalogues using the phrase as a key word, since some researchers use other terms such as ‘transfer’ and ‘cultural brokerage’ (Nagy 2009) or ‘hybridisation’ (Blum 2015).
The post-communist area shares certain legacies and geographical and political characteristics which bear on social remitting. One obvious feature is the fact that EU membership plus the abolition of visa requirements for countries neighbouring the EU have led to variegated and dynamic patterns of international migration. Here, we focus mostly on two other features. The first is the habit of migration as an individual/family project, which makes social remitting an individual endeavour. The second is how receptivity to social remitting connects with the level of development characterising high- and upper-middle-income countries in the CEE region, as well as their cultural similarities and shared history with Western Europe. These make sending societies both more and less receptive to social remittances.

Policy-makers often assert that diasporas should contribute to development for their societies of origin. The assumption that they will want to do so may be correct where migrants move en masse between specific locations like Boca Canasta and Boston, and there is social pressure to contribute to sending communities through hometown associations. However, post-accession migrants from a single location in CEE are often scattered around Western Europe and do not form hometown associations. Insofar as they self-organise, it is usually to defend their interests in the receiving society (White and Grabowska 2018: 45). Migration is an individual or family project, not one undertaken for the sake of the origin community. Its individualistic nature is linked to the fact that migration has often been a livelihood strategy chosen because of defects in the post-communist system transformation at local level. The state is blamed for the weaknesses of local labour markets, while individuals laud their own resourcefulness in getting by, outside official structures, through employing a range of informal practices and relations (Ledeneva 2018; Rakowski 2016). These include informal migration networks (White 2016). Researchers therefore need to focus on individuals’ experiences of adopting new ideas, practices, etc. and on trying to spread these further among their family members, friends and neighbours – in other words, individual social remitting.

Numerous lifestyle and cultural similarities exist between countries in CEE and those in Western Europe. Health and education outcomes are comparable and, according to UN Human Development Indicators, the whole area is ‘highly developed’. Hence CEE does not fit neatly into the migration–development nexus often used to explain migration’s social impact. Close similarity between sending and receiving societies facilitates the easy transfer of ideas, so that – particularly in the bigger cities of CEE with a large share of highly educated and prosperous residents – there is a constant flow of influences in both directions. New fashions and habits can be picked up abroad and transferred to CEE without friction. In the CEEMR special issue on social remittances (vol. 5, no. 2), Levitt (2016: 17) refers to ‘the cultural and discursive backdrop that makes those exchanges possible by making people more open to these new ideas and behaviours’.

On the other hand, CEE, particularly outside major cities, sometimes seems to lack that backdrop. It offers an intriguing study of power relationships in a not quite ‘post-colonial’ setting. These relationships rest on an economic hierarchy. North-West EU member-states, through European funds, subsidise most regions in CEE, as well as constituting the main destination countries for EU migrants. Also relevant are historically rooted superiority and inferiority complexes and assumptions about cultural difference between ‘East’ and ‘West’. Such complicated feelings – to some extent reinforced by growing Euroscepticism – can impede receptivity to social remitting in contemporary CEE. Nevinskaité (2016) introduces the concept of country receptivity. As Garapich (2016) shows, receptivity at the local level is also key to successful remitting.

Haynes and Galasińska (2016: 55) point out that, on Polish Internet fora, ‘non-migrants tend to agree with migrants when comparing cultural differences between two countries and that, more often than not, they are united in mutual complaints about their home country’ (Galasińska 2010). However, other authors – such as Dzięgielewski (2016), Garapich (2016) and Nevinskaitė (2016) – highlight instances of low receptivity, and resistance to social remittances. Nevinskaitė (2016: 135), for example, mentions ‘a perceived negative opinion (unwelcoming attitude) in society towards Lithuanians from abroad’. Garapich’s (2016) article is titled I Don’t
Want this Town to Change. Dzięgielewski (2016: 178) highlights the lack of trust within Polish society, resulting in ‘reserved and distant attitudes towards new ideas, know-how, behaviours and any social innovation of which migrants might be the propagators’. Kubal (2015) similarly records how Ukrainians hesitate to try to enact foreign practices after they return, for fear that they will not be sympathetically received.

Like Kubal (2015), Blum (2015) identifies varying degrees of acceptability for different practices, in this case imported from the USA to Kazakhstan. Blum’s interviewees found it easier to convince non-migrants to emulate a perceived American work ethic than to enthuse them about volunteering. Ideas about gender equality seemed to travel surprisingly well: female non-migrants, at least, were receptive to persuasion by female returnees (2015: 159). Blum (2015) argues that migrants’ likelihood of picking up social remittances depends largely on their individual capacity for reflexivity — and also that, overall, women acquired social remittances more easily than men. This last finding is echoed in a number of studies of Polish migrants (Grabowska-Lusińska and Jaźwińska-Motylska 2013; Mole, Parutis, Gerry and Burns 2017; Siara 2009).

Adopting a slightly different approach to receptivity among the various social groups in post-communist Poland, our own recent book (White et al. 2018) considers links between social remitting and other demographic and socio-economic characteristics, arguing that social remittances can be particularly influential where one might assume the population to be the least receptive to new ideas — among working-class, older and small-town Poles less exposed to other globalisation influences, such as through higher education, tourism or big-city life.

Some of the most useful scholarship for understanding CEE focuses on how different sub-types of remittance — economic, social and political — intertwine. Since we are interested in explaining Poland ‘in the round’, this type of approach seems particularly helpful. Here, we very briefly review some studies of the sociology of economic remitting, remittances of democratic values and the ‘transnational action space’.

In a recent article showing how economic remitters in Senegal influence the voting patterns of remittance receivers, Vari-Lavoisier (2016) claims that the literature on social aspects of economic remitting is still underdeveloped. While this may be true of quantitative sociology, there do also exist social anthropological studies of economic remitting, including on CEE. Qualitative researchers seek to understand the symbolic functions of money transfers and the cultural capital of remitters. For example, as Vianello (2013: 92) points out, in Ukraine but also globally, migrant women represent ‘the act of remitting money… as a symbol of love and faithfulness towards their families left behind’. This fulfils an emotional need but also has a social function in justifying non-standard behaviour, when women leave their children and become the household’s main breadwinner.

The literature on households and remittances cannot avoid the topic of family politics. More conventionally ‘political’ are studies of circumstances under which social remitting contributes to democratisation or its reverse. For example, Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2010: 476) argue for ‘the high importance of migration in Bulgaria and Romania, which seems to facilitate social learning and contributes to greater domestic pressures for better democratic governance’. Although the EU loses leverage after candidate countries join, it can indirectly influence post-accession politics in a more liberal direction, thanks to EU-engendered mobility. Ahmadov and Sasse (2015), drawing on the wider literature as well as on their empirical studies of Ukraine and Poland, suggest that the picture is more complex.

Migrants’ political outlooks can differ from those of their non-migrant compatriots in some respects, while closely resembling them in others. A nuanced understanding of migrant political outlooks and behaviour and their congruence with those of their non-migrant compatriots calls for careful micro-level empirical studies of specific identities’ (2015: 1770).
The political remittances literature, as this quotation hints, is short on qualitative studies. There are, however, qualitative studies of how social movements spread across international borders. Erdmans (1998) had already written about this phenomenon with regard to links between Solidarity in 1980s Poland and Chicago. Today, opportunities for mobility between CEE and foreign countries, as well as the Internet, facilitate transnational action. Binnie and Klesse (2013), for example, in their article Like a Bomb in a Gasoline Station, describe Polish LGBT activism in and between Poland and abroad. While criticising the over-optimistic activist who used this metaphor to describe the impact of migrants returning to Poland with more LGBT-friendly outlooks, they do document extensive cross-border collaboration in what they label the ‘transnational social action space’. At the other end of the political spectrum, increasing collaboration and exchanges of visits between far-right organisations in Poland and the UK in 2017–2018 have been documented by journalists and by the website niepatriociuk.com, ‘non-patriots.com’, which monitors the activities of nationalist extremists. The edited volume Transnational Ukraine? Networks and Ties that Influence(d) Contemporary Ukraine argues that, rather than focusing on internal fragmentation in order to understand Ukrainian politics, scholars should turn their gaze towards the multiple ties (of all political colours) between Ukrainians in Ukraine and Ukrainians abroad (Beichelt and Worschech 2017: 16).

As these examples suggest, recent research has unearthed many interesting empirical data about social, economic and/or political remittances in CEE. However, with the partial exception of studies of transnational social action space (Binnie and Klesse 2013), the literature insufficiently addresses broader questions about how and when social remittances can spread. More qualitative work is needed to understand the nuanced process of social remitting, including the domains in which remitting occurs, the characteristics of remitters who can be ‘agents of change’ and the stage of diffusion among stayers. Moreover, very little indeed is written about how remittances circulate and ‘scale up’, relating to wider patterns of social change. The next sections discuss these matters, mostly with reference to our own research.

Our projects and methodology

The remainder of the article is based on our own recent research and, in particular, on the following four projects.

- **Cultural Diffusion through Social Remittances between Poland and the UK.** This was a longitudinal project conducted by Izabela Grabowska, Michał Garapich, Ewa Juźwińska and Agnieszka Radziwiłowiczówna in 2011–2014. The research team interviewed 121 residents of three small Polish towns (c. 20 000 inhabitants) – Sokółka, Trzebnica and Pszczyna – and their contacts in the UK, both migrants, return migrants and non-migrants. We also conducted participant observation.

- **Education to Domestic and Foreign Labour-Market Transitions of Youth: The Role of Locality, Peer Groups and Migration** (abbreviated to Peer Groups and Migration). This project consists of qualitative longitudinal studies in 2016–2020 in three medium-sized towns in Poland (c. 100 000 inhabitants): Puławy, Słupsk and Mielec. The units of analysis are both individuals and high-school peer groups, with both migrants and non-migrants as a direct reference population. The team of the research project conducted 111 structured in-depth interviews in the first wave and 54 semi-structured in-depth interviews with narrative components along the life line.

- **The Impact of Migration on Social Change in Poland.** White interviewed both stayers and return migrants in Wrocław, Łódź, Warsaw and Lublin in 2015–2016. The research project also drew on her 2006–2013 projects on return migration and family migration from Polish small towns and villages. She interviewed a total of 229 people (see White 2018: 135).
The present article also draws on this project, for which Anne White and Kinga Goodwin interviewed 28 British-born Poles in the UK in 2018. White’s interviewees were given pseudonyms, while Grabowska’s in the Cultural Diffusion project are referred to by the occupations they performed at the time of the interview and by the birth year in the Peer Groups and Migration project. All interviews were conducted in Polish except those with British-born Poles.

The process of social remitting and agents of change

The process of social remitting is complex and has many stages. It is not easy to discover what ideas and practices were taken from one place to the other and what impact they had. By breaking the process down into separate stages, one can observe these various aspects. As already discussed, social remitting involves acquisition, transfer and the outcomes of transfer (Grabowska et al. 2017). Resistance can be encountered at every stage (Garapich 2016). The stage of acquisition occurs when encounters (sometimes only fleeting) take place in various social settings: at workplaces, clubs, sports centres, restaurants, parks, private houses, etc. Such encounters occur not only with representatives of the receiving society but also with co-nationals from other regions of the migrant’s own country, representatives of neighbouring countries (in the Polish case, from CEE) and migrants from other parts of the world. This socially situated learning seems to be crucial for acquiring social remittances – mostly ideas and practices. People acquire new ideas and learn new practices predominantly by observing, communicating and doing things with the others in places such as these (Grabowska 2018b). When people change the context of their lives and feel a contextual disjunction, they usually acquire a bifocal perspective (Garapich 2016). This involves making comparisons between destination and origin locations, which tends to lead to a better appreciation of what was left behind and is therefore often not favourable to acquiring social remittances. Nonetheless, social remitting is occurring, since acquiring a bifocal perspective can be a social remittance in itself. This is illustrated in the following quotation from an anonymous male migrant interviewee in Pulawy (the Peer Groups and Migration project).

_I made a lot of new friends from around the world. I certainly practised the language, and there is always a different perspective on how you look at life. Even after returning to Poland, I used to look at Poland, thinking that here it is so beautiful and when you come here it is the most beautiful place on earth. And earlier I didn’t appreciate it._

Social remittances can be divided into ‘wide-ranging’ and ‘selective’. The former usually constitute a whole mind-set and world view, which people adjust or change as a result of international migration. They can relate to religion, gender roles, political views and affiliations or, more generally, to an overall way of life. Selective social remittances are usually partial and are acquired singly. They are situational and relate to life situations and ventures which people are undertaking or are planning to undertake – or, in some cases, avoid – in the near future. In our research findings, these included family celebrations such as weddings, christenings, first Holy Communion, funerals, Easter and Christmas and family reunions; life-cycle events such as pregnancy, retirement, divorce, school-to-work transitions, a gap year or taking care of older family members; and purchasing or renting property, cars and equipment for the home, as well as house and garden makeovers.

The stage of transfer involves the travel of already acquired remittances from one place to another. Wide-ranging social remittances usually travel in bundles, because they relate to a wider set of practices and might also be translated into norms, beliefs and values, as in the first example below, by a male return migrant in Slupsk born in 1989 (the Peer Groups and Migration project). Selective social remittances usually travel singly, as in
the case of seating name cards for wedding guests mentioned in the second quotation by a sports coach in Sokółka (the Cultural Diffusion project).

Cultural knowledge, because understanding other people isn’t just about speaking the language, but also about how you behave in a setting with different cultures. Is there anything else? I think perhaps you see the world differently... We have a wider perspective on people – that everyone’s entitled to their own views and opinions.

We brought these little name cards for the guests, to show them where to sit at the wedding table, in order to avoid family tensions which we knew about before. It worked out very well.

Sometimes the transfer is incomplete or blocked because there is no opportunity structure (Merton 1996) to implement new ideas and practices acquired abroad. Most commonly, English language skills, which are usually required by employers after return, are rarely needed because the company has not developed business links across international borders and has no need to communicate in English with suppliers, clients or other parties on a daily basis. The stage of transfer might also involve resistance, when people discover that an idea or a practice is too innovative for an origin location and decide that it will never be possible to introduce it.

Some migrants, as a result of migration and acquiring a bifocal perspective, even prefer their origin locations to remain unchanged. They idealise them and deliberately do not transfer innovative social remittances, even in cases where it seems that these could be useful. A process of re-traditionalisation takes place, meaning that people want to either freeze or bring back traditional beliefs, values and norms about both community and family. In the case of Poland, this is connected with a patriarchal family model and the Catholic Church.

The stage of outcomes of transfer involves both implementation and adaptation by others of acquired and transferred social remittances. It includes copying and pasting social remittances – ‘borrowed’ from abroad and imitated after return – and social remittances which are ‘translated’ or ‘adjusted’ to local terms and conditions. It is much easier to extensively copy and paste selective social remittances and much more difficult to implement wide-ranging social remittances and persuade others of their merits. Success is only possible for certain carriers of social remittances. They need to demonstrate innovative behaviour and possess specific traits. In other words, human agency is essential to the process.

We collected the opinions of local people about some active carriers of social remittances in three communities – Sokółka, Trzebnica and Pszczyna, small towns with varying economic profiles located in different regions of Poland (Grabowska et al. 2017). The carriers of social remittances were a nurse, a beautician, a sports coach, a bartender, a pet-shop owner and a person who spent much time socialising in public places in the town and sold legal highs. We identified a set of features necessary to become an ‘agent of change’: (1) personality traits; (2) opportunities for contact and informal learning abroad; (3) organisational and institutional settings for diffusion in home town; (4) a socially useful, everyday role in the community; (5) migration money and awareness of its social value (Grabowska 2018a: 84). As one of the non-migrants – the colleague and co-worker of a cosmetician in Sokółka (the Cultural Diffusion project) – observed about her friend, a returned migrant:

She does not realise but she has changed as a result of working abroad. She has a different approach to clients. She knows how to do the beauty business. We observe her, how she brings up her children and behaves in her second marriage, and we learn from her. She organises these small charity events in her beauty parlour and clients go for it.
It is difficult for one person to combine all the features of an agent of change. Moreover, some people possess individual hallmarks without having any collective impact on a community. They have acquired many social remittances but are not able to transfer and implement them because of local conditions. These social remittances are then kept as an individual resource which might eventually be activated after a time lag if opportunities appear. Another situation occurs when some people are not credible and socially visible enough to achieve a following. In both cases, the window of opportunity for scaling up the outcomes of social remittances is somewhat limited.

Earlier in this article we mentioned the most active sites of encounter for acquiring social remittances. Here we would like to discuss the most active social sites for transferring and implementing both wide-ranging and selective social remittances. Throughout the course of our research we found that the most active sites of transfer and implementation of social remittances were workplaces and families. Workplaces are the most open and innovative micro-publics (Amin 2002), allowing both selective and comprehensive social remitting. By contrast, families are private spaces, able to implement selective social remittances, although also more prone to resist wide-ranging social remittances connected to norms, beliefs and values when these are remitted rapidly and at once. However, selective remittances may eventually lead to wider transformations (Buler, Grabowska, Pustułka and Sarnowska, manuscript).

Polish workplaces also reflect, to some extent, the social trends taking place in society. They are affected by the general economic prosperity of recent years in Poland, the inflow of European Union funds, foreign investments and innovation, which make a friendly environment for innovative social remittances connected to non-material capital transfers of knowledge, skills and international contacts. Karolak (2016) argues, however, that the micro businesses which are usually set up by return migrants are more a source for the potential but not the actual transfer of social remittances into Polish workplaces. Grabowska and Jastrzębowska (2019, forthcoming) and Grabowska (2019) found that working abroad has an impact on transferable competences: cognitive, intrapersonal and interpersonal. The strongest impact was found on the birth cohort 1968–1972, described by Szewczyk (2015) as the ‘European Generation of Change’. This is the generation which was partly educated under communism and partly within the democratic system; its members did not necessarily acquire marketable qualifications in Poland and the experience of international migration enhances their social competence in the labour market.

In the case of families, the process of implementing social remitting is more nuanced. It is easier to transmit and implement selective remittances connected to simple practices which facilitate daily life than to adopt new norm and value systems. It seems that family life is still particularly exposed in Poland to a high level of social control. Abroad, people behave more freely but, when they return to their origin communities, they either follow the existing rules or actively choose re-traditionalisation (Buler et al., manuscript). We have however identified three categories of social remittance transferred into family life in the translocal perspective (Buler et al., manuscript). These categories are (1) the everyday logistics of organising family life observed and imitated from British families; (2) bringing up small children to be more independent by giving them small duties, more freedom and less ‘helicoptering’; and (3) gender roles, although this domain does not display one uniform pattern of social remitting. With regard to gender roles as bundles of social remittances, we found that, if there is some opening in the family and community (more-individualised migration, a weaker migration culture and less social control), people are more able to work out their own household division of labour, childcare, family quality and rubbish time, and to make decisions about women’s education, women setting up their own businesses and taking care of older family members.

Because active remitters are usually people who are both willing to learn and to share things with others, they also engage in the circulation of social remittances. This came out clearly in the stories of a nurse who had returned from the UK to live in Trzebnica (the Cultural Diffusion project):
I also showed the staff in the British nursing home the healing properties of garlic… They laughed at me. I went to the local library and I proved it. And I always thanked my fellow workers after we had been on a shift together, something I always did in Poland. (...) My husband gathered his co-workers in the garage and told them facts and stories about Polish history, not only about the Battle of Britain.

Circulation does not seem to be a symmetrical process, meaning that the same quantity and quality of social remittances are remitted to origin and destination. It is, however, worth considering it further and looking for evidence of remittances to receiving countries, even if they are not on the same scale as reverse flows.

**Circulation and ‘scaling up’/reinforcing existing trends**

The assertion that there can also be ‘circulation’ of social remittances often seems to be used to refute suggestions that social remittances are just a form of cultural colonisation of poorer countries by richer ones. However, the term is used variously by different scholars. By some, circulation is seen as something occurring within the brains/experiences of individual migrants. Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011) suggest that Dominican villagers come to the USA with cultural repertoires which they refine (rather than abandon) in the process of acquiring US social remittances. Vianello (2013: 92) similarly observes: ‘Social remittances should not be viewed as a cultural colonization, because they are developed – and not passively learned – by [Ukrainian] migrants through their work experiences, their life events and the interaction with different cultures’.

Social-media content researchers are able to study how ideas are tossed back and forth between stayers in the sending country and their co-nationals who have migrated. For example, Galasinska (2010) analyses arguments for and against return migration to Poland and Trandafoiu (2013) shows how Romanian stayers and migrants, through their discussions, jointly construct migration as the survival of the fittest. However, although this methodology allows the researcher to see how threads develop, one has the impression that true circulation is limited, in the sense that the migrant participants are not particularly receptive to ideas coming from the sending country. In any case, the information is too fragmentary to allow for thorough analysis of how ideas travel round and round in such settings.

Circulation also occurs when members of the receiving society adopt social remittances from migrants. Grabowska *et al.* (2017: 211) write about the ‘rule of reciprocity’ as facilitating social remitting. It is easier to take if you also give something back. Contact theory, although usually used for analysing integration, is equally relevant for understanding social remitting (which is, in some respects, the same phenomenon as integration but viewed from a sending-country perspective). For example, equality of status is said by contact theorists to be one precondition for good relations between different ethnic groups (Fonseca and McGarrigle 2012: 10). This can be illustrated in cases where Poles living abroad invite their foreign friends and employers to visit them in Poland, so that they can reverse the roles and temporarily adopt the ‘superior’ position of host rather than guest (Ahmadov and Sasse 2015; Galent, Goddeeris and Niedźwiedzki 2009; White 2018).

Visits potentially equalise the relationship, although not always – visitors may simply have their prejudices about supposed Polish backwardness confirmed, as, for example, in the case of a German farmer who visited his ex-employee in north-east Poland and noticed a farm horse pulling a cart. According to Tomasz, interviewed by White in Grajewo in 2012, ‘He was amazed. In the West agriculture is different; here in the Mazury Region it was like in the nineteenth century; the German had only heard about such things from his grandparents’.

However, Polish migrants often emphasise that visits to Poland persuaded foreigners to adopt favourable impressions of the country. Such visits apparently led the Belgian employers in Galent *et al.*’s study to see Poland as being ‘green instead of grey’ (2009: 130). A similar observation was made in London in 2018 by
Teodora, a half-Polish, half-British retiree who owned a house in Poland to which she often invited British friends:

For many of them, it’s their first time in Poland and they come with a certain perception of what they think it’s going to be like and go away with a very different perception. I think they still have a feeling – maybe it’s a throwback to communist times – that it’s going to be very grey and people are very dour. But they come away with a very strong feeling about the people of Poland – I suppose that’s because we have family, they’re involved in that and they meet friends, as well. The food they think is wonderful!

Iwona, a stayer interviewed in Lublin in 2016, commented on how her husband’s Italian brother-in-law and his friends and relatives acquired a taste for Polish food products.

Doughnuts and Polish buns. They can eat lots of those... They bring horseradish back from Poland... and ptasie mleczko chocolates. They don’t have it. Paolo can eat a whole box.

As indicated in the example from Trzebnica, cited above, social remitting also occurs when migrants enact changes in attitudes, habits, etc. in the receiving country. As well as describing visits by Italians to Poland, Iwona, from Lublin, commented in 2016 on the behaviour of Paolo’s wife, her Polish sister-in-law, in Italy:

When her [Italian] friends come round, she treats them to Polish food, so that they can find out what it’s like. She always brings back something from Poland, some herbs or other Polish stuff. And when her parents visit her, her mother always makes pierogi and especially Polish things like bigos – bigos to die for!

These examples suggest a subtext of wishing to counter assumptions that the migrant and his or her country of origin are culturally inferior: the migrant needs to make a special effort to correct that impression. No doubt this situation occurs in many societies but post-communist countries have a particular image problem, given that, in the West, they are viewed as having languished behind the Iron Curtain and, as both Galent et al. (2009) and Teodora (above) suggest, been infected by presumed Soviet ‘greyness’.

As research in receiving countries shows, convivial occasions can be particularly effective for promoting understanding between people of different cultural backgrounds (Rzepnikowska 2015). Such occasions were described by a number of stayers – such as Beata, from Wrocław – interviewed by White in Polish cities in 2016.

The wedding [in Spain] was half-Polish, half-Spanish... I knew all the friends [at the wedding] because heaps of them had been to visit us [in Wrocław]. My son invited them [to Wrocław] because I always love having guests... And they all turned up at the wedding... Generally they don’t dance [at Spanish weddings] but my son wanted everything to be Polish and Spanish.

Since, as discussed above, the family is a domain where social remitting can be particularly effective, it is not surprising to find that the non-Polish partners adopt behaviour and even norms and values from their spouses. For example, Phil (from Bath), who was half-Polish but had grown up in the UK in a culturally English household, had married a recent Polish migrant. He commented in 2018:

The other thing I really like about Poland – and this is going to sound strange – is that they do not forget their dead... When my parents died in ’91 I made the first two or three token visits on birthdays and
I probably never saw their grave for five or six years. The minute I met my wife in the 2000s – ‘Where’s your family buried? We’re going’. And now I regularly go there and clean it. It’s a very strange custom which is alien to English people, probably.

The increasing number of mixed marriages between Poles and Western Europeans offers favourable conditions for sending-to-receiving-country social remittances, with Polish spouses being well placed to diffuse selective social remittances in the receiving country. As shown by the examples of Teodora and Phil, there are also children of Polish refugees from the 1940s who are nowadays becoming ‘more Polish’, partly as a result of new opportunities – offered by Poland’s EU accession – to meet Poles born in Poland and to live and work in the country (White and Goodwin 2019).

On an institutional level, social remittances can be transmitted within the Catholic Church. The Church as an institution in Western Europe has seen its membership shrink among natives of Western European countries and has often become heavily dependent for its survival on attracting migrant worshippers (Pasura and Erdal 2017). As indicated in this quotation from Tomek, a British-born Pole living in a small town in Berkshire, outside London, English parishes sometimes have to adapt to the expectations of their Polish parishioners:


Quite a number of Polish people go to the English Catholic Church. A couple of years ago, our parish priest introduced the blessing of food on Holy Saturday, for Easter, so he’s trying to widen those cultural ties. For the Christmas Eve mass – it’s no longer Midnight [Mass], but the equivalent of – we sing a number of Polish carols.

Turning now to the question of ‘scaling up’; the above example of how a practice from CEE became institutionalised in the UK could be considered an instance of scaling up, since it was presumably at the request of a number of Polish parishioners that the British priest was persuaded to introduce the blessing of food at Easter.9 The adoption of selective Polish practices in British parishes can be seen as part of the wider process, mentioned above, of adaptation to migrants by the Catholic Church in countries such as Norway or the UK.

Within sending societies in CEE, there are naturally parallel cases of institutionalisation, where organisations are changing their practices as a result of input from migrants and former migrants. For example, Binnie and Kless (2013) refer to LGBT activists who had previously lived abroad and their impact on the LGBT movement in Poland. Since we are defining ‘migration-driven cultural diffusion’ (Levitt 1998) to include all kinds of mobility, social remitting can encompass all manner of influences on business cultures, political institutions, etc. which result from short visits as well as longer stays abroad. However, in many cases it is impossible to disentangle social remittances from other types of communication and channels of influence which do not involve people physically moving from place to place. Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011: 3) argue that social remittances ‘are distinct from, but often reinforce and are reinforced by, other forms of global cultural circulation’. This is particularly likely to be true in parts of the world such as CEE – especially cities – which are already subject to a mass of different influences from Western Europe. Social remittances are most likely to be significant, ‘scaling up’ when they work in tandem with and reinforce other influences.

This is not to claim that they are insignificant. In fact, in some cases they may be more significant than the influences with which they intertwine. For example, Arcimowicz, Bieńko and Łaciak (2015: 385–386), in their study of changing customs in Poland, looked primarily for media influences but found, from their 406 in-depth interviews, that ‘more often than the media, our respondents cited personal experience and observation from travel (from tourism, professionally, to work, to visit family – from their own or someone else’s experience)’. Many scholars have observed that Polish migrants, especially manual workers, are suspicious of Polish strangers; locations in Poland with high volumes of international migration and reliance on migration networks
also seem to be pervaded by mistrust, and it seems clear that this is a significant factor in helping to dampen down levels of generalised trust which one could otherwise have expected to be improving, as life in Poland becomes easier and more prosperous (White 2018: 147–150).

White’s research into social remittances in Polish cities – whose inhabitants sometimes deny that migration has any influence – concluded that cities are particularly receptive to social remitting because it reinforces the cultural change which is occurring there already. For example, pensioners who are attracted by older people’s lifestyles which they see on visits abroad find it easier to emulate such lifestyles when they return to Polish cities, where opportunities for adult education and so forth are already increasing. There is growing popular acceptance of ‘active ageing’ and a belief that pensioners should be able to enjoy their leisure time as individuals without sacrificing it entirely to their families (Krzyżowski, Kowalik, Suwada and Pawlina 2014). However, as mentioned earlier in this article, where influences from higher education and foreign tourism are somewhat fewer, in smaller towns and villages, social remittances – if they are successfully transferred – are more likely to be important in transforming the lives of individuals. For example, going abroad might be their only opportunity to make friends with a black or an LGBT person. Hence social remittances can be considered to have a more significant impact in smaller locations, even if they are more prevalent and transferrable (though often invisible to outsiders) in the cities.

Conclusions

The concept of social remittances is a tool for embedding migration-related factors into analysis of societies experiencing threefold social, economic and political system transformation. Since the collapse of communist regimes in 1989–1991, societies in CEE have undergone many changes – some directly linked to system transformation, others similar to developments in the West, though often different in ‘pace and scale’ (Jacobsson 2015: 10). Simultaneously, CEE citizens acquired a freedom to travel and live abroad which had been denied under communism. It is intriguing, therefore, to consider how exactly this new mobility influenced the wider processes of change. Although research on the impact of migration on sending countries has mostly focused on the development of countries outside Europe, there is now some scholarship on CEE as well. This tends to consist of individual-country case studies. However, our article has looked much more broadly at CEE, identifying its special characteristics as a sending region: cultural and lifestyle similarities with Western Europe which make it easier for social remittances to spread but also complexes and antagonisms which can have the opposite effect, diverse patterns of mobility – thanks to EU membership – and an individualised/family-oriented approach to migration which makes collective social remitting rare.

The complexity of this situation makes it particularly important to study in detail the cases of individual migrants, each with their own unique transnational ties, and also the circulation of social remittances, where ideas are spread from CEE to Western Europe as well as vice versa. As we have suggested, individual small changes often travel in ‘bundles’: individual, selective changes in practice can indicate deeper insights and changes to values and attitudes. Even when remittances seem to be primarily economic, as is often the case, for example, among small-town labour migrants, they contribute to social change through their symbolic significance – for instance, in restructuring gender hierarchies.

Sceptics might argue that wealthier cities in CEE are now so similar to those in Western Europe that there is no social remitting. However, short-term mobility in the form of business trips, educational exchanges, etc., as undertaken by many city residents, surely does produce social remittances. In fact, since their purpose is often to obtain knowledge and know-how, this is precisely what such mobility should achieve. Moreover, the ‘transnational action space’ is particularly observable in cities. Here the overlap between ‘social’ and ‘political’ remitting is marked.
Some scholars assert that social remittances are insignificant when compared to other factors for change. For example, it does seem that, when migration leads to improvements in gender equality in sending countries, this happens for reasons indirectly connected to migration rather than because people (especially men) are converted to the belief that gender equality is important. However, it cannot be assumed that social remittances are somehow minor factors. Our article mentioned the cautionary tale of Arcimowicz et al.’s (2015) research into television’s influence on changing habits in Poland, which unexpectedly turned into a study of the impact of travel and life abroad. One should also ask ‘important for whom?’ Highly educated city-dwellers are subject to a mass of different influences which help to mould their opinions and practices but, for a person in a small town, social remittances can stand out in their experience as a major influence for change. Hence they do have a significant role to play in reinforcing social trends.

In the end, however, the point is not to weigh the significance of one determinant of change against another. It is enough to acknowledge that, without studying social remittances, our understanding of important trends in CEE, for example towards or away from greater equality and respect for diversity, or stagnant levels of generalised trust, cannot be fully understood.

Turning to the future, an obvious deficiency of contemporary social-remittances research is its short perspective. The EU, with its extreme mobility since 2004, is a fascinating laboratory for studying migration influences; however, only longitudinal studies will be able to discover the long-term impact of the social remittances transferred today. Moreover, as more migrants come to countries in Central Europe and these latter become receiving societies, this creates an additional set of migration influences and the potential for impressions from both immigration and emigration to intertwine.

Notes

1 In 2018 the World Bank classified Romania, Bulgaria and CEE countries outside the EU as upper-middle income. The remaining countries in CEE were high-income (World Bank 2018).

2 Cingolani and Vietti (2018) do provide some counter-examples in Moldova, where in a few well-publicised cases members of the ‘diaspora’ have contributed to projects in their communities of origin.

3 For various examples, see Grabowska et al. (2017) and White et al. (2018).

4 Kazakhstan is not comparable, in some respects, to post-communist Europe but, despite differences in detail, the overall story is similar. This ‘same but different character’ is illustrated by the following case, described by Blum (2015: 158), where the dish is typically Kazakh but the situation, of causing offence by adopting new eating habits, could happen anywhere. ‘After coming back home he decided to slim down by going on a vegetarian diet. Based on his experience in an American college, this represented an appropriate course of action. But he quickly learned that it constituted an affront to national pride. ‘My dad said, “You’re a Kazakh! You should be eating horsemeat! Stop infiltrating your American attitudes!”’

5 The research was funded by the National Science Centre, Poland (see Grabowska et al. 2017).

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9 One could also consider this to be an example of integration, with a British institution adapting to meet the cultural expectations of migrants. Theorists of integration routinely claim that it is a two-way process, with the onus partly on the receiving society to adapt to migrants. However, as in the case of social remitting, this direction is very much less studied than the other, where migrants adapt their ways.
Conflict of interest statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Do Diasporas Matter? The Growing Role of the Ukrainian Diaspora in the UK and Poland in the Development of the Homeland in Times of War

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Ukraine has been going through a series of political and economic crises, notably the Euromaidan revolution and the Russian aggression and subsequent economic downturn. These events triggered fresh transnational diaspora-led activities such as the ‘London Euromaidan’ and the ‘Warsaw Euromaidan’. This paper analyses Ukrainian diaspora volunteerism in the UK and Poland and explores how the Ukrainian diaspora engages and contributes economically, socially, politically and culturally to the development of Ukraine. Drawing on fieldwork in both countries, three main findings were identified. First, due to the events in Ukraine, the Ukrainian diaspora has mobilised, grown stronger and became more united, whilst transforming from a more inward-looking to a more outward-looking community which, as a result, is now more and critically engaging with Ukrainian affairs. Second, the Ukrainian diaspora has the willingness, power and resources to contribute to the development of the home country, claiming to be recognised as an important stakeholder in the development of Ukraine. Thirdly, the Ukrainian government’s lack of recognition of the contribution of the Ukrainian diaspora is one of the most significant barriers to more comprehensive diaspora involvement in development.

Keywords: Ukrainian diaspora; Euromaidan; the UK; Poland; development

Introduction

Two events have dominated recent developments in Ukraine – the Euromaidan of 2013 and the subsequent and ongoing war in the east of the country. These, however, are only the culmination of years of poor governance, economic crises and endemic corruption.
Ukraine has suffered from a prolonged period of poor governance, beginning with the Kuchma administration (1994–2005), through the failure of the so-called Orange Revolution (2004) – notably the subsequent stalemate between the two main camps led by Yushchenko and Timoshenko and the coming to power of the Party of Regions. Under the then-new president Yanukovych, a new kleptocracy took shape (Bobinski 2014) that gave rise to a system of nepotism which specifically benefitted the Eastern oligarchs and the out-dated heavy industries in the east. This almost ruined the country (Leshchenko 2013). In addition, corruption in all sectors of society reached new highs and severely undermined the rule of law (Lapshyna 2014).

The massive protests in Ukraine in 2013 – known as ‘Euromaidan’ – led to the fall of Yanukovych’s kleptocratic regime. However, this did not signify the end of the Revolution of Dignity but, rather, its beginning, as Ukraine required a complete overhaul in its political system and not just a simple change of regime. The Revolution of Dignity prevented the country from ‘slipping’ into open state authoritarianism. However, its main task was to lay the foundation for a liberal and stable democracy (Shveda and Park 2016). Thus, it can be argued that the Euromaidan and the subsequent crisis are part of a wider transition process and socio-economic transformation of Ukraine. Recovering after a protracted socioeconomic and political crisis will require not only time but also improved governance, updated institutions and a revitalised investment climate. Taken together, this can be called the second start of Ukraine’s transition (Grigoriev, Buryak and Golyashev 2016).

Over the last 15 years, Ukraine has lost a significant amount of its already meagre human capital, largely by way of international migration. This, however, resulted in the formation of significant diasporas in many countries, whose role and potential for development, reform and post-war reconstruction are the focus of this article. Based on the project Do Diasporas Matter? Exploring the Potential Role of Diaspora in the UK and Poland in the Reform and Post-War Reconstruction of Ukraine, funded by British Academy, the aim was to explore whether and how the Ukrainian diaspora and the communities of Ukrainian migrants in the UK and Poland could contribute economically, socially, politically and culturally to the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.

My research question is whether the Ukrainian diaspora and communities of Ukrainian migrants in the UK and Poland are willing and have the power and resources to contribute to the development of the home country. Ames (2014) suggests that diasporas are ‘key to recovery’. This might be exaggerated as the key probably lies, instead, with the people in Ukraine; however, in a pointed manner it raises attention for the potential role of the Ukrainian diaspora with regards to matters in the home country.

This article, based on a qualitative study conducted from 2015 to 2016 in the UK and Poland, examines Ukrainian diaspora mobilisation and explores how the Ukrainian diaspora engages and contributes to the development of Ukraine. It thereby enables the exploration of the dynamic interaction and synergy effects of the different segments of diaspora and immigrant communities with respect to their activities towards Ukraine. The two cases, Poland and the UK, were selected because they were distinctly different in some important aspects. Poland has a long-established historical Ukrainian diaspora and has recently received very large numbers of immigrants. The diaspora in the UK is comparably new and also much smaller. This provides for an interesting comparison.

Theoretical background

Notions of diaspora

Before commencing with an examination of the role of diaspora in development, a discussion of the definition and conceptualisation of diaspora is needed. The definition of ‘diaspora’ is not a straightforward task as there is no widely accepted definition; instead, there are diverse and partly conflicting definitions and the term is
used to describe many different phenomena. The term ‘diaspora’ is derived from the Greek, meaning the ‘dispersal or scattering of seeds’. Diaspora is an old concept, the uses and meanings of which have recently undergone dramatic change (Bauböck and Faist 2010). Originally, the concept referred only to the historic experience of particular groups – specifically Jews and Armenians. Later, it was extended to religious minorities in Europe. Since the late 1970s, ‘diaspora’ has experienced a veritable inflation of applications and interpretations. ‘Diaspora’ and ‘diasporic communities’ are increasingly being used as a synonym for expatriates, expellees, refugees, immigrants, displaced communities and ethnic minorities. The scholars examining diasporas have therefore largely agreed that the term ‘diaspora’ has often been overused; subsequently, there has been much debate over what it actually means (Cohen 1997; Gamlen 2011; Safran 1991; Tölöyan 1996). Akenson (1995: 382) even complained that ‘diaspora’ has become a ‘massive linguistic weed’. Sökefeld (2006) emphasised that the formation of diaspora is not a ‘natural’ consequence of migration but that particular processes of mobilisation in response to specific critical events have to take place for a diaspora to emerge. Marienstras (1989: 125) added that ‘time has to pass’ before we can know that any community that has migrated ‘is really diaspora’ and strongly emphasised this temporal dimension of diaspora formation. In other words, one does not immediately know and thus does not announce the formation of a diaspora from the moment of arrival. A strong attachment to the past or a block to assimilation in the present and future must exist to permit a diasporic consciousness to be mobilised or retained. Thus, it is important to stress that not all migrants will cohere into communities, not all migrant communities will imagine themselves as transnational and not all transnational communities are simultaneously diasporic communities. The key marker would be diasporic identities and practices.

I endorse a broad definition of diaspora communities offered by Agunias and Newland (2012: 15) as ‘emigrants and their descendants who live outside of the country of their birth or ancestry on temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin’. At the same time, I support Cohen’s (2008) argument that not all groups who migrate internationally in search of work evolve into a diaspora. For instance, there are, of course, individual, family or small group who migrate for the purpose of settlement and who do not develop diasporic consciousness, particularly if they intend to assimilate and are readily accepted. I argue that, to qualify as a member of a diaspora, it is crucial to display ‘diasporic consciousness’. According to Duarte’s (2005) study, such interrelated patterns can be seen as indicative of diaspora consciousness, as (1) the co-presence of ‘here’ and ‘there’; (2) the re-creation of ‘own spaces’ in the host country; (3) ‘othering’; and (4) a reflexive appraisal of the homeland and its cultural values and norms. Some scholars suggest that an essential part of diasporic consciousness is the desire to return to the homeland. I believe that it is not the physical return to the homeland that is essential to the diasporic experience but, rather, the related sense of connection or disconnection.

I aim to study the issue of diaspora by taking a critical approach. This implies thinking beyond the box and studying diaspora more broadly but without over-stretching the concept. In order to not miss potentially relevant findings but to discover all diasporic or similar transnational activities, I include not only established ‘old’ diaspora but also ‘new’ diaspora groups. These latter still maintain ties to their homeland and, as I will show, also develop a diasporic consciousness and display diasporic practices and identities. For this purpose, definitions will be applied and a distinction made between ‘old’ and conventional and ‘new’ diasporas. When I use the words ‘old diaspora’ I mean specifically the community of post-World War Two immigrants and their descendants – in case of the UK – and a Ukrainian minority, formed prior to independence in 1991, for Poland. Under ‘new diaspora’ I understand migrants from independent Ukraine, who left there in large numbers from 1991 onwards. Including the new diaspora groups enables me to explore the dynamic interaction and synergy effects of the different social groups with respect to their activities towards Ukraine, as well as the adaptation
of classical diasporas to some new realities – notably the fresh influx of contemporary immigrants. Furthermore, thinking of diaspora broadly, following Van Hear (1998) and paraphrasing Sartre (1957), I suggest that we distinguish between diaspora ‘in itself’, hence all Ukrainians who live abroad – as, in our case, in the UK and Poland – and diaspora ‘for itself’, hence those Ukrainians living abroad, actively engaging with Ukrainian matters and displaying diasporic practices and identities. Important characteristics of the diaspora ‘for itself’ are that its members have developed diasporic consciousness and maintain ties to their homeland.

The diaspora–development nexus

Over the past few years, the contributions of migrants and diaspora to sustainable development in their countries of origin and destination have been acknowledged by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the Summits of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (for a definition of development, see IOM 2005). In many EU policy documents, diasporas and migrant communities are discussed as emerging agents of development in their own right – pointing to the increased significance of migrant categories and collectives for cross-border policymaking (Weinar 2017). The engagement of diasporas in issues conventionally seen as relating to development, poverty reduction, economic growth, trade, post-crisis recovery or post-war reconstruction has generated an increasing interest among academics (e.g. Cohen 1997; Van Hear and Liberatore 2015) and stakeholders (the UNDP, CoE, IOM etc.). However, for over 80 years, migration studies have looked mainly at immigration from the point of view of immigrant-receiving countries, whilst paying little attention to the large body of mostly non-Anglophone literature produced in the emigration countries (Okólski 2009). The re-introduction of the country-of-origin perspective in the 2000s was an important step in migration studies (Weinar 2017). Desiderio (2014) argues that, in the past two decades, origin countries began to better understand diaspora contributions to development in the homeland. These countries have increasingly acknowledged that the development effects of migration stem not only from returns and remittances but, more broadly, also from knowledge transfers and direct investments. They also recognise the capacity of emigrants and their descend- ants to ‘market’ their homeland abroad – thus contributing to the country’s attractiveness for tourists and foreign investors, stimulating trade and even channelling broader geopolitical benefits. Levitt (1996) suggests that members of the diaspora also contribute social remittances – the ideas, behaviours, identities, new values, expectations, ideas and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities – which can impact on conflict resolution or post-conflict reconstruction. Bercovitch (2007) points to socio-cultural influences that can be beneficial in a post-conflict environment; he suggests that, with regards to reconciliation, people in the homeland are preferring to accept advice from members of the diaspora rather than from other foreigners. He envisions this in terms of the diaspora’s ability to provide culturally appropriate facilitation to reconciliation processes and socio-psychological healing. Van Hear and Cohen (2017) distinguished three spheres of diaspora engagement: the largely private and personal sphere of the household and the extended family; the more public sphere of the ‘known community’, by which is meant collectivities of people who know, or know of, each other; and the largely public sphere of the ‘imagined community’, which includes the transnational political field, among other arenas. Sinatti and Horst (2015) argue for a reconceptualisation of development as a process of social change that is linked to human mobility across a range of socio-spatial levels and of diaspora as a mobilising tool and an imagined, as opposed to an actual, community. They suggest that many programmes and policies have taken a too-restrictive understanding of development as a distinct area of professional practice and have thus attempted to channel migrants’ transfers of financial, social and human capital towards this planned development. A reconceptualisation beyond the narrow understanding of
development as a Western intervention would allow for the exploration of new aspects of migrant contributions to societal transformations in countries of origin and residence.

There is a variety of positive contributions that diaspora populations can and do make; community-based NGOs, professional networks and political entrepreneurs all have the potential to bring about positive change. European research shows that migrant organisations, too, make important contributions to the development of their countries of origin (see, for example, Sezgin 2010). Gallina (2008), for instance, analyses the organisations of Malians in France and argues that they not only provided aid to Mali after the drought of 1973–1974, but were also responsible for 60 per cent of the infrastructure projects in certain regions. Similarly, Lampert (2014) argues that London-based Nigerian organisations transcend the ethicised boundaries of belonging to articulate and pursue visions of Nigeria’s national development and that their potential for contributing to a unified and prosperous Nigeria should not be dismissed. Furthermore, InWent (2008) shows that cooperation with migrant organisations not only improves development work but also deepens the understanding of the lives of migrants in Germany. Schmelz (2007), for example, illustrated that there are diverse types of Cameroonian migrant organisations in Germany, including those with a primary focus on development policy. He argued that Cameroonian migrant organisations are engaged in a range of activities which, as a whole, serve for a better education and the empowerment of young people, especially in rural areas. In Ukraine, the Chernobyl catastrophe provided one of the first opportunities for the diaspora to play an officially sanctioned role in Ukrainian society. Humanitarian aid worth US $40 million was provided to the victims of the disaster by members of the Ukrainian diaspora (Satzewich 2002).

The Ukrainian diaspora and the diaspora–development nexus

While much literature exists about the historical formation of the Ukrainian diaspora, few scholars focus on its role in the development of the homeland. Satzewich (2002) studied the North American Ukrainian diaspora and its response to the post-war suppression of the Ukrainian language, culture and religion in the home country. He explored how the diaspora’s relationships with Ukraine have changed since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Comparing the Ukrainian diaspora with the other East-Central European groups, he pointed out that fewer diaspora Ukrainians seem willing to ‘return’ or move to their ancestral homeland than the members of other East-Central European diasporas. Another important finding of Satzewich is that diasporas, like communities, often contain social divisions, conflicts and differences. This reservation is also relevant for the Ukrainian diaspora. He argued that Ukrainians in the diaspora have emphasised their within-group differences as much as their similarities within a larger imagined community. In his book, Satzewich (2002: 17) said:

In many ways, the story of Ukrainian diaspora community life in the west is one of conflict, struggle and hostility between Ukrainians of different political persuasions, religious affiliations, classes and wave of immigration. Divisions between socialists and nationalists, Catholic and Orthodox churches, eastern and western Ukrainians, ‘new-wave immigrants’ and longer-settled members of the community, and between followers of different nationalist leaders have all at some point fractured the Ukrainian diaspora.

Previous research on the Ukrainian diaspora acknowledged its important role in the development of Ukraine, especially since independence in 1991. The Ukrainian diaspora enhanced the process of democratisation and lobbied foreign governments to adopt pro-Ukrainian policies. It contributed financially to political parties’ advocating state independence (Satzewich 2002). A growing body of literature has begun to highlight the response of the Ukrainian diaspora to the Euromaidan movement. Malyutina (2014) focused her research on the transnational activism of the ‘London Euromaidan’ in 2013–2014. She pointed out that, despite the fact
that the Ukrainian community in London is smaller than that in Canada or USA, the ‘London Euromaidan’ was one of the most active and mobilised Ukrainian communities abroad supporting protests and actively engaging in political events in Ukraine. She suggested that one of the main characteristics of London’s Euromaidan was its dynamism and perseverance and the regularity of protests, the variety of targets of protests and the social diversity of the protesters. However, she only studied the beginning of the protest over a quite short period of time (November 2013 to spring 2014), which does not really allow examination of the changing dynamics. My research was conducted at the later stage of the protest cycle, which allowed me to also observe any up- and down-swings. The role of Ukrainian diasporas in (post)revolutionary processes has also been studied by Melnyk, Patalong, Plottka and Steinberg (2016) who, in their research, discussed the formation of a new Ukrainian ‘diasporic community’ in Germany and Poland. As in my findings, they argued that the civic engagement of Ukrainians in Germany with their home country has dramatically increased since the Maidan protests.

Kolyada and Raicheva (2018) studied the Ukrainian diasporas in the context of the latter using their social and economic potential to improve the competitiveness of Ukraine’s economy. The authors argued that collaboration with the Ukrainian diaspora is not efficient because too few leading foreign managers of Ukrainian origin are involved in the Ukrainian economy. They concluded that any potential economic benefits of the Ukrainian diaspora are not used enough for the Ukraine’s economic development. CEDOS (2017) added to this by stating that Ukrainians abroad are an underestimated capital of Ukraine, as the diaspora and migrants not only financially support their relatives but are also interested in Ukraine’s development. They support Ukrainian soldiers, offer expertise for reforms and good governance, cooperate with Ukrainian scientists in joint projects and serve as cultural diplomats.

Despite this evidence, however, there has been a lack of theorising about the role of the Ukrainian diaspora in the development of its country of origin. This article aims to address some of the research gaps.

Methodology

This study is based on research which took place in 2015 and 2016 and 43 in-depth semi-structured interviews, field observations and a literature survey. I have chosen Poland and the UK as two different cases. Poland is a country with a large number of Ukrainians (estimates vary between 500 000 to 1 million); while, the UK has a relatively small number of Ukrainians (estimates vary between 30 000 to 100 000).

The interviews were conducted mostly in London and Warsaw. This is because, firstly, in the UK, Ukrainians are mostly concentrated in the capital, London. For comparative reasons, I have chosen the Polish capital, Warsaw, where Ukrainians are also found in significant numbers. Secondly, and more importantly, however, is that diaspora organisations are typically concentrated in the capital of the country because of their interest in communicating with the power structures. Therefore, the main diasporic and Euromaidan activities – which are the focus of this study – were mostly held in the capitals. Nevertheless, some interviews were also conducted in other cities of the UK and Poland. The sample consisted of 20 interviewees in the UK and 20 in Poland. Amongst these were 20 representatives of diverse Ukrainian diaspora organisations: 3 community leaders, 9 professionals/activists/volunteers, three business people, 3 embassy representatives; and 2 Church representatives. I also conducted three expert interviews in Ukraine. Each interview lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. The material was anonymised, coded and analysed using NVivo software.
The Ukrainian diaspora – diversity and segmentation

In both countries, the Ukrainian diaspora turned out to be diverse and segmented, depending on the members’ skills, religion, class, age, initial migration motives, migration status and duration of stay in the host country. However, in one sense, the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland is distinctly different from that in the UK because, in Poland, there is a historic Ukrainian minority, a feature that does not exist in the UK.

The diaspora population in the UK

The Ukrainian community in the UK has a long history and its own institutions – associations, a newspaper, archives, a community Saturday school, etc. (Kubal, Bakewell and de Haas 2011). However, no definite figures exist for the size or social composition of the Ukrainian community there today. According to the 2018 Annual Population Survey, 36 000 persons born in Ukraine were residing in the UK in 2017 (Office for National Statistics 2018). However, this figure excludes second-generation Ukrainians. Leaders of Ukrainian community organisations believe that the Ukrainian community currently numbers some 30 000 persons (Embassy of Ukraine to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, n.d.). These are mainly first- and second-generation Ukrainians from post-World War Two immigration flows. However, over the past few years, the Ukrainian community of Great Britain has increased due to – partly irregular – migrant workers. Any analysis of the Ukrainian diaspora in the UK cannot ignore the distinction between the different segments. Ukrainians in the UK can be divided in three main groups, between which there are significant differences with respect to their socio-economic and demographic characteristics and their involvement in organised Ukrainian community life. These three groups are a) post-World War Two immigrants, b) their descendants and c) migrants from independent Ukraine. Most of the Ukrainians who have come to the UK since Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991 have been relatively young people of working age, with roughly equal numbers of men and women. They fall into several categories, depending on the circumstances of their arrival in the country and their status. Broadly speaking, two main subgroups can be distinguished within this category: those with a regular immigration and employment status and those with an irregular status. Those in the first group are employed in a wide range of occupations, from academic or highly skilled posts to unskilled jobs. Most of the undocumented immigrants work in un- or semi-skilled jobs in sectors such as agriculture, food processing, construction, catering and domestic work, even if they have higher educational qualifications and previously worked in higher-level jobs in Ukraine (Krawec 2017).

Recent migrants from independent Ukraine differ significantly from the post-war immigrants and their British-born descendants in terms of life experience and world outlook. As a consequence of this, they have generally not become involved in the life of the established Ukrainian community, albeit with some notable exceptions. The dramatic events of recent years in Ukraine – the Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine – have inspired newcomers in the UK to get involved and to make powerful contributions to their home country. Some have become members or supporters of both well-established and new diaspora organisations.

The ‘old diaspora’ refers mostly to the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (AUGB), which was founded in 1946 by Ukrainians who went there at the end of World War Two. The association is the largest representative body for Ukrainians and those of Ukrainian descent, with branches in many UK cities. It exists to develop, promote and support the interests of the Ukrainian community and the AUGB community in London and the UK have been actively engaged in protests and providing aid to the home country. Members of the ‘new diaspora’ have different characteristics to those who have lived in the UK for a longer period of time. For example, more-settled immigrants are more likely to speak better English, to have become English citizens,
to have higher incomes and to have become homeowners – thus, a highly diverse diaspora. This was also confirmed by my interviewees. A senior representative of old diaspora organisation explained:

There is no ‘one size fits all’, so every segment has to be approached in a very different manner. It is very important to understand, whenever doing anything with the diaspora, how diverse it is. There are Ukrainian oligarchs and their families, they are present in the UK and own hundreds of millions of pounds-worth of properties. Then there are Ukrainian big businessmen. The next segment is the Ukrainian professionals like the bankers, the lawyers, who are very well-paid individuals. Another group is academic – students and people who are working in academia. Then there is the old diaspora, which itself has different segments in it. Those who were born outside of Ukraine or in other countries, whose children have been born in the UK, this is a sort of diaspora. Then we have the migrants: legal and irregular migrants. We have this full eclectic mix, very diverse mix [UK14].

Crucially, all these segments complement one another, as the representative of the Embassy of Ukraine in London pointed out: ‘It [the Ukrainian diaspora] has different target groups and spheres of influence’ [UK19].

My research findings showed that, in some cases, there was a clear overlap between the different groups when, for instance, a newly arrived highly skilled labour migrant nevertheless became, first, a member of an old diaspora organisation – the AUGB – and then one of the leaders of the newly founded ‘London Euromaidan’. Therefore, my findings challenge the neat distinction between immigrant communities and diasporas and the narrow conceptualisation of diaspora based on their historic roots. This approach implies that the idea of diaspora ‘in itself’ is derived from members’ historic roots only. Instead, I suggest considering diaspora ‘for itself’, instead taking peoples’ concrete engagement in diasporic activities and identities as the defining moment, no matter whether their ancestors had migrated or whether they themselves have migrated only recently. For these reasons, I distinguish between old and new diasporas.

The diaspora population in Poland

As in the UK, the majority of my interviews in Poland reveal that the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland is quite diverse and segmented. First of all, there is a Ukrainian minority – the ‘conventional’ or ‘old’ Ukrainian diaspora in Poland – formed prior to independence in 1991 and represented by the Ukrainians’ Union in Poland (Związek Ukraińców w Polsce). The Association of Ukrainians in Poland was founded in 1990 as a descendant of the Ukrainian Social and Cultural Society (USKT), established in 1956. It was the only community institution in post-war Poland which was allowed to engage in Ukrainian cultural and educational activities until the 1980s.

Notably, Ukrainians are the fourth-largest minority in Poland – a distinctive feature of the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland. According to a 2011 survey, this diaspora consists of 51 000 people (Central Statistical Office in Poland 2011). Again as in the UK, there is a new post-independence Ukrainian diaspora in Poland, made up of a combination of people who emigrated after 1991. The number of Ukrainian nationals (including ethnic Ukrainians) who work in Poland either permanently or temporarily has been significantly increasing since the 1990s (Tyma 2018). This flow consists mainly of labour migrants, students, professionals and undocumented migrants. There are different estimates of the number of Ukrainians in Poland – according to the Ukraiński Świat Society in 2015, there were 400 000 (Kunicka 2015). Deschychtsia, the Ukrainian ambassador in Poland, argued that, in 2018, the number of Ukrainians living and working in Poland was over million (quoted in Radio Svoboda 2018). The ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine has contributed to an increase in a new category in Poland – applications for refugee status submitted by Ukrainian citizens.
It is important to stress that, despite segmentation, there is a dialogue and collaboration between the ‘conventional’ old diaspora and the new diaspora, as stated by the representative of a new diaspora organisation in Warsaw:

*They [old diaspora] collaborate with us, they see potential in us – Ukrainians from Ukraine, because one of the challenges for them is assimilation. Their children speak Polish at school, and only at home speak Ukrainian. We are native speakers and by communicating with us in Ukrainian they improve their Ukrainian language proficiency. On two occasions we organised major events together with the Association of Ukrainians in Poland – Ukraine’s Independence Day, this year and last year [P5].*

At the same time, a representative of the old diaspora organisation in Warsaw confirmed that:

*We collaborate with the organisation ‘Nash Vybir’ ['Our Choice’], which was founded by new-comers, highly educated Ukrainian migrants. They are people who work at universities, graduated from universities or have some scholarships in Poland. They differ considerably from the previous migration wave in 1990 [P7].*

Another representative of the new diaspora in Warsaw was very positive about the old diaspora and pointed out that there was a lot to learn from it:

*When they came here first, it was not easy, they had to be very patient. Newcomers must learn from the old diaspora. Because we are [newcomers] ‘hot’ people, we want everything at once and immediately. And if there is no result we are quickly disappointed, whereas the old diaspora were more patient. We have to learn it from them. We do not appreciate that, in the past, everything was different [P20].*

Generally, all groups or segments in both countries engage in a variety of activities, have different target groups and spheres of influence and partly compete with, but also complement, one another. However, what they have in common is concern about the affairs of the country of origin, Ukraine. From my interviews with different representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, it became clear that, in both cases and to a greater or lesser extent, the Ukrainian diaspora displays some divisions, conflicts and differences, thus echoing Satzewich’s (2002) description. For instance, a representative of the new diaspora in Warsaw revealed that:

*Young people here are very creative, whereas the old diaspora do not create new innovative things. They do not organise activities for the newcomers because they do not understand them. Therefore, we are very divided in Warsaw [P3].*

Differences between newcomers and more-settled immigrants were reflected in the comments of another representative of the new diaspora in Warsaw:

*Within the last 10 years there have been lots of changes here. Those Ukrainians who were born here [in Poland] lived a very quiet life, made some money but now feel uncomfortable. Their importance is decreasing. They have their own problems which are more related to history. Labour migrants, students or newcomers have different kinds of problem [P14].*

Several interviewees mentioned the division and conflict between migrant organisations in Warsaw:
The division has also deepened due to the Euromaidan. In the beginning, the Euromaidan united all of us but, later, there was a division and many misunderstandings appeared. Everyone started discussing who has done more. One organisation accused another of being ‘Kremlin agents’.

On the one hand, there are organisations ‘X’ and ‘Y’ and, on the other, there is the organisation ‘Z’. When there was a celebration of Ukraine’s Independence Day, a picnic was organised by X, while Z organised the Vyshyvanka March. They deliberately organised these events on the same day and at the same time [P3].

The representative of the new diaspora in Warsaw was also critical of the conflict and made it clear that ‘this problem hinders the development of the Ukrainian community in Poland. It would be better to act together’ [P3].

The Euromaidan: the emergence of a diasporic civil society in the UK and Poland

The Euromaidan, the subsequent occupation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine have all mobilised activists, volunteers, associations and various NGOs and foundations but have also inspired previously non-active Ukrainians abroad and triggered a unique response and powerful wave of diasporic activities in the UK and Poland. All actors quickly responded to the events in Ukraine – almost every Ukrainian NGO in London and Warsaw and many active citizens in the two countries were pulling together to help and support Ukraine. The great majority of my interviewees agreed that the Ukrainian community has united and grown stronger due to events in Ukraine. A representative of the new diaspora in London revealed:

What we have seen is this joint effort of all the migrants – those who came long ago, more recently and even more recently – to join forces and support the Revolution of Dignity and unite as a front to oppose the Russian annexation of Crimea. So, if there is anything positive to come out of the tragic and horrendous events in Ukraine then it is that our community has grown stronger [UK3].

The mobilisation of civil society has been remarkable in terms of the levels of engagement and participation across all segments of the Ukrainian diaspora. A number of my interviewees agreed that, due to Euromaidan and the war in Eastern Ukraine, diaspora members united their efforts and activities. A representative of the new diaspora in Warsaw observed:

When the Euromaidan started, many people who were friends and trusted one another assembled in the square. This encouraged and drove other people to join in. A common enemy united different groups in Poland – the older diaspora, young people and newcomers. When the situation in Ukraine deteriorated, all were united [P18].

On the one hand, traditional diaspora groups reported a surge in members, participants and activities. On the other, almost every Ukrainian NGO and many active citizens in the UK and Poland pulled together to help and support individual victims, civil society, the army and Ukraine in general. A representative of the new diaspora in London explains:

When the Euromaidan started, the old diaspora became very active and they mobilised. There were more joint efforts, I remember petitions we signed together – we collected signatures. I remember the ‘March for
Peace’ – up to 10 000 people turned up and it was organised with the help of the old diaspora. The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain and the Association of Ukrainian Women in Great Britain were very proactive. They were sending parcels to the front line, to kids, to families [UK9].

Finally, ‘The Revolution of Dignity’ brought together different and often scattered diaspora and civil-society groups who had not previously collaborated.

I think that the Maidan and the war in Eastern Ukraine mobilised people here. I could say about myself that, before all this happened, I did not do much. There were people who organised meetings, Ukrainian evenings etc. Now there are many people who come and are ready to help. I am sure that the war has changed us and Ukrainians have realised that they have to do something [P13].

Thus, due to the events in Ukraine, the country’s diaspora has mobilised, grown stronger and became more united, whilst transforming from more inward-looking to more outward-looking communities which, as a result, are now engaging more and more critically with Ukrainian affairs. These activities can thus be conceptualised as a diasporic civil society.

The diaspora contribution to Ukraine’s development

Most of the diaspora members retain strong emotional, financial and familial connections with their homeland. They are also well integrated in their host countries, with the potential and willingness to contribute to its development, poverty reduction and economic growth. A well-engaged diaspora may help governments and communities to resolve a crisis, deal with its humanitarian consequences and contribute to post-crisis recovery and rehabilitation. The transfer of diaspora skills can strengthen and build health, education, justice and other institutions in a crisis-affected country; diaspora members can, in turn, mobilise other support for the rehabilitation of the country of origin.

My research findings showed that the Ukrainian diaspora in the UK and Poland has the ambition and willingness as well as the resources and power to contribute to the homeland’s development. However, interaction with the Ukrainian diaspora is sporadic and unstructured, and its members are rarely included or consulted in the design of policies or decision-making processes. Members of the diaspora are often perceived as ‘money senders’. However, what are often not emphasised enough are the other forms through which the diaspora provides valuable contributions to the economic development of the homeland, such as trade and investment, job creation, the transfer of know-how and innovation and promotion of the country globally, etc. Effective diaspora engagement relies on two-way communication, with benefits achieved only when working jointly on common development goals. Although many of this potential remains largely untapped, the diaspora is considered as one of the key players in the development of a homeland. Here I discuss some of the key means of influence and the variety of contributions which the diaspora has made to Ukraine.

Economic influences: from humanitarian to development assistance

One of the most important influences which a diaspora can have on its country of origin is through economic contribution. Private remittances from the diaspora can help individuals and families to survive during conflict and to rebuild their lives afterwards. The great majority of my interviewees agreed that remittances by individuals constitute the most sizeable and tangible form of Ukrainian diaspora contribution to development.
From the interviews and observations and, by referring to the categorisation offered by Van Hear and Cohen (2017), it became evident that diaspora engagement in Ukraine tends to be privately orientated towards family and the known community rather than concerned with broad societal renewal. This orientation toward recovery and development – implicit and rarely articulated – is largely private, focused more on fostering the survival of and supporting kin and community, rather than geared to notions of recovery and development led by the state, which they often mistrust.

Recognising the importance of remittances by individuals as a reliable source of funds in the development context, in this section I focus on the humanitarian aid and development assistance which the Ukrainian diaspora has provided for the homeland. Remittances, on their own, will not result in development if the conditions for those sending and those receiving remittances are not conducive to development.

In the context of the Euromaidan and the subsequent and ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian diaspora efforts in the UK and Poland are directed towards the provision of humanitarian aid. It should be stressed that organising humanitarian aid is not the monopoly of skilled members of the intellectual diaspora only; instead, all diaspora groups make contributions to the home country. Many low-skilled or even undocumented migrants in both countries actively contributed to activities like the provision of humanitarian aid. An old diaspora representative in London summarises the situation thus:

One of the things I was very proud of when the Euromaidan started in Ukraine was that each and every Ukrainian community group was doing its bit. The Ukrainian Medical Association in the UK took over medical issues, issues with hospitals, wounded people. ‘London Euromaidan’ had people to collect, fundraise and get supplies for the front line, for volunteering battalions. At the same time, people from the same group who had skills in networking would approach the media and talk in front of cameras and microphones to raise awareness. Others with skills and networks would go to parliament and raise issues [there] [UK3].

Although the Ukrainian diaspora continues to engage in a number of important issues in Ukraine, the scope of their engagement has shifted as events have unfolded. At the beginning of the Euromaidan movement, solidarity activities were organised but, when things turned violent, humanitarian aid became a major field of activity; this gained further importance due to the war in Eastern Ukraine, when people were wounded in the fighting. As explained by one of my interviewees:

It all started with the organisation of the mini-Maidan near our Embassy [in Warsaw], then I went for two weeks to Ukraine to be on the Maidan in Kiev. I went there two days before they started shooting at Maidan. It was end of January. Later, in February, wounded Ukrainian soldiers were brought to Warsaw. We organised a mini-chain of the volunteers in Warsaw. Someone was cooking, someone was dealing with the documents, translations, others were dealing with the accommodation of the wounded after their stay in hospital. Then we organised a concert with fundraising for the Maidan. Every member of the community was mobilised: those who came here to work long term, those who came here for one to two months and those who were born here [P20].

Since the start of Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine, new organisations have been created, in both the UK and Poland, which aimed to support specific stakeholders in Ukraine in multiple ways. For instance, many were helping Ukrainian soldiers and volunteers by providing military and medical aid, whilst others were providing humanitarian aid to and helping more than 1.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). The ‘new diaspora’ representative of the British-Ukrainian organisation which supports people suffering from armed
conflict and the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, including the injured and wounded, orphaned children, the elderly, IDPs and families who lost their breadwinners, shared her experience:

*The first time we came up with this idea [of volunteering] was more than one year ago, when we saw how many people in Ukraine were injured and wounded. Being very active since Euromaidan started, we had actually experienced the fact that our government and state could not be very helpful and we decided to do what we could, what possibilities there were for us to help. Several months later we decided to start the process of registration and, at the same time, began to do some fundraising to try to deliver some help already to Kiev military hospital. Gradually we developed three main areas of assistance. First, help with prosthetics and with providing medical treatment. Second, help to families and IDPs. The third area was help for children who had lost a parent during the war. I would say we have a fourth area as well – we try to help hospitals by delivering medical equipment [UK9].*

As noted before, not only organisations but many individuals in both countries are actively involved in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. It has to be stressed that a number of interviewees confirmed Marienstras’ (1989) argument that ‘time has to pass’ before we can know that any community that has migrated ‘is really a diaspora’ and strongly emphasised this temporal dimension of diaspora formation. One Ukrainian volunteer in Poland (a representative of the new diaspora in Warsaw) explained how her diasporic consciousness had been formed:

*I have been living in Poland for 15 years. I arrived here in 2000 when I was 10 years old. Now I am 25 years old. I received my Master’s degree in International Relations here. I was not involved in any volunteerism for Ukraine before the Maidan. I have been helping some children from the orphanage, some animals, but I haven’t had anything to do with Ukrainian people. It needed some time to develop. I lived and studied in Lublin, after I entered University in Wroclaw and lived there for one year. Later, when I moved to Warsaw I got to know the Ukrainian diaspora; I got to know people who maintained Ukrainian traditions and were involved in all sorts of activities. The Ukrainian community that lives here maintains Ukrainian traditions, probably even more than Ukrainians in Ukraine. It was before Euromaidan and I had a big wish to do something but did not know what I could do. Then the Euromaidan started and all the people who wanted to help united. They wanted to help from here [Poland] as much as they could [P20].*

Another individual in Warsaw first started volunteering at an individual level but later united her efforts with those of the Monastery and proceeded with the organisation that helped people in Ukraine. She explained:

*Last year I decided that I had to do something. I decided to organise, together with the Polish Monastery, the collection of humanitarian aid, namely – clothes. The priest announced that we would collect clothes for IDPs in Ukraine and many Polish people donated clothes. We collected 50 huge sacks and all of them were delivered to my home. I was sorting all this together with my friends. It took us three days. Then we gave these clothes to the Foundation ‘Open Dialogue’, and they delivered them to Ukraine. This how my volunteering started [P13].*

However, it should be pointed out that the contribution of a diaspora to the development of its countries of origin goes far beyond financial remittances, including the transfer of skills and knowledge, entrepreneurship, trade, investments, network building and bridging cultural divides.
Social and cultural influences

Members of the diaspora have, in many cases, acquired not only financial but also human capital, such as skills, networks and ideas that can be of use to their countries of origin. In addition, they can capitalise on their ‘insider status’ in two countries, which may allow them to understand the particular issues facing their countries of origin, while leveraging their resources and influence in their countries of settlement.

The great majority of my interviewees agreed that social remittances are extremely important for Ukraine. A remarkable example of social influence is an academic project entitled Leadership Education and Development (LEAD), organised by Young City Club in 2014, an arm of the London-based non-profit organisation Ukrainian-British City Club (UBCC). LEAD aims to develop and support talented Ukrainian students who are keen to drive positive changes in their native country by implementing social initiatives or pursuing public-sector careers. Within the framework of the programme, Ukrainian students spend 10 days in London gaining exposure to and insights into the professional environment, work ethics and corporate culture of the UK’s public- and private-sector institutions. Through attendance at topical presentations, participation in workshops, case studies and group projects, participants hone their communication, organisation and political skills, and explore concepts of transparency, compliance and public governance. Under the patronage of UBCC and with the endorsement of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, LEAD endeavours to motivate young Ukrainians to learn from the best Western practices and to use this knowledge to reform systems, institutions and values in their native Ukraine.

Another example of how social remittances are used is the project Children of Heroes run by The Ukrainian Youth Association of Great Britain. This latter organised several summer camps in the UK for children who had lost a parent during the war. For a number of years, Ukrainian children have been invited to the UK to experience the summer camp at Tarasivka – a unique opportunity to meet their peers of Ukrainian parentage who were born in Great Britain, and to enjoy a brief respite from the continuing turmoil in their lives at home in Ukraine.

It is important to note that, in their daily activities, the volunteering Ukrainians adhere to European values such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, transparency or non-corruption, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. European values are not only shared among the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland and the UK but are diffused in interactions with the authorities and non-state actors in Ukraine.

In December, I went to the Maidan in Kiev for the first time. I have joined the self-defence of the Maidan. It was difficult to combine work in Warsaw and my Maidan activities. I also was responsible for the security of the volunteers. We were in charge of gathering information about human rights violations [P3].

Another value of great relevance for volunteers’ own activities is transparency. The Ukrainian activists wanted to support the idea of the Europeanisation of Ukraine. Therefore, most of the Ukrainian activists aim to be transparent in their own activities and publish on-line progress reports in order to set precedences and only cooperate with Ukrainian partners whom they consider to be reliable.

One more sphere in which the diaspora can play a significant role and contribute to the home country is the promotion of Ukraine abroad. A representative of the old diaspora in the UK highlighted that:

The diaspora can help to promote Ukraine, which we do a lot from the cultural aspect and also to try re-educate people who still think that Kiev is Russian or that Ukraine is part of Russia. And also, I am not sure that I heard much from the Ukrainian government emphasising the Ukrainian aspect of things and this
war, the Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine, has helped a bit, but there are still occasions when people still do not understand the differences between Ukraine and Russia [UK10].

At the same time a representative of the new diaspora suggested that:

We must offer more to modern people, because sometimes we are more concentrated on our culture, on our national clothes, songs. But we have a modern culture as well and it is not represented at exhibitions here [in the UK]. If there are exhibitions, they are sponsored by Firtash.² Recently we were invited to Glasgow by a Scottish charity to show photos from our exhibition and we were asked to present a short video of Ivan Kravchysyn’s ‘Letters to the front’. I travelled overnight by bus with S. to Glasgow; we did not sleep, then had to prepare the exhibition. We came back to London by plane and next day we went back to work. On the Sunday we had another charity event. Sometimes it is too much – we all have ordinary jobs – volunteering we do in our free time [UK11].

Cultural diplomacy using diasporic communities as facilitators of interaction between states has long been important. For example, the Ukrainian Institute in London has been making a big contribution to the development of Ukraine.

It [the Ukrainian Institute] is ‘working de-facto as Ukraine’s cultural institute and serving a platform for debate about Ukraine, engaging key influencers in the UK, bringing Ukrainian artists and thinkers over to the UK, working with leading UK institutions, such as British Library, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, promoting Ukrainian-Jewish understanding, running Ukrainian language school, initiating a roundtable on Ukraine culture policies in Chatham House [UK19].

Thus, the Ukrainian diaspora became an important stakeholder actively contributing social and cultural remittances: ideas, new values, expectations and social capital that can have an impact on post-war reconstruction and the county’s development.

Political influences

There are various channels of political engagement open to diaspora members. One such route is through lobbying their host governments to take action in some manner vis-à-vis the conflict. On the other hand, lobbying and awareness-raising could have the more general purpose of promoting international attention to a homeland conflict. The Ukrainian diaspora turned out to be a source of the soft powers of the country – for example, these actors spontaneously act as voluntary ambassadors and cultural diplomats abroad. Their lobbying activities had the general purpose of raising international attention to the war in their homeland conflict, challenging the partly neutral international stance over the conflict and specifically counter-misperceptions of Ukraine and the conflict and (Russian) misinformation. At present, the Ukrainian diaspora is firmly involved in political activities, as a representative of the new diaspora in London explained:

We became very active in political terms. Another area of Euromaidan work is political lobbying. Our activists attend different sessions in parliament, speak to members of parliament [UK4].

A representative of a new diaspora organisation in Warsaw stressed that one of their most important activities is a political one:
This includes the preparation of official letters and petitions to Ukrainian and international politicians who can influence the situation in Ukraine. We also organise political events, marches and the picketing of embassies. In addition, we lobby for Ukrainian interests. We have good contacts and have established good relationships with Polish and European politicians who support Ukraine [P10].

Furthermore, almost all my interviewees agreed that the diaspora has the ability to counter misinformation on Ukraine. As expressed by one of them:

The other thing the diaspora might be able to help with is trying to prevent or stem the flow of misinformation about Ukraine. So, the diaspora can fight against all this misinformation. It needs to be organised and coordinated in some way because this is very important. There was a lot of misinformation or disinformation around and that needs to be fought at every step. Because if there is no response to that then people start believing [UK10].

The diaspora is also understood to be an active part of civil society in Ukraine. Its integration could thus be important for national development. For instance, the representative of the Ukrainian Embassy in the UK viewed the diaspora as an ‘ambassador’ of goodwill for the country of origin: ‘Diaspora is an active part of civil society in Ukraine. Every Ukrainian is an ambassador of Ukraine and everybody should contribute’ [UK20]. My interviewees confirmed that they have both the willingness and the ability to represent Ukraine:

Often there are no official representatives of Ukraine and we try to fill this niche. We also approach the Polish mass media, organise different events and attract the attention of the Polish media to Ukraine. We are often invited on TV to comment on some event. I believe it is very positive when, on Polish TV, Ukrainians speak about Ukraine but not as a sort of ‘expert’ who was only once in Ukraine. It helps to show real the Ukraine, not the Ukraine that was shown in books or articles [P10].

Crucially, in addition to providing substantial aid to Ukraine, the diaspora has been at the forefront in supporting the country diplomatically. For example, the AUGB urged Westminster to ‘freeze all Russian assets in the UK and EU and to provide urgent medical and military assistance to Ukraine’s government’ (Robertson 2014). In terms of future post-war activities of the Ukrainian diaspora, an activist in London explained: ‘We will still be active. We will still have the victims of war, they will need further assistance. They will need humanitarian aid’ [UK4].

Finally, the diaspora became a fairly critical actor of development in Ukraine, aiming to maintain the momentum of the Maidan revolution:

We still have to communicate with the governments in Ukraine and here and make sure that we help the government to stay on track with reforms and keep up the dialogue with the British government in order to continue support for Ukraine [UK4].

The above demonstrates the Ukrainian diaspora’s huge contribution to the economic, political and social development of Ukraine. The diaspora claims to be recognised as an important stakeholder. If the Ukrainian government and the diaspora work together, utilising each other’s strengths, they can, collectively, have a greater impact on Ukraine’s development and in reforming the country.
Ukraine: perceptions of diaspora, the realities and the prospects for collaboration

The growing prominence of diaspora communities around the world has led to increased recognition of the role they play in the domestic affairs of their respective homelands and as global actors and agents of change in their own right (Odermatt 2016; Vullnetari 2013; White, Grabowska, Kaczmarczyk and Slany 2018). However, the Ukrainian diaspora seems to have been less successful in becoming involved in the politics of the homeland than other diasporas (Satzewich 2002). It seems to have had little influence on developments in Ukraine – for instance, on reforming the country after the end of communism – unlike Lithuania, where diaspora returnees from the USA joined the first post-communist government.

The Euromaidan protest movement unified Ukrainians from otherwise-diverse political, ethnic, religious and socio-economic backgrounds. We observe the mobilisation of different actors of the Ukrainian diaspora in the UK and Poland who are engaging diaspora and international migrant communities in helping Ukraine. It should be noted that some positive developments in terms of diaspora influence took place in Ukraine after the Euromaidan protest. The most prominent examples are the Ukrainian diaspora returnees who have had or continue to hold high-level positions in the Ukrainian government, such as Dr Ulana Suprun, acting Health Minister of Ukraine since 2016, who was previously the Director of Humanitarian Initiatives of the Ukrainian World Congress, and Natalie Ann Jaresko – Ukrainian former Minister of Finance.

However, from my interviews with diaspora members it became clear that they believe that the Ukrainian government does not consider them to be a significant development actor, and the recent focus on remittances, although good in itself, has further overshadowed the development issues that the diaspora is involved in.

Despite the strong connections between the diaspora and the country of origin, the data collected during my fieldwork allow me to identify several challenges which have implications for homeland–diaspora relations and which add to the negative perception of the diaspora by certain members of local communities. The first challenge is the perception held by many in the homeland that the diaspora is trying to come in from the outside and teach: ‘Why are you teaching us? We know better’ [UK14]. The second challenge relates to two different contradictory perceptions of the Ukrainian diaspora. As an expert from Ukraine explained: ‘On one side, the diaspora is perceived as beggars who constantly want something and, on the other hand, as a “cash cow”’ [U2]. However, there were some positive shifts in perceptions of the diaspora in Ukraine, as a Ukrainian expert explained:

*I think there are different stages of country development. And now society is getting older, more responsible and there are some positive changes in perceptions. In the USSR, emigration abroad was considered as a betrayal. So, within 20 years society went through big changes from a closed society to being more open. Because at that time those who left the country were traitors and those who came to the country were spies. There was a lot of mistrust of foreigners. Even though those perceptions of migrants have changed, Ukraine is still far from understanding that the diaspora is a powerful resource. But there is understanding that migration is a natural process and not a crime* [U3].

Overall, Ukraine’s collaboration with Ukrainians abroad was highly criticised by the Ukrainian community. A representative of the old Ukrainian diaspora in Warsaw described it as ‘two parallel worlds’. Other interviewees added that there is very little understanding of the scale of activities done in this sphere and that a dialogue between the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian communities abroad is needed. Practically, such collaboration is almost non-existent and is somewhat declarative.

In addition, several representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora complained that Ukraine is probably the only country in the world that does not support its own diaspora. As one representative of an old diaspora explained:
We don’t have any expectations of the Ukrainian state. Diaspora always relies on itself... Ukrainian society here (in London) always supported Ukraine in difficult times. When the catastrophe in Chernobyl happened, when there were floods, the diaspora organised fundraising. Also, the diaspora has helped in all the revolutions – The Orange Revolution, in the last Revolution of Dignity. However, unfortunately the Ukrainian state did not support Ukrainians here [UK6].

It has to be stressed that members of the old and the new diaspora have divergent expectations vis-à-vis the Ukrainian government. A representative of the old diaspora pointed out:

We expect nothing. We chose to make this our country and I am British as much as I am Ukrainian. So, I expect nothing from the Ukrainian government; however, we use every opportunity to communicate our strong desire to support their work and we wish them luck in achieving a corruption-free country which is open to Europe. We have no expectations of the Ukrainian government per se, but we obviously have a lot of hopes and dreams that things will settle and the government will function for the purpose of the public and not the oligarchs, as so many people claim [UK8].

Meanwhile the new diaspora has high expectations of the Ukrainian government. One activist from a newly created diasporic organisation in the UK shared his view:

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has to elaborate a concept of collaboration with the Ukrainian diaspora in different countries. The diaspora has to participate in this programme elaboration. A road map and action plan should be prepared together. We are ready to represent Ukraine abroad and work effectively in the lobbying for Ukraine’s interests. On the other hand, feedback is very important for us. We want the Ukrainian authorities to react to our criticism, to work better and more efficiently [UK4].

This demonstrates that the diaspora claims that it is being recognised as an important, almost equal political stakeholder.

Answering the question of whether the Ukrainian diaspora is a positive agent for change, a Ukrainian expert pointed out:

The diaspora might be a positive agent for change. There is no doubt that there is great potential. This is a two-sided issue. I would rather ask whether the state is able to use this agent, whether there is an understanding of this resource. There should be certain mechanisms in place for use of this resource. The diaspora needs support, but not everything depends on money issues. Many problems can be resolved with the help of organisational activities and they do not need to be funded [U2].

The representatives of the diaspora and experts believe that it will take very serious work to build trust between a state and a diaspora. As expressed by a Ukrainian expert:

Today there is no trust in the state. Citizens of Ukrainians who live in Ukraine do not have trust; what can we say about those who are outside Ukraine? If there is no trust, there is no collaboration [U2].

It became clear from the interviewees’ accounts that the Ukrainian diaspora has little trust in Ukraine’s government and politicians. An old diaspora representative in the UK expressed his scepticism:
One of the problems was that there had been no collaboration in the past because of mistrust of the Ukrainian government and I think the Ukrainian government needs to get itself sorted out first. Mistrust is maybe too strong a word but is due to the fact that we did not have confidence in believing in what we were trying to do. You know there are different ambassadors here in Great Britain. Some of them have been very cooperative and wanted to mix with a diaspora, others have been very official and not wanted to mix and to work together. Because I think working together we can do more. If we are always doing our own thing without any coordination, it is really not good, I think [UK10].

The long-term project of building partnerships between governments and diaspora is much more likely to succeed if it has a strong foundation of good communication and trust. Building trust is a necessary element of diaspora engagement strategy (Agunias and Newland 2012).

Conclusion

This study has mapped and discussed the Ukrainian diaspora in the UK and Poland and specifically its role in Ukraine’s development in times of war. We have seen that the Ukrainian diaspora community in the two countries is quite diverse. It has within-group differences and similarities in terms of its historical background, initial migration motives, skills, duration of stay (old and new diasporas) and migratory status. However, in one sense, the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland is distinctly different from that in the UK because in Poland there is a historic Ukrainian ethnic minority, a feature that does not exist in the UK. From the interviews with the Ukrainian diaspora it became evident that, in both cases, to a greater or lesser extent, the Ukrainian diaspora displays divisions, conflicts and differences. It seems that there is competition and thus more division and conflict between migrant organisations in Warsaw than in London, which hinders the development of the Ukrainian community in Poland. This could be due to the personalities of the various leaders as there are no other obvious reasons. One of the key conclusions is that, due to the Euromaidan and the war in Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian diaspora has mobilised, grown stronger and became more united. A fresh surge of diasporic and similar activities was triggered in the UK and Poland. The empirical evidence shows that, due to these events, the Ukrainian diasporas became more powerful and influential. Furthermore, it transformed from more inward- to more outward-looking communities which, as a result, are now engaging more with but also claiming a stake in Ukrainian affairs.

From the interviews with different representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, it became clear that, in both host countries, the diaspora has made an important contribution to Ukraine’s economic, social and political development and has the willingness and potential to support post-war reconstruction efforts. All diaspora groups make contributions to their home countries – they are not a monopoly of skilled/intellectual diaspora members only. These are indeed hugely significant and there is massive potential for increasing this further. However, as became evident from the interviews, despite the fact that the Ukrainian diaspora claims to be recognised as an important stakeholder in the development of Ukraine, one of the most significant barriers to more comprehensive diaspora involvement in development lies in the lack of recognition by the Ukrainian government of the contributions of the Ukrainian diaspora. Ukraine barely engages with its diaspora. The main challenges to diaspora engagement with affairs in Ukraine have been described as a lack of commitment by the origin country, notably its authorities, mistrust between governments and some diaspora organisations and, in some cases, a lack of unity among diaspora members.

To address this discrepancy, the first step could be to build trust and then, second, to implement other activities depending on the diaspora’s potential and on state needs. Furthermore, in order to benefit from the
resources of the diaspora, the government should make diaspora engagement one of its foreign policy priorities. The major policy challenge is to understand how the Ukrainian diaspora can be better engaged to support development and foreign and socio-economic policies in Ukraine and link to and reintegrate the Ukrainian diaspora in the future development of the country.

This study generates a number of further questions that are relevant for research on the Ukrainian diaspora. How can the diaspora’s motivation to engage in Ukrainian matters be maintained? Which determinants drive people to fade out from diaspora activities? How can the diaspora’s engagement in development be stimulated? Finally, what are the diaspora’s engagement determinants and dynamics?

Notes

1 UK14 is a code for the interviewee, where UK refers to the UK, 14 is the number of the respondent, P refers to Poland and U refers to Ukraine.

2 Dmytro Firtash is a Ukrainian oligarch, highly influential during Viktor Yanukovych administration. Firtash long seen as pro-Russian, has lost considerable influence in Ukraine since the Maidan revolution.

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References


Snakes or Ladders? Job Quality Assessment among Temp Workers from Ukraine in Hungarian Electronics

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In contrast to the usual integration of migrant workers in the ‘bottom jobs’ on the labour market, the employment of Ukrainian workers in Hungarian electronics plants seems to take place in a more beneficial way. With the active mediation of temporary (temp) agencies, Ukrainian migrant workers are offered regular blue-collar assembly work, together with the same social rights and benefits as their local Hungarian colleagues. Relying, in our analysis, on the literature on industrial sociology, migration research and global value chains, we are developing a critical perspective in which migration and employment are not seen as separate spheres but as mutually reinforcing each other. We combine bottom-up empirical research based on interviews with workers and a sectoral inquiry on industrial and employment relations in the temp agency sector supplying multinational corporations. Our main argument is that complex contracting also means subtle controlling. Such contracting is not the cheapest form but it creates a different, efficient employment regime with dependent, controllable, flexibly available, ‘fluid’ employees. Employee respondents described their position as dependent, ‘out of control’ and a temporary earning opportunity. Devoid of clear mechanisms for controlling their work conditions or growth within the job, all respondents turned to a more instrumental approach, in which they invested in building up social capital through friendships, networks and personal relationships. Obtaining Hungarian citizenship and learning the language were two other main strategies for dealing with insecurity. Their efforts correspond with and reinforce a more globally integrated but ethnically motivated immigration regime, characteristic of post-socialist Hungary.

Keywords: migration; precarious employment; temporary work agencies; job quality; Hungary; Ukraine

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Introduction

There has been a recent increase in the number of workers from Ukraine in manufacturing jobs in Hungary, especially in large multinational corporations (MNC) in electronics and automotives. Here, in contrast to the usual integration of migrant workers into the ‘bottom jobs’ on the labour market, we observe, initially, that the placement of workers from Ukraine occurs in a more beneficial way. Workers with Ukrainian citizenship are regularly allocated to blue-collar assembly work, receive valid residency permits and, at least in theory, have access to social benefits in the same way as their Hungarian colleagues. While we do not exclude the possibility that straightforward exploitative integration of workers from Ukraine is still taking place to some extent in the Hungarian labour market, we ask in this paper what it is which explains the formal upgrade? Assessments from the global value chains literature and the employment relations of migrant workers in core capitalist countries provide us with critical concepts through which to investigate these optimistic claims.

Whereas the formal placement of ‘Ukrainian workers’ is carried out with the active mediation of temporary (temp) agencies, our main aim is to explain the recent shift towards an established, regulated, form of employment for migrant workers. This change means, we claim, more than merely a shift to a more regulated labour ‘import’ – which includes, for instance, a more beneficial form of entry in the Hungarian labour market for third-country workers. This new form of employment is made possible via a complex hiring process, including a new type of worker recruitment from Ukraine and their specific placement in Hungary. As we know from the global value chain (GVC) literature, in recent decades the biggest firms in Hungary generated massive cross-border movements that brought about changes in production processes. Consequently there were somewhat negative changes in the quality of these jobs, especially for migrants, and it is these forms of employment that we assess as precarious. More precisely, our assessment suggests that there are serious limits to the economic and social upgrading of blue-collar jobs for third-country-national (TCN) temp workers in electronics.

We thus take the existing critique in order to discover whether or not it reveals a story beyond what we call ‘a formal upgrade’ for migrant workers. Starting with the motivations which make workers take up these jobs – which include poor employment opportunities in the home country (push factors) – we also examine the workers’ efforts and opportunities to secure a better labour-market position. Analysis of migrant workers’ narratives allows us to see if we can find any truth in this critique. We also examine the enabling conditions (pull factors) leading to the presence of a new type of subcontracted workforce – not only from the perspective of the workers themselves but also from that of intermediaries (temporary work agencies or TWA).

Focusing, in this paper, on a critical understanding of the notions of precariousness and the potential for social upgrade among temp workers from Ukraine in blue-collar manufacturing jobs, we evaluate what these jobs mean for our respondents. In particular, we asked them what opportunities and closures their current jobs offered, how they fitted into their biographical and professional trajectories and what advantages and/or difficulties they encountered in their employment.

Relying, in our analysis, on the industrial-sociological, migration and GVC literatures we are developing a critical perspective in which migration and employment are not seen as separate spheres but as mutually self-reinforcing. Our main argument is that complex contracting leads to obscuring mechanisms of control. While not the cheapest, such contracting creates a different, efficient form and regime of employment with dependent, controllable, flexibly available, ‘fluid’ employees. As we will show, a new kind of labour integration of migrant workers takes place under employer-friendly regulations, whereby employees (whether individuals or groups) have very limited bargaining power. While recruited workers are typically overqualified compared to local workers, they are much less independent and fill jobs as a permanently unskilled workforce. In other words, whereas their temp employers construct (and valorise) ‘Ukranians’ as ‘good workers’ and highlight the mutual benefits for all parties of the employment triangle, we argue that this formal upgrade has a shady side, as it is
conditioned by administrative requirements, social fragmentation, complex employment relations (flexible and triangular) and more precarious working and housing conditions. This leads to controlling practices that limit not only individual or collective bargaining power but also the willingness to be subordinate in a ‘secure’ but dependent, complex employment relation.

At the centre of this relation are TWAs – with specific and wide-ranging characteristics that we will reevaluate. First, TWAs became broker-participants actively shaping this employment form – softening up and changing state regulations in order to comply with the new production needs stemming from a very tight labour market. Second, low standards in the home country (Ukraine) leave the workers entering Hungary not only vulnerable to exploitation but unprepared for this type of employment. This then matches up with the often-negligible care for the extra needs of migrant workers by the host country. Finally, we claim, the context of migration and the exposure to recruiters is the final reason why many workers still evaluate their position as satisfactory.

The paper is structured in the following way. In the next section, we outline the relevant literature, merging it with a more specific overview of the literature on the employment of ‘third-country nationals’ (TCN) in post-socialist Hungary. The third section outlines our methodology, the changing labour-market context in Hungary and the background findings informing our field research. The fourth section will then discuss how our respondents perceived their jobs, contextualising this through their previous experiences and the perceived potential and social position of a given gender, age and family situation. In the final short section we conclude our exercise.

**Pattern(s) of migration and employment of workers from Ukraine in Hungary**

The concept of the dual or segmented labour market is a good starting-point for understanding and analysing changes in the employment of migrant workers, traditionally in lower-paid, labour-intensive jobs – a situation often bordering on informality (see, in particular, Castel 2000; May, Wills, Datta, Evans, Herbert and McIlwaine 2007; Piore 1979). In post-socialist Hungary, the employment of blue-collar migrant workers from non-EU neighbouring countries, especially from Romania, Ukraine and, to lesser extent, Serbia (the former Yugoslavia), followed this logic. In the first two decades of system change, blue-collar jobs for citizens from neighbouring countries were typically available in the most labour-intensive and labour-cost-sensitive sectors.

A very specific feature of the Hungarian immigration regime is its ethnic motivation. In fact, the migration waves are dominated by the movements of ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries (Feischmidt and Zakariás 2010; Melegh 2011). Moreover, immigration has been a highly politicised issue over the last 30 years (e.g. Kántor 2014; Melegh 2016) – peaking since 2016 and embodied in the Hungarian centre-right government’s notorious anti-refugee and anti-immigration campaigns, more broadly directed against the mobility of ‘ethnic others’. This being said, researchers also cannot avoid dealing with the interconnected categories and processes of (constructing) ethnicity and migration. In our research we were faced with the common but obscure use of the category of ‘Ukrainians’ or, at best, ‘Ukrainian workers’ in everyday discourses. For the purposes of this paper, we use the term ‘workers from Ukraine’ to avoid the traps of ethnic essentialisation and to refer to people of any ethnicity who are the holders of Ukrainian passports. This terminology also allows us to include those who have used employment in Hungary in order to obtain Hungarian citizenship (either with or without a Hungarian ethnic background) and who, while our research was carried out, were either on the legal path to naturalisation or had obtained their Hungarian passports but were still employed using their Ukrainian documents. We now provide a short historical overview that should help to reveal the complexity of the overlap between the ethnic and legal citizenship categories and how they are played out in political and public discourse.
In the 1990s, about two-thirds of the immigrants in Hungary declared that they had Hungarian ethnic roots and mobilised individual contacts when making migration decisions (Gödri 2011; Juhász, Csatári and Makara 2010). Census data revealed that, compared to other migrant workers, Ukrainian citizens residing in Hungary had a relatively low employment rate and high unemployment rate (Gödri 2011; Gödri, Soltész and Bodacz-Nagy 2014). Based on the number of work permits issued in 2009, there was a higher presence of workers from Ukraine in the more labour-intensive and seasonal (cyclical) sectors of agriculture, construction and other services (see, e.g., Langerné Rédei 2011). While Ukrainian citizens were the most numerous foreigners with work permits, they were also the most likely to fill the unskilled job vacancies (Hárs 2010). Moreover, a cyclical or temporal employment pattern was also present – e.g. in agriculture and construction (Pakurár, Oláh and Cehla 2012) – as many workers opted for seasonal employment, also spending substantial periods of time in their home country (e.g. the winter months, harvest, etc.). In situations of highly personal and informal recruitment patterns, the ratio of undeclared workers from Ukraine was estimated at 40–45 per cent of all workers from Ukraine, typically employed informally in small enterprises, often together with colleagues from the same country (Juhász et al. 2010). Characteristic of labour-intensive small enterprises were poorer working conditions and extended, flexible working hours (Juhász et al. 2010). In a nutshell, in its first two decades as an open economy, Hungary was a net immigration country, with ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries as well as from Ukraine filling blue-collar jobs in the most cost- and labour-intensive sectors (cf. Bertalan 1997; Melegh 2011; Soltész, Erőss, Karácsonyi and Kincses 2014).

Joining the EU in 2004 and the Schengen Zone in 2008 furthered the distance between Hungary and its ethnic minority in Ukraine, although it reinforced the ethnically motivated immigration regime, as it opened mobility to the EU and eventually to the Schengen Zone. As the ethnic Hungarian community in Ukraine was also affected by EU-level restrictive TCN policies, the Hungarian state sought to compensate via the activation of kin-state policies. The Hungarian government resolved to grant preferential access to its ethnic minorities through visas and citizenship, thus satisfying its need for an external labour force and voters ( Çağlar and Ger-eöffy 2008). A culmination of this ethnic-based migration regime occurred after 2010 (Melegh 2011) when a policy document (MPAJ 2011) marked a further turn in Hungarian kin-state politics in which Hungarian ethnic minorities in the bordering countries were seen as valuable political and economic allies. The Hungarian state was to take a proactive role in fostering both the transnational connections and the prosperity of these communities across the border (Erőss, Kovály and Tátrai 2016).

The changing economic conditions and administrative opportunities led to visible transformations in the migratory trends from Ukraine: the numbers indicate a stable growth in immigration from Ukraine up until 2008 and a decline since 2010. This change can be explained only when compared with the rise of Ukrainians who obtained Hungarian citizenship under new beneficial conditions – the number of new Hungarian citizens born in Ukraine doubled from around 20 000 in 2011 to 40 000 in 2014 (Erőss et al. 2016). As the literature indicates, the 2010 amendment to the law, which allowed citizenship without residence in Hungary to be requested, resulted in some 70 000 citizenships issued to Ukrainian citizens between 2011 and 2014, with a further 79 000 applications submitted by June 2016 (Erőss et al. 2016; Soltész and Zimmerer 2014). Some research (and our findings in this project) also indicates that an opportunity provided for ethnic Hungarians also became a general strategy for non-Hungarian ethnicities (mostly in Transcarpathia) seeking ‘to avoid the military draft and economic crisis triggered by the unrest in Eastern Ukraine’ (Erőss et al. 2016: 12). Unfortunately, we do not have more specific data on the employment of workers from Ukraine who obtained citizenship.

Since 2010, emigration from Hungary has also intensified (Hárs 2016; Sík 2012) and thus, since 2015, a new feature of the Hungarian labour market has been a labour-force shortage. Whereas the overall registered number of immigrant blue-collar workers’ jobs dropped radically at the beginning of 2008, there has been
a rise, since 2015, in employer-registered manufacturing jobs carried out by Ukrainian nationals, as we discuss later in this paper. This was also the case in multinational manufacturing companies – e.g. in electronics.

In the Hungarian electronics industry, as in other locations in the global semi-periphery, the subsidiary companies of original equipment manufacturers typically specialise in ‘medium-skilled, mixed production technologies of work’ (Gereffi 2005). Work here necessitates quite advanced, lean production technologies, clean working conditions and some variation in skill levels. Since the early 2000s, a specific feature of many Hungarian electronics manufacturers or subsidiaries was their high reliance on temp agency workers, including non-Hungarian citizens; this reliance also went hand-in-hand with an internal fragmentation of the workforce. In electronics and, generally, in export-driven manufacturing, basic wages are low (calculated as hour-based remuneration) and there is a strong incentive for the workforce to be flexible in order to receive employee premia, compensation for overtime or shift work, performance bonuses and other non-wage benefits as well as an agreement in order for workers to maximise their incomes. Blue-collar employees on the assembly line typically have highly limited opportunities for upward mobility in the company hierarchy.

In the context of targeted, employer-driven encompassing recruitment strategies, there was thus a new major intermediary actor, taking over some classic employer roles: temporary work agencies (TWA). In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the staffing industry found a niche in the expanding foreign direct investment (FDI) driven subsidiaries of multinational firms (e.g. Coe, Johns and Ward 2007; Peck, Theodore and Ward 2005). Temp agencies followed the employment hunger and specific employment strategies of the MNC-driven industries of electronics and car manufacturing, also attracting workers from abroad. The temp sector has been a fast-growing sector over the last 15 years, starting off from a low base around the time of Hungary’s EU accession, peaking with the global economic crisis and rebounding and stabilising since 2010. Dominantly, temp agencies employed semi-skilled workers and leased them out to large original equipment manufacturers and their direct suppliers – contract manufacturers (Meszmann 2016). The 2012 Labour Code of Hungary transposed Directive 2008/104/EC on the equal treatment of temporary agency workers and, since December 2016, there can no longer be a difference in wages between employed temp workers and core workers. While, originally, temp workers had less job security and lower average incomes, the implementation of the 2011 EU regulative in December 2016 eliminated wage differentials, while the tight labour market in practice made employment more secure in general. Nevertheless, temporary agency workers (TAWs) have, in effect, two employers and it is only in some aspects that the separation of rights and responsibilities is regulated by law. As in other cases, in certain elements, such as setting working hours, either the TWA or the user company can exercise such employer rights. Both the TWA and a user company are legally bound to inform the employee under the right to information; however, there is a separation of responsibilities for providing the different types of information; some are defined by law, while others can be defined by the contracting parties. While securing general safety and working conditions was the obligation of the user-company indirect employer, in terms of legal issues, contracting and the payment of social contributions was the responsibility of TWAs.

We do not have definite data but there are some indicative registers related to the number of workers from Ukraine employed by Hungarian temp agencies in manufacturing. The number of TCNs registered by employers indicates a sudden rise of workers from Ukraine between 2016 and 2017 – some 3 246 Ukrainian citizens workers declared in 2017, a significant increase compared to the 786 cases registered in 2016. In this period, the number of foreign temp-agency workers registered by the agencies themselves seems also to have doubled: in 2017 there were a maximum of 3 976 TCN temp agency workers – i.e. workers employed in the more-general sector of administrative and production service provision (NFSZ 2018). Additionally, a ‘visa-free regime’ introduced in June 2017 for Ukrainian citizens, holders of biometric passports, allowed them 90 days of travel in Schengen countries. Although it was designed for travel purposes only and did not give permission
to work. Ukrainian citizens could use it as a springboard to employment or an opportunity for short-term seasonal work. As such, this falls within the 3-month Hungarian probation period for work, and the numbers benefiting from it do not, therefore, usually figure in employment statistics.

Thus, while in recent years there has been an increased focus in the literature on Hungarian emigration and atypical employment forms, relatively little attention has been given to new, changing patterns of immigrant workers’ employment – not only in Hungary but also in other semi-peripheral Eastern European countries. In Visegrad countries, for example, the number of workers – TCNs – increased significantly but there was also some variation in the legal forms of employment and conditions of stay. This lack of scholarly attention is, nevertheless, surprising since, in the ‘core’ capitalist countries, the topic has become increasingly important in recent decades. Hence scholars introduced the category of new labour migration and the central role of employers as not only passive hirers but also major organisers, setting in motion complex employment strategies (Rodriguez 2006). Many related research topics appeared, in both Visegrad countries and in the EU. For example, Thompson, Newsome and Commander (2013) inquired about UK employers’ being increasingly willing and, indeed, preferring to employ workers from CEE. While, at first, employers described Eastern European employees as overqualified, committed and industrious, Thompson et al. (2013) highlighted other, hidden, structural reasons for employers’ preference for migrant workers, also stressing the industry context and employment needs. Understanding companies’ employment strategies more structurally, they highlighted the importance of appreciating the ‘perspectives, rationales and discursive resources of key labour market actors’ (Thompson et al. 2013: 130). Similarly, others such as MacKenzie and Forde (2009) and Findlay, Kalleberg and Warhurst (2013) point to the employer-driven rhetorical construct of the ‘good worker’. In order to find a balanced assessment, Thompson et al. (2013) also introduced the analytical concept of the ‘vulnerable worker’. In short, they posit that immigrant labour is not only ‘cheaper’ but is also subject to stricter social control, which makes immigrants preferential employer targets.

MacKenzie and Forde (2009), however, warn against the dangers of victimising the discourses surrounding migrant workers but shed light on the institutionalised match between ‘precarious work’ and ‘temporary migrants’. Counterposing migrant workers as active subjects, many scholars (e.g. Andrijašević and Sacchetto 2016; Kalleberg 2009; Thompson et al. 2013) also highlight the vertical and spatial mobility of workers, making them active and not passive agents (see also Chan, Pun and Selden 2013). While vulnerability, for Pollert and Charlwood (2009), is also key, Kalleberg (2009) and Anderson (2010), among many others, use precarious work or precariousness in order to grasp the institutional insecurity of the unstable and atypical employment that is also common among migrant workers. Anderson (2010) also points to the critical importance of ‘immigration control’ as a pervasive variable negatively affecting the job status of immigrant workers. The dimension of workers in a transnational employment context and the perceived vs actual temporality/vulnerability issue is thus a key fix.

In this respect, the state infrastructure in both sending and receiving countries has been increasingly in focus, although less so in the EU than elsewhere (see e.g. Lindquist, Xiang and Yeoh 2012). To understand the nature of transnational worker placement, the existing literature on transnational migration informs us of the importance of the state infrastructure behind emigration and immigration – i.e. of both sending and receiving countries (see, in particular, Gordon 2015; Williams 2012). Similarly, with the privatisation and liberalisation of employment services (see, for example, Nyberg Sørensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013), there is also increasing attention given to the role of intermediaries, including temp agencies that actively shape the governance structures of transnational migration (Groutsis, van den Broek and Harvey 2015; Lindquist et al. 2012). Last but not least, Jones (2014) argues that temp agencies are key intermediaries in producing a new kind of labour, creating docile workers via two-sided processes – the deregulation of labour markets and increased control by the intermediaries (see also Findlay et al. 2013).
While there is a rising interest in complex transnational employment and migration enabling conditions and mechanisms also known as the ‘migration industries’ (Cranston, Schapendonk and Spaan 2018), our focus is on the position of workers in both (changing) production processes and social relations, as integral parts of global production and the local social context. Thus we see our research aim more as to ‘integrate workers as productive and social agents into the changing dynamics of GPN’s’ (global production networks) (Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi 2011: 322) and to assess the labour process along with social relations at work (e.g. Hammer and Riisgard 2015). In taking a step in this direction, with the concrete aim of evaluating the jobs of Ukrainian workers in Hungarian electronics firms, we compare the concept of precariousness and vulnerability with that of status-based social upgrading or downgrading potential, including concrete struggles in the workplace. As global value chain research informs us (e.g. Bair 2009; Gereffi 2005), economic upgrading does not necessarily mean social upgrading – even when the latter does occur, it does not necessarily mean that all groups of workers are affected by it. While also studying the nature of the labour process, it is important to keep in mind Rossi’s (2011) finding that the status of workers is a crucial factor in assessing their potential to participate in social and economic upgrading. In other words, if there are at least two categories of employed workers, the labour intensive, low-skilled segment might well be excluded from the upgrading perspective. The limits of social upgrading or of vulnerability are also highlighted in the case of third-party contractors, mediating between employers’ urgent need for a workforce and search for the right workers, and the labour supply (e.g. Barrientos 2011).

The concepts of precariousness and the potential for social upgrading will guide us in our evaluation of Ukrainian temp workers’ placement in blue-collar manufacturing jobs. In our evaluation we examine the wages, social benefits, working hours and workplace conditions of blue-collar workers from Ukraine, as well as their job security and prospects of vertical mobility, both in the workplace and outside. The very jobs and employment relations we researched and evaluated can be understood in the following regulatory, sectoral and employment-relations context.

Our findings are not representative but indicative for other Hungarian user companies employing TCNs via temp agencies. As the Hungarian immigration regime and industrial relations have their specificities, we could only ask open questions about how the recent labour shortage and third-country migration wave played out in enterprises operating in other post-socialist Central European countries for workers arriving from third countries. We hope that this paper will invite comparative discussion.

Context, methodology and background research

Our study is based on the research and consequent country report for the STRONGLAB project (Stronglab 2018), which explored the employment of workers from Ukraine through intermediaries in Visegrad four countries. We combined a bottom-up empirical approach based on interviews with workers and a sectoral industrial-relations perspective, mostly focusing on the operation of the temp-agency sector in supplying workers for MNCs. To understand the temp-agency perspective, we spoke to an intermediary temp company and a state-sponsored recruitment platform for intermediary agencies searching for workers in Ukraine in different sectors – two trade unionists, lawyers, ministry workers and labour inspectors. For the workers’ perspective, eight people (four men and four women in the age range 19–60) were interviewed with two workers agreeing to a follow-up interview a few months later.

While we held most of the background interviews with experts and intermediaries in Budapest, we conducted the interviews with workers in the medium-sized Hungarian town of Jászberény. The latter is a regional hub for electronics and various subcontractors working for both the electronics and the automotive industry, and located just outside the Budapest metropolitan and labour market, in the more depressed east of the
country. Workers from Ukraine arrived as temp workers at Electronic MNC1 as early as August 2016. Among our respondents, at least half were part of the original cohort, which allowed us to get a longitudinal perspective on the changing dynamics in the workplace and reception in Hungary in general. The great majority of our respondents worked for user company MNC1, while the other – MNC2 – also started employing temp workers. Although the TWA was leasing out its employees to both plants – user companies – it was clear that temp workers from Ukraine were not entitled to choose between them. According to our interviewees, the number of Ukrainian temp workers employed by MNC1 was estimated at different times during the first half of 2017 to range between 150 and 400. In addition, according to our interviewees, there was a high turnover of workers. There were several accommodation sites – worker dormitories in towns or hotel complexes, in the country or in a resort town, each hosting 2–5 people in one room. The employing temp agency also provided a wide range of fringe benefits, like free transportation to the Ukrainian border once a month, as well as excursions in Hungary.

We also screened jobs advertised through Ukrainian recruitment websites (e.g. EuRabota) in order to understand the practices around recruitment. From here we already knew what was confirmed by our interviewees – that the jobs were advertised as ‘no knowledge of Hungarian needed’. After selecting seven intermediary recruiting companies of different sizes, we made inquiries – as potential employees – about work conditions, contracts and salaries.

Ukraine, as a sending country, had the necessary ‘reserve army’ of workers who were able to follow the call of capital. From the workers’ perspective, there were several push factors, the three main criteria for which were identified as those in the home country of Ukraine – the low wages, salary backlogs and dominance of informal work – making employment in neighbouring countries attractive to Ukrainian workers. Thus, in 2017, the minimum wage in Ukraine – paid to a third of the working population – was 3 200 UAH (circa 100 Euros). Furthermore, as of 1 January 2016, the average salary in Transcarpathia (the region from which 90 per cent of Ukrainians working in Hungary come) was only 3 419 UAH (129 Euros), thus lagging behind Ukraine’s average of 4 362 UAH (165 Euros). The head of the State Labour Service of Ukraine (SLS) identified the most common violation of the Ukrainian labour market as being the unpaid salary (Fedyuk and Volodko 2018); in September 2017 there were over 70 million Euros’ worth of backlogged unpaid salaries, affecting up to 700 000 people, not including the territories to the east, outside of Ukrainian state control (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2019).

Our research followed rapidly changing developments in the Hungarian labour market, to which all state and labour-market actors reacted swiftly. Apart from the full implementation of the EU Directive on temp workers, which we have already mentioned, the opening of the internal European labour market encouraged labour migration from and within Hungary. Finally, the criteria governing visa and social benefits for TCNs from the area (Bosnia, Serbia and Ukraine) also changed quite quickly from 2016. Simultaneously and irrespective of the migrant crisis and anti-migrant sentiments expressed by state representatives and the media, a new discourse on culturally acceptable migrant workers surfaced in the summer of 2016 (Nagy 2016; Stubnya 2016).

In order to cope with its labour shortage, in January 2017 the Hungarian state contracted an intermediary charged with the recruitment of workers from Ukraine. To achieve this, the National Employment Fund – under the Hungarian Ministry for National Economy – financed a special programme to attract, recruit and select workers in Ukraine, especially for sectors and professions where the lack of workers was the most acute. The largest winner of the project tender was the company Horizon 2020 Nonprofit Kft (H2020). The initial recruitment part of the project was a broad media campaign targeting workers in several Ukrainian towns. The primary role of H2020 was to increase the labour pool by attracting and recruiting workers with specific skills. To do so, H2020 also worked with a partner organisation in Ukraine which carried out a summary of the
recruited people. H2020 forwarded the data to temp agencies, which then took charge of running the selection process via tests, etc.

Larger intermediary temp agencies acted on their own when they pooled workers from Ukraine. Such a mode of employment necessitated a thorough network of (local, subcontracted) recruiters, which typically involved screening, in-depth testing and interviewing and, in the final phase, providing all kinds of administrative and other services. The administrative services included helping would-be migrant workers to secure a work permit, collaborating with social security offices, tax authorities and the Immigration Office. In the final and later stage, they were also required to provide practical services in travel and accommodation.

For a user company, therefore, the comparative gross cost of employing a temp agency worker – i.e. as a service fee to the temp agency, also calculated according to the hourly rate of a leased worker – is higher than the hourly fee of a regular worker. The sum defined in a service contract between a temp agency and a user company is, in the end, the result of negotiations between the two parties. Power and information asymmetries left aside, the service price depends on such factors as a temp agency’s capacity to source its available leased workers, as well as on the cumulative cost of the various services associated with employing temp workers (recruitment, housing, administration, translation, travel, etc.).

As our interviews with experts and intermediaries revealed, employment contracts for TCNs were dependent on work permits, therefore the contracts could not be permanent but only fixed-term. The usual duration of a contract was, first, a probation period of three months, followed by a one- or a maximum two-year fixed-term employment contract with the employer – a temp agency. A longer contract was not really possible, since a TCN’s work permit could not exceed three years. Moreover, a worker’s visa also bore the name of the temp agency – the employer. When a worker from Ukraine lost his or her job with the temp agency, he or she would need to travel back home and reapply for a work visa with a different employer.

Both of our intermediary interviewees praised Ukrainian workers. Our respondent from a regional TWA said that, while turnover among those with Hungarian passports is quite high, Ukrainian workers come to work and stay. Our interviewee from H2020 also praised Ukrainian workers as committed, diligent, adaptable and capable of solving problems and meeting expectations. The critical literature on temp agencies in Western countries shows that such praise resonates well with the specific commodification practices of temp agencies, most importantly marketing workers of specific ethnicity/nationality as ‘good’ or ideal workers’ (cf. Jones 2014). Theoretically, it also resonates with the literature on the social construction of migrant workers (e.g. England and Stiell 1997). Here we only highlight this overlap, instead focusing our investigation on the employment experiences of workers from Ukraine and their job evaluation.

**Temp jobs in electronics for workers from Ukraine: in the shadow of formal upgrading**

Interviewed workers mostly confirmed their satisfaction with the wages, stable income and, in general, possibilities for earning money, especially compared to their perceived opportunities for earning back in Ukraine. However, references to precariousness, insecurity and a lack of control emerged throughout their accounts of all the levels of contracting, organisation of the daily work process and working schedule. Our findings highlight that the job satisfaction came, rather, from their minimal expectations linked to the possibility of earning a living, rather than a concern about their working conditions, while the problematic issues were endured. These problematic issues included, among others, a loss of income due to unilateral changes in working hours and schedules, the language barrier to receiving information and communication concerns and the general confusion about the roles of the employing TWA and the multinational user companies as a workplace. All these reinforced the strongest negative sentiment – a deep sense of dependency on the employer. We argue that, despite the material upgrade in terms of earnings and formal contracts, these jobs, in practice, are highly
precarious, with workers feeling unsafe and not in control. Despite this, the workers do have some agency, mostly that of being able to build social capital individually and to actively search for channels and routes out of this type of employment. Some workers developed a rhetoric of seeing their jobs as temporary and just a step towards other, more-general life goals.

When asked to evaluate their current employment and work on the assembly line, our respondents the most often began discussing the perceived (poor) opportunities back in Ukraine or their previous jobs. All but one respondent remarked on the difficulty of finding a paid job in Ukraine; all mentioned that they have never worked according to their level of education. Some workers also went through longer period of informal work abroad – in other countries. Taking up the temp agency job in Hungarian manufacturing was an attempt to escape the harsher conditions in Ukraine. Migrants’ previous experience of the poor working conditions and low salaries later translated into their minimal requirements and the negligence of the recruiting and employing agency in respecting the conditions offered. Typically, when negotiating the details of the job, prospective Ukrainian employees only enquired about the most basics elements of the employment contract – the salary and hours of work, the housing conditions and, to a much lesser extent, the conditions in the workplace. Already, too, when attempting to negotiate their contracts, workers’ lack of language skills also added to the power imbalance. One of our interviewees, Petro, who was 18 years old at the time he was interviewed, said that he signed the contract in Hungarian without understanding a word of it.

Several respondents expressed their belief that they were lucky to have a job in Hungary. One respondent, Inna, compared it with her previous employment in a similar job at an electronics MNC back in Ukraine:

I had very few opportunities to work at home. With five children, you can imagine that I had very little opportunities to work (...). I had a direct contract with a factory – they recruited directly from the village. Lots of people from our area worked there. Those who had no opportunity to migrate for work considered it to be a good job. (...) [In Hungary] I didn’t know that I would be working officially, that I would have a contract and would not have to pay for anything. I didn’t pay anything for any paperwork. My friend told me the salary and I went to an intermediary at home, who explained the conditions, the salary. I decided to just go and see. It is better than borrowing money for day-to-day living.

The power of such comparison clearly showed how our respondents were grateful workers, which confirms the temporary work agency’s portrayal of Ukrainians as ‘good workers’. Having very few initial expectations of work beyond the possibility of earning a certain income, and willing to dive straight into any working conditions irrespective of the registered employment status, our respondents were docile but still critical of their working conditions. In general, there were no complaints about the job. Only two younger informants, clearly from a non-working-class background, provided us with a more-critical insight into the work on offer and its context. For them, the job was considered easy, monotonous and only physically demanding, as employees needed to stand at the assembly line for 8 or 12 hours at a time and occasionally endure swollen legs, as Vitalij illustrates.

This job is absurd: you put your feet on this piece of tile in the morning and in the evening, you are still there, you haven’t moved. It’s not hard. Not for a 20-year-old. I feel ashamed to say that I do work; my task is to put two stickers on or off the TV. It is not work. But it is tiring for the legs, for your back. [Psychologically] it’s like you are in a bunker – no windows, nothing. If you are lucky, there will be an OK Ukrainian next to you – you can talk to him. If not, you just stand and think of your life... I had all sorts of thoughts like this.
Thus, the job was experienced as an undignified with little quality to it.

Wages, working hours and social benefits for the Ukrainian workers were nominally the same as those of their Hungarian colleagues. At the MNC1, workers’ remuneration was based on an hourly wage at the minimum basic rate. In addition, there were various incentives that motivated worker flexibility and compliance with the production schedule, the most important of which rewarded good attendance and achievement. This said, our interviewees were not clear about parts of their income and could not read or fully understand the pay slip they received each month, as we show in more detail later.

There was a major fluctuation in the work schedule and the hours worked. Originally, in 2016, workers were on 8-hour shifts for five days. However, after the New Year they were only offered three days per week in 12-hour shifts, including Saturdays. This unilaterally announced and implemented change was much resented. A 12-hour shift, besides being physically and mentally strenuous, created gaps of two days of idleness, particularly felt by the migrant workers. One of our respondents complained that, at times, people had no shift for five consecutive days; however, as they only learned about it on the day of the schedule change, they were unable to organise a trip home, etc. Several respondents complained of boredom and wasted time, and their desire to work through this period and earn some extra money. Living in a dormitory with two or four strangers/co-workers added to the discomfort felt on these days off.

On the level of daily work, there were many basic issues which the workers felt were out of their control or implemented without any regard for their interest. Most importantly, changes in working hours – i.e. flexibilisation – negatively affected their income. Even though there was a period of reference introduced for working hours, the workers understood little about it and simply had to comply. Similarly, working on Saturdays was not an option or an opportunity to earn ‘overtime’ but was obligatory when announced by the plant; it was also paid at the regular working hours rate. Every Thursday the workers would receive a schedule – which was entirely in compliance with the law – announcing the following week’s working hours.

The user companies, especially MNC1, were occasionally plagued by the lack of a workforce and the accompanying phenomenon of a high turnover. This has translated into the unilateral distribution of workers in various sections of production, without any opportunity for the workers to have a say. While there was limited control over or knowledge about working hours, there was also no autonomy or way of knowing about them, as Vitalij stated: ‘When I first came, all Ukrainians were on the same assembly line. Now they mixed us all up – today you work here, tomorrow there’. Vitalij then went on to talk about the allocation of jobs on arrival, without any reference to the workers’ skills or interests:

_We have no choice over what we do. For instance, I don’t like the job I do. I want to work, but this particular task is just not mine. I feel that I would be much better working in a warehouse. Why can’t I transfer? But no!_

Assembly-line work meant subordination to a work rhythm, so much so that when there were insufficient hands, team leaders had to work, too, especially if a worker needed to go to the bathroom or have some water.

While the remuneration was kept low and flexible in line with production, the user company could also charge its employees a ‘penalty fee’ of 10 000 forints (circa 32 Euros or approximately a 13-hour basic wage) – for example, if an employee was late, or forgot to bring the protective uniform, or needed disciplining for working too slowly or talking too much. No one communicates information about the penalty in person – workers only learn about it from their pay slip, on their badge or on a screen.

Thus, in the period under study, employment at MNC1 seemed to indicate a complete lack of opportunities for social upgrading which affected all production workers. The hypothetical equality between temp workers from Ukraine and their Hungarian temp-worker peers at MNC1 stopped about then as elements of additional
precariousness and control appeared. Together with their employment with the temp agency operating with a number of MNCs in that town, Ukrainian workers received a maximum 2-year-long job-linked residence permit, with the name of their employer on it. Stemming from this and from the workers’ lack of language skills, job security, communication and the right to information, social security was more difficult to secure. Finally, our research participants also reported minor discriminatory practices.

Those of our middle-aged respondents who had worked at the plant for more than six months judged their job security to be low. Older workers, unlike the younger ones, had more serious stakes in this job, as Victor told us: ‘People bring their families, people move, people leave their jobs in Ukraine to come and work, they count on something, they plan and build their lives around it’. We also heard a story of workers who had been fired but were never told about it and only realised it while trying to enter the plant with their cancelled badges the next day. Victor commented that Hungarian workers were not afraid of their managers because they knew that a bad job was bad and they were not afraid to lose it, while workers from Ukraine were actually trying to hold on to it. This is, of course, the flip side of the same discourse painting Ukrainian workers as ‘good workers’ – i.e. more easily controlled by the TWAs.

Temp workers from Ukraine were limited to the most basic and monotonous types of job due to their third-country employee status and had no opportunities to climb any job ladder. For example, they would never become fork-lift truck drivers or team leaders. To become machinery operators, TCNs had to have nostrified diplomas – i.e. officially recognised vocational qualifications. However, this crucial bit of information was never explained to our respondents and thus confusion reigned among them, sometimes mixed with feelings of discrimination. Victor recounted one example of the latter whereby the management told them that no Ukrainians would occupy any job above that of working on the assembly line. The management thus articulated it without explanation and with a stress on the workers’ nationality. This leads us to the general complaint about it being a dead-end job.

While, at MNC2, there was an official interpreter to translate on all issues, this was not the case at MNC1. There was simply informal translation related to tasks that were to be performed. However, problems of communication also translated into a lack of information. Only two of our respondents could read their payslips, and there was considerable confusion when our respondents explained the calculation of their salary. Unsurprisingly, several interviewees expressed mistrust about the fairness of the calculation.

Their work contract formally provided workers from Ukraine with access to social security coverage equal to that of their Hungarian colleagues. The only formal requirement was that any overlapping social protection in Ukraine be suspended – a regulation which, in practice, could not be enforced fully due to the lack of comparable and cooperative systems of social protection between the two countries. However, in practice, as we saw, there were many obstacles to realising this right to social protection – in particular, language barriers, the refusal by local doctors to add Ukrainian clients to their practices and, more importantly, the workers’ general lack of understanding of what social benefits in Hungary actually entail.

Together with this feeling of indifference on the part of Hungarian employers, participants in our study felt discriminated against in their treatment by the user company managers. Several respondents reported that their Hungarian-co-workers would leave work exactly on time, irrespective of whether or not they had fulfilled their quotas. At the same time, workers from Ukraine were pressured by their line managers into staying and finishing their production norms, which resulted in about 30 minutes of unpaid overtime every day. Similarly, according to one female worker, Hungarians would easily be allowed up to 10 minutes’ bathroom break, while Ukrainian workers had to plan their toilet breaks very carefully.

We have sensed this attempt by the TWA hiring the workers to constantly divide and group workers in order to prevent any sense of solidarity forming. Thus, the earlier workers seemed to have been counter-positioned to the newly arrived ones. Even the dormitory, which was shared by employees of the same TWA
working in two different MNCs, became an object of manipulation during the year of our research. The workers of one MNC were told by the TWA that they would be moved to more remote accommodation because they ‘complained too much’. In a sense, this technique yielded results, since only one of our respondents spoke of a collective solution to their dissatisfaction.

Victor described the temp agency as a ‘buffer zone’ between user company and the workers. He argued that the main problem with their type of employment is that they have a one-sided contract in which the employer has all the rights and employee just has to follow with no voice, no means of changing it and no ways of contesting it, even if changes are made to the contract. He describes how the representatives of the employing temp agencies are at the plant every day, ‘listening to all the claims and complaints but never doing anything’.

As discussed in the previous section, involving the temporary agency is seen as a way of saving the user companies from the otherwise costly and time-consuming recruitment of migrant workers in sufficient numbers in response to fluctuating production demands and the increasing lack of a local labour force. From the workers’ perspective, it has a positive function as well – in a similar way it undermines the exhausting bureaucratic procedures linked to obtaining work and residence permits and, at least in principle, sets up access, for the workers, to healthcare and accommodation. However, it also brings another element into the employment chain, obscuring the relationship between the worker and the user company and creating an additional tool for controlling the workers.

Such a triadic employment relationship is then linked to a specific migration regime. In effect, there was a ‘workforce’ that was, through both work permits/regulations and employment relations, made very loyal and dependent on the employer. On the one hand, with fixed-term contracts and work permit validity being controlled by temp–employer relations, workers were highly dependent. On the other, it was actually the user company that set the work requirements, schedule and remuneration that could not be easily challenged by an ‘indirect’ worker.

In general, the frustration with work quality and conditions did not turn our respondents into passive ‘victims’. To start with, Victor described a threat of strike action that resolved a two-month lingering two-month delay in the issuing of residence permits. He suggested to the original cohort of workers that they should stop work and not restart on the assembly line after lunch until they receive their documents. The issue was resolved but Victor admits that, since that time, every effort is made to divide the workers and to pitch them against each other.

In day-to-day situations we observed that many respondents sought to make personal friendships and connections at work, as a way of overcoming their contractual limitations. Ukrainian workers unable to read their payslips would ask a favour from colleagues in the dormitory who had Hungarian relatives who could translate them. This individual social-capital building seemed to be quite effective when the blurry line between the responsibilities of the temp agency and the user company resulted in a failure to provide an effective solution. Thus, Inna, a 35-year-old female worker, said that she managed to become very good friends with their floor managers.

Our respondents’ strategies mainly centred on re-framing their employment as a step on the road to a larger life project, an unpleasant but necessary step towards achieving their future goals. Seeking Hungarian and EU citizenship was the most common strategy, while all but two of our respondents framed their time at work as a period in which to learn to speak Hungarian well enough to pass the citizenship language test. Citizenship was seen as a stepping stone on the way to more organic life plans and trajectories. Thus two women in our study, who both had children, identified their main goal as to be able to ‘give opportunities to’ (Inna) and ‘secure the future’ for (Ilona) their children. The young men and one woman in our research saw citizenship as the gateway to a wider Europe, to studying abroad and to professional development in Hungary or elsewhere.
In this way, we can also say that their incentive for sticking to the job, enduring unsatisfying conditions and stress at work was quite high as, at times, the whole future life trajectory and intergenerational family strategy was at stake and depended on their ability to remain in Hungary until they obtained the desired documents. In this case, our respondents tapped into the larger national ambition of the Hungarian state towards its ethnic minorities abroad and capitalised on their own ethnic and social networks, irrespective of whether or not they claimed to have a Hungarian ethnic background.

All these attempts to circumvent the official employer and have a direct impact on the user company show that, though seemingly satisfied with their conditions and even negligent when it came to signing the contract, migrant workers keenly felt the controlling power bundled in a complex employment relationship reinforced by employer- and temp-agency-driven work permits.

Conclusions

The transformation of migration patterns in the post-socialist Eastern European region cannot be understood without considering the macrostructural political, economic and social changes. In our paper we reflected on a growing and more organised incorporation of Ukrainian TCNs into a new type of employment relationship in Hungary, where both high emigration rates and high levels of informal employment are present. This type of employment relationship, with the weighted role of intermediaries – particularly temp agencies – presents a shift from an earlier picture in which we saw workers from Ukraine entering Hungary mainly through shuttle, seasonal and circular migration and informal, labour-intensive jobs. While directly exploitative, informal employment relations most probably also happen in today’s Hungary; however, we did not delve into exploring employment chains with multiple subcontractors or more labour-intensive sectors. We were only looking at a new kind of employment relationship in which prospects for social upgrading were present – those original equipment manufacturers at the top of the production and value chain which often dictated employment standards and working conditions. These companies are also more sensitive to their reputation and under more public scrutiny.

The general evaluation of blue-collar jobs by the workers themselves revealed many issues that made their jobs unsuitable for formal social upgrading. To use the metaphor of the board game we refer to in the title, one started with a ladder; however, there were many snakes and more-obscure ladders thereafter. Limited autonomy, full dependency on the work schedule and no opportunity to move up the hierarchical ladders made social upgrading unlikely. On the contrary, they instead indicated a trend towards downgrading, which affected the whole enterprise. It is a precarious employment relation that cements a low social status in the workplace. One of the most critically expressed issues was that the temp-agency employment of TCNs has features of coercive control. For non-Hungarian-speaking temp workers from Ukraine, the fear of losing their work-based residence permit makes a big difference. This is also wrapped up in the institutionalised cultural factors of Hungarian employment relations, which rest on playing out power imbalances. With the workers’ high levels of dependency, the language barrier becomes yet another problem, further hampering a good understanding of their rights or an opportunity to make a complaint.

Even our employee respondents often referred to instruments of misinformation and pressure (as in the case of payslips and the lack of translators, together with racialised treatment) as a form of submission. In general, workers from Ukraine were highly unprepared to enter the Hungarian labour market or to protect their rights; they knew next to nothing about the industrial relations system, employee rights, protective labour-market institutions or the social security system. Their dependency rendered their work experience a matter of luck – if the supervisor was good, the work was tolerable; if not, their only means of resistance were exit and
change. This deprived our respondents of consistent social protection, particularly pension opportunities, and constructed them as ‘unskilled’ workers, despite their diverse skills and work experience.

Employee respondents described their position as dependent, ‘out of control’ and only a temporary earnings opportunity. Devoid of clear mechanisms for controlling their work conditions or growth within the job, all respondents turned to a more instrumental approach, in which they invested in building up personal social capital through friendships, networks and personal relationships. Obtaining Hungarian citizenship and learning the language were two other main strategies for dealing with insecurity. This attempt corresponds with, and reinforces, a more globally integrated but ethnically motivated immigration regime, characteristic of post-socialist Hungary (cf. Melegh 2011, 2016).

At the level of the enterprise, instead of social upgrading, stagnation or even elements of downgrading were in evidence. Thus, our research fully confirms the results of the analysis of subcontracting practices in the core capitalist countries – and on the periphery of the EU – involving and connecting temp agencies and migrant workers. While the temp-agency employment of migrants is an efficient and flexible form of employment (Fellini, Ferro and Fullin 2007), our more nuanced analysis indicates that employers consciously build on such cost-saving arrangements, including the characteristics of the labour force, who are often overqualified for the low-skilled jobs, disorganised, unprepared for the local market and easily controlled (cf. Anderson 2010; Holgate 2005; Thompson et al. 2013). Our results also confirm the assessment of organisations of production within value chains that is intertwined with broader migration arrangements, in which the issue of power and control come to the fore, reaching beyond the level of the workplace.

Notes

1 As Erőss et al. (2016) remark, this number alone adds up to almost the full size of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine (equal to 156 000 persons, according to the 2001 census).

2 See, for example, Migrationonline (2018).

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The paper investigates the mechanisms behind the formation and maintenance of those migrants’ social ties which translate into a particular composition of the network and become a source of social capital. Based on a number of in-depth interviews with Ukrainian migrants in Warsaw, we find that Ukrainian migrants’ networks are based primarily on ties homogenous in regard to nationality, level of education and character of work. The institutional context of social interaction determines with whom migrants form relations and whether these ties become a source of social advancement. The studied migrants do form bridging ties with more experienced, as well as socially and legally embedded persons, mainly other migrants, receiving both instrumental and emotional support.

Keywords: social networks; bridging ties; social capital; Ukrainian migrants; Poland; institutional embedding
Introduction

You see, I only have Ukrainians on my list (...). I think that each of those persons on this list, the ones who are in Poland, have even more Ukrainian acquaintances, who I do not know.

In this quote Petro, a Ukrainian migrant who has studied and now works in Poland, comments on the fact that his co-nationals are the only people he contacts on a regular basis and with whom he forms meaningful relationships. He adds that his Ukrainian friends living in Poland also have Ukrainians in their extended social circle. This statement seems to go against past research assumptions and findings, claiming that due to their ‘cultural proximity’ Ukrainians practically ‘assimilate’ in Poland (see, for example, Brzozowska and Grzymała-Kazłowska 2014). At the same time, Petro’s seemingly highly homogenous network is a source of social capital, allowing him to find a prestigious job and having a satisfying social life in Poland. Why is Petro’s network characterised primarily by the presence of his co-nationals? Who are these co-nationals? These questions raise the issue of the mechanisms behind social tie formation, the character of relationships and the resulting source of migrants’ social capital.

While social networks are regarded as necessary to explain the processes occurring after migrants’ arrival, such as finding employment, accommodation or receiving emotional support (Anthias and Cederberg 2009; Cheung and Phillimore 2014; Drever and Hoffmeister 2008) any precise definitions of the term are rare in migration studies (Dahinden 2011). A number of migration studies refer to Granovetter’s work and ‘the strength of ties’ (for example, see Brzozowska and Grzymała-Kazłowska 2014; Damstra and Tillie 2016; Hagan 1998; Liu 2013; Mostowska 2013; Palloni, Massey, Ceballos, Espinosa and Spittel 2001; Pilati 2012; Tillie 2004; Vervoort 2012; Wilson 1998). Following Granovetter’s definition of the strength of ties as ‘the amount of time, emotional intensity, intimacy (mutual confiding) and reciprocal services’ (1973: 1361), some authors hypothesise on the importance of weak ties, especially of the so-called bridges, and the role they play in diffusing information. For example, Louise Ryan and other authors (Ryan 2011; Ryan, Sales, Tilki and Siara 2008) draw on Granovetter’s and Bourdieu’s (1986) concept of ‘social location’ and ‘social distance’ and suggest that networks may be conceptualised in terms of the value of resources travelling across ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ bridging ties. Establishing social networks in the country of migration – forming new ties and maintaining old ones – is presented in numerous studies as a zero-sum game. Migrants are seen as either forming bridging-ties with ‘natives’ (accessing and mobilising social capital that is different to their own and understood as ‘better’) and thus ‘integrating’ into society or relying on bonding ties to their co-nationals, (forming so-called ‘ethnic networks’, and accessing social capital similar to their own), which is interpreted as a sign of ‘non-integration’ (Danzer and Ulku 2011; Waldinger 1994; Wierzbicki 2004). Numerous past studies also follow Granovetter (1973, 1977, 1983, 1985) in assuming that close, friendship ties (strong ties) are interconnected and that they provide emotional and care support, while weak ties extending beyond one’s own social circle provide more instrumental support, by, for example, facilitating the broad diffusion of information when it comes to job search (Granovetter 1977). However, more recent research findings have questioned some of the assumptions of structural network theory. There is evidence to doubt the interconnection of strong ties in a network (people interact in different spaces, with little reason to believe that friends from two different contexts will necessarily interact) and to show that, actually, weak ties may be equally or even more important than strong ties in providing emotional support (confiding ‘truly serious matters’ to those with whom we share close ties bears high risks of harm to the relationship) and what matters is not how well the confidant is known to a person, but how well the confidant can empathise (Small 2017).
In this analysis we are primarily interested in how social networks are formed and become a form of individual social capital. We define social capital following Lin (2001: 29) as ‘resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilised in purposive actions’. As Coleman (1994), we underline that social capital is not coterminous with resources as such. The key is being able to use these resources for social advancement. However, we want to reach beyond the rational actor approach and reflect on whether social capital can be an unintended outcome of a particular network structure, which is conditioned by institutional embeddedness (Small 2009).

Our case study, that is, personal social networks of Ukrainian migrants in Warsaw and its vicinities, might not, at first glance, be an obvious choice. First of all, Poland was a country of emigration rather than immigration for most of its contemporary history. However, in the 1990s, Poland and other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, were referred to as ‘migration magnets’ for people from the former Soviet Union (Okólski 2001, 2012; Wallace 2001, 2002). A characteristic feature of this ‘local mobility’ was the fact that it was based primarily on social networks. In the case of migrants circulating between Ukraine and Poland, they used social networks to receive documents, cross the border, trade goods or find work (Brunarska, Kindler, Szulecka and Toruńczyk-Ruiz 2016). Today, the majority of Ukrainians in Poland continue to be so-called circular migrants, which means they enter and stay in Poland for a limited period of time on the basis of a visa (Górny 2017; Górny and Kindler 2016). However, since the dramatic political changes in Ukraine started in 2014, the number of migrants applying for a temporary or permanent residence permit has been growing dynamically (Feduk and Kindler 2016). Although rural areas are an important destination for seasonal workers from Ukraine (as they attract workers to the agriculture sector) and emerging research shows that Ukrainian migration to Poland is now more evenly spread out throughout the country, large urban centres, including Warsaw in the Mazowieckie province, continue to be an important destination for migrants (Brunarska et al. 2016). One may assume that such a spatial concentration of migrants in cities may be conducive towards establishing homophilic ties and segregated neighbourhoods. However, until now no evidence has been found to prove this kind of spatial segregation in case of Ukrainian migrants, who are present in numerous Warsaw neighbourhoods (Górny and Toruńczyk-Ruiz 2014; Grzymała-Kazłowska and Piekut 2007; Piekut 2012; Piekut and Valentine 2017).

This article explores the mechanisms behind the construction and reproduction of migrant social networks and their advantages looking at the case study of Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland. The main research questions are the following: How do migrants form and maintain their social ties? What is the composition of migrants’ networks? How do networks become a source of social capital for migrants? We analyse conditions for personal network establishment, look at how and with whom migrants form ties, and check whether they are able to form so-called bridging ties. Putnam (2007: 143) refers to bridging ties as ‘ties to people who are unlike me in some important ways’ and which allow reaching different social circles and, consequently, a different (better) quality of support. Following Putnam (2007) we assume that bridging and bonding ties are not exclusive (not a zero-sum game), but can be compatible with each other. We also assume that bridging does not only refer to forming ties along the lines of shared ethnicity or nationality, but also along other important social differentiating factors, such as class, level of education or gender. We investigate how the character of a tie in a network may reflect a particular type of social capital (emotional or instrumental). We pay attention to the link between ties and space: local ties (such as those formed in the neighbourhood) are recognised in the literature as important in finding out information about the location of the nearest grocery shop, kindergarten or school for the child (van Eijk 2012; van Meeteren, Engbersen and van San 2009), while translocal or even transnational ties may be important sources of emotional support for individuals (Wellman 2002; Wellman and Berkowitz 1988).
After a brief theory section introducing some relevant network concepts, we outline the research methodology and method of analysis. Based on the qualitative research material (interviews with participants who differ in terms of gender, age, family situation and occupation), we demonstrate the mechanisms behind migrants’ tie formation and network social capital they use in three basic dimensions of life: legal, professional and personal (to compare, see Ryan 2015; Ryan, Erel and D’Angelo 2015). Each dimension is analysed in regard to a network-conditioning structure, such as institutional embeddedness, and agency involving network derived resources.

With this paper, we aim to respond to the call by Mario Luis Small (2009: 8) to explore ‘how do people make social ties’ that provide social capital, going beyond the rational actor approach. At the theoretical level, we draw on our research data to reflect on the importance of institutional embedment for network (re)production, turnover and the complexity of ‘bridging’ ties. Based on a more diverse research sample, we go beyond the past research outputs, which showed a tendency of the Ukrainian migrants who stay in Poland longer (i.e., those who do not circulate) to have very few ties to other Ukrainians (Brzozowska and Grzymała-Kazłowska 2014; Grzymała-Kazłowska 2015). We also aim to contribute to (until now rarely present in migration research on migrants in Poland) a systematic approach to social network analysis.

Network theory analysis: basic theoretical concepts

We propose to use social ties as the main unit of analysis, instead of essentialising ‘ethnic’ groups by assuming that they are a ‘natural’ starting point for research. A social tie is, at its most basic, ‘a sedimented interaction history embellished by the anticipated likelihood of future interaction’ (Crossley 2016: 172). In general, a person’s ties are interdependent, usually embedded in broad networks. In this paper we understand a social network as a ‘structured set of social ties between individuals’ (Gurak and Caces 1992: 152). A given pattern of ties modifies the effects of a particular tie. That is why we focus on social networks, which are always ‘in-process’ and evolve at different paces, with new ties forming, and the old ones changing or breaking up. In addition, we acknowledge that network effects and dynamics are ‘mediated by meanings, identities, actors’ understandings and thus by culture’ (Crossley 2016: 179). These meanings and identities, as well as opportunities and constraints, are negotiated by actors during interaction. The interactions are also very much influenced by the particular contexts in which they take place, including the mediating role of both formal and informal institutions (their norms and rules) (Small 2017). Thus, a person may not use the opportunities s/he has thanks to her/his network position, while another person may respond in different ways to the same constraints, with the importance of agency and structure depending on circumstances. Ties may also be formed accidentally (not purposefully), and social capital can be an unintended outcome of a particular network structure (Small 2009).

We assume that social ties are generally formed along the homophily principle – the tendency for similar individuals to associate with one another (Lazarsfeld, Merton and Ronkeylaf 1954; Lin 2002; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). Similarity may be divided into three types: attribute similarity (commonality of ethnicity, gender, nationality or other personal characteristic), situational similarity and structural similarity (people who are in nearly equivalent structural positions within a network) (Small 2017: 99). Homophily can be divided into baseline and inbreeding. Baseline homophily occurs due to demographic factors, for example a large size of a particular group. It means that an individual has a higher chance to meet people who are similar to him or her when the pool of potential contacts like him/her is larger. In-breeding homophily refers not only to personal preferences, but also to social structures below the population level (for example, churches or migrant organisations). This leads us to organisational or institutional embeddedness of social interaction, which not only provides the space for interaction, but also mediates interaction via its norms and rules of
behaviour (Small 2009: 2017). Thus, particular similarities may matter in one context, while not in another (Small 2017).

The network effects or outcomes are also known as network social capital – a particular form of resource present in social networks, which can be accessed and/or mobilised (Lin 2002). The assumption is that the better the quality of social resources one has gained via social ties, the more chances they have to attain their goals. Network social capital varies with the network composition. Thus, networks with a high variety of diverse ties, both ‘strong and weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973), and a wide range of ties with qualitatively different connections to diverse others (in terms of gender, ethnicity, class; or, more generally, in terms of status; but also in terms of roles, such as kin, friends, etc.) are said to represent better network social capital. In other words, the people with whom ties are formed and the character of these ties translate into the diversity of a social network and, consequently, their potential function (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass and Labianca 2009). The more homogenous a network is, the weaker the networking effect and the less resources one can expect, while, the more diverse a network is, the higher potential for bridging ties and better quality of resources (Lin 2002).

Research methods

This analysis of migrants’ social ties is based on data collected during a qualitative study consisting of 39 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian labour migrants carried out between May and July 2017. We purposively sampled a diverse group of 23 interviewees from the pool of respondents participating in the 2016 survey, based on respondent-driven sampling (quantitative part of the research project Migrant Networks and Integration of Ukrainian Migrants in Poland: A Quantitative and Qualitative Approach, 2015–2019). These respondents represented migrants with a minimum of two years of migration experience and with diverse social networks in terms of size, character and social capital volume. We recruited the remaining 16 informants via snowball sampling, intending to reach migrants with higher education working in white collar occupations as this group was underrepresented in the survey.¹ 21 interviewees worked as cleaners, care-workers, construction workers, seamstresses or waiters, while 18 worked on managerial positions in business, civil society or as professionals in academia or freelance jobs, such as journalists (some of our interviewees had two occupations). The majority of the 18 professionals have graduated from a university in Poland. Our sample is uneven when it comes to gender, with 30 interviewees being women and only 9 being men, (the latter were more likely to refuse to participate in the research than the former).

The interview script concerns the migrants’ situation prior to migration, their first migration experiences and focuses on the mechanisms behind the ego-centred network character, formation and maintenance, practices involved in crossing over to new social circles and the drawing of network boundaries. Following the ‘free-listing’ technique, we asked our interviewees to write down the names (initials or pseudonyms) of persons (or groups of persons) with whom they maintain regular contact – a network visualisation (Reyes 2016). We did not use a sociogram for that purpose, as we did not want to impose any pre-defined categories on the informants. We were interested to see to what extent the interviewees would create their own ‘labels’. We also asked the interviewees to write down the names of any institutions that had an impact on their migration experience (whether positive or negative). We further enquired about the quality of the relationships, asking the interviewees about the history of the different relationships, but also their meaning. We asked to what extent these relationships amount to social capital and were mobilised via the ties to obtain different forms of support. Additionally, we inquired whether, in the interviewees’ opinion, Ukrainian migrants do support each other. We also asked whether they had experienced discrimination (verbal and/or physical) in Poland and whether they had reached out for resources to cope with that discrimination within their network.
Our informants were able to choose the language of the interview: 23 interviews were conducted in Ukrainian, 13 in Polish and 3 in Russian. The research team recorded and transcribed the interviews, translating interviews from Ukrainian and Russian into Polish. The transcriptions were not cross-checked. The quality of translation of the Polish quotes into English in this text was double-checked by the editor. In the process of qualitative data analysis, we used Atlas.ti qualitative analysis software. We anonymised the names of all our interviewees.

Legal dimension: routes of migrant entry as spaces for interaction and availability of social capital

Migrants’ ability to establish a network is determined by wider social processes, such as migration policy and the resulting rights attached to particular migration statuses (Berry 1992; Meissner 2018; Menjívar 2014; Morris 2006). The character of ties together with their capacity to become a source of social capital and solve practical problems are shaped by these statuses, as well as by the local power contexts within which such statuses are expressed. Practically all the interviewees who first came to Poland after 2003 claimed to have entered the country on the basis of a visa (for work, study or tourism purposes). In general, migrants who entered as tourists (before the visa regime) and later, those who entered on the visa for ‘tourist’ purposes had the most precarious legal status as they were not able to work legally or to apply for a residence card. The interviewees who entered on the basis of a tourist visa, tended to lack ties to individuals or (educational or business) institutions in Poland, whose aid they could use in order to receive a work or student visa. Circular labour migrants first entered Poland for seasonal work using documents arranged for by informal ‘travel agencies’ in Ukraine. Those who entered after 2006 did so mostly on the basis of visas received thanks to employers’ declarations issued by unknown Poles via Ukrainian ‘taxi drivers’, circulating between Poland and Ukraine. Let us present the legal trajectories of two of our informants, both of whom were working in the domestic work sector in Poland at the time of the interview. Valerija is a 52-year-old divorcee, who first entered Poland in 1995 via an informal ‘tourist bureau’ for seasonal work, did a job picking cherries the first time, and in the following years she collected potatoes and onions. After she had lost her job in Ukraine in 1997, she needed to find another source of income to support her daughters. Together with a friend they went to Warsaw and asked random people in the street where to look for a job. Following their advice, they went to a ‘job fair market’ on the outskirts of Warsaw. After a few months of picking fruit and planting flowers, Valerija’s friend found a job in the domestic work sector and helped her to enter this sector. Valerija’s case shows the difficulties experienced by a migrant who has a precarious legal status, does not know anyone in Poland and is forced to build his/her network from scratch. In these circumstances, Valerija relied on information she had obtained from people who were not part of her network, but who just happened to be there. This is in line with Small’s findings to the effect that, instead of searching for particular ties, people rely on those that are available and willing to help (Small 2017). The composition of our informants’ networks and ability to use them as a source of social capital to improve the stability of one’s legal status changed with the length of migration experience. Sofija, a 58-year-old migrant, who has been circulating between Ukraine and Poland since 2001, mentions the change in her legal status and network composition:

*At that time I still needed to leave every three months, so I left for three months, then I returned, stayed for three months, and then I returned again (...), because at that time I still couldn’t manage to arrange for it. So, I took the tourist one. And later on, they gave me an invitation to come to work here and I came to work, for a year...*
The change from ‘at that time I still couldn’t manage to arrange for it’ to ‘later they gave me an invitation to come to work here’ (italics added by authors) shows two types of change. First, it marks the change in the employment policies towards foreigners, which came with the introduction of the facilitated employment scheme in 2006; secondly, it demonstrates how Sofija’s personal network changed: from the situation where she had no bridging or bonding ties to her having access to and being able to use a tie to a Polish employer in order to receive the necessary work documents. Valerija, on the other hand, not knowing any Poles willing to facilitate her legal stay, and facing a return to Ukraine with no perspective of earning an income there, decided to overstay the permitted period and remained in Poland for 12 years without valid residence documents and no right to cross the border. However, despite her precarious legal status, she managed to reach a sense of stability in her personal and work life. Finally, her Ukrainian migrant friends encouraged her to reach out to relevant organisations to regularise her status during the abolition in 2012:

A friend suggested that I should go to [name of international aid organisation] – it’s this organisation for foreigners, which helps them return home... (...) and I went there, quite a few people were there, we started talking, everyone asked something, then my turn came and then this Mr P. said to me ‘and you?’; and I said ‘I’ve been here for eight years already, without leaving, I do not have any documents, I would like to go to Ukraine and I would like to return [here], because I have family here, I have a stable job, I have...’ (...) and he said ‘If you have stayed here for eight years, just wait a little bit longer, because there will be an abolition’. And then I started going everywhere, knocking at every door, asking what this will look like, which documents I will need what else is needed, when will this abolition take place, because people in Poland did not know too much about it. And then I started going to this organisation [name of NGO]. K. was running it (...) and she said that I had to wait, she said what was needed, and that starting from 2nd of January they would accept documents. And then... oh, I called a friend, some acquaintances, because I knew that they were also here without [the possibility to] ‘leave’, like me, a bit shorter, but still they were stuck, like me. And on the 2nd of January, at 4 a.m., I was in Bankowy Square in front of the door. I was the first [in line].

The particular circumstances, searching for opportunities to regularise one’s status, and particular institutional spaces – civil society organisations supporting migrants in legal distress, provide not only information on how to proceed, but also a place for conversation for irregular migrants, who could share their worries and provide a trigger for agency at the right time. As in the study by Engbersen and colleagues (2006) on the importance of network resources for irregular migrants, Valerija shared with other labour migrants her knowledge and experiences about the process of regularising one’s stay during the abolition. According to Valerija, she advised more than 400 people on how to go through the legalisation procedure.

At the moment of regularising her stay, Valerija had already been working in the domestic work sector. Several months later, a friend of her informal Polish employer offered her a job and a proper employment contract. On that basis, she applied for a temporary residence permit, which she received. However, in the domestic work sector, employment is often characterised by quasi-legality or so-called ‘façade employment’. As a result, whether one is able to maintain their residence permit depends on the stability of ties to employers: with time these may turn, either into a ‘permanent’ permit or the opposite – a precarious residence status. For example, Roma, a 61-year-old widow, who has been working as a care-worker and circulating between Ukraine and Poland on a regular basis since 2007, had a temporary residence permit in the past. However, at the moment of the interview she was staying in Poland on the basis of a visa, having received from one of her informal employers an employer’s declaration to hire a foreigner. Although she managed to persuade her informal Polish employers to somehow legalise her entry and stay in Poland, she did not identify them as part of
her network, referring to ‘Polish acquaintances’ only once throughout the whole interview. The precarious legal status of these two informants shows a very different trajectory when it comes to the use of social ties as a source of social capital to legalise their stay. In Valerija’s case, not only did she rely on information from her migrant friends to use the structural opportunities of the 2012 regularisation Act to be able to regularise her legal status, but she also became – by her own account – an important source of information on that procedure for other migrants. Having had the experience of irregularity, she seemed to be more determined to have a secure residence status and mobilised her available ties to informal Polish employers and their acquaintances to achieve that. On the other hand, in Sofija’s case, it seems that entering the domestic work sector and the interest (or lack of it) of the informal Polish employers for Sofija to continue work as a care-worker for their elderly parents, played a leading role in determining her legal status. Sofija did not really mobilise these ties herself, nor did she consider them to be part of her social network. This also points to the structural opportunities (regularisation policy), the context of informal care-work (motivation of employers, routine interactions) and individual agency, as factors influencing to what extent, by whom and which social capital is accessed and mobilised.

Those of our informants who entered Poland based on a student visa (that is, the majority of our interviewees who work as professionals), entered a particular institutional space which mediated interactions; also, during their studies and after graduation they had an easier access to the labour market (no need for work permit). Still, applying for a temporary residence permit before the expiration of the visa was quite a challenge. Artem, who was admitted to a university in Poland in 2003, said:

*I experienced the greatest problems during my studies, because I did not understand the whole procedure. (...) When I got here I asked some experienced people in the dorm and they explained to me what it is, I mean there were no electronic queuing systems at that time – one had to wake up in the morning, as everyone arrived in October, so the 90 days passed in December (...) so in December at 6 a.m. when it was so cold we had to queue in Długa street. We were all in the same cycle, everyone got their visas in the beginning of October and the 90 days finished at the same time, so I remember we went in groups and filled out these applications.*

Neither in this quote, nor at any point during the interview, does Artem mention the university as an institution facilitating the stay legalisation procedure. However, thanks to entering Poland via the ‘educational channel’, Artem and some other Ukrainians we interviewed had the opportunity to move into university dormitories, which proved to be important spaces for interaction. As the university had a policy to place all foreign students together in the dormitories, these provided particular structural conditions for in-breeding homophily. As a result, at moment of studying the interviewees had almost exclusively Ukrainians in their network, with the rare Belarusian or other non-Ukrainian Russian-speaking colleagues. Many of our interviewees who studied in Poland received information on how to legalise their stay from more experienced, foreign (usually Ukrainian) students with whom they shared dormitories. Interestingly enough, however, not only were these more experienced students not part of the informants’ networks at that time, but they never became part of their network in the future. Again, they were present in a particular context when particular information was needed, sharing some attributes (nationality) and the situational similarity (being foreign students in Poland), but differing in terms of the knowledge they had about the legalisation procedure for newcomers.

The task of collecting the necessary documents required to apply for a temporary residence permit was also a serious challenge due to time limitations. Here is what Yuliya who was accepted as a doctoral student in Poland in 2008 said:
At that time there was a law saying that in order to apply for a residence card you had to do that no later than 45 days before the expiration of the last valid document, so when I arrived in Poland I had 45 days to find an apartment, apply for insurance, apply for the tax identification number, because then you needed it to apply for residence and the personal identification number, to obtain housing registration, because you also needed that to apply for a residence card.

The housing issue Yuliya mentioned as a barrier in legalising her stay was confirmed as problematic in other interviews. Not only did Ukrainian migrants face serious obstacles renting apartments due to their limited funds, but also Polish landlords were unwilling to rent to foreigners. In addition, they had to find a landlord who would be willing to register them at this particular address, for them to have all the necessary documents to apply for a residence permit. Yuliya’s network played a crucial role in solving this problem. She met a more established migrant through an acquaintance from Ukraine involved in the same doctoral programme:

She went to some sort of a rosary circle for ‘Easterners’, which was run by the Polonia House in [name of street] (...). And there she met this girl, who had lived in Poland for 10 years already. (...) She said that at that moment her flat-mate – they were renting an apartment together – had left for the US for three months and she wasn’t using these two rooms, so we could move into that room, for three months she said no problem, if you need to stay longer, we will talk about it. And she didn’t even charge us for that.

Having an acquaintance among the Ukrainian students in Poland, who already had rented a place that one could share the flat with was an important resource facilitating the legalisation procedure. Yuliya’s doctoral programme provided the circumstances, in which she met someone, who also searched for an apartment and who had access to a very different social circle (‘rosary-circle’) than that of Yuliya (an atheist). The solution to the problem arrived with the tie to a person, whom neither of them knew well, and who due to her negative past experiences related to housing conditions, decided to help them. As in the previously discussed cases, Yuliya no longer considers this ‘bridging weak tie’ as part of her network. The role of the institutional setting, particular situational similarity and resulting sense of solidarity, activates support in legalising the residence status of those who entered Poland as students. At the moment of the study most of these interviewees had a stable legal status. They were residing in Poland on the basis of different forms of residence cards, with one person having even received Polish citizenship. Most of them claimed that social networks’ resources played a very limited or no role in the legal dimension of their lives. However, it seems that in the past an important role in the legalisation of their stay was played primarily by those whom they came across thanks to their institutional embeddedness and interaction with people with whom they shared some attributes and situational similarity.

Among our interviewees who were working as professionals at the time of our study only a few first entered Poland not to study, but to work. The role of social networks in their case was rather limited. In the initial phase of migration, these persons used their vocational skills to find blue-collar occupations and so enter Poland legally. These manual jobs provided them with the necessary financial support and gave them time to apply to have their Ukrainian diplomas recognised (a time-consuming and costly process) and to improve their Polish language skills. They reached out for professional help rather than network-resources to solve such issues as administrative barriers concerning prolonging of residence, health and social insurance or starting one’s own company. However, they also faced legal barriers they were unable to overcome, such as the inability to buy land or limited possibilities for political activism.
Professional dimension: the workplace as a context for interaction

The majority of our interviewees received the first information about jobs from more experienced migrants – Ukrainian acquaintances or friends they had met in Ukraine. This allowed them not only to find work, but also to avoid poor working conditions, especially regarding payment. For example, Dmytro, who came to Poland to study, found his first summer job in Poland thanks to information provided by a Ukrainian acquaintance (who was working in Poland) over the internet. It was a manual job in a carpet warehouse. He received the information about his current place of employment (his first full-time job after graduation and a highly-skilled one) from a Ukrainian friend, an experienced migrant, who was his first information source when making the decision whether to go to Poland and who had also helped him to find accommodation in Poland. However, the interviews also contain examples of a mechanism of social capital generation which Portes (1998) referred to as ‘reciprocity exchanges’, that is, exchanges where access to resources was provided with the expectation of ‘repayment’ in the future. As Irina, a 31-year-old deputy director in a real-estate company, who first worked in cleaning in Poland, comments:

My parents’ acquaintances helped me with my arrival, I don’t even know their name. And this was not some sort of unselfish aid, it was more like a sort of barter. Their sons also used to come here and my father helped them find some jobs for men, so we had agreed that when I arrived, they would help me with a job for a woman.

While working as a cleaner, Irina graduated from a university in Poland, and started to look for a job on her own, sending CVs in response to job advertisements in her professional area. The support she needed and received from her social network at this stage was not instrumental, but emotional: she was encouraged to apply for a job suitable to her skills.

With time, the position of migrants within the network changes. Roma, who has been circulating to work as a care-worker for over 10 years, claims to be more of a source of support for other Ukrainians than a person who receives it. She had lost her job in Ukraine and relied on an intermediary agency to find her first job in Poland as she did not know any migrants herself and she was dependent on the earnings from seasonal work. In the subsequent years, she also worked in Poland as a cleaner and kitchen help. She argued that, over the years, she had helped many people whom she did not include in her personal network:

Now it’s much better, I know lots of people and I have Polish friends. We are really good friends. It used to be hard, I came here and I didn’t know anybody. (...) I helped a lot with job searching, passing on information about work, I did.

The workplace constitutes an important formal or informal institutional context for interaction and potential tie formation for labour migrants. The type of work our interviewees perform is one of the important differentiating factors determining who they form ties with. Labour migrants who work in agriculture, construction, services or as cleaners in public institutions, usually have Ukrainian co-workers and mainly form ties with them. Even in the rare case where our interviewees do have Polish co-workers, the relations remain formal. Vasyli, a 27-year-old, who works at a construction site, mentions his three Polish co-workers:

We are only in touch because of work. These are, in fact, work relations. (...) No point in calling. We could maybe call each other on our birthdays.
The only exception among the interviewed labour migrants are women working as domestic workers in private households. These women work alone and the tie to the Polish (informal) employer is the only meaningful relationship they are potentially able to form. Migrant domestic workers, as many other circular labour migrants, meet other Ukrainian migrants ‘on the road’, while commuting between home (Ukraine) and their workplace (Poland) by means of one of the migrant institutions, the informal ‘taxi’ (see Kindler 2011). Here is an example of Maria, who has already circulated to work as a cleaner for two years and who met her best friend while travelling to Poland:

*I was travelling to Warsaw then, and we met on the way and all this time we have been in touch, we travel, we are friends. (...) Because we always use some private transport we arrange for, a taxi – several people get into a car and we go. And so, this is how I met this woman and we’ve been friends until today.*

The interviewees who work in office jobs and as specialists also have few opportunities to meet Polish colleagues at work: they predominantly work in so-called ‘Eastern departments’ of various private companies, non-governmental organisations related to Eastern Europe, as freelance journalists, translators or are concentrated in niches for which there is a high demand on the Polish labour market, such as IT. While looking for a job, these migrants strive to capitalise on their cultural competences, which are unique on the Polish labour market. The institutional embeddedness determines the construction and reproduction of their network. Although some of our interviewees have met Poles through their workplace, in most cases the only Poles in their workplace are the bosses. Their co-workers are foreigners, mainly other highly-skilled Ukrainians, who become the main or important part of their social circle. Most of these interviewees, like Dmytro, thr 27-year-old project manager in the advertising and marketing department of a large IT company, has job colleagues who are approximately the same age and share similar migration experience:

*Well, first of all there are my job colleagues. In general, the people I know from my job, we are in touch, there is an integration trip sometimes... or maybe we play billiard or others... such like, for example on Fridays, we do this kind of thing. (...) It’s a really large company – some 200, 200 people work there. But I work in the ‘Ukrainian department’ where there are some 35 or 40 people.*

Thus, the homophilic character of the formation of these ties, where the similarity is due to the shared nationality and profession, is structured by the institutional context. Those who have contacts with Poles at work claim that their work relations remain professional. An exception in terms of forming bridging-ties with Poles are labour migrants who work with Poles in the public sector or who meet Poles while working during their studies. For example, Kalina, who finished her studies at a Polish university, is a qualified teacher and has two Polish colleagues from her previous workplace (a public kindergarten) in her network:

*[These are] Poles. I mean, I met them in my previous job. The people I work with now we’re constantly in touch. I was the only Ukrainian then...*
superior in relation to her co-workers. The different institutional work context, i.e., working either for a company in the private sector (with more co-nationals available) or working in the public sector (with more Poles available), as well as the position in the employment hierarchy both have a clear impact on who our informants interact with.

In terms of its consequences for social capital access and mobilisation, it is important to note that for the social ties in the group under study, homophily runs not only along the lines of nationality, but also along the lines of occupational or even social class. Petro, who works for an international corporation in Poland, and who earlier commented on having only Ukrainians among the friends and acquaintances he listed during the interview, added:

Another thing is that all of them, how to say that in a way that’s politically correct, are from the same social class, although their earnings may differ. All of them have higher education, there are no representatives of the working-class on that list (...). I am not saying that uneducated people are not ok, but I do not know anyone, who would be in touch with such people, I mean the people who have come here only to make money, with the so-called ‘zarobitchanie’ (‘money-makers’), who have completely different views.

Petro claims that neither him nor anyone from his social circle has ties to ‘zarobitchanie’, which is a rather derogatory term used to refer to labour migrants in Ukrainian. Class inequalities within migrant groups limit the possibilities of forming ties, but do not seem to translate into more ties with representatives of the receiving society as found in other research (Akkaymak 2016; Marchetti 2017). The missing bridging ties among Ukrainian migrants to people in different occupational positions on the Polish labour markets mean that specialised knowledge or skills of highly-skilled migrants are generally passed on within a closed social circle, which also suggests little chances for upward mobility for those working in the secondary sector of the labour market.

Very few of our interviewees are able to move to the primary sector of the labour market in Poland (unless they have graduated from Polish universities) and make a transition similar to Polish students: from part-time, low-skilled jobs during studies to highly-skilled jobs after graduation.

Migrants share a common experience of initial hardships, having no acquaintances and few opportunities to find a job and it is this sense of solidarity with their compatriots in a similar situation that triggers their willingness to help. Thus, we can find evidence of what Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) called bounded solidarity, that is, a group-oriented behaviour whose sources lie in the shared situation, common experiences and perceived community of interests. These factors lead to the emergence of norms of mutual support and a sense of duty towards co-nationals, letting the social capital travel along the networks. Our interviewees spontaneously refer to the imagined national community when speaking of Ukrainians, using the pronoun ‘us’.

However, with time the newly arrived migrants are also seen as competition on the labour market and the cause of the worsening working conditions by the migrants with longer migration experience. As Polina mentions:

Ukrainians who first come to Poland, especially if they come to work, do not know anything, they have only heard stories told by acquaintances who worked in a factory somewhere... They come to earn anything, they agree to work for 5 zlotys per hour, or 8, 7 zloty. The general hourly wage decreases. As far as I know not only Ukrainians suffer from this. For example, supposing I’ve come here to do training, I’ve invested money in that and then they tell me that the maximum hourly rate is 8 zlotys. But sorry, I am an inhabitant here, I pay taxes, and some people come here to earn a little and return to Ukraine.
Polina refers to an argument we heard in many other interviews, identifying the different needs of the circular migrants, who, in Polina’s words, ‘come here to earn a little and return to Ukraine’ and those who are more settled, and so have higher living expenses. The absence of ties between migrants via employment as the result of the competitive character of such employment sectors as care, cleaning or construction was also found in other studies (Marchetti 2017). From the initial bridgehead role of migration facilitators, migrants turn into gatekeepers, unwilling to share their network resources.

**Personal dimension: from internet through professional to migrant institutional context for interaction**

Social ties, both transnational and local, play an important role both in the initial and at later stages of migration for our interviewees. The migrants engaged in circular migration, with a precarious legal status and working in less skilled jobs, maintain ties to family members in Ukraine via everyday phone-calls (via social media communicators), and regular visits home. They also preserve the ties to best friends in Ukraine via communicators and playing internet games together. Vasyli, whose sister and mother are also living in Poland, but his best friends are in Ukraine, had this to say:

> J. is a friend, J., P. – my two best friends. They are from my village. They are 26 and 25 years old. We call each other. We are constantly in touch, whenever we play football [internet game] we can talk, or, when something happened, when there is a message, I contact those two guys, we can write to each other or call. Now they are in Ukraine, they work there. They are Ukrainian. They only come to Poland for shopping. They are single. A. [another friend] is a friend from the same [school] grade. So, it’s the same with him, we write to each other, maintain a relationship. He sat next to me in class, then his daughter was born. He doesn’t have an international passport. He doesn’t go to Poland, he works in Ukraine. He is 27 years old, like me.

The internet provides a crucial platform to communicate, as well as to socialise. It allows younger migrants not only to maintain transnational ties, but to meet new people in Poland. The interviewees with a stable legal status in Poland and mostly higher education are members of many hobby groups they have found via social media and thematic forums, which are important networking channels. From knitting to intellectual games, the interviewees have formed ties with new Ukrainian acquaintances, who they regularly meet off-line. Usually, these communities consist of several tens of people: the narratives of the migrants under study indicate that the ties are numerous, but relatively weak and the composition of the group may change (characteristically, the informants tended to speak about a group as a whole rather than about specific people). For example, Dmytro, whose girlfriend from Ukraine has recently joined him in Poland, is an active user of sites with ‘intellectual games’. He uses two main game sites, one with over 100 members, who also meet off-line. 10 of these people are on Dmytro’s list, and he refers to them as friends. On another internet site Dmytro has ties to approximately 40 persons, mainly Ukrainians:

> Many people in that group, the majority, in fact, are from Ukraine, but also from Russia..., there is even a Pole [female], but she is great, she speaks Russian.

In the case of Dmytro, his limited Polish restricts the possibilities of tie formation with Poles. However, the moment a Ukrainian or Russian-language hobby-group ceased to exist, some of our interviewees reached out to such hobby groups in Polish, this way meeting Poles. Thus, it seems that it was not the attributional similarity
(in this case – nationality), but the similar hobby interests and availability of hobby groups (informal institutional context), which determined who the informants interacted with. Lena, who came to Poland in 2015 and lives here with her Ukrainian boyfriend, is an active participant of a knitting group organised via the internet, in which up to 60 Ukrainian women share their passion for yarn:

*I’m part of a group of girls from Ukraine, we are from different towns, but we share a passion for yarn, knitting needles, crocheting needles unite us, it’s a true passion for us. Each of us does something different here in Poland, for example, one of us comes from G. to attend these meetings. So, we do these ‘knitting-meetings’, in different places, for example during Chopin concerts at the Royal Lazienki Park or in some cafés and restaurants. So these are the women I meet once a week or once every two weeks, and one of them is Polish.*

Lena does reflect upon her ‘yarn-club’ as an important source of emotional support in sharing the estrangement of being a foreigner in Poland, but these are neither her close friends nor does she mentioned them by name, when drawing her network visualisation during the interview. It is also clear that this informal organisation does not rely on personal attributes, such as nationality, as their primary formation, but on a common ‘passion’. However, the group was established and functioned in Ukrainian. The participation of interviewees in interest/hobby groups was also determined by their gender and the moment in their life-cycle, with mothers of young children meeting other mothers in baby-clubs or music groups for children (see also similar findings in Goodson and Phillimore 2008).

As we already showed in the previous sections, those who had studied in Poland, met the main Ukrainian group of friends during the studies and later at work. As Kalina, who currently lives with her Polish partner and two children in Warsaw suburbs, mentions:

*Certainly, a kind of... let us call it psychological support, I can get from my university friends. We don’t get in touch very often, but when we do call each other or meet, then we always talk about life issues, we can complain about things, we give each other advice.*

Work contacts turn into friendships, too. Yuliya, the 30-year old free-lance journalist, said:

*When it comes to private [ties], my Ukrainian friends are in Poland. I met all those people through my professional life, but now we do not work together anymore and these relations from work transformed into very nice private relations.*

There were substantial differences between the interviewees in terms of how much personal life they had, including leisure time to socialise with friends or to meet new ones. In the case of those working in the secondary labour market sector, the time to socialise was limited and places of religious worship, such as the Greek-Catholic Church in Warsaw, provided sometimes the only opportunity to meet new Ukrainian acquaintances or exchange news with Ukrainian friends. As Zlata, a 58-year old divorcee, said:

*Lena is a cleaner, too, but she is my closest friend (...). We met in church, she approached me and said that she liked me and maybe we could become friends. I said ‘no problem, I like everyone’ [laughter].*

For these interviewees, sustaining a relationship during migration is possible thanks to phone calls, often using internet communicators, and the little free time spent together during and after religious services. The vast majority of our informants were Greek Catholics or Orthodox, but we also interviewed migrants who belonged
to Jehovah Witnesses. They joined the group at the time when neither Ukrainian nor Russian congregations existed in Poland, so the Jehovah Witness congregation provided the opportunity to form close relationships with other Jehovah Witnesses, who were mostly Polish nationals.

A number of our interviewees used the services of NGOs dedicated to Ukrainian migrants or attended events they organised. Our informants participated in culinary events, sang in a choir or attended Polish language classes during which they met other Ukrainian migrants. At the same time, labour migrants working in Poland as professionals were also involved as event organisers and even members of the NGOs, which allowed them to build up their network during common projects. Thus, the NGO provided the institutional setting for interaction and knowledge exchange among people who would otherwise be unlikely to belong to one network. Only circular labour migrants did not use NGOs to form ties with other Ukrainians. They were neither aware of the existence of such organisations nor did they have the time to attend cultural events. They used the practical services only if the NGOs reached out by, for example, organising an event on the premises of the Greek Orthodox Church.

While access to information about jobs and legalising one’s status is of crucial importance in the initial phase of migration, with the passing of time, emotional support becomes the most valuable resource for our interviewees. For example, Roma receives emotional support mainly from other Ukrainians, circular migrants like herself, when speaking to them over the phone, discussing family problems, sharing migration experiences. However, although she treats them as her closest friends, they rarely meet. Roma’s work, which requires almost full availability, limits her opportunities to socialise, enjoy the culture or any entertainment in Poland. The only place that she visits in Warsaw is the Greek-Catholic church and she meets her friends there once a week. Valerija, also receives her most important network resource – emotional support – thanks to ties to her female migrant friends. They discuss family problems, spend leisure time together and help each other in emergencies. Here is what she says about her best friend B., who is ‘more than a sister’ to her:

_Sometimes I have the kind of problems I cannot share with my children or other people, then I immediately call her and tell her – or we meet and then we start to talk – when my dad was ill, or right after he died, when I learned about it, when they called me, for example, they called me and said that dad is dead I called B. right away. This was a Friday, I returned from work at 5 pm and at 5 pm I heard that my dad had died. And B. [arrived] from G. right at 5:30, she was with me... they came with K. [husband] and took out some money, said ’maybe you do not have money, and even if you do, doesn’t matter, take the money, go to Ukraine and buy flowers or a laurel from us’._

Valerija remarks that there are ‘problems’, which she ‘cannot share with children’ or other family members, pointing to the fact that close ties to family members do not necessarily provide an outlet for migrants’ emotional distress. It seems that they tend to rely on empathy and support from people who are migrants like them (situational similarity).

In general, the labour migrants from this research group who worked in office jobs or as specialists did spend considerably more time than the regular labour migrants socialising with friends. They also received emotional support via transnational ties to other Ukrainian migrants (family and friends) living in other cities in Poland or outside Ukraine and Poland, among others in Ireland, Italy, Israel or France. They also had friendship ties to other foreigners they had met during their work at international corporations in Poland, who are currently abroad. As Yuliya said:

_My three best friends from university [in Ukraine], one left for Jerusalem, the other for Boston and the third one is in Germany (...). I have not visited the one in the US, but we are in touch. In exactly one week we are meeting_
in Kiev, because she goes there for summer holidays, and the one who stayed in Israel and the one in Germany I try to visit once a year, or they come see me here, or we meet in Kiev during summer holidays, we have a tradition to meet on the 24th of August, during Ukraine’s independence day, in Kiev, to spend time together.

Again, the situational similarity of these transnational ties (all of Yuliya’s friends are migrants) provides an important ground for maintaining this relationship. This is in line with other research findings showing that cross-border ties are important sources of emotional support for migrants (Baldassar, Nedelcu, Merla and Wilding 2016; Dahinden 2012; Herz 2015; Kozielska 2014).

Conclusions

At the moment the study was conducted, the interviewees’ social ties are similar to each other in terms of nationality, level of education, type of work and character of migration. We argue that in the case of the studied group, organisational or institutional embeddedness of social ties such as workplaces and university dormitories with a large presence of their co-nationals, the existence of Ukrainian migrant help groups, the Greek-Catholic or Orthodox Churches and Ukrainian or Russian-language hobby groups, but also the migrants’ own social networks, are crucial in determining with whom migrants interact and the extent to which their networks are homogenous. These formal and informal institutions provide the opportunities for interactions and also mediate these interactions via their norms and values. The fact that our interviewees mainly have ties with their fellow countrymen, who are similar to them in terms of their socio-economic status, is primarily the result of the particular circumstances in which they live. For example, functioning in the ambiance of other Ukrainians for several years (at work or at university) contributes to establishing ties with highly-skilled compatriots, as the relationships have their sources in previous ones. There are only few social bridges in networks which would connect Ukrainian migrants from different socio-economic statuses and to members of the receiving society. These particular institutional conditions provide little opportunities to form relationships with Poles who are, following Putnam’s’ bridging tie notion, ‘unlike me in important ways’ (with a few exceptions). The migrants do not perceive contacts with compatriots as an autotelic value, but rather as the most accessible form of networking. Individual preferences to associate with someone who speaks the same language and has a similar migration character complement the structural/institutional context. At the same time, however, interacting in multiple spaces and contexts means that migrants have the opportunity to form ties which are bridging in some ways (for example, migration experience or legal status in Poland), but not in other (for example, nationality or level of education).

However, our analysis also showed important boundary-drawing processes within the migrant group, which facilitate access to resources for some of them, while hindering this access for others, depending on their region of origin, languages spoken, socio-economic status and the moment of arrival in Poland. For example, Ukrainians from regions located in Western Ukraine had no or very few ties to Russian-speaking Ukrainians from Central and Eastern Ukraine. Such network boundaries mean less opportunities to form so-called bridging ties to people with resources different from one’s own. This is especially acute in the case of those labour migrants under study who work in the secondary sector of the labour market: they rarely have access to people with higher economic, social or cultural capital, which could possibly lead to their upward social mobility and to a shift from the ‘migration’ sector to the primary sectors of the labour market. However, in our study we saw examples of how the work and social status boundaries, as well as the boundaries between newcomers and the established migrants, are overcome thanks to value introjections or bounded solidarity. Thus, social capital is provided to people who are not necessary part of one’s network. It seems that, as Small (2017) claimed, mi-
grants also rely on those who are available in a given interaction space, and they receive help without expectations of reciprocity. We also see examples of what Portes (1998) called ‘reciprocity exchanges’, where access to resources was provided on the expectation of ‘repayment’ in the future. It was also evident from the analysis that the network of our informants changed dynamically and that apart from a few close ties, there was a substantial turnover of social ties when comparing those they had at the initial phase of migration and their social ties at the moment of the study was conducted.

As we have shown above, the character of social networks of the Ukrainian migrants under study changes over time, as they gather more migration experience and their needs and circumstances alter. We can identify two ideal types of social capital provided via migrants’ social ties, i.e., emotional and functional capital. These two types of social capital facilitated circulation between Ukraine and Poland, a kind of ‘settlement in mobility’. This was possible first of all thanks to ties to Poles, mainly the migrants’ (informal) employers, who facilitated their legal entry and stay. Depending on the circumstances, migrants either mobilised these ties to receive the necessary legal documents for entry or the employers provided the latter without the migrants’ initiative, guided by their own interest. Thus, the informal organisational embeddedness of migrants’ work relations provided the opportunities for both mobilisation of social capital and access to social capital, without the actual need of mobilisation. The importance of the tie to Poles for circular labour migrants continued if migrants had a precarious legal status and diminished with the increased stability of legal status. The ‘settlement in mobility’ was also possible thanks to ties to kin or friends in Ukraine (with household based in Ukraine) and a few ties to Ukrainian friends met in Poland, who were a source of the second type of ideal social capital, that is, emotional support. The transnational ties were upheld thanks to face-to-face contacts during regular stays in both countries and via everyday communication at a distance (internet communicators). Transnational ties help circular labour migrants to maintain the attachment to their places of origin and the feeling of belonging to their local communities in Ukraine. However, ties to Ukrainian migrant friends in Poland, but also transnational ties to family and friends in Ukraine and abroad, allowed migrants to cope with the difficulties of adapting to a new environment. They were also supportive in leading a transnational life, in case of those migrants with households back in Ukraine, a safety-net in case of emergencies and in decision-making processes concerning among other shifts in the labour market. However, migrants preferred to share their emotional difficulties with other migrants, who found it easier to empathise with them thanks to the shared experience of migration, than their families back home.

The transnational ties of highly qualified migrants limit the risk of estrangement and isolation in the new country and help them to maintain a sense of continuity and stability in their lives. What’s interesting, however, is that they mostly consist of ties with Ukrainian co-nationals who are also migrants, but who live in other countries. They are often rooted in childhood, adolescence or early adulthood (especially in the period of study) and are based on a sense of mutual understanding resulting from the shared experience of migration. Thanks to new technologies, migrants share their everyday reality on a regular basis during routine interactions and offer emotional support to each other. The emotional support was crucial for both personal and professional dimensions of migrants’ lives.

To conclude, migrants’ form bridging ties and these ties are a source of social capital, but not in the way we would expect. The bridging occurs mainly along the lines of possessing the knowledge or holding a position (legal or professional) that could be used to advance one’s social position either in Poland or in Ukraine (‘settled in mobility’). It mainly concerns ties to migrants with a longer migration experience (providing both instrumental and emotional support) and, in rare cases, to Poles. Bridging also occurs thanks to institutionally provided opportunities for knowledge exchange, as in the case of services used and projects developed by migrants in the civil society.
Notes

1 For more on respondent-driven sampling based survey see, for example, Górny (2017), Tyldum and Johnston (2014).

2 Since 2014 the legal requirements have changed, and the application has to be submitted one day before the expiration of the valid document.

3 These organisations were usually formed in response to political events in Ukraine, such as the Orange Revolution or the protests at the Euromaidan.

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References


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Nationality and Rationality: Ancestors, ‘Diaspora’ and the Impact of Ethnic Policy in the Country of Emigration on Ethnic Return Migration from Western Ukraine to the Czech Republic

Luděk Jirka*

Ethnic return migration is a widespread strategy for migrants from economically disadvantaged countries. This article is about those ethnic return migrants who might successfully migrate thanks to their ancestors; their decision is based upon economic, pragmatic or rationalistic incentives aside from their diasporic feeling of belonging. Although this phenomenon has already been studied, scholars still mostly refer only to the benefits proposed by immigration policy as a key to understanding it. The impact of policy in the country of emigration on ethnic return migration is understudied. This article fills this gap. I found that when the Soviet Union introduced an attractive policy for Ukrainians/Russians in terms of study or work opportunities and the inhabitants in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic were quick to proclaim themselves as Ukrainians or Russians, the dissolution of the Soviet Union quickly changed this motivation. Ukrainians with Czech ancestors started to aim at obtaining official status as Czech members of the diaspora because of the benefits proposed by the Czech government (mainly permanent residency). However, it is difficult to prove the required link to one’s Czech ancestors due to Soviet-era documents in which the column with the Czech nationality of people’s ancestors is often missing. These observations lead to the conclusion that an attractive immigration policy aimed at the diaspora should not be treated as the only comprehensive explanation for ethnic return migration. Ethnic policy in the country of emigration also shapes this kind of migration and – in this concrete case – could even discourage ethnic return migrants.

Keywords: ethnic return migration; Czech Republic; West Ukraine; ethnic policy; diaspora

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Introduction

The father was Kazakh and the mother Czech, or conversely, and the child is registered as Kazakh. The child is living in Kazakhstan and wants to go further, further and further. [In Kazakhstan] he wasn’t able to do anything, there are no opportunities, so he thinks: ‘Ok, I will move to my mother’s home country – there is the advantage of migrating somewhere else’ [because of maternal heredity]. Do you understand? [They are doing it] right this way (N. G., Dubno, Ukraine, 5 April 2012).

Migration to the European Union is highly promoted today in the media; however, the publicity is mainly dedicated to situations on the southern borders of the European Union, where refugees struggle to stay alive. The publicity given to East-to-West migration is now minor compared to its South-to-North direction, although the former migration stream remains important. Unsuccessful transitions to democracy and market economies after 1991 triggered migration from Eastern Europe to Central and Western Europe (Castles and Miller 2003). Migrants from Russia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus moved to Central European countries such as Poland, Germany or the Czech Republic, as well as to Southern European countries such as Spain, Italy or Portugal (Fedyuk and Kindler 2016; Markov 2009; Libanova and Poznjak 2010).

Migration from Ukraine has different meanings over time according to the political and economic situation in the country. Mobility outside Ukraine is now strategic and even Ukrainians who did not decide to migrate before 2013 are now tempted to move. Critical is combination of the Euromaidan, the war in Eastern Ukraine and following economic regression. The most popular countries are now Poland and Russia (Jaroszewicz 2015). Mobility to the European Union has also recently become a strategy for those from central and eastern parts of Ukraine, not just for Ukrainians from its western part (Jaroszewicz and Piechal 2016).

This paper is devoted to migrants from West Ukraine who have Czech ancestors. Many of these migrants – recent members of the Czech diaspora in West Ukraine – are the descendants of Czech immigrants from the second half of the nineteenth century (approximately 1868–1888). There were almost 40 000 Czechs in Western Ukraine during the interwar period – when it was part of Poland – but most of them repatriated to Czechoslovakia in 1947 after the war when West Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union. Some did not receive permission to repatriate in 1947, others were imprisoned in Soviet labour camps (gulags) and still others simply did not want to repatriate for personal or family reasons. There were also those who had unexpected deaths or serious illnesses in the family or problems with personal documents. Other specific constraints were mixed marriages – women whose husbands were of non-Czech origin were not allowed to repatriate, while men married to wives with non-Czech origins were allowed to. According to repatriation documents, 34 122 persons wanted to repatriate in 1947 (Vizitiv 2008), 34 010 persons received approval and only 33 077 of them actually repatriated.1 In all, 933 persons did not move to Czechoslovakia in spite of their approval for repatriation, while a further 112 persons were not given permission. In total, 1 045 Czechs failed to repatriate, although the number of non-repatriated Czechs is actually higher, for political and social reasons. Many of these non-repatriated Czechs remained sparsely distributed among Ukrainians after 1947 so that mixed marriages occurred.

Ukraine is an independent state today, but the Soviet Union’s heritage is still prominently important, at least for ethnic return migrants. I argue that Russian (as the leading nation in Soviet Union) and Ukrainian nationality (as a leading nation in the Ukrainian SSR) was preferred in Soviet era because of the greater possibilities to access an education and a career. These nationalities were also preferred because they aroused less suspicion with the Soviet security agency (KGB; Committee for State Security). Consequently, Czechs living
in the Ukrainian SSR often claimed Russian and Ukrainian nationality and therefore it was a rationalistic decision which sometimes went against their ‘true’ ethnic consciousness. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed all this and suddenly Czech nationality became more attractive because of the unsuccessful Ukrainian transition to a market economy, the economic crisis in Russia, and the growing tendency for emigration from West Ukraine to Europe. Ukrainians with Czech ancestry today proclaim themselves as members of the Czech diaspora because of the benefits – such as permanent residency in the Czech Republic – offered to them by Czech government. However, to achieve confirmation of their belonging to the Czech diasporic community abroad and then permanent residency, it is necessary to prove the linkage to their Czech ancestors with documents recording Czech nationality.

I show in this paper that young and middle generations of Ukrainians with Czech ancestors refer today to their Czech descent and derive benefits from membership in Czech diaspora, but ‘blank space’ from Soviet era is a big constraint. However, they have rationalistic rather than nostalgic incentives to ‘return home’ and their pragmatic decision is driven by the harmful economic and political situation in Ukraine. This type of migration fits into the concepts of ‘ethnic return migration’ (Tsuda 2003, 2009) or ‘ethnomigration’ (Brubaker 1998). Scholars researching this type of migration, aside from studying the pragmatic decisions of migrants, focus mainly on the ‘diaspora’ policy in the country of immigration as a crucial aspect which encourages ethnic return migration. Indeed, ‘diaspora’ members are attracted by the scale of the different kinds of benefits promoted by the country of immigration, like being able to obtain a house or finances (Anghel 2013). They are often privileged as members of the nation (Joppke 2005). Pull factors in terms of policy towards the ‘diaspora’ in the country of immigration are very important and this is the case in the Czech Republic. However, in this paper, I ask a question: Does policy in the country of emigration also have any influence on ethnic return migrants? It may be taken as a matter of course, but which conditions are there concretely? To understand that point, I refer to the Rivne and Volyn regions (West Ukraine) as emigration areas and the Czech Republic as an immigration country. Consequently, I claim that both Soviet and Ukrainian ethnic policies played their role in shaping the contemporary ethnic return migration from Ukraine to the Czech Republic, but the Soviet one was even more influential.

The first section of this paper is dedicated to the theoretical implications of my research and the second is about the methodology – i.e. my anthropological fieldwork in the Rivne and Volyn regions in West Ukraine. The third section concerns Soviet ethnic policy and ethnos theory while the following sections deal with proclaimed nationalities in the Soviet era and independent Ukraine, Czech policy towards the ‘diaspora’, participants and their nationality and the national identity declared in documents. To conclude, I show how Czech members of the ‘diaspora’ in post-Soviet Ukraine and, more generally, ethnic minorities in post-Soviet countries, present their nationality, how they are treated and defined and how the flow of ethnic return migration is limited. This paper does not cover the emigration policy of the Soviet Union or post-Soviet Ukraine, but only the interior policy of the two regimes and its impact on ethnic return migration. In this article the term nationality refers to ‘membership of a national minority living within a state and/or culturally linked to an external national “homeland”’ (Baübôck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch 2006: 485) as it is often used in Central and Eastern Europe (Brubaker 2006).

**Theoretical implications**

Ethnic return migration could be interpreted as (a) migration driven by diasporic attachment, nostalgia, or ethnic ties to homeland (e.g. Cohen 1997; Safran 1991; Tsuda 2009) or as (b) migration of later-generation diasporic descendants who are fully assimilated in their countries of birth and who lose their ‘ancestral’ culture to a considerable extent (Tsuda 2009). In this article, I deal with the latter approach to ethnic return migration,
because the studied ethnic return migrants are strongly embedded in structural, social and cultural norms – i.e. they fully identify with the majority in their country of birth, due to their intra-generational assimilation into the local environment (through intermarriage, urbanisation and linguistic and cultural assimilation) and they express the ethnic subjective consciousness of the majority.

Nevertheless, ethnic ancestors can be ‘used’ even if ethnic return migrants do not express any ethnic closeness to the nation of immigration but respond to merely economic incentives (economic prosperity, living conditions, a developed labour market – Fox 2007; Kulu and Tammaru 2000; Tsuda 2003, 2009; Waterbury 2006). They could even be seen as ‘labour migrants’ (Fox 2003, 2007; Skrentny et al. 2007; Tsuda 2009; Waterbury 2006, 2014). The situation could also be interpreted as a deception of official policy (Iglicka 2001; Tsuda 2009).

Generally speaking, scholars deal mainly with the political level in the case of ethnic return migration – i.e. they analyse the policy of the country of immigration as being favourable towards ‘members of diaspora’ and as forming immigration flows (Fox 2003, 2007; Iglicka 2001; Joppke 2005; Joppke and Rosenhek 2009; Kulu and Tammaru 2000; Tsuda 2009; Skrentny et al. 2007; Waterbury 2014). Immigration is then explained by the attractive policy of economically advanced countries, which channeled migration (Tsuda 2009) by offering benefits (i.e. citizenship, better jobs or pensions, entrance into fully developed welfare systems, etc.). As Christian Joppke and Zeev Rosenhek (2009) explicitly put it, countries of immigration produce ethnic return migration. In reality, countries set preferential policy for various reasons. Nevertheless, some scholars have dealt with the immigration policy of specific countries as the sole cause of the rise and fall of ethnic return migration (Iglicka 2001; Joppke 2005; Skrentny et al. 2007; Waterbury 2006, 2014). Following such reasoning, one could claim that, if countries of immigration stopped their preferential immigration policy towards members of the diaspora, ethnic return migration would become insignificant (and vice versa). Other explanations for fluctuations in ethnic return migration – such as social networks and information flows, the proximity of language (Fox 2007; Kulu and Tammaru 2000) or education for children (Kulu and Tammaru 2000) – remain smaller in scale; however, these social networks are very often not present (Brubaker 1998; Kulu and Tammaru 2000; Tsuda 2009).

Conditions in the country of birth are often described as impoverished (Fox 2007; Joppke and Rosenhek 2009) and this affects ethnic return migration. Indeed, the return migration of Russian Jews, ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union / Russia, ethnic Koreans from China or ethnic Japanese from Brazil is explained as the consequence of economic crises in their countries of birth (Tsuda 2009). Another explanation is ethnic persecution (Joppke 2005; Kulu 2002; Tsuda 2009) or environmental change (Kulu 1998). Economic regression is, however, seen as the primary reason for leaving. In this sense, ethnic return migration is a product of global disparities of wealth. At the same time, almost no effort has been made to properly describe policies in the country of emigration and how they shape the decisions of ethnic return migrants.

In other words, in the literature, the political impacts of countries of emigration on ethnic return migrants are often neglected, although they could potentially cause or hinder migration. In this article, I try to fill this gap, by showing that immigration policy is not the only politically based element ‘producing’ ethnic return migration and that policy in the country of emigration could also crucially impact on it. I present policies from the Soviet Union and independent Ukraine to shed more light on this issue. This leads me to ask how policy in a migrant’s country of birth, accompanied by policy in the country of immigration, influences ethnic return migration.
Methodology

Qualitative research was conducted with members of Czech diasporic associations from the Rivne and Volyn regions in West Ukraine (see Map 1) (the Czech association Stromovka, in Dubno, the Association of Czech Matice Volynska in Luck and the Czech association in Rivne) during the years 2012–2015. These Czech diasporic associations are relatively small and consist not only of members of the ‘diaspora’ but also of the spouses and relatives of members of the ‘diaspora’ and their sympathisers. The Association of Czech Matice Volynska in Luck had 220 members in 2013; however only 70 members remained after its reorganisation in 2014. The Czech association Stromovka in Dubno had 264 members in 2013 and the association in Rivne had 72 members in the same year.

Map 1. Migration flows of Czechs between Czechia and Luck region and Rivne region

Semi-structured interviews were held in Czech diasporic associations. Twenty-eight interviews were conducted with members of the ‘diaspora’ (those with Czech ancestors) and ten with other association members. Five of the latter were convinced that they had Czech ancestors, but were unable to prove it by documents. Another five participants were without Czech ancestors. However, all were connected with Czech diasporic associations. It was not always possible to interview a whole family each time for different reasons (some refused to be interviewed, older-generation participants refused to be recorded, and some were abroad at the time). Complete families were interviewed only in four cases, and family members were mostly in a ‘mother–child’ (older–middle generation) relationship.
Table 1. Demographic information about participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College/grammar school</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age (to date of interview)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 and below</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–60</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and above</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, nurses</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers, academics</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative work</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual work</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (lawyers, industrialists, chemists)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residency</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubno</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luck</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zdolbuniv</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrounding villages</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To this day, older-generation of Czech diaspora (60+ years old) have one or two Czech parents, the middle generation (30–60 years old) have one Czech parent or one grandparent, and the younger participants (up to 30 years old) often have only one Czech grandparent or just one great-grandparent. Participants from the older generation expressed their Czech ethnic consciousness but have no intention of migrating. Middle-aged participants expressed their Czech as well as Ukrainian ethnic consciousness (depending on their childhood and personal development), while the younger generation expressed Ukrainian ethnic consciousness. Members of the young and middle generations are mostly affected by emigration tendencies; the decision to migrate by those of the younger generation is mostly a pragmatic one for the purpose of study (fee-free) or work, and still enroll as members of the Czech diaspora. Most had made tourist trips to the Czech Republic – a country which they consider to be economically and materially advanced compared to Ukraine. On the other hand, their attitude towards the Ukrainian state and society is negative – they consider Ukrainians as passive and xenophobic, and Ukraine as a bad state in which to live. These are crucial factors encouraging them to enroll as members of Czech diaspora, as one participant, I. K., from Dubno in Ukraine stated in an interview on 9 July 2013:

*I. K.:* In the Czech Republic life is more interesting. You don’t know what to do in Ukraine on the weekend. There is nowhere you can go.

*L. J.:* I know what you are talking about.
I. K.: People in the Czech Republic have swimming pools and other activities. It is also in Ukraine, but not as in the Czech Republic.

Firstly, I contacted participants from the older generation who are active leaders in Czech diasporic associations; they in turn put me in touch with their family members. Participants from the younger generation were the last to be interviewed because I presumed that the most relevant information which would clarify the situation in the Soviet Union and after the independence of Ukraine in 1991 could be gained from interviews with the older generation. However, the younger generation was important when researching their migration intentions.

This research was launched in Dubno, a small town in the Rivne region and the centre of the Czech diaspora before 1947. In Dubno the most active Czech diasporic association – Stromovka – was also located. Participants also came from the surrounding villages and from the towns of Luck, Zdolbuniv and Rivne. The average interview lasted about 90 minutes. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and saved in my personal archive.

At the beginning of the interview, participants were asked to recount their life story; any additional questions were then asked. In the interviews, participants emphasised their relationship with their Czech ancestors and the Czech nation, culture and folklore. My positionality as being of Czech ethnicity was crucial, as participants often felt able to proclaim their closeness to the Czech nationality and they talked mainly about others when they wanted to emphasise how they dealt with the problem of nationality. Participants were more open about themselves after further appointments with me, although they often were not entirely frank with me and I had to tease out certain details or contexts in the participant’s life course during ‘little chats’ with them (or with others). Additional questions concerned the ethnicity of the participants and of their ancestors and any documentation proving the latter relationship, ethnic policy and nationality issues in the Soviet Union and independent Ukraine and the process of proving their belonging to the Czech diasporic community abroad and gaining permanent residency in the Czech Republic.

An interview was also obtained with Miroslav Klíma, the General Consul of the Czech Republic in Lviv. Notes from my field diary served as clarification together with my ‘little chats’ with non-interviewed members of Czech associations and other inhabitants in West Ukraine (written also into field diary).

Soviet Union policy: ‘Be a member’ of a nation

It is necessary to understand the historical background – in this case the Soviet regime in West Ukraine – and its implications for the current situation. During the Soviet regime the interrelatedness of nation and specific territory had a strong effect (Skalník and Krjukov 1990). This involved the territory of the Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Moldavia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). This went hand-in-hand with the development of the ‘nation’ – i.e. a ‘group of people’ recognised as a nation could develop themselves ‘ethnically’, mainly by using their language as the official one. Many ‘nations’ then saw themselves as preferable owners of national autonomies (Moledikova 2016) because this predicts that the subjectivity of people should be complementary to the territory of their ‘origin’ (Brubaker 1996). Forced and wishful commonalities created a status of groupness because persons were labelled and included as a preferable group on the basis of their ethnicity in a specific territory. However, this juristic output did not apply to smaller ethnic groups or even huge minorities like Tatars or Gagauzes, who could not use their own language officially.

Inhabitants of the Soviet Union recognised nationality as asserted by Soviet policy, e.g. nationality was written on identity cards that were needed during negotiations with bureaucrats. Nationalities with ‘their own’ territory outside the Soviet Union could also receive identity cards with ‘their’ nationality (e.g. people of Polish
origin who were signed as Polish; Iglicka 1998). People born in the Soviet Union could be assigned to a specific nation located outside Soviet territory (Brubaker 1996).

This is also the case for those of Czech origin living in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were surrounded by others who were labelled Ukrainians and should therefore become accustomed to the Ukrainian majority, but could still be labelled as having Czech nationality. Indeed, they were able to speak Czech during informal meetings but official language rights were not accorded. According to this policy, Czechs were not given the same rights as Ukrainians and this was the first ‘obstacle’ for inhabitants of Czech origin. This was the first aspect which had a negative impact on Czech ethnicity (and subsequently on ethnic return migration) because Ukrainian and Russian nationality was preferred.

**Proclaimed Russian and Ukrainian nationality in the Soviet era**

During the Soviet period, inhabitants from mixed marriages could (at the age of 16) choose either their mother’s or their father’s nationality, without any choice of ethnicity other than those of their parents (Modlodikova 2016). Such a decision had an impact on their personal career. Nationality was written on identity cards, pay-books or other personal documents (birth and death certificates, church register, etc.) and Russian and Ukrainian nationality was preferable as far as improved life expectations were concerned. Having an institutionally preferable nationality meant better access to education or employment (Brubaker 1996; Modlodikova 2016), otherwise social mobility was very difficult. For the Czech diaspora, Russian or Ukrainian nationality was often more preferable than Czech nationality.

However, it should be mentioned that some inhabitants were institutionally forced – even as adults – to declare nationality as Ukrainian because they were indispensable to the local political structure as experts. This was the case for one participant’s father, who worked as an industrialist: ‘They took away (his) identity card and put him down as being of Ukrainian nationality. However, his documents proclaimed him as having Czech nationality. Even in (his) pay-book he was Czech’ (interview with H. N., Dubno, 17 July 2013). Bureaucrats, in some cases, decided on a person’s nationality which means that the possibility of someone choosing their nationality was somewhat limited.

Participants also mentioned that some Czechs were afraid to declare non-Russian or non-Ukrainian nationality due to the oppressive Soviet regime (see also Iglicka 2001). Those who had declared Czech nationality had problems with the Soviet security agency (KGB) and said that they were interrogated and suspected or accused of having enemy contacts abroad. The following conversation with T. S. in Dubno on 6 April 2012 goes back to the situation in 1939, after the Soviet invasion of East Poland:

**L. H.:** Your father was not Russian, but Czech. [Because] your grandmother was Czech. However, [your father] was declared as Russian in his passport, but he is Czech.

**T. S.:** Yes and he was written as Russian only in his passport. His mother is Czech.

**L. H.:** And it was written in passports that the mother was Czech and any children followed their mother.

**T. S.:** Yes, after his mother. But in 1939 he declared himself as Russian.

**L. H.:** His mother was Czech and he was written in his passport as Russian, because his father was Russian and [really] he is Czech.
T. S.: He had to, because they [the Soviets] arrived in 1939, so my Russian grandfather signed everyone [or our family] as Russian.

Some families even became accustomed to speaking in Russian or Ukrainian despite their subjective feelings of ethnicity. For example, in an interview on 8 July 2013, R. I., from Luck in the Ukraine, said that she was born in the Uman region and that both of her parents were Czech; however, they spoke only Russian so she had not been able to learn Czech until today: ‘My mother learned German as well as the Czech language, but she was afraid and did not talk [in the Czech language], so we were not able to learn our native language’.

Some participants also mentioned changing their original names to make them sound more Russian or Ukrainian and some others – as is expected – explicitly mentioned putting their nationality as Russian or Ukrainian on their identity cards or pay-books. In spite of these reasons, even during the Soviet regime, five participants declared their nationality to be Czech. Nevertheless, most referred to Soviet policy and its authority as a decisive factor in them choosing their nationality, which admits that ‘unfriendly’ Soviet policy was important and had an assimilative impact. Russian or Ukrainian nationality was preferred in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and participants behaved in line with these nationalities to avoid oppression and to improve their lives. The breakdown of the Soviet Union and declaration of Ukraine independence in 1991 changed all this.

Proclaimed Czech ethnic consciousness after the dissolution of the Soviet Union

Ukraine’s unsuccessful transition from a planned to a market economy caused a huge economic crisis; political and economic turbulence in post-Soviet countries, including Russia, ushered in new preferences. Czech, Polish, Hungarian and other nationalities became more preferred than Russian or Ukrainian concerning people’s economic and social objectives.

Table 2. Nationalities of participants and children’s country of settlement (2013–2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant (year born)</th>
<th>Nationality of parents (written in documents or proclaimed by participants – proclaimed today)</th>
<th>Nationality of participant (self-proclaimed – today)</th>
<th>Nationality of husband/wife (self-proclaimed – today)</th>
<th>Children’s current country of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. N. (1966)</td>
<td>Czech (M) – Ukrainian (F)</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. N. (1944)</td>
<td>Czech (M) – Czech (F)</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. L. (1959)</td>
<td>Russian (M) – Czech (F)</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. F. (1955)</td>
<td>Czech (M) – Belarus (F)</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. N. (1940)</td>
<td>Czech (M) – Czech (F)</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ukraine, grandson in Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. S. (1949)</td>
<td>Ukrainian (M) – Czech (F)</td>
<td>‘Both’</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. T. (1948)</td>
<td>Ukrainian (M) – Czech (F)</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. D. (1972)</td>
<td>Czech (M) – Ukrainian (F)</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. G. (1954)</td>
<td>Ukrainian (M) – Czech (F)</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. S. (1947)</td>
<td>Czech (M) – Russian (F)</td>
<td>‘Both’</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. R. (1940)</td>
<td>Ukrainian (M) – Czech (F)</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>No children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. B. (1928)</td>
<td>Czech (M) – Czech (F)</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Not all participants are in this table. Please note that these data were collected after ‘ethnic re-identification’.
Categories of nationality persisted in post-Soviet countries after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and had an impact on preferences, including those of members of the Czech diasporic association in Ukraine. They became citizens of their current country of residence – Ukraine – in 1991 but, roughly since then, most define themselves as belonging to the Czech nation. In justification, many of them talked about the improper declarations of their nationality which they had made during the Soviet regime. They said that their ‘true’ nationality was different and now defined themselves as ‘Czechs’, stating ‘We are Czechs’ even if not ‘clear Czechs’, but ‘mixed with Ukrainian nationality’ or have ‘one quarter Czech blood’. They ‘re-identified’ with Czech ethnicity even if they were originally from mixed marriages. As Table 2 shows, only three participants from the older/middle generation had parents who were both Czechs while ten had one Ukrainian, Russian or Belarusian parent; they mostly declared themselves as Czechs in spite of the mixed marriages of their parents. However, two participants declared that they could not be defined as either Czech or Ukrainian, because they live on ‘both sides simultaneously’ and one declared Ukrainian nationality. Table 2 also shows that participants from the middle generation mostly married Ukrainians (although two participants married Russians and one a Romanian); however their children (from the younger generation) had already declared Ukrainian ethnicity (even if they admired the Czech political system, for example). Nevertheless, the attractive economic and political conditions of the Czech Republic have crucial influence and even the young generation could apply for confirmation of belonging to the Czech diasporic community abroad and then for permanent residency in the Czech Republic.

**Benefits for members of the Czech ‘diaspora’**

Until 1996, members of the Czech ‘diaspora’ in Ukraine were treated by the Czech government as other Ukrainians; however, in 1996 the situation changed and Ukrainian citizens with Czech ancestors were positively viewed. They were then allowed to apply for documents declaring that they belonged to the Czech diasporic community living abroad and to receive benefits on the basis of their Czech origin and their membership in Czech diasporic associations.

These benefits included easier access to a Schengen (tourist) visa (the quick and successful provision of a visa provided by the Consulate General of the Czech Republic and the possibility of not having to pay the 35-euro fee for its preparation, although confirmation from the Czech diasporic association of their membership in the association was needed), the confirmation of multi-visas (multiple entrance into the Schengen area; residence in the Czech Republic for 90 days) and easier access to permanent residency in the Czech Republic (obtaining permanent residency in 6 months, together with the possibility of obtaining citizenship). However, having confirmation of belonging to the diasporic community abroad is necessary in all cases.

Indeed, all of the above is a kind of positive discrimination based upon the principle of ethnic affiliation. The affirmative treatment of Czech members of the ‘diaspora’ did not change even after the Czech Republic joined the European Union in 2004. The European Commission does not ban the positive discrimination of diaspora and the Czech Republic still allows the ‘diaspora’ living abroad to reap the benefits.

One of the strongest of those benefits is the opportunity to receive permanent residency in the Czech Republic for those who are able to confirm their membership in a diasporic community abroad and members of the ‘diaspora’ are able to settle in the Czech Republic much faster than other interested persons. Other Ukrainian citizens without this confirmation can obtain permanent residency only after five years of working or ten years of studying in the Czech Republic. This only confirms the importance of the Czech Republic’s immigration policy and legitimises the benefits available to the ‘diaspora’ as a strong pull factor. As Table 2 shows, six of my participants from the young generation live in the Czech Republic (plus one grandson) and only four live in Ukraine. In Table 3 we can see that four of these six participants living in the Czech Republic had
written confirmation of belonging to the Czech diasporic community abroad and were thus able to obtain permanent residency (one was hoping to receive confirmation of belonging to the Czech diasporic community abroad in the future). Participants from the older and middle generations also now have permanent residency, although most of them remain in Ukraine.

Table 3. Confirmation of belonging to Czech diasporic community abroad and permanent residency (2013–2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year of birth</td>
<td>Confirmation of belonging to Czech diasporic community abroad (PPKK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. N. (1966)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. N. (1944)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. L. (1959)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. F. (1955)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. N. (1940)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. S. (1949)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. T. (1948)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. K. (1974)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. D. (1972)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. G. (1954)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. S. (1947)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. R. (1940)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. B. (1928)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Not all participants are in this table. Not all participants necessarily have proof of belonging to the Czech ‘diaspora’ abroad nor of permanent residency – it depends on their documents and personal incentives.

In sum, young participants used the documents of their ancestors to gain permanent residency. However, some were prevented from ethnic return migration to the Czech Republic because of the official Russian or Ukrainian nationality stated in their ancestors’ documents. This policy in the Soviet Union could discourage ethnic return migration.

Declared Russian and Ukrainian nationality as a limitation to ethnic return migration

Crucial for the successful receipt of confirmation of belonging to a diasporic community abroad is the holding of appropriate (and not falsified) documents declaring Czech ancestors and proving a connection to them. It is practically impossible for participants to prove kinship from the period of Tsarist Russia (regime in Ukraine until 1917), so they can only prove it through documents from the interwar period, the era of the Soviet Union or the period of Ukraine independence up until 1996. Nationality in independent Ukraine could be altered by adult participants during the years 1991–1996. Since 1996, nationality is not recognised on identity cards, but is only stated on birth certificates (even today). This means ‘fewer opportunities for using’ ethnic ancestors. However, some participants managed to change their nationality in time to maintain the benefits for their children, as E. S., from Luck, told us in an interview on 18 April 2014:
I’ve got an identity card [with written Czech nationality]. On my first card I was Ukrainian. In 1970 my grandmother died. She spoke Czech and I promised her I would change my nationality. However, I was told it was not possible until 1991. So I changed my nationality to Czech in 1991. My cousin also changed his nationality; another cousin not. My aunts did the same – one changed her nationality, one did not.

What were the benefits for the children? Identity cards issued before 1996 were not returned to Ukrainians – the old photo of the person was just replaced by a new one and identity cards with a column for nationality remained unchanged, at least so I was told by my participants. These could be used as a document proving connection to a Czech ancestor.

For those aged 16+ in post-Soviet Ukraine who are the children of mixed marriages, they can choose the nationality they prefer from either of their parents’ nationalities. Today, however, it is possible for anyone to change their nationality in a court of law, and some older participants undertook it for the sake of their children. However, children’s nationality can be changed only to that of the second parent. An official avowal of Czech parentage in Ukraine has no impact on the obtain of confirmation of belonging to the Czech diasporic community abroad, because this proof is issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and documented linkage to Czech ancestors is researched by the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. Nationality can be changed in Ukraine to ‘Czech’ but the applicant’s Czech origins need to be confirmed by the Ministry of the Interior; for my participants, documents from the Soviet era or the interwar period showing official Czech nationality were the most important for attaining permanent residency in the Czech Republic because they proved the applicants’ origins.

However, documents proving a person’s links to a Czech ancestor from the Soviet Union period (i.e. documents showing an ancestor’s Czech nationality) are often missing because Russian or Ukrainian nationality was preferred at that time. Only two participants had their father’s pay-book from the Soviet era with his Czech nationality acknowledged. The other 17 participants held documents from the interwar period (or documents issued prior to repatriation in 1947 – e.g. a marriage certificate from 1947) and five had no documents.

Moreover, most participants had documents from the interwar period proclaiming the Czech nationality of a specific ancestor but were unable to prove a link with this person on their family tree due to missing or ‘misinterpreted’ documents from the Soviet period. For example, if the surname of a person’s grandmother differs on her birth certificate (she perhaps changed her name to sound more Russian), a link to her could not be proven. Indeed, very few people have all the documents – i.e. birth and marriage certificates, pay-books, etc. – which are necessary to prove a link to a Czech ancestor from the interwar period, as stated by L. K. from Luck in an interview on 13 May 2015:

*His grandmother is written as Ukrainian, [his grandfather] as Ukrainian and he has only one very old document which shows the Czech nationality [of their ancestor]. They have only this one and [they couldn’t prove] the sequence by which that ancestor links to him. (...) I don’t know about others. My documents are ideal.*

Some falsification of documents appears to be due to the positive immigration policy of the Czech Republic towards the ‘ diaspora’ and the economic and social situation in Ukraine, as L. K. again asserts: ‘There was no Photoshop in 2001. Maybe there was, but not everyone could work with it. Right now, the Czech government has to check documents’. These were fictional attempts to get confirmation of belonging to a diasporic community abroad, thanks to the declaration of non-original documents or the stating of untrue information. The Czech Consul General in Lviv, M. K., said on 1 August 2014 that:
[The] number of diaspora has risen [in Ukraine] from 200 to 700 during a short period after the introduction of some benefits. It is not natural. Also, the submitted documents were fakes.

Paradoxically, as Table 4 shows, confirmation of belonging to the Czech diasporic community abroad is increasingly being issued – rising by more than 100 per cent between 2006 and 2014. We might conclude that more people have learned how to use ancestry to achieve permanent residency in the Czech Republic as this strategy was probably less-well known in 2006. This thesis is also supported by growing attempts to falsify documents. Consequently, it should be mentioned that the Czech diasporic association in Carpathian-Ruthenia enrolled 500 new members between 2014 and 2015, most probably because of the Eastern Ukraine conflict and new economic crisis in Ukraine, as the Czech Consul General in Lviv pointed out.

Table 4. Confirmations of belonging to the Czech diasporic community abroad (PPKK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of confirmations issued</th>
<th>Other comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>208</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>315 applications were returned (new rules for applicants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>War in Eastern Ukraine – issuing was faster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>War in Eastern Ukraine – issuing was faster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data are from the whole of Ukraine.
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

Declaring a specific nationality is a strategy for settling in the Czech Republic. During the Soviet period, Russian or Ukrainian nationality was favoured when seeking preferable treatment and social mobility. More recently, choosing the Czech nationality is a strategy enabling access to better life opportunities due to the distressed political, economic and social situation in Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Euromaidan and the Eastern Ukraine conflict. This could be called ‘ethnic reidentification’ (Brubaker 1998). However, declaring Russian or Ukrainian nationality during the Soviet period limited a person’s chances of ethnic return migration – in other words, of attaining Czech ‘co-ethnicity’ and permanent residency in the Czech Republic.

Conclusion

Receiving states introduced more or less attractive criteria for immigration of members of the ‘diaspora’ – drawing up beneficial immigration policies toward them could trigger larger (or smaller) inflows of ethnic return migrants (Joppke 2005). The policy of the Czech Republic towards members of the ‘diaspora’ also implies ‘opening a door’ to the immigration of ‘co-ethnics’ living abroad. The effectiveness of policy on ethnic return migration in countries of immigration has been considerably researched (Brubaker 1996; Iglicka 1998; Joppke 2005; Tsuda 2003), yet the impact of policy on this kind of migration in countries of emigration remains
somewhat understudied. Studies of ethnic policy in countries of emigration are rare and, even when mentioned (Brubaker 1996; Iglicka 1998), its consequences for migrant actions were never fully analysed.

My empirical research has shown that policies in countries of emigration – in this case the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Ukraine – must be considered. These policies resulted in fewer opportunities for migration success and discouraged ethnic return migrants. Crucially, Russian and Ukrainian nationality during the Soviet Union period was desirable because it supposedly assisted the development of a person’s career (education or job). However, the changing economic and political development in Europe after 1991 quickly changed migrant preferences (see Fedyuk and Kindler 2016) and at least the ‘Czech’ nationality is coveted in Ukraine to this day. Nevertheless, many Ukrainian citizens with Czech ancestors do not have in recently proper documents when applying for membership of the Czech diaspora. Main constraint is the Russian or Ukrainian nationality written on their documents or those of their ancestors. The expectations of participants remained the same – well-being for themselves – but the desirability of countries is reversed and ethnic ‘reidentification’ (Iglicka 2001) – i.e. shifts in nationality after 1991 – means fewer opportunities for ethnic return migration even today.

Scholars have dealt primarily with the policy of the ‘ancestral homeland’ and its impact on generating ethnic return migration (Joppke and Rosenhek 2009), but this thesis has also its converse. Therefore, both immigration policies and policy in the country of a person’s birth affect the numbers of ethnic return migrants. They are not just persons who registered as members of the diaspora when the country of immigration ‘call’ to them and propose benefits (as scholars who studied ethnic return migration put it). Ethnic return migrants must also pass through constraints in the country of emigration, which could limit instrumental and strategic acting.

The circumstances analysed above may well also be common to other minorities in post-Soviet regions; they should not be applied only to Czech ethnic return migrants. The situation in West Ukraine did not differ from that in Kazakhstan, Belarus or Moldova, etc., because ‘European’ nationality might also be attractive in these countries – especially if their inhabitants have German, Polish or Estonian ancestors. Inhabitants of many post-Soviet countries could use ethnic ancestors to establish an ethnic disposition towards migration in very similar way but, again, their efforts could be thwarted because of the political situation during the period of the Soviet Union and the Russian (and one other preferable) nationality written in their parental documents.

Nevertheless, some constraints limit conclusion of this article. There are still differences about awareness of this possibility. First, the handling of nationality mostly took place in Czech diasporic associations and participants were often the most active members within them. They have a special interest in the activities in these associations and the improvement of members’ living conditions as well as the possibility of migration are two of the usual objectives. Second, even Czech descendants with proper documents have to overcome some constraints. Only a small number of participants among the whole ‘diasporic community’ possess the know-how to handle nationality. Others do not know how to bureaucratically ‘use nationality’ to their advantage. They have to ask others. To conclude, the strategy described above is one possible way, but one which not everyone is fully aware of or utilises it. Ukrainian citizens with Czech ancestors could be less responsive to this strategy and strategies pursued by them could differ.

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Notes

1 Danilicheva and Leonova (1997). Czech soldiers who fought in the Czechoslovak army corpus and settled in Czechoslovakia in 1945 were included.
2 This form of ethnic return migration is mostly connected with Eastern Europe (post-Soviet countries) and the Balkans and is common for Russian Jews or ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and Russia (Brubaker 1998; Markowitz and Steffanson 2004; Tsuda 2009) and, to lesser extent, for ethnic Poles from post-Soviet countries (Iglicka 2001), Serbians, Bulgarians, Romanians and Croats in the Balkans (Waterbury 2014) or Greeks, Finns, Kazakh or Russians from post-Soviet countries (Brubaker 1998).
3 Preferential immigration policy is also analysed in nationalistic terms, as the protection of persecuted members of the diaspora abroad (Brubaker 1998; Joppke 2005; Skrentny et al. 2007; Tsuda 2009; Waterbury 2014) or as an effort to reverse ethnic dispersion (Joppke 2005; Joppke and Rosenhek 2009).
4 Indeed, many countries do not actively support diasporic return, but do want to improve the living conditions of members of the diaspora in their countries of settlement.
5 The social and economic adaptation of ethnic return migrants in the country of immigration is also much studied. (Fox 2003, 2007; Kulu 1998, 2002; Kulu and Tammaru 2000; Skrentny et al. 2007; Tsuda 2001, 2003). This is often seen as problematic because of the different internalised norms and cultural values, the paucity of knowledge about the situation in the country of immigration (Iglicka 2001; Tsuda 2009) or – explicitly stated – the different ethnicity (Fox 2007; Kulu and Tammaru 2000) even if some of them retain their ’ancestral’ language (Kulu and Tamaru 2000) or religion (Iglicka 2001).
6 There is a difference between European countries and countries in East and South-East Asia. The latter attract members of the diaspora to work; they are invited for economic purposes as labour migrants (Tsuda 2009). For example, South Korea and Taiwan want high-skilled ethnic return migrants and South Korea and Japan attract low-skilled workers employed in 3D – or dirty, dangerous and demeaning – jobs (Skrentny et al. 2007). European countries tend to introduce more ‘romantic’ immigration policies and economic ties are seen as less important (Skrentny et al. 2007).
7 Describing political tensions in terms of diaspora between both countries is the right way (Skrentny et al. 2007; Waterbury 2014), but this is just a consequence of nationality policies.
8 There was one other repatriation in 1991–1993 because of the Chernobyl disaster. However, those repatriated were from the Zhytomyr and Kyiv regions and not from the Rivne or Volyn regions.
The status of groupness was invented by Soviet policy; Soviet ‘cabinet’ scholars and inhabitants were simply categorised. Even rare empirical fieldwork was not carried out, so that subjective expressions of ethnicity and self-determination were not followed (Allworth 1990).

Czechs could not gather officially during Soviet Era, but informal meetings proceeded in graveyard during funerals or visiting at home were the usual situations (participant S.N., Molodavo, Ukraine, 14 July 2013).

Czech diasporic associations were funded by a programme of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was designed to support Czech cultural heritage abroad from 1996 until 2001. Funds were mostly used for repairing original Czech buildings and objects, supporting Czech schools, libraries and festivals, teaching the Czech language and upholding Czech ethnic consciousness. From 2007 to the present day, these funds are distributed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which also collects information about the ‘diaspora’ and Czech diasporic associations. Direct contacts with the ‘diaspora’ remain tained by employees of Czech embassies; they are often invited by Czech diasporic associations to festivals and other events.

This situation was changed by the introduction of a visa-free regime in 2017. However, Ukrainians still need biometric passports for a visa-free regime and this is also a problem.

Such benefits also include the awarding of special scholarships for Czech language courses in the Czech Republic (a one-month stay in Dobruška; one or two semesters at Charles University in Prague or Masaryk University in Brno).

Interesting benefits for its diaspora in Ukraine, Poland introduced the ‘Pole’s Card’, recognised in 2007 and Hungary the ‘Foreign Hungarians’ Card’, recognised in 2001 (Status Law). Polish and Hungarian cards accorded, among other things, the right to travel freely into the European Union.

This is more than visible in the case of Jews who migrated from Russia to Israel and Germans from the same country to Germany (Brubaker 1998; Joppke 2005; Markowitz and Steffanson 2004).

Ukraine guarantees political, social, economic and cultural rights to national minorities, and the development and self-determination of national minorities as basic human or political rights. Representatives of minorities could be elected to councils or other Ukrainians institutions, and national minorities are also financially supported by the Ukrainian government (Zakon Ukrayiny pro natsionalni menshyny v Ukrajini. Vidomosti Verchovnoji Rady Ukrayiny (BBR), 1992, No. 36, stattja 526/11). The rights of national minorities are also guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine, Rights of National Minorities in Ukraine and international agreements (Ukraine signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities declared by the Council of Europe).


For example, one lady from Dubno asked me to do her a favour, as she wanted to find a document concerning her great-grandfather in the archives in the Czech Republic in order to obtain confirmation of belonging to a diasporic community abroad. Nevertheless, even though she knew his name and birth place, my efforts were fruitless.

Searching for documents in archives (the state archive of the Rivne region and that of the Volyn region) was difficult before access to online research in 2008. Right now it is possible to find information about ancestors quite easily – just the name and date of birth of a person’s ancestors are needed to find any available documents. However, the actual information required is often missing.
References


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